I was wondering about this part of Genesis: The tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. (Genesis 2:9). Is the tree of knowledge between good and evil how people gain knowledge? Like is all knowledge based on distinguishing the difference between good and evil, or is it more nuanced than that? Does moral discernment form the foundation of all knowledge shown in this passage?

The reason why are people living unfair lives, why are there bad things we cant control

Looking for answers from all denominations of Christianity. Morality. Did God create a universal law of good and evil and humans have the freedom to choose good from bad. Did God create humans inherently good according to his universal law of morality? Therefore when sin is committed it goes against man and God? Is man responsible for his own idea of good and evil, therefore it becomes shaped by humanities developement and the overall acceptance by society about what is good and bad. Or are humans inherently bad natured and we have to choose good based on a universal law of morality. Or am I just overcomplicating this idea? I've had this conversation with lots of peers. I will admit I dont know too much on where the bible stands on this issue. And I am hopeful to hear what answers come from this.

The [free-will defense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga%27s_free-will_defense) is an argument commonly attributed to Alvin Plantinga, who developed it as a response to the [logical problem of evil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil#Logical_problem_of_evil) . However, in developing this argument Plantinga unwittingly ended up reinventing/rediscovering the [Molinist doctrine of middle knowledge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga%27s_free-will_defense#Molinism) , so the key ideas of the argument are not entirely novel, and people have certainly come up with similar defenses independently more than once. The Wikipedia article includes a summary of the argument: > A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can't cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good. I have the following objection to this argument: - If human beings were created in the image of God and have free will, then it follows that **God also has free will**. - Likewise, if human beings, in virtue of having free will, are capable of moral evil, **then God, in virtue of having free will, must also be capable of moral evil**. - However, **if God is omnibenevolent, He is not capable of moral evil**. - So it looks like we have a contradiction between the last two points. Said in another way, if God can have free will and be incapable of moral evil at the same time, then why would God create human beings that have free will and yet are ***not*** incapable of moral evil at the same time? In other words, God is a counterexample to the claim that free will necessarily entails being vulnerable to moral evil, since God has free will and yet is not vulnerable to it, and so one wonders why God would create free creatures that are not immune to moral evil, just like He is. How do proponents of the free will defense against the problem of evil resolve this conundrum? --- --- Based on some of the comments received, I will try to write a more formal and rigorous version of the objection: **Premises** - P1: God is omnibenevolent - P2: God is omnibenevolent => God is *not* capable of moral evil - P3: God has free will - P4: God has free will => God is capable of moral evil **Deductions** - D1: God is *not* capable of moral evil (from P1 & P2) - D2: God is capable of moral evil (from P3 & P4) - Contradiction between D1 & D2 (=> God is not capable of moral evil*) should be uncontroversial as well. God cannot do evil. It's impossible/unfeasible for Him. It just won't happen. - P3 (*God has free will*) is based on the intuition that if humans (and angels) have free will, it would be very strange for God not to have free will as well. One could reject this premise and claim that, perhaps, God is a deterministic being who created free creatures. Sure, one could hold such a view, but it would be a very novel (and strange) one, wouldn't it? - P4 (*God has free will => God is capable of moral evil*) is based on the same intuition used by the *free-will defense against the problem of evil*. If evil is explained as an undesired price of having creatures with free will (which God was willing to pay because of how valuable free will is), then what the defense is basically saying is that *free will => capable of moral evil*. So P4 is just a particular application of that rule to God, if we concede that God has free will. --- If anyone is interested in further objections to the *free-will defense against the problem of evil*, feel free (no pun intended) to pay a visit to [this question](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/99881/66156) on Philosophy Stack Exchange.

> I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and **create evil**: I the LORD do all these things. ([Isaiah 45:7](https://www.biblehub.com/kjv/isaiah/45.htm)) [emphasis mine] This is consistent with God being called "all-mighty" and "omnipotent". However, it seems to be grossly *incompatible* with God being called "good". If he truly is all these things, why would he create evil, which is the opposite of what is good, which He is claimed to be?

We Christians say the devil is responsible for our sins and temptations. However, I don't see how this can coexist with scientific knowledge. Specifically, we know that life has adapted over time to surviving and reproducing as much as possible (after all, that is what causes more similar lifeforms to arise - it's called natural selection). This includes hormonal systems in the brain that create a positive response to things like reproduction (sex) or eating (gluttony), along with other behaviors like the challenging of authority, or the seeking of (evil) novelties to carry out, which positively impact the species' prosperity. However, this also extends to "rational" (non-chemical) sins as well. In the end, every lie, every insult and even every murder comes from an underlying reasoning (in the latter case, it comes from a reasoning which has been heavily corrupted by the conditions in which one has developed, but the point still holds). Bearing in mind all this, how can we say that there is an external influence "creating" these sins and temptations when it is the internal systems of the brain that are? Saying so would be like saying that demons are responsible for our survival, or like saying that they created these systems in the first place (which, inevitable as they are due to the conditions of the Earth, would imply that they would have created the Earth itself!) Where does this reasoning go wrong?

Are there any Christian denominations that believe certain scientific knowledge is leading humanity away from the truth of God? Especially where that piece of technology has been used for evil exploitation?

I'm referring to Carlo Alvaro's paper [The “Heaven Ab Initio” Argument from Evil](https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/2/200) : > HAIAFE (“Heaven Ab Initio” Argument from Evil): > > 1. As a perfect being, God’s goal is to create free-willed creatures that choose to love God and forever exist with him in a state of > eternal bliss. > 2. An omnibenevolent God would want to create free-willed beings in a state of eternal bliss devoid of evil if he could and if evil and > suffering were unnecessary. > 3. An omnipotent God can create free-willed beings directly in a spiritual state of eternal bliss devoid of evil. > 4. However, God created physical creatures in a physical world that is full of unnecessary evil and suffering. > 5. Therefore, God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. > > (A possible extended conclusion: 6. Therefore, there exists a deistic > god that created the universe, but this god is not a person who > willfully created the world or that has a relationship with humans. > Hence, god cannot prevent or eliminate evil and suffering). In short, Alvaro argues that there is a way for God to create free-willed beings that can grow morally without ever experiencing evil. The option is for God to create free-willed beings directly in a spiritual form in a non-physical state of eternal bliss. In such a state, there are no objects of temptation, and by directly creating spiritual beings, God can eliminate carnal pleasure, which is the root of lust and evil and suffering. This, therefore, precisely demonstrates that “There is no morally sufficient reason for God to allow instances of evil” and, a fortiori, it shows that the God of classical theism does not exist. How do Christians rebut Carlo Alvaro's position? Alvaro anticipated and responded to a few responses to his argument: 1. The Freedom Objective: > A strong objection to God’s creating free creatures directly in heaven concerns freedom of choice. Namely, one might concede that God can create free-willed creatures directly in heaven and even that many of them might live happy lives in heaven. However, if God created his children directly in heaven, essentially, he would force them to accept such an eternal life without giving them a choice. 2. The “Morally Good Reason”: > First, the theist can reply that even if the HAIAFE is valid, in the end, it is not possible to know God’s mind. Additionally, for all we know, it might turn out that God has morally good reasons for creating humans the way he did. Perhaps, when time comes and we meet him, God will explain to us why he did not create us directly in heaven. 3. The “Resurrection of the Body”: > Concerning our resurrecting in heaven with a physical body, not all theists believe that this is true. Even if it is assumed that it is, it does not undermine the HAIAFE. So I am particularly interested in other responses to Alvaro's argument.

This quote is attributed to J.R.R. Tolkien: > Evil cannot create anything new, they can only corrupt and ruin what good forces have invented or made. and clarified here that it is only a paraphrase from Tolkien's work. While the statement above is beautiful, and by my personal judgment entirely true, I am interested to know of there is any official statement (preferably in the Holy Bible, or some other very "strong" source) which conceives the same information. Without a proper foundation, this quote has little to no value, except maybe artistic, sentimental, motivational...

The Bible teaches that God created everything and when He beheld what he had created, ***it was good.*** Since the animals were created before us, and God beheld them and saw that every animal was ***good.*** I understand good in this context meant that every animal was good and they lived together in harmony, where the lion would pass close by the impala and would not attack. Is it safe to conclude that the original sin committed by Adam and Eve caused wild animals to be evil inherently and hence wild? This is because everything God created was good. *Genesis 1:31* >God saw everything he had made: it was supremely good

I have have read the posts related to this question, but they do not tackle this issue from the same angle. For the related questions i have seen, the focus was only on why we inherit Adam's sins. **I flip and ask why we don't inherit Adam's good deeds**? For those that may say we inherited his "sinful nature" or capacity to do evil but not the original sin itself, that doesn't tally well with the Protestant concept that flows from "we (including children), have all sinned and fallen short of the glory of God". **Personally, I believe children come from God pure and without sin.** **I believe Adam's sins were his own sins (the "original" and any other sins), and I should not be asked about them; because Adam was a human being with his own issues, and I have mine**. To argue otherwise is to contradict Ezekiel 18:19-21 **"The soul who sins shall die. The son shall not bear the guilt of the father, nor the father bear the guilt of the son**. The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon himself, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon himself.."

What is the reason Satan hates humans according to scripture? Were we in anyway responsible for his fall according to the Bible? Why is he dedicated to our destruction? By way of analogy, the Islamic tradition is that God created humans to be higher than the angels and other spirits (ostensibly because a human being goes through many trials in his path to loving and worshipping God). That God gave the angels and other spiritual beings a test that they failed but Adam passed it. As a result, God ordered the angels and other spirits to bow down to Adam (in honor, recognition or veneration like one bows to a King). They all accepted but Satan said: "I can not bow down to a mere mortal made from clay. I am superior to him." God cursed Satan and banished him from His presence and all those who follow Satan. Satan, thus, blames Adam for his fall, instead of blaming his own pride/self.

I understand that a form of this question would have been previously asked, however I think I have a slight difference with regard to a solution to this problem, with regard to God. The problem of evil is a question that potentially dismisses the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God, on the grounds that how can that God exist in the world when the evil of man and the suffering of humans and animals within our world exist and not only because of the actions of those animals and humans, there are natural disasters outside the control of man that cause suffering. Why does this God allow that to happen when God has the power to prevent it? My response to the Epicurean problem of evil is: why would God create a world without evil in the first place, because if so, there would be nothing to reward the inhabitants of that world who have lived a just and moral life and whose actions tried to limit the amount suffering that their actions caused within that world to others, etc? Is the Epicurean problem of evil (a.k.a. the [Epicurean paradox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicurean_paradox)) a dumb question with regard to God, not just from the Christian perspective but also from the perspective of all world religions? Why would God begin with heaven first, when heaven is a place free from evil? How can you reward behaviour within heaven with a better life after your presence there?

After Lucifer and the fallen angels were hurled away from Heaven and landed on Earth instead of hell, because Earth was once paradise before the fall of man and Satan and his demons were sent there, if Satan weren't to persuade Eve to eat of the *fruit of good and evil*, would Satan and his demons live in earth forever and would have not been damned. Have any biblical scholars or theologians written the question following: **Would the Serpent (Satan) have dwelled eternally on earth if the fruit was not bitten?**

This is related to this other question about the Christadelphian view that Satan is not a person. Here I wanted to ask how they view the case of Job. Job was apparently a real person as he is referred to in Ezekiel 14:14 where God said the words > Though these three men, Noah, Daniel, and Job, were in it, they should > deliver but their own souls by their righteousness, saith the Lord > GOD. Also James 1:13 says that God cannot be tempted with evil and does not bring about tests upon us just to see if we fail them or not > Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot > be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: In the case of Job the Bible gives this conversation between Satan and God (Job 2:2-3) > And the LORD said unto Satan, From whence comest thou? And Satan > answered the LORD, and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and > from walking up and down in it. And the LORD said unto Satan, Hast > thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the > earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God, and > escheweth evil? and still he holdeth fast his integrity, although thou > movedst me against him, to destroy him without cause. In the context of Job, do Christadelphians view Satan as a principle of evil within God, some separate entity, or something else?

Deuteronomy 20:10-18 ESV > 10 “When you draw near to a city to fight against it, offer terms of peace to it. 11 And if it responds to you peaceably and it opens to you, then all the people who are found in it shall do forced labor for you and shall serve you. 12 But if it makes no peace with you, but makes war against you, then you shall besiege it. 13 And when the Lord your God gives it into your hand, you shall put all its males to the sword, 14 but the women **and the little ones**, the livestock, and everything else in the city, all its spoil, you shall take as plunder for yourselves. And you shall enjoy the spoil of your enemies, which the Lord your God has given you. 15 Thus you shall do to all the cities that are very far from you, which are not cities of the nations here. 16 **But in the cities of these peoples that the Lord your God is giving you for an inheritance, you shall save alive nothing that breathes**, 17 **but you shall devote them to complete destruction, the Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizzites, the Hivites and the Jebusites, as the Lord your God has commanded**, 18 that they may not teach you to do according to all their abominable practices that they have done for their gods, and so you sin against the Lord your God. Joshua 6:20-21 ESV > 20 So the people shouted, and the trumpets were blown. As soon as the people heard the sound of the trumpet, the people shouted a great shout, and the wall fell down flat, so that the people went up into the city, every man straight before him, and they captured the city. 21 **Then they devoted all in the city to destruction, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and donkeys, with the edge of the sword**. It's undeniable that a plain reading of these passages suggests that God commanded the complete annihilation not only of the adult inhabitants of Canaanite cities but also their children. Slaughtering children is universally recognized as a profound moral evil. If a group of soldiers were to invade our city, break into our homes, and kill and slaughter everyone, including babies and children, our fundamental moral instincts would undoubtedly recognize it as an egregious atrocity. In light of this, how can such actions be reconciled with the concept of a loving God? If under any other circumstances, our moral compass would unequivocally condemn the slaughter of children as profoundly wrong—arguably the epitome of wrongdoing—why should the slaughter of Canaanite children be viewed as an exception? How could such a command be considered the most loving, just, and benevolent action that God could have taken? To encourage objective answers, I'm primarily interested in exploring theodicies found in Christian literature (please provide references where applicable). --- **Note**: My question has been prompted by recent discussions on YouTube, namely, [William Lane Craig Defends the Canaanite Slaughter](https://youtu.be/WjsSHd23e0Q) and ["It's Horrific" | Reviewing WLC's Defense of the Slaughter of the Canaanites w/ Akin and Rauser](https://youtu.be/lhZtIvgbi9M) . --- **A related passage from Psalm 137** > 8 O daughter of Babylon, doomed to be destroyed, blessed shall he be who repays you with what you have done to us! 9 **Blessed shall he be who takes your little ones and dashes them against the rock!** I thank @NigelJ for the suggestion.

In Galatians 5, Paul helps us understand the work of the flesh, such as in verse 17: "For the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh, for these are opposed to each other, to keep you from doing the things you want to do" (ESV). Also in vv. 19-21: "Now the works of the flesh are evident: sexual immorality, impurity, sensuality, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, fits of anger, rivalries, dissensions, divisions, envy, drunkenness, orgies, and things like these. I warn you, as I warned you before, that those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God" (ESV). The main identifier of the flesh seems to be in v. 17, as being against the Spirit. In what ways do we mistake normal weaknesses in our bodies and faculties as the flesh when they are not? What examples would help us know the difference, and perhaps not feel guilty and attempt wrong solutions for recovery?

Previously, I inquired on https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/100110/61679 . Now, I would like to shift the focus to Christian responses to the **Evidential Problem of Evil**. For an in-depth exploration of this argument, a comprehensive article is available at [The Evidential Problem of Evil | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/) . I'll provide a short version with the gist of William Rowe's formulation of the argument, followed by a longer version with multiple excerpts from the original article for those seeking deeper insights. ## Short version > 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some > greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. > 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse. > 3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (Rowe 1979: 336) ## Longer version > Evidential arguments from evil seek to show that the presence of evil in the world inductively supports or makes likely the claim that God (or, more precisely, the God of orthodox theism) does not exist. A variety of evidential arguments have been formulated in recent years, but here I will concentrate on one very influential formulation, namely, that provided by William Rowe. **Rowe’s version of the evidential argument has received much attention since its formal inception in 1978, for it is often considered to be the most cogent presentation of the evidential problem of evil**. James Sennett (1993: 220), for example, views Rowe’s argument as “the clearest, most easily understood, and most intuitively appealing of those available.” Terry Christlieb (1992: 47), likewise, thinks of Rowe’s argument as “the strongest sort of evidential argument, the sort that has the best chance of success.” It is important to note, however, that Rowe’s thinking on the evidential problem of evil has developed in significant ways since his earliest writings on the subject, and two (if not three) distinct evidential arguments can be identified in his work. Here I will only discuss that version of Rowe’s argument that received its first full-length formulation in Rowe (1978) and, most famously, in Rowe (1979), and was successively refined in the light of criticisms in Rowe (1986), (1988), (1991), and (1995), before being abandoned in favour of a quite different evidential argument in Rowe (1996). > > **An Outline of Rowe’s Argument** > > In presenting his evidential argument from evil in his justly > celebrated 1979 paper, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of > Atheism”, Rowe thinks it best to focus on a particular kind of evil > that is found in our world in abundance. He therefore selects “intense > human and animal suffering” as this occurs on a daily basis, is in > great plenitude in our world, and is a clear case of evil. More > precisely, it is a case of intrinsic evil: it is bad in and of itself, > even though it sometimes is part of, or leads to, some good state of > affairs (Rowe 1979: 335). Rowe then proceeds to state his argument for > atheism as follows: > > 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some > greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. > 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse. > 3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (Rowe 1979: 336) > > This argument, as Rowe points out, is clearly valid, and so if there > are rational grounds for accepting its premises, to that extent there > are rational grounds for accepting the conclusion, that is to say, > atheism. > **The Factual Premise** > > Criticisms of Rowe’s argument tend to focus on its first premise, sometimes dubbed “the factual premise,” as it purports to state a fact about the world. Briefly put, the fact in question is that there exist instances of intense suffering which are gratuitous or pointless. As indicated above, an instance of suffering is gratuitous, according to Rowe, if an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented it without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. A gratuitous evil, in this sense, is a state of affairs that is not (logically) necessary to the attainment of a greater good or to the prevention of an evil at least as bad. > > **Rowe’s Case in Support of the Factual Premise** > > Rowe builds his case in support of the factual premise by appealing to particular instances of human and animal suffering, such as the following: > > **E1: the case of Bambi** >> “In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering” (Rowe 1979: 337). > > Although this is presented as a hypothetical event, Rowe takes it to be “a familiar sort of tragedy, played not infrequently on the stage of nature” (1988: 119). > > **E2: the case of Sue** >> This is an actual event in which a five-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan was severely beaten, raped and then strangled to death early on New Year’s Day in 1986. The case was introduced by Bruce Russell (1989: 123), whose account of it, drawn from a report in the Detroit Free Press of January 3 1986, runs as follows: >> >> The girl’s mother was living with her boyfriend, another man who was unemployed, her two children, and her 9-month old infant fathered by the boyfriend. On New Year’s Eve all three adults were drinking at a bar near the woman’s home. The boyfriend had been taking drugs and drinking heavily. He was asked to leave the bar at 8:00 p.m. After several reappearances he finally stayed away for good at about 9:30 p.m. The woman and the unemployed man remained at the bar until 2:00 a.m. at which time the woman went home and the man to a party at a neighbor’s home. Perhaps out of jealousy, the boyfriend attacked the woman when she walked into the house. Her brother was there and broke up the fight by hitting the boyfriend who was passed out and slumped over a table when the brother left. Later the boyfriend attacked the woman again, and this time she knocked him unconscious. After checking the children, she went to bed. Later the woman’s 5-year old girl went downstairs to go to the bathroom. The unemployed man returned from the party at 3:45 a.m. and found the 5-year old dead. She had been raped, severely beaten over most of her body and strangled to death by the boyfriend. > > Following Rowe (1988: 120), the case of the fawn will be referred to > as “E1”, and the case of the little girl as “E2”. Further, following > William Alston’s (1991: 32) practice, the fawn will be named “Bambi” > and the little girl “Sue”. > > Rowe (1996: 264) states that, in choosing to focus on E1 and E2, he is > “trying to pose a serious difficulty for the theist by picking a > difficult case of natural evil, E1 (Bambi), and a difficult case of > moral evil, E2 (Sue).” Rowe, then, is attempting to state the > evidential argument in the strongest possible terms. As one > commentator has put it, “if these cases of evil [E1 and E2] are not > evidence against theism, then none are” (Christlieb 1992: 47). > However, Rowe’s almost exclusive preoccupation with these two > instances of suffering must be placed within the context of his belief > (as expressed in, for example, 1979: 337-38) that even if we > discovered that God could not have eliminated E1 and E2 without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse, it would still be unreasonable to believe this of all cases > of horrendous evil occurring daily in our world. E1 and E2 are thus > best viewed as representative of a particular class of evil which > poses a specific problem for theistic belief. This problem is > expressed by Rowe in the following way: > > - (P) No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s > permitting E1 or E2. Therefore, > > - (Q) It is likely that no good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that > being in permitting E1 or E2. > > P states that no good we know of justifies God in permitting E1 and > E2. From this it is inferred that Q is likely to be true, or that > probably there are no goods which justify God in permitting E1 and E2. > Q, of course, corresponds to the factual premise of Rowe’s argument. > Thus, Rowe attempts to establish the truth of the factual premise by > appealing to P. > > > **The Inference from P to Q** > > On what grounds does Rowe think that P is true? Rowe (1988: 120) states that “we have *good reason* to believe that no good state of affairs we know of would justify an omnipotent, omniscient being in permitting either E1 or E2” (emphasis his). The good reason in question consists of the fact that the good states of affairs we know of, when reflecting on them, meet one or both of the following conditions: either an omnipotent being could obtain them without having to permit E1 or E2, or obtaining them would not morally justify that being in permitting E1 or E2 (Rowe 1988: 121, 123; 1991: 72). > > This brings us, finally, to Rowe’s inference from P to Q. This is, of course, **an inductive inference**. Rowe does not claim to know or be able to prove that cases of intense suffering such as the fawn’s are indeed pointless. For as he acknowledges, it is quite possible that there is some familiar good outweighing the fawn’s suffering and which is connected to that suffering in a way unbeknown to us. Or there may be goods we are not aware of, to which the fawn’s suffering is intimately connected. **But although we do not know or cannot establish the truth of Q, we do possess rational grounds for accepting Q, and these grounds consist of the considerations adumbrated in P. Thus, the truth of P is taken to provide strong evidence for the truth of Q** (Rowe 1979: 337).

The following is a more succinct presentation of the **Logical Problem of Evil** based on the original presentation found in the introduction of the article [Logical Problem of Evil | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://iep.utm.edu/evil-log/) : > **Logical Problem of Evil** > > The existence of evil and suffering in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that happen in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil and suffering. Furthermore, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. And yet we find that our world is filled with countless instances of evil and suffering. These facts about evil and suffering seem to conflict with the orthodox theist claim that there exists a perfectly good God. The challenge posed by this apparent conflict has come to be known as the problem of evil. > > This article addresses one form of that problem that is prominent in recent philosophical discussions–that the conflict that exists between the claims of orthodox theism and the facts about evil and suffering in our world is a logical one. This is the “logical problem of evil.” > **Formal argument** > 1. God is omnipotent (that is, all-powerful). > 2. God is omniscient (that is, all-knowing). > 3. God is perfectly good. > 4. Evil exists > 5. If God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world. > 6. If God is omniscient, he would know about all of the evil and suffering in the world and would know how to eliminate or prevent it. > 7. If God is perfectly good, he would want to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world. > 8. If God knows about all of the evil and suffering in the world, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent > it, and yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good. > 9. If God knows about all of the evil and suffering, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, wants to prevent it, and yet does not do so, > he must not be all- powerful. > 10. If God is powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and suffering, wants to do so, and yet does not, he must not know about > all of the suffering or know how to eliminate or prevent it—that is, > he must not be all-knowing. > 11. If evil and suffering exist, then God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. (from 8-10) > 12. God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. (from 4 and 11) > 13. God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. (from 1-3) > > There is no way that (12) and (13) could both be true at the same > time. These statements are logically inconsistent or contradictory. > > Statement (13) is simply the conjunction of (1) through (3) and > expresses the central belief of classical theism. However, > atheologians claim that statement (12) can also be derived from (1) > through (3). [Statements (5) through (11) purport to show how this is > done.] (12) and (13), however, are logically contradictory. Because a > contradiction can be deduced from statements (1) through (4) and > because all theists believe (1) through (4), atheologians claim that > theists have logically inconsistent beliefs. They note that > philosophers have always believed it is never rational to believe > something contradictory. So, the existence of evil and suffering makes > theists’ belief in the existence of a perfect God irrational. What are Christian responses, in terms of defenses and theodicies, to this specific presentation of the Logical Problem of Evil? Do they specifically challenge certain premises or steps in the argument's reasoning process? Answers that provide detailed insights into the challenged steps of the argument would be greatly appreciated.

Arguments from evil, such as the [logical problem of evil](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/100110/61679) or the [evidential problem of evil](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/100129/61679) , aim to demonstrate that certain forms of suffering in the world are either unnecessary or gratuitous. Advocates of this argument contend that if it's conceivable to imagine a world with slightly less suffering without sacrificing any greater good, then an all-powerful, all-knowing, and wholly good being would prevent such instances of unnecessary suffering. For instance, proponents might argue that if a deer, like Bambi, endured one less second of agony in a wildfire in which it got caught without affecting any greater purpose, a benevolent deity would intervene to spare that needless second of suffering. Even if one nanosecond of suffering could be spared without compromising a greater good, it would be spared. However, skeptics point to the plethora of suffering and evil worldwide, both in nature and society, suggesting that for sure at least one instance of suffering must be gratuitous. Or at least that's the abductive argument they purport to make: that at least one instance of suffering could have been prevented, but it wasn't, therefore a wholly good God cannot exist. This motivates my question: Are Christians theologically committed to the belief that every iota of suffering and evil in the world necessarily serves a profound purpose, and that no suffering or evil is without justification, not even a nanosecond of it? **Clarification**: I'm interested in an overview of theological responses to this question.