Many Jews claim that if God wanted them to stop observing the Old Law He would have made it more obvious that this was the case, in fact they assume that He would have to give them some kind of deductive knowledge that this was the case because otherwise they would allegedly be left in grave uncertainty as to how to obey God. As you can see, they are not just being skeptics, for example, they might admit that the argument for the resurrection is pretty substantial, but they would refuse to accept it because it is merely inductive, saying maybe it would be a good reason to reject Deism but not Judaism. How do Christian apologists respond to this argument? For example, could they point out that arguably there is progressive revelation even within the Old Covenant?

This will be my first post on the Christianity Exchange. My question involves people who confront me on the basis that they were told by secular causes that certain Koine words like "arsenkoitoi", which historically has referred to a male-male coital relationship and also transliterates to "man-bedder", are now being told that the original meaning is misunderstood to mean things like "pedophile" or "sodomy" but not to same-sex attraction. I see the same attention to the Hebrew word "zakhur", which I've seen translated as "male", but others are trying to tie it to "boy", again to refer to Jewish teachings to prohibit only pedophilia and not homosexuality. Based on the translations I've seen and examples of these words in other texts, the context suggests that the original translations indicate the case that same-sex relations are not allowed. How do I better support the truth about this when people are tugging at doubt to allow for sin?

When I ask this question I usually end up getting the response of: > “Well, that was just him giving us free will!” And then I ask why he would give us free will if he knew we would sin and would send us to Hell. Which gets the response of: > “Well, he didn’t want us to be robots! That would just be awful.” Then this goes on and on. What I’m trying to ask is: why did God give us the ability to sin if he would get so mad at us that he would send us to Hell? Why did God make Satan if he knew he would tempt Adam and Eve? Honestly why even make Satan in the first place?

As far as I know [there are 4 Gospels](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/18703/what-is-a-gospel-and-how-many-gospels-are-there-in-the-catholic-bible) : Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. I am an ex-Christian (currently atheist) who had a debate with a Muslim about a few discrepancies between the Qur'an and the Bible. The Muslims believe that 1. Haman worked for Pharaoh and is building babel tower 2. Mary was a sibling of Aaron 3. Jesus is given "gospel". As a non-Muslim and atheist, I of course think that Muhammad simply made a mistake. Perhaps he didn't get the story right or wasn't consistent with his sources. But of course Muslim apologists will claim that it's a misunderstanding anyway: different Haman, different meaning of sibling, and different gospel. The 3rd point is more interesting though. My Muslim friend pointed out that gospels *already* EXISTED before the Bible was written: - [Mark 1:14](https://biblehub.com/mark/1-14.htm) - [Matthew 4:23](https://biblehub.com/matthew/4-23.htm) - [Luke 8:1](https://biblehub.com/luke/8-1.htm) So it's a bit tricky. In Indonesia the word for "gospel" is "injil". I wonder where that word came from. Muslims seem to think that Jesus got the "gospel" like Muhammad got the Qur'an. But I think that's just not the case. The Gospels we have now, I understand them to be Jesus' late biographies, a bit like Hadith in Islam. However, the fact that the word "gospel" DOES show up in the Gospels themselves is intriguing. **What "gospel" was Jesus preaching because the Gospels as books weren't even written when he was living?** It looks to me that he was a Rabbi who preached typical Judaism stuff that might or might not be reinterpreted by his followers to be something much more than that.

Some people believe the King James Version of the Bible is the only version English-speakers should be using, as it is the only inspired translation. (This is referred to as "KJV-onlyism.") Basically, the KJV-only position is that: - The Bible is God's word - God promises to preserve His word * E.G., [Psalm 12:7 (read this article)](http://www.kjvtoday.com/home/does-the-second-them-in-psalm-127-refer-to-gods-words) - This preservation is accomplished via a perfect translation (one per language) - The KJV is His perfect, preserved translation in the English language - The reason other English Bibles differ from the KJV is because those other Bibles have been tainted by sin and error **What are the main counterarguments to this view?** I am specifically looking for answers which would be convincing to an English-speaking Protestant with a high view of Scripture.

## Short version I'm specifically referring to [Graham Oppy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Oppy) 's paper [An Argument for Atheism from Naturalism](https://philarchive.org/rec/OPPAAF) : > **Abstract** This paper outlines an argument for atheism from naturalism that I have developed in more detail elsewhere (in particular, in *The Best Argument against God*). The overall shape of the argument is as follows: first, naturalism is simpler than theism; second, there is no data that naturalism does not explain at least as well as theism; and, third, naturalism entails atheism; so we have good reason to prefer atheism to theism. Note that this statement of the shape of the argument is NOT a statement of the argument itself. In short, Oppy argues that *naturalism is simpler than theism*, and that, all else being equal, we should always rationally prefer a simpler explanation of the data. How do Christians rebut Graham Oppy's position? ## Longer version A few relevant quotes from the [paper](https://philpapers.org/archive/OPPAAF.pdf) : > Theists differ in the ways that they depart from naturalism. Some theists believe in a God who created our universe ex nihilo. Some theists believe in a God whose actions preserve our universe in existence. Some theists believe in a God who inhabits an eternal realm that has no spatiotemporal relation to our universe. Some theists believe in an intelligent and active God who is neither a natural organism nor an artificial intelligence created by natural organisms. Some theists believe in a God that is a non-personal supernatural power or supernatural force that exerts influence on our universe. Some theists believe that the universe possesses the non-natural property of being divine, or that the non-natural property of being divine ‘permeates’ the universe. And so on. > > **Although theists differ in the ways in which they depart from naturalism, there is a common feature** **to theistic departures from naturalism. In every case, theists differ from naturalists by believing in** **something additional**: either believing in one or more additional intelligent agents, or believing in one or more additional forces or powers, or believing in one or more additional non-natural properties of the universe. > > > Suppose that we are comparing a particular version of theism with a particular version of naturalism. Suppose, further, that these versions of theism and naturalism agree in their beliefs about which natural entities, and natural powers, and natural forces, and natural properties, and natural laws there are. In this case, it’s not just that the theist has beliefs in something over and above the things the atheist believes in; it’s also the case that the naturalist does not have beliefs in anything over and above the things the theist believes in. **From the standpoint of the naturalist, the theistic beliefs** **of the theist are pure addition; and, from the standpoint of the theist, the naturalistic beliefs of the** **naturalist are pure subtraction**. > > **In this case, if all else is no better than equal, then there is clear reason to prefer naturalism to** **theism. For, if all else is no better than equal, then there is no reason to have the additional theistic beliefs**. Hence, in this case, in order to decide between theism and naturalism, we just need to determine whether all else is no better than equal. ... > **The burden of the rest of this chapter is to argue that there are no features of the natural universe** **that have a better explanation on theism than they do on naturalism**. Of course, I won’t be able to examine every feature of the natural universe that might be thought to have a better explanation on theism than it does on naturalism. However, I shall try to examine all of the most prominent features of the natural universe that have been widely supposed to have a better explanation on theism than on naturalism. Given the treatment of the cases that I do discuss, it should be obvious how to extend the discussion to features of the natural universe that I do not examine here. He then goes on to explain how 8 features of the world commonly used to argue for theism can be better accounted for under naturalism. Namely: - Existence - Causation - Fine-Tuning - Morality - Consciousness - Miracles - Religious Experiences - Meaning and Purpose > 9\. **Conclusion** > As I mentioned at the outset, I cannot claim to have considered all of the data that bears on the decision between theism and naturalism (and not can I claim to have given a fully adequate assessment of any of the data that I have considered). However, I hope that I have done enough to indicate how my argument for naturalism would look if it were set out in full and complete detail. (I give a fuller—but still incomplete—exposition of the argument in The Best Argument against God, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013.) > > 10\. **Note about Evil** > Of course, there is data that at least some theists suppose favours naturalism over theism—e.g. data about horrendous suffering, data about non-belief, and data about the scale of our universe. Some naturalists think that data about horrendous suffering is logically inconsistent with theism. As Epicurus argued long ago: >> Is God willing to prevent evil but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God? > > Other naturalists think that data about horrendous suffering renders theism highly improbable: given the major horrors of the twentieth century alone, isn’t it incredible to suppose that our universe is the work of an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good being? I have focussed on data that many theists suppose favour theism over naturalism because my argument requires only that, on any piece of data, naturalism does at least as well as theism in explaining that data. Even if it is true, for example, that naturalism affords a better explanation of horrendous suffering in our universe than is given by theism, that truth makes no contribution to the argument that I have been advancing here. --- **NOTE**: Graham Oppy's formulation of the argument is arguably one of the strongest available in the literature, given Oppy's reputation as one of the most respected contemporary atheist philosophers. For instance, William Lane Craig once said about Oppy's book *Arguing about Gods*: > Oppy's book is not merely recommended but essential reading for anyone interested in natural theology today. No one can pretend to a successful theistic argument unless he has dealt with Oppy's criticisms first. ([source](https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/the-existence-of-god/arguing-successfully-about-god-a-review-essay-of-graham-oppys-arguing-about)) However, the claim that naturalism is "simpler" than theism is thrown around quite frequently in informal discussions with atheists. For example, take a look at some of the answers to [Could Occam's Razor ever favor theism?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/110026/66156) .

I came across this striking comment on Mark 13:32: > 192. It is written, they say: But of that day and that hour knows no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the > Father only. Mark 13:32 **First of all the ancient Greek manuscripts do > not contain the words, neither the Son.** But it is not to be wondered > at if they who have corrupted the sacred Scriptures, have also > falsified this passage. The reason for which it seems to have been > inserted is perfectly plain, so long as it is applied to unfold such > blasphemy. https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/34045.htm Ambrose seems to suggest that this verse was a later corruption or interpolation. My question: How should one respond to such a claim in an apologetical setting? Does Ambrose’s statement reflect any known textual variant among the extant Greek manuscripts, or is he simply making a theological argument against Arian interpretation?

Evolutionism [claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_psychology_of_religion) that religious beliefs result from their ability to give us a cooperative ability to survive. This, an Evolutionist would argue, would imply that religion comes into existence, not on any truth claim, but from evolution giving us useful, but otherwise untrue beliefs. What is the proper response to this argument? (Here is [another article](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429488818-18/ritual-made-us-human-matt-rossano) on the subject.)

In studying the 1830 publication alongside the 1966 publication, I've discovered a lot of changes in words and phrases. If a Book is purported to be inspired by God (such as the Bible) is it not logical to expect it to not need "improvements?" Does not the existence of these changes demonstrate that indeed neither the original 1830 version nor the 1966 version are inspired or God breathed? And if one does believe that God can change his revelation to man, how then can we know and trust that it won't change again and again like shifting sand? Isn't God by nature immutable? And therefore shouldn't his word to us also be unchanging?

The [fine tuning argument](https://www.discovery.org/a/91/) essentially states that there is so much about the universe that is "fine tuned" for life - eg things like the gravitational constant would cause the universe to disintegrate if they were off by 1 part in a million million - that there must be a creator who did the tuning. The most common response from eg atheists is comparing the situation to water in a puddle remarking on how the hole in the ground is exactly the right shape to hold it. In other words, claiming that rather than the universe being fine tuned, it just fit the existing conditions out of necessity. Whenever this is mentioned in Christian forums, it is pooh-poohed and derided as though it is obviously wrong, but no-one ever seems to actually explain it. What is the "obvious" refutation of the puddle analogy that everyone seems to know?

Origen and some early Christian thinkers speculated that God may have created and destroyed worlds in cycles before the current creation described in Genesis 1. This idea, though speculative, raises the question: since Scripture does not detail what God did in His eternal past (before "In the beginning"), on what biblical basis do Christian traditions reject such views? Given that: - God is eternal and existed before time, - Genesis 1 focuses on the beginning of our world, not necessarily God's first act of creation, - Ecclesiastes 3:11 says, "He has put eternity into man's heart, yet so that he cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end," How do Christians who reject Origen’s cyclical creation model ground that rejection **biblically**, rather than merely philosophically or theologically? Are there specific Scriptures or doctrinal principles that limit God's act of creation to a single beginning as described in Genesis?

I was listening to a preacher and he made this claim that a woman was the first witness to the risen Christ because traditionally our societies hold the testimony of women to be more credible than that of men. I thought Mary became the first witness because of co-incidence but he suggests otherwise, is he correct that Mary Magdalene being the first witness to the risen Christ was part of God's plan because the testimony of women is more credible?

If Jesus was merely a man, then God would seem unjust for punishing the innocent Jesus in place of the guilty due to violating the following: 1. Man is to be put to death for his own sin and not for the sin of another (Ez 18:20; Dt 24:16) 2. No man can ransom another or give to God the price of his life (Ps 49:7-9) Moreover, God seems unjust for WANTING to crush the innocent man that is Jesus (Is 53:10; Lk 22:42), regardless of Jesus' willingness to follow the Father's will and lay His life down as a sacrifice. That God could desire and plan to punish/sacrifice an innocent man, His Son no less, for the sins of others would go against His character. The only way I see God being just would be that Jesus is God. Thus, God's plan would not be the unjust sacrifice of an innocent third party but rather the just, noble sacrifice of the self. But if you can show that God is just in sacrificing Jesus even if Jesus isn't God, then please leave an answer down below.

I recently took the time to re-read the prelusive words of William Lane Craig’s Reasonable Faith. This quote stuck with me:

When a person refuses to come to Christ, it is never just because of lack of evidence or because of intellectual difficulties: at root, he refuses to come because he willingly ignores and rejects the drawing of God’s Spirit on his heart. No one in the final analysis really fails to become a Christian because of lack of arguments; he fails to become a Christian because he loves darkness rather than light and wants nothing to do with God.

A decade after first reading this, I remember I was struggling to understand who he intends the book to be for, and Craig's motivations. If we are not to assume that Craig is not serious or that he is lying about his sincerity, it could be that he is sincere but wrong: in the sense that he genuinely cannot make sense of atheism as an intellectual position. But then it seems to me that he is so caught up in his own religious convictions he cannot fathom the possibility someone could sincerely disagree with his position. An unfortunate position, in my view. The disagreement is also shifted from the intellectual realm of evidence to the moral realm of personal integrity, effectively *faulting the non-believer* for an emotional or spiritual deficiency. It appeals to notions of spiritual deficiency rather than engaging directly with intellectual critiques. The quote makes apologetics seem like its whole purpose is to convince those who already are convinced. I also think this type of argumentation renders the argument difficult to empirically verify or falsify. If non-belief is attributed to an internal disposition (such as a preference for "darkness" over "light"), it becomes impossible to test or refute through evidence. Thus I am curious if Craig has revised these position in recent times, if he has matured as he has gotten older. Questions: 1. Has Craig changed his view or added nuance to his stance? Does he still attribute unbelief primarily to the willful rejection of God rather than to intellectual or evidential challenges? 2. Is evidence still something that, for him, acts only insofar as a dual warrant of one’s Christian beliefs alongside the inner witness of the Spirit? 3. Has he acknowledged intellectual or evidential factors as genuine obstacles to faith? 4. What role does he currently assign to evidence and objective methods in relation to the work of the Holy Spirit?

If there is a god then he probably wouldn't let us have 100% proof that he is real, so that we can have faith in him instead of just having physical proof. so we cant know for sure that he is or isn't real. But if there isn't a god, then eventually we should be able to find 100% proof that he isn't real, and that people are just bending reality to fit their religion. but we don't have that proof yet. So, how can I know if he exists or not?

> In contemporary philosophy, a **brute fact** is a fact that cannot be explained in terms of a deeper, more "fundamental" fact. There are two main ways to explain something: say what "brought it about", or describe it at a more "fundamental" level. For example, a cat displayed on a computer screen can be explained, more "fundamentally", in terms of certain voltages in bits of metal in the screen, which in turn can be explained, more "fundamentally", in terms of certain subatomic particles moving in a certain manner. If one were to keep explaining the world in this way and reach a point at which no more "deeper" explanations can be given, then one would have found some facts which are brute or inexplicable, in the sense that we cannot give them an ontological explanation. As it might be put, there may exist some things that just are. > > To reject the existence of brute facts is to think that everything can be explained ("Everything can be explained" is sometimes called the principle of sufficient reason). > > ... > > **Bertrand Russell took a brute fact position when he said, "I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all." Sean Carroll similarly concluded that "any attempt to account for the existence of something rather than nothing must ultimately bottom out in a set of brute facts; the universe simply is, without ultimate cause or explanation."** > > Source: [Brute fact - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_fact) Postulating that the universe *just is*, as a *brute fact*, devoid of an ultimate cause or explanation, is a viewpoint often embraced by naturalists and non-theists, exemplified by figures like [Sean Carroll](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sean_M._Carroll) and [Bertrand Russell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell) . However, this notion runs contrary to the Christian faith's premise of a Creator God serving as the ultimate explanation for the universe's existence. How might a Christian effectively persuade a naturalist non-theist, such as Sean Carroll, that it is metaphysically impossible for the universe to be a brute fact? --- *Bonus for the interested reader with about one hour of free time*: [God is not a Good Theory (Sean Carroll)](https://youtu.be/ew_cNONhhKI)

How does Catholicism respond to this? From what I understand in some responses, a Catholic may accept this text as referring to either the particular or general judgment, but I don’t understand how 1 Corinthians 3, if referring to the general judgment, could support the doctrine of purgatory. It seems to go against the dogma. Defense: 1 Corinthians 3:15 The passage that Catholics generally use—based on their own distortion—is the one that supposedly speaks of a purifying fire. They quote the following passage: >“If it is burned up, the builder will suffer loss but yet will be saved—even though only as one escaping through the flames.” (1 Corinthians 3:15 – Ave-Maria Version) To understand the nature of this “fire,” it is crucial to examine the context of the passage. In the Catholic version, the broader passage reads: >“If anyone builds on this foundation using gold, silver, costly stones, wood, hay or straw, their work will be shown for what it is, because the Day will bring it to light. It will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test the quality of each person’s work. If what has been built survives, the builder will receive a reward. If it is burned up, the builder will suffer loss but yet will be saved—even though only as one escaping through the flames.” (1 Corinthians 3:12–15) It is clear that Paul is not referring to an ordinary day, but to the Day of Judgment before the Tribunal of Christ. The challenge for defenders of the Catholic doctrine lies in the fact that, according to Scripture, this Day of Judgment takes place at Christ’s second coming—which has not yet occurred—and by then, there would no longer be any “purgatory” available for purification. That intermediate state would have given way to the eternal state. This is why Paul declares: >“In the presence of God and of Christ Jesus, who will judge the living and the dead, and in view of his appearing and his kingdom, I give you this charge...” (2 Timothy 4:1) Paul refers to that “Day” for himself before dying, in the hope of being rewarded at the Tribunal of Christ at His coming: >“Now there is in store for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will award to me on that day—and not only to me, but also to all who have longed for his appearing.” (2 Timothy 4:8) We see that this Day of Judgment is intrinsically linked to Jesus’s return, when His Kingdom will be fully revealed. On that Day—according to Catholic teaching—there would no longer be a purgatory for postmortem purification. Therefore, the text cannot be referring to purgatory. Even the Jerusalem Bible (a Catholic Bible) has a footnote that nearly admits this verse does not speak about purgatory: >“1 Corinthians 3:15: That is, like someone escaping through flames. Such a person is saved barely. Purgatory is not directly considered here, though this text, along with others, was used by the Church to explain the doctrine.” Newer versions of the Jerusalem Bible now give a shorter note: >“1 Corinthians 3:15: That is, like someone escaping through flames. Such a person is saved barely.” It almost seems like they are omitting the earlier note that stated explicitly that purgatory is not considered in the text. To address this difficulty, Catholic theologians developed the doctrine of the “two judgments”—a concept absent from the Eastern Church. According to this Roman Catholic perspective, there are two judgments: the particular judgment, which occurs immediately after death and begins the intermediate state; and the general judgment, which takes place at Christ’s second coming, ending that intermediate state. Therefore, under this view, each person goes through two judgments: the individual and the general. They argue that 1 Corinthians 3:15 refers to the individual judgment after death, not the general judgment at Christ’s second coming. However, this explanation introduces significant theological problems. First, the context of 1 Corinthians 3:15 seems to point to the general judgment rather than a personal one. Verse 13 says: >“...the Day will bring it to light; it will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test the quality of each person’s work.” There are two aspects supporting the idea of the general judgment at Christ’s second coming. First, the Day will “bring to light” the sins hidden during life. Jesus said that “nothing is hidden except to be made manifest, nor is anything secret except to come to light” (Mark 4:22). Historically, this has been interpreted as referring to the general judgment, when all will be gathered and the sins of each person exposed—nothing hidden will remain hidden. Moreover, verse 13 says the fire will test the work of “each one,” not of one person individually. The text implies a general assembly, where many are judged, not a private encounter with God after death.

N.b.: I originally posted this question in the Philosophy stack, but then realized it was more appropriate, and might get more informed answers, here. In a famous article, Anscombe castigates "Modern Moral Philosophy" (including but not limited to consequentialism) as "quite incompatible with the Hebrew-Christian ethic. For **it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good; vicarious punishment**...," which in contrast consequentialists can sometimes allow for sufficiently good consequences. (p.10) Many other Christian apologists make similar claims. Yet I have also seen many Christian apologists--and often the same ones--bend over backwards to defend, e.g., the drowning of babies in the Biblical flood, the slaughter of the Canaanite civilian population after a war victory, etc., as well as vicarious punishment: of the Egyptian first-born, of children "to the third and fourth generation" (Num 14:18), etc. Even Christians who do not take these stories literally at least generally say that they reveal something about the character of God and morality, and so have to excuse them away--giving special reasons (consequentialist or otherwise) for why these cases of innocent-killing and vicarious punishment are justified. So my question is, **is Anscombe's quoted claim simply and quite obviously wrong, or can something be said in its defense?** The only thing I sometimes see apologists say about this is that these moral obligations only apply to humans, not to God, though this is odd if God is supposed to be morally good. But even for God, these actions are often excused on account of being part of his "plan," i.e., because in some way (perhaps unknowable to us) these will lead to good consequences. I am not asking whether any of these arguments are plausible, but simply whether they /exist/ and fit Anscombe's description of what Christian ethics supposedly does not do. If so, then these are not innovations of "modern moral philosophy" but old hat strategies which Christian moralists have been using for centuries. So is she just the pot calling the kettle black? Or does she really have a point in saying that there is something novel about modern consequentialist morality which is not present in the history of Christian apologetics? Note that I am well aware that Christian moralists have not historically espoused consequentialism as a general theory, at least before William Paley. But espousing this theory is different from making occasional consequentialist arguments in specific cases. It is also possible that the modern apologists I read giving such arguments are in fact a novelty, and that historical theologians didn't do this, so that perhaps Anscombe's criticism should be extended to "Modern Moral Theology" insofar as she might think it has been infected by a consequentialist thinking anathema to Christian tradition. This is an interesting question; did Augustine, Aquinas, etc., *never* make consequentialist arguments for God's doing or commanding such things? But again, it's not my full question, for Anscombe is claiming that Christians *never* gave justifications for ever doing these things, consequentialist or otherwise. But this seems false, for "I am God," or "I have been commanded by God to do/allow these things" apparently *was* such a justification in some such cases.

It's well known that Protestants reject the doctrine of Intercession of Saints. According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercession_of_saints#Protestant_views) : > With the exception of a few early Protestant churches, most modern Protestant churches strongly reject the intercession of the dead for the living, but they are in favor of the intercession of the living for the living according to Romans 15:30. When it comes to arguing for the rejection of the doctrine of Intercession of Saints (specifically, the intercession of *the dead for the living*), what are the strongest apologetic arguments according to Protestants? Are there compelling reasons that should be able to dissuade any rational believer from seeking intercession support from departed Saints? *Note: the counterpart question can be found at [What are the strongest apologetic arguments in defense of the veracity of the doctrine of Intercession of Saints?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/84039/what-are-the-strongest-apologetic-arguments-in-defense-of-the-veracity-of-the-do)*

Are there any deductive arguments in favor of Christianity against Judaism?, that is, an argument whose conclusion given the premises is necessary rather than likely. In other words, are there any arguments that would compel a rational follower of Judaism to believe in Christianity?