The [fine tuning argument](https://www.discovery.org/a/91/) essentially states that there is so much about the universe that is "fine tuned" for life - eg things like the gravitational constant would cause the universe to disintegrate if they were off by 1 part in a million million - that there must be a creator who did the tuning. The most common response from eg atheists is comparing the situation to water in a puddle remarking on how the hole in the ground is exactly the right shape to hold it. In other words, claiming that rather than the universe being fine tuned, it just fit the existing conditions out of necessity. Whenever this is mentioned in Christian forums, it is pooh-poohed and derided as though it is obviously wrong, but no-one ever seems to actually explain it. What is the "obvious" refutation of the puddle analogy that everyone seems to know?

Origen and some early Christian thinkers speculated that God may have created and destroyed worlds in cycles before the current creation described in Genesis 1. This idea, though speculative, raises the question: since Scripture does not detail what God did in His eternal past (before "In the beginning"), on what biblical basis do Christian traditions reject such views? Given that: - God is eternal and existed before time, - Genesis 1 focuses on the beginning of our world, not necessarily God's first act of creation, - Ecclesiastes 3:11 says, "He has put eternity into man's heart, yet so that he cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end," How do Christians who reject Origen’s cyclical creation model ground that rejection **biblically**, rather than merely philosophically or theologically? Are there specific Scriptures or doctrinal principles that limit God's act of creation to a single beginning as described in Genesis?

I was listening to a preacher and he made this claim that a woman was the first witness to the risen Christ because traditionally our societies hold the testimony of women to be more credible than that of men. I thought Mary became the first witness because of co-incidence but he suggests otherwise, is he correct that Mary Magdalene being the first witness to the risen Christ was part of God's plan because the testimony of women is more credible?

If Jesus was merely a man, then God would seem unjust for punishing the innocent Jesus in place of the guilty due to violating the following: 1. Man is to be put to death for his own sin and not for the sin of another (Ez 18:20; Dt 24:16) 2. No man can ransom another or give to God the price of his life (Ps 49:7-9) Moreover, God seems unjust for WANTING to crush the innocent man that is Jesus (Is 53:10; Lk 22:42), regardless of Jesus' willingness to follow the Father's will and lay His life down as a sacrifice. That God could desire and plan to punish/sacrifice an innocent man, His Son no less, for the sins of others would go against His character. The only way I see God being just would be that Jesus is God. Thus, God's plan would not be the unjust sacrifice of an innocent third party but rather the just, noble sacrifice of the self. But if you can show that God is just in sacrificing Jesus even if Jesus isn't God, then please leave an answer down below.

I recently took the time to re-read the prelusive words of William Lane Craig’s Reasonable Faith. This quote stuck with me:

When a person refuses to come to Christ, it is never just because of lack of evidence or because of intellectual difficulties: at root, he refuses to come because he willingly ignores and rejects the drawing of God’s Spirit on his heart. No one in the final analysis really fails to become a Christian because of lack of arguments; he fails to become a Christian because he loves darkness rather than light and wants nothing to do with God.

A decade after first reading this, I remember I was struggling to understand who he intends the book to be for, and Craig's motivations. If we are not to assume that Craig is not serious or that he is lying about his sincerity, it could be that he is sincere but wrong: in the sense that he genuinely cannot make sense of atheism as an intellectual position. But then it seems to me that he is so caught up in his own religious convictions he cannot fathom the possibility someone could sincerely disagree with his position. An unfortunate position, in my view. The disagreement is also shifted from the intellectual realm of evidence to the moral realm of personal integrity, effectively *faulting the non-believer* for an emotional or spiritual deficiency. It appeals to notions of spiritual deficiency rather than engaging directly with intellectual critiques. The quote makes apologetics seem like its whole purpose is to convince those who already are convinced. I also think this type of argumentation renders the argument difficult to empirically verify or falsify. If non-belief is attributed to an internal disposition (such as a preference for "darkness" over "light"), it becomes impossible to test or refute through evidence. Thus I am curious if Craig has revised these position in recent times, if he has matured as he has gotten older. Questions: 1. Has Craig changed his view or added nuance to his stance? Does he still attribute unbelief primarily to the willful rejection of God rather than to intellectual or evidential challenges? 2. Is evidence still something that, for him, acts only insofar as a dual warrant of one’s Christian beliefs alongside the inner witness of the Spirit? 3. Has he acknowledged intellectual or evidential factors as genuine obstacles to faith? 4. What role does he currently assign to evidence and objective methods in relation to the work of the Holy Spirit?

If there is a god then he probably wouldn't let us have 100% proof that he is real, so that we can have faith in him instead of just having physical proof. so we cant know for sure that he is or isn't real. But if there isn't a god, then eventually we should be able to find 100% proof that he isn't real, and that people are just bending reality to fit their religion. but we don't have that proof yet. So, how can I know if he exists or not?

> In contemporary philosophy, a **brute fact** is a fact that cannot be explained in terms of a deeper, more "fundamental" fact. There are two main ways to explain something: say what "brought it about", or describe it at a more "fundamental" level. For example, a cat displayed on a computer screen can be explained, more "fundamentally", in terms of certain voltages in bits of metal in the screen, which in turn can be explained, more "fundamentally", in terms of certain subatomic particles moving in a certain manner. If one were to keep explaining the world in this way and reach a point at which no more "deeper" explanations can be given, then one would have found some facts which are brute or inexplicable, in the sense that we cannot give them an ontological explanation. As it might be put, there may exist some things that just are. > > To reject the existence of brute facts is to think that everything can be explained ("Everything can be explained" is sometimes called the principle of sufficient reason). > > ... > > **Bertrand Russell took a brute fact position when he said, "I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all." Sean Carroll similarly concluded that "any attempt to account for the existence of something rather than nothing must ultimately bottom out in a set of brute facts; the universe simply is, without ultimate cause or explanation."** > > Source: [Brute fact - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_fact) Postulating that the universe *just is*, as a *brute fact*, devoid of an ultimate cause or explanation, is a viewpoint often embraced by naturalists and non-theists, exemplified by figures like [Sean Carroll](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sean_M._Carroll) and [Bertrand Russell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell) . However, this notion runs contrary to the Christian faith's premise of a Creator God serving as the ultimate explanation for the universe's existence. How might a Christian effectively persuade a naturalist non-theist, such as Sean Carroll, that it is metaphysically impossible for the universe to be a brute fact? --- *Bonus for the interested reader with about one hour of free time*: [God is not a Good Theory (Sean Carroll)](https://youtu.be/ew_cNONhhKI)

How does Catholicism respond to this? From what I understand in some responses, a Catholic may accept this text as referring to either the particular or general judgment, but I don’t understand how 1 Corinthians 3, if referring to the general judgment, could support the doctrine of purgatory. It seems to go against the dogma. Defense: 1 Corinthians 3:15 The passage that Catholics generally use—based on their own distortion—is the one that supposedly speaks of a purifying fire. They quote the following passage: >“If it is burned up, the builder will suffer loss but yet will be saved—even though only as one escaping through the flames.” (1 Corinthians 3:15 – Ave-Maria Version) To understand the nature of this “fire,” it is crucial to examine the context of the passage. In the Catholic version, the broader passage reads: >“If anyone builds on this foundation using gold, silver, costly stones, wood, hay or straw, their work will be shown for what it is, because the Day will bring it to light. It will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test the quality of each person’s work. If what has been built survives, the builder will receive a reward. If it is burned up, the builder will suffer loss but yet will be saved—even though only as one escaping through the flames.” (1 Corinthians 3:12–15) It is clear that Paul is not referring to an ordinary day, but to the Day of Judgment before the Tribunal of Christ. The challenge for defenders of the Catholic doctrine lies in the fact that, according to Scripture, this Day of Judgment takes place at Christ’s second coming—which has not yet occurred—and by then, there would no longer be any “purgatory” available for purification. That intermediate state would have given way to the eternal state. This is why Paul declares: >“In the presence of God and of Christ Jesus, who will judge the living and the dead, and in view of his appearing and his kingdom, I give you this charge...” (2 Timothy 4:1) Paul refers to that “Day” for himself before dying, in the hope of being rewarded at the Tribunal of Christ at His coming: >“Now there is in store for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will award to me on that day—and not only to me, but also to all who have longed for his appearing.” (2 Timothy 4:8) We see that this Day of Judgment is intrinsically linked to Jesus’s return, when His Kingdom will be fully revealed. On that Day—according to Catholic teaching—there would no longer be a purgatory for postmortem purification. Therefore, the text cannot be referring to purgatory. Even the Jerusalem Bible (a Catholic Bible) has a footnote that nearly admits this verse does not speak about purgatory: >“1 Corinthians 3:15: That is, like someone escaping through flames. Such a person is saved barely. Purgatory is not directly considered here, though this text, along with others, was used by the Church to explain the doctrine.” Newer versions of the Jerusalem Bible now give a shorter note: >“1 Corinthians 3:15: That is, like someone escaping through flames. Such a person is saved barely.” It almost seems like they are omitting the earlier note that stated explicitly that purgatory is not considered in the text. To address this difficulty, Catholic theologians developed the doctrine of the “two judgments”—a concept absent from the Eastern Church. According to this Roman Catholic perspective, there are two judgments: the particular judgment, which occurs immediately after death and begins the intermediate state; and the general judgment, which takes place at Christ’s second coming, ending that intermediate state. Therefore, under this view, each person goes through two judgments: the individual and the general. They argue that 1 Corinthians 3:15 refers to the individual judgment after death, not the general judgment at Christ’s second coming. However, this explanation introduces significant theological problems. First, the context of 1 Corinthians 3:15 seems to point to the general judgment rather than a personal one. Verse 13 says: >“...the Day will bring it to light; it will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test the quality of each person’s work.” There are two aspects supporting the idea of the general judgment at Christ’s second coming. First, the Day will “bring to light” the sins hidden during life. Jesus said that “nothing is hidden except to be made manifest, nor is anything secret except to come to light” (Mark 4:22). Historically, this has been interpreted as referring to the general judgment, when all will be gathered and the sins of each person exposed—nothing hidden will remain hidden. Moreover, verse 13 says the fire will test the work of “each one,” not of one person individually. The text implies a general assembly, where many are judged, not a private encounter with God after death.

N.b.: I originally posted this question in the Philosophy stack, but then realized it was more appropriate, and might get more informed answers, here. In a famous article, Anscombe castigates "Modern Moral Philosophy" (including but not limited to consequentialism) as "quite incompatible with the Hebrew-Christian ethic. For **it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good; vicarious punishment**...," which in contrast consequentialists can sometimes allow for sufficiently good consequences. (p.10) Many other Christian apologists make similar claims. Yet I have also seen many Christian apologists--and often the same ones--bend over backwards to defend, e.g., the drowning of babies in the Biblical flood, the slaughter of the Canaanite civilian population after a war victory, etc., as well as vicarious punishment: of the Egyptian first-born, of children "to the third and fourth generation" (Num 14:18), etc. Even Christians who do not take these stories literally at least generally say that they reveal something about the character of God and morality, and so have to excuse them away--giving special reasons (consequentialist or otherwise) for why these cases of innocent-killing and vicarious punishment are justified. So my question is, **is Anscombe's quoted claim simply and quite obviously wrong, or can something be said in its defense?** The only thing I sometimes see apologists say about this is that these moral obligations only apply to humans, not to God, though this is odd if God is supposed to be morally good. But even for God, these actions are often excused on account of being part of his "plan," i.e., because in some way (perhaps unknowable to us) these will lead to good consequences. I am not asking whether any of these arguments are plausible, but simply whether they /exist/ and fit Anscombe's description of what Christian ethics supposedly does not do. If so, then these are not innovations of "modern moral philosophy" but old hat strategies which Christian moralists have been using for centuries. So is she just the pot calling the kettle black? Or does she really have a point in saying that there is something novel about modern consequentialist morality which is not present in the history of Christian apologetics? Note that I am well aware that Christian moralists have not historically espoused consequentialism as a general theory, at least before William Paley. But espousing this theory is different from making occasional consequentialist arguments in specific cases. It is also possible that the modern apologists I read giving such arguments are in fact a novelty, and that historical theologians didn't do this, so that perhaps Anscombe's criticism should be extended to "Modern Moral Theology" insofar as she might think it has been infected by a consequentialist thinking anathema to Christian tradition. This is an interesting question; did Augustine, Aquinas, etc., *never* make consequentialist arguments for God's doing or commanding such things? But again, it's not my full question, for Anscombe is claiming that Christians *never* gave justifications for ever doing these things, consequentialist or otherwise. But this seems false, for "I am God," or "I have been commanded by God to do/allow these things" apparently *was* such a justification in some such cases.

It's well known that Protestants reject the doctrine of Intercession of Saints. According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercession_of_saints#Protestant_views) : > With the exception of a few early Protestant churches, most modern Protestant churches strongly reject the intercession of the dead for the living, but they are in favor of the intercession of the living for the living according to Romans 15:30. When it comes to arguing for the rejection of the doctrine of Intercession of Saints (specifically, the intercession of *the dead for the living*), what are the strongest apologetic arguments according to Protestants? Are there compelling reasons that should be able to dissuade any rational believer from seeking intercession support from departed Saints? *Note: the counterpart question can be found at [What are the strongest apologetic arguments in defense of the veracity of the doctrine of Intercession of Saints?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/84039/what-are-the-strongest-apologetic-arguments-in-defense-of-the-veracity-of-the-do)*

Are there any deductive arguments in favor of Christianity against Judaism?, that is, an argument whose conclusion given the premises is necessary rather than likely. In other words, are there any arguments that would compel a rational follower of Judaism to believe in Christianity?

It seems that Christian apologetics very much rests on the historical veracity of the resurrection. That is, if we can verify the resurrection, then we have an objective rationale to believe in the Christian faith. Let's assume for a moment that William Craig is correct that there is good evidence for the resurrection. Even so, does this conclude that Jesus was in fact who he said he was, i.e. the son of God? Deuteronomy 13:1-4 reads as follows: >If there appears among you a prophet or a dream-diviner and he gives you a sign or a portent, saying, “Let us follow and worship another god”—whom you have not known—even if the sign or portent that he named to you comes true, do not heed the words of that prophet or that dream-diviner. For the LORD your God is testing you to see whether you really love the LORD your God with all your heart and soul. Follow none but the LORD your God, and revere none but Him; observe His commandments alone, and heed only His orders; worship none but Him, and hold fast to Him. And the resurrection served as a sign: >Then some of the scribes and Pharisees answered him, saying, “Teacher, we wish to see a sign from you.” But he answered them, "An evil and adulterous generation seeks for a sign, but no sign will be given to it except the sign of the prophet Jonah. For just as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the great fish, so will the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. (Matthew 12:38-40) As far as a Pharisee Jew is concerned, Jesus is certainly a god "whom you have not known"; Jesus and the Trinity were completely unknown to the Jews. Thus his sign should be disregarded. Now you might be tempted to respond that Jesus is indeed the same God that they knew, but he just didn't come out of the closet as Jesus until later. The question would then be: how are we to know that Jesus is, in fact, the same god? For that Christian apologetics has turned to the resurrection as evidence. But the verse clearly states: "_even if the sign or portent that he named to you comes true, do not heed the words_" thus excluding supernatural signs as evidence! (In fact, in Exodus 7:11 even Pharoah's sorcerers were capable of performing supernatural feats.) So we are back to square one; first, we need evidence that Jesus was indeed the son of God. Then and only then, does the historicity of the resurrection have any relevance to affirming Jesus. Without prior evidence, it seems justifiable to write Jesus off as a false prophet. Now many are quick to point out that Jesus claimed to be that very same god of the OT and even admonished Israel for not revering the god of the OT. Nonetheless, this doesn't prove that he is that very same god. Where are we to look for that verification? The resurrection? But that may just be another "sign" or "portent". It seems that the only acceptable form of validation must come from the Old Testament itself i.e fulfilled messianic prophecies. That is, the historicity of a supernatural feat has no place in the debate between Christians and Jews. Please note what I'm **not** saying: 1. Christianity therefore _must_ be false 2. Deuteronomy 13 by definition _must_ exclude Jesus 3. The purpose of the resurrection was to serve as "proof" What I **am** saying: The Resurrection _in and of itself_ can be evaded on supernaturalistic grounds.

Is drunkenness necessarily a sin, like hating God, or is it just because God decreed it to be? This is of particular interest to me because Rabbinic Judaism claims that it is not (It's only allowed on Purim) hence one could argue the following: 1. Rabbinic Judaism says that getting drunk is not (always) a sin. 2. But getting drunk is always a sin. 3. :. Rabbinic Judaism is false. Is this a sound argument? I know Aquinas and the Catholic Church would say yes, but advocates of some versions of divine command theory might say no. But it's also true that getting intoxicated can be allowed in a medical context although presumably in that case you're in a sort of controlled environment and there's a proportionate risk of bodily harm. Also Judaism concedes that sins committed due to getting drunk on Purim are still sins hence doing so may be a sin for some people. **Note:** Just for clarification, especially for those who don't speak English natively, we're talking about getting severely intoxicated, not just drinking alcohol.

*Note*: This question has been inspired by the related question *https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/99867/61679* --- I'm intrigued by the prospect of tailoring apologetics strategies specifically to effectively present a compelling case for the truth of Christianity to those who adhere to pagan beliefs. While traditional apologetics often focuses on persuading atheists and agnostics, such as in works like "[I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist](https://www.amazon.com/Dont-Have-Enough-Faith-Atheist/dp/1581345615) ," there is a unique challenge when engaging with individuals who already accept beliefs in deities, miracles, the supernatural, and similar concepts within a pagan or non-Christian framework. What arguments and approaches does Christian apologetics employ to effectively persuade individuals holding such perspectives? Delving further into pagan theology unveils intriguing concepts such as [theurgy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theurgy) and [thaumaturgy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thaumaturgy) . Theurgy, commonly linked with [Neoplatonism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoplatonism) , encompasses rituals and practices aimed at invoking the presence of divine entities. Thaumaturgy, on the other hand, often pertains to the use of magical acts or miracles for practical ends. Additionally, one may encounter related terms such as [Western esotericism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_esotericism) , [Eastern Esotercisim](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_esotericism) , [Perennial philosophy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perennial_philosophy) , [Kabbalah](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabbalah) , [Hermeticism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermeticism) , [Occult](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occult) , [Modern paganism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_paganism) , [Shamanism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamanism) , [Spiritualism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spiritualism) , [New Thought](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Thought) , [Theosophy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theosophy) , [Witchcraft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witchcraft) , [Druidism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Druidry_(modern)) , [Yoga](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoga) , [Reiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reiki) , [Astrology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astrology) , and [New Age](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Age) . > Theurgy (/ˈθiːɜːrdʒi/; from Greek θεουργία theourgía), also known as divine magic, is one of two major branches of the magical arts, the other being practical magic or thaumaturgy. Theurgy describes the ritual practices associated with the invocation or evocation of the presence of one or more deities (also called "godforms"), especially with the goal of achieving henosis (uniting with the divine) and perfecting oneself. (Source: [Theurgy - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theurgy).) > Thaumaturgy is the purported capability of a magician to work magic or other paranormal events or a saint to perform miracles. It is sometimes translated into English as wonderworking. > >A practitioner of thaumaturgy is a "thaumaturge", "thaumaturgist", "thaumaturgus", "miracle worker", or "wonderworker". A 'saint', being one who is variably defined as having an exceptional degree of holiness, enlightenment, or likeness or closeness to God, may be claimed to have performed miracles; these generally being defined as exceptional events or deeds not within the normative means of natural or human power, instead being of some supernatural or preternatural manner. Although the definition of a 'miracle', like the definition of a 'saint', will vary yet further among separate religions, sects, and schools. > > **Buddhism** > See also: *Abhijñā* and *Miracles of Gautama Buddha* > In the introduction of his translation of the "Spiritual Powers (神通 Jinzū)" chapter of Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō, Carl Bielefel refers to the powers developed by adepts of Buddhist meditation as belonging to the "thaumaturgical tradition". These powers, known as siddhi or abhijñā, were ascribed to the Buddha and subsequent disciples. Legendary monks like Bodhidharma, Upagupta, Padmasambhava, and others were depicted in popular legends and hagiographical accounts as wielding various supernatural powers. > > **Hinduism** > See also: *Godman (India)* > Godman is a colloquial term used in India for a type of charismatic guru. They usually have a high-profile presence, and are capable of attracting attention and support from large sections of the society. Godmen also sometimes claim to possess paranormal powers, such as the ability to heal, the ability to see or influence future events, and the ability to read minds. > > (Source: [Thaumaturgy - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thaumaturgy).) When exploring these concepts, I'm intrigued to know if apologists have crafted arguments or techniques specifically designed to resonate with followers and practitioners of pagan religions. For example, are there instances where apologetics has been meticulously tailored to address the beliefs of modern New Agers or adherents of the *perennial philosophy*? Analyzing specific instances across different religions can provide valuable insights into how apologetics effectively navigates the nuances between Christianity and the diverse viewpoints found within pagan traditions, especially in the context of engaging with and proselytizing a pagan audience.

Context: before answering this question, I highly recommend reading the answers to [Is Christianity testable?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/105659/66156) and https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/97877/61679 . --- Some Christians believe that Christianity is testable. At least John Lennox [does](https://youtu.be/fSYwCaFkYno?t=2687) . According to such Christians, what is a step-by-step guide on how to perform such a test? I'm putting on my scientific hat here. Specifically, I'm interested in the following points: 1. Is there a set of clear, specific, measurable, non-ambiguous conditions that need to be satisfied for the test to become successful? 2. Is there a set of clear, specific, non-ambiguous steps that need to be carried out in sequence for the test to become successful? 3. Are there clear time frames for each step of the test, or for the test as a whole? 4. Are there clear, specific, non-ambiguous, measurable standards for evaluating the success or failure of the test? 5. Is [falsifiability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability) on the table? That is, if the conditions of the test are perfectly satisfied and the steps are performed precisely as instructed, and yet the expected outcome of the test fails to take place, would that falsify the hypothesis underlying the test?

This is intended to be a question of general applicability, but in all honesty, I'm asking inspired by concrete YouTube channels that promote atheism and skepticism, most notably, [CosmicSkeptic](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7kIy8fZavEni8Gzl8NLjOQ) and [RationalityRules](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCqZMgLgGlYAWvSU8lZ9xiVg) . These are examples of a special category of atheists that stand out for their remarkable understanding of philosophy, logical thinking, and skepticism, as well as their outstanding debating skills, even against renowned Christian apologists. Just to give you an idea, Alex O'Connor, the founder of CosmicSkeptic, has debated [William Lane Craig](https://youtu.be/eOfVBqGPwi0) , [Frank Turek](https://youtu.be/b5a3MxIqZOs) , [Jonathan McLatchie](https://youtu.be/woqy13ZkeqM) , [Trent Horn](https://youtu.be/5PF1JgXOKDQ) and several other defenders of the faith. When it comes to atheists of this caliber, I see no possible way of evangelizing them through purely intellectual/argumentative means. Not even the best apologists have managed to do so. If I were asked my honest opinion, I would say that the only thing that can turn them around would be a supernatural, "road to Damascus" kind of experience. I see no other way. But leaving my personal opinions aside, I would like to know if there are any denominations that provide official advice on how to evangelize highly intellectual and well-spoken atheists and skeptics. What recommendations do they give to win strong atheists for Christ? Or is this category of atheists simply a lost cause and the only thing that we can do is to throw up our hands, leave them alone and hope for the best?

James Fodor is an atheist physicist who has written rebuttals against the Christian faith and its arguments for God. One of those articles that he wrote was [*A Case for Christianity: a Critique*](https://jamesfodor.com/2014/05/02/a-case-for-christianity-a-critique/) in which he tried to debunk the contingency argument. I was wondering how you would reply to him? Here are some quotes from the article: **On Contingency** > The speaker argues that the universe is probably contingent, because > the universe is simply the sum total of everything in the universe, > and as far as we know everything in the universe is contingent. There > are several flaws with this argument. First, we simply do not know > very much about the large-scale structure, origin, and nature of the > universe. We do not know what was possible and what wasn’t – the > science (and philosophy) of these matters is a long way from being > settled. For the speaker therefore to simply assert that ‘as far as we > know everything is contingent’ grossly overstates the extent of our > knowledge, and dismisses too readily the high levels of uncertainty > that remain. Second, the speaker actually gives no reason as to why > the universe should be contingent even if all of its constituent > components are contingent. This is simply the fallacy of composition. > He does acknowledge that it isn’t logically necessary that this be the > case, but then he simply brushes off this objection and asserts that > ‘it is a real stretch’ to argue that the universe could be necessary > even though all its constituents are contingent. Why? No argument is > given. Indeed, there seem to be many obvious counterexamples where > properties of the whole are not manifested in any of the parts. For > instance, cells are alive, but cells are made up of nothing but atoms, > which are not alive. Words have meaning, but words are made up solely > of vibrations of air or dots of ink, which do not have any meaning > associated with them individually. To give another example, we would > have to ‘go and look’ to see if any particular book was in a library – > that fact would be contingent. But it would not be a contingent fact > that a library contains books of some sort, or else it would not be a > library at all. For these reasons, the speaker fails to establish > their conclusion that the universe is contingent. **On the Principle of Sufficient Reason** > The speaker argues that all contingent facts must have some reason or > explanation as to why they are the case, a notion which is called the > ‘principle of sufficient reason’. He argues that this principle > underpins essentially all of science, and that rejecting it leads to > nonsensical conclusions. However, I think the speaker fails to > establish their argument about PSR, for the following reasons. First, > he is not clear about exactly what constitutes a ‘reason’. Is it a > physical cause? A non-physical cause? An explanation? A purpose? What > exactly? It seems difficult to take the argument very seriously when > it is not even clear what claim is actually being made. On a related > point, even the notion of causation itself is philosophically > problematic, as David Hume and others have noted. To this the speaker > makes no reference at all, and seems content merely to take the > concept of ‘causation’ as an unproblematic given. Second, the fact > that something like the PSR (arguably) ‘underpins all of science’ does > not imply that it is everywhere and always true. The author falls into > the same trap that he accuses the naturalist speaker of falling into, > namely of assuming that because a given concept sometimes works or is > successful in a particular sphere (in this case science), it therefore > follows that it is universally applicable. That simply does not > follow. It could be the case that science works well for questions > where PSR (or something like it) is applicable, and does not work well > for questions where it does not. One can also raise the deeper > question of whether science actually provides ‘reasons’ or ’causes’ at > all, rather than merely describing empirical regularities (again, as > argued by Hume). These are complex and much-debated questions in > philosophy, but the speaker ignores them, and simply adopts as > ‘obvious’ particular simplistic answers which, conveniently enough, > also support his argument. Third, to reject the PSR does not imply > ‘nonsense’. It merely is to say that we do not properly understand > abstract and difficult concepts like ‘causation’ well enough to make > confident claims about them.

Many Christians who attend church, when confronted by inquirers outside the church, who wonder why they believe in Christianity, simply respond by saying, *I just accept it by faith*. Or they might say, *It was good enough for my grandpa, so it's good enough for me.* But in an age of science and technology, which places a premium on "facts, evidence, proofs, etc., those responses seem hollow--even irrational, or at least unintellectual. Quite inadequate to the modern mind enmeshed in collegiate surroundings. The average church-goer seems oblivious to the biblical aspect of *apologetics*. Nor do they understand the exhortation of Saint Peter: >Sanctify the Lord God in your hearts, and be ready always to give an answer (Gk. apologian) for the reason (Gk. logos) of the hope that is in you with meekness and fear. (1 Peter 3:15) This leaves the Christian, especially the Christian student, in the lurch, susceptible to attacks of doubt by professors, as well as peer pressure from culture. So should pastors and teachers equip their congregations with occasional sermons on the *evidences, infallible proofs (Acts 1:3), metaphysical proofs (Romans 1, Acts 17:18-34), reasons (1 Peter 3:15), supernatural conclusions (John 5:36 miracles), eye-witness testimony (1 John 1:1-3):* things which would provide a "reasonable response" to skeptics who doubt these revolutionary facts"? Or is "faith in faith" without proofs, or "blind faith" as some would call it (uninformed faith, that is), sufficient for Christian believers? Should this be the biblical approach for preparing congregates to survive in modern society? What is the correct definition of "faith"? What is the best definition that would be adequate for the modern mind, and cause him to consider Christ as God?

Evolutionism [claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_psychology_of_religion) that religious beliefs result from their ability to give us a cooperative ability to survive. This, an Evolutionist would argue, would imply that religion comes into existence, not on any truth claim, but from evolution giving us useful, but otherwise untrue beliefs. What is the proper response to this argument? (Here is [another article](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429488818-18/ritual-made-us-human-matt-rossano) on the subject.)

What are some examples of Christian apologetics responses to the Islamic concept of God that God is all-powerful so that everything that happens to a human being is because of fate and thus that what happens to a human being is interpreted as being more deterministic in nature? Background to this question: what is the use of praying if fate is a ruling force against/for a person?