Open theism posits that God possesses comprehensive knowledge of every possible future but is unaware of which particular future will be actualized due to human free will. Wouldn't this result in the same thing as Molinism? If God has exhaustive knowledge of every potential future, He knows precisely how each individual would act in any given situation. Thus, God would be aware of whether a person will ultimately be good or bad from the moment of their birth. Isn't this analogous to Molinism's concept of "middle knowledge"? One could argue that God's awareness of possibilities is so vast that He comprehends every conceivable outcome for an individual, not just every choice they might make. For instance, there exists a potential world where I become a terrorist, and another where I become a priest. God understands all these possibilities in perfect detail but is unaware of which one will unfold because it depends on my exercise of free will. However, wouldn't this contradict the Christian concept of the soul? This perspective seems to suggest that there is no inherent soul, and that a person's character is entirely contingent on circumstances. For example, if I had been born to strict Muslim parents, I might have become an extremist Muslim. If I'm not misunderstanding open theism, it appears to imply that a person's characteristics are solely determined by the random chance of their upbringing.

The [free-will defense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga%27s_free-will_defense) is an argument commonly attributed to Alvin Plantinga, who developed it as a response to the [logical problem of evil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil#Logical_problem_of_evil) . However, in developing this argument Plantinga unwittingly ended up reinventing/rediscovering the [Molinist doctrine of middle knowledge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga%27s_free-will_defense#Molinism) , so the key ideas of the argument are not entirely novel, and people have certainly come up with similar defenses independently more than once. The Wikipedia article includes a summary of the argument: > A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can't cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good. I have the following objection to this argument: - If human beings were created in the image of God and have free will, then it follows that **God also has free will**. - Likewise, if human beings, in virtue of having free will, are capable of moral evil, **then God, in virtue of having free will, must also be capable of moral evil**. - However, **if God is omnibenevolent, He is not capable of moral evil**. - So it looks like we have a contradiction between the last two points. Said in another way, if God can have free will and be incapable of moral evil at the same time, then why would God create human beings that have free will and yet are ***not*** incapable of moral evil at the same time? In other words, God is a counterexample to the claim that free will necessarily entails being vulnerable to moral evil, since God has free will and yet is not vulnerable to it, and so one wonders why God would create free creatures that are not immune to moral evil, just like He is. How do proponents of the free will defense against the problem of evil resolve this conundrum? --- --- Based on some of the comments received, I will try to write a more formal and rigorous version of the objection: **Premises** - P1: God is omnibenevolent - P2: God is omnibenevolent => God is *not* capable of moral evil - P3: God has free will - P4: God has free will => God is capable of moral evil **Deductions** - D1: God is *not* capable of moral evil (from P1 & P2) - D2: God is capable of moral evil (from P3 & P4) - Contradiction between D1 & D2 (=> God is not capable of moral evil*) should be uncontroversial as well. God cannot do evil. It's impossible/unfeasible for Him. It just won't happen. - P3 (*God has free will*) is based on the intuition that if humans (and angels) have free will, it would be very strange for God not to have free will as well. One could reject this premise and claim that, perhaps, God is a deterministic being who created free creatures. Sure, one could hold such a view, but it would be a very novel (and strange) one, wouldn't it? - P4 (*God has free will => God is capable of moral evil*) is based on the same intuition used by the *free-will defense against the problem of evil*. If evil is explained as an undesired price of having creatures with free will (which God was willing to pay because of how valuable free will is), then what the defense is basically saying is that *free will => capable of moral evil*. So P4 is just a particular application of that rule to God, if we concede that God has free will. --- If anyone is interested in further objections to the *free-will defense against the problem of evil*, feel free (no pun intended) to pay a visit to [this question](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/99881/66156) on Philosophy Stack Exchange.

When God created the world, He had to accept the fact that some of His creatures would sin and ultimately fail to repent and be saved (I'm assuming that [universalism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_universalism) is false, to be clear). For example, suppose that X is one of such people. In this world, X fails to repent and gets condemned. One could ask the following question about X: *"Okay, X gets condemned in this world, but was it theoretically possible for God to have created a different, counterfactual world in which X would have been saved?"*. For example, if X had been born and raised in ideal conditions, say, if X had been filled with the Holy Spirit since he was in his mother's womb (like John the Baptist was), who knows, perhaps under those counterfactual conditions X would have been saved. However, God didn't create that ideal world for X. Instead, He created this world. And in this world, unfortunately, X doesn't make it to Heaven ... Which sounds terrible. If God is a loving father, and if there is at least one possible world in which X would be saved, for sure God would create that world so that X gets actually saved, right? This can lead to entertain the idea that, perhaps, God didn't create a world in which X would get saved because there is no such world in the first place. That is, no matter what world God could have created, in all possible worlds X always systematically fails to be saved. God exhaustively searched all the "alternative worlds space" and couldn't find a single world in which X is saved. And perhaps, all the people who freely reject salvation in this world are people who would have also freely rejected salvation in all other possible worlds. In other words, some individuals are just unsavable. They freely mess up always, no matter the world in which you create them. Does this belief have a name? I found this related question https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/57626/how-do-molinists-justify-a-world-where-not-everyone-freely-chooses-salvation , and so Molinism is surely relevant to this discussion of free will and counterfactual worlds, but I'm specifically interested in finding out if there is an official name for the specific belief that some individuals are unsavable in all possible worlds. Or at least I would like to know if there are any Christian groups who believe this.

I was wondering if someone could give me some of the key differences between Thomism and Molinism. That includes things like grace, foreknowledge, and any other aspect that they may disagree on.

Assuming not all humans on earth will become Christians. Many have lived and died that have not. The Bible is clear that many will fall away and perish. If Molinism is true, Then either: > A. There is no possible world or state of being that allows all individuals on earth to freely choose belief in God Or: > B. There is some possible world or state of being that would allow all individuals on earth to freely choose belief in God If A is true, this implies some limit to God’s power, or if not, it seems *prima facie* false. It's fair to think that there is some possible world where all individuals on earth to freely choose belief in God. If B is true, then God freely chose not to create a world where all individuals freely choose God, even though he could have. Which seems very unlikely if God is omnibenevolent. Is there an official molinist response to this?

I know the basic difference between Arminianism and Calvinism in the soteriology subject, but when Molinism comes I can't grasp the core doctrines that it teaches. I'm not asking for which is better, just a concise, easy, and helpful definition of each one without too much philosophical blather.

What is the role of free will in Thomistic predestination? My understanding of Thomist teachings: - people have free will to do what they want - everyone gets sufficient amount of grace (Sufficient for what, if they will go to hell as they live a sinful life.) - God just chooses some for salvation (predestines them), gives them a special amount of grace (efficacious grace) and these will go to Heaven - the others (who got sufficient amount of grace) are reprobates who go to hell I do not see any real connection between free will and grace - I suppose there is no. Thus, I do not understand how God chooses whom to provide efficacious grace and how this can be aligned with a loving God (e.g. what if he chooses killers etc. for salvation).

If I understand correctly, Molinists consider it important that counterfactuals of freedom ("If person P experienced circumstances C, she would perform action A") are meaningful. In fact, if I understand correctly, the crux of Molinism is the doctrine that the truth or falsity of a counterfactual of freedom is logically prior to Creation. But I'm struggling to understand what a counterfactual of freedom even *means* from a Molinist perspective. It seems clear that the circumstances C do not *logically entail* the action A; we can coherently imagine P experiencing circumstances C but nevertheless refraining from A. But if I understand correctly, Molinists endorse a libertarian notion of free will, in the sense that the circumstances C do not *cause* the action A, either. So in what sense is A the unique action that P "would" perform, were she to experience circumstances C?

The main Wikipedia page on Molinism lists Plantinga as one of its (Molinism's) best known advocates. However, Plantinga, in a speech given at Azusa Pacific University, describes himself as "a Calvinist, of a certain kind" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UDnOcS20HM 30:55). Does anyone familiar with Plantinga's work know exactly what his view is, whether it is a hybrid, or has changed from Calvinism to Molinism (or vice-versa) over time? I am interested in whether he is mainly in agreement with William Lane Craig on this matter, or actually has a more Calvinistic worldview, and if the latter, if and how he has defended this view against objections similar to Craig's (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-vs-calvinism) . Of course, I would not expect him to have engaged Craig himself, but certainly these arguments against Calvinism have been around for some time. It goes without saying that such a defense could have relevance in the life of a Christian contemplating the truth of these views.