St. Thomas Aquinas presents a good logical proof on how a being called god exists: He is what I assumed he said [this is in my own words]: > Everything in the universe has a cause, without a cause nothing will take place [like Newton's first law]. If we try to question the existence of anything present on the earth, the causes of the causes will lead us to the very creation of earth. Reasoning more, will lead to the formation of the universe. Now the universe, needs a cause for its production, which is, God. Now how do I prove that God is good, or God "is active," or "interferes in human activity"? With this I mean that God [son of God, who is in fact God but a different manifestation] comes onto earth, does miracles, and punishes and blesses, and tells everybody that they are subject to a future judgement. How do I prove that God is not a Deist God, which means that God is merely transcendent in relation to the universe, who doesn't interfere in its working? Some people may reason that since God is the creator, he has a fundamental power to morph things in the universe, but some may ask why. In my atheist friend's language—"Why does god check on the actions of people? why doesn't he chill?" This is all part of some kind of thought experiment to prove logically that God is as He is portrayed in the Bible. Since St. Thomas Aquinas started this "logical thinking" and was a Christian, I decided to ask it in the Christianity Stack Exchange. I myself am not a Christian, but I love studying Christianity and pondering over it.

It's well known that Protestants reject the doctrine of Intercession of Saints. According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercession_of_saints#Protestant_views) : > With the exception of a few early Protestant churches, most modern Protestant churches strongly reject the intercession of the dead for the living, but they are in favor of the intercession of the living for the living according to Romans 15:30. When it comes to arguing for the rejection of the doctrine of Intercession of Saints (specifically, the intercession of *the dead for the living*), what are the strongest apologetic arguments according to Protestants? Are there compelling reasons that should be able to dissuade any rational believer from seeking intercession support from departed Saints? *Note: the counterpart question can be found at [What are the strongest apologetic arguments in defense of the veracity of the doctrine of Intercession of Saints?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/84039/what-are-the-strongest-apologetic-arguments-in-defense-of-the-veracity-of-the-do)*

**The argument** 1. If X saves, X must be God. 2. Jesus saves. 3. Therefore, Jesus must be God. **Question** According to Biblical Unitarians, what's wrong with this argument? _____ **Related questions** - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/91343/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/91318/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/83087/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/81155/50422

Are there any deductive arguments in favor of Christianity against Judaism?, that is, an argument whose conclusion given the premises is necessary rather than likely. In other words, are there any arguments that would compel a rational follower of Judaism to believe in Christianity?

For example, I understand that paradoxes of God include the trinity, and the fact that Jesus is both God and man. Are there any other paradoxical traits about God?

This question may seem strange, but I believe it is valid. It is commonly understood that God cannot create logical contradictions, such as a square circle, or make 1+1=3. However, it seems that the trinity itself is a logical contradiction being three distinct persons but still only one God. Why can God not create logical contradictions when his own nature is a logical contradiction? I am a trinitarian, but I am unsure of how to answer this question.

Simple question: What are the best arguments for the divine inspiration of the longer ending of Mark (Mark 16:9-20), according to believers in its inspiration? These are examples of articles presenting arguments *against* Mark 16:9-20's inspiration: - [Why I Will Not Be Preaching the Longer Ending of Mark](https://g3min.org/longer-ending-mark/) - [Should Mark 16:9-20 be in the Bible?](https://www.gotquestions.org/Mark-16-9-20.html) Answers rebutting these articles will be highly appreciated. ____ A related question illustrating why the question about inspiration is important: [Are the signs mentioned in Mark 16:17-18 universally expected of all true believers?](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/q/59009/38524)

What renowned atheist Richard Dawkins has claimed to be is looked at on this blog site, with the link to the video where he says it at the end of this question: https://possil.wordpress.com/2024/05/09/without-foundations-the-building-falls/ Renowned atheist Richard Dawkins has now declared himself to be a ‘cultural Christian’. He cherishes the cultural artifacts and traditions of Christianity, from hymns and Christmas carols to beautiful parish churches and old-fashioned liberalism. He ‘feels the Christian ethos’, and considers the UK a Christian country and that ‘to substitute any alternative religion would be truly dreadful’. How very nice of him to say so. But has the emergence of ‘Cultural Christianity’ muddied the once-clear waters as to what Christianity really is? How did we get from the martyrdom of 10 of Jesus’ Apostles for refusing to renounce belief in Christ, to atheists today saying they are cultural Christians? And could it be argued that the one word in their claim that should not be allowed is ‘Christian’? They could call themselves cultural atheists supporting the cultural side of Christianity, perhaps, but we all know that in this sound-bite era, a two-word designation goes down without question, while an exact designation has many people fast asleep halfway through reading it. All right. That’s not very nice of me to say so. Those questions still remain important, though: What have Christian artifacts and traditions got to do with claiming to be any kind of a Christian? Can an atheist ever claim to be any kind of a Christian? Does such a claim show the atheist has no real understanding of what it is to be a Christian? Has the emergence of ‘Cultural Christianity’ muddied the once-clear waters as to what it is to be a Christian? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=COHgEFUFWyg Question addressed to atheists and Christians who have examined the logic behind such a claim.

To steelman the case for proving God's existence using reason alone, I think one of the best contemporary examples of how this could be done is found in Edward Feser's book [*Five Proofs of the Existence of God*](https://www.amazon.com/Five-Proofs-Existence-Edward-Feser/dp/1621641333) : > This book provides a detailed, updated exposition and defense of five of the historically most important (but in recent years largely neglected) philosophical proofs of God’s existence: the Aristotelian, the Neo-Platonic, the Augustinian, the Thomistic, and the Rationalist. > > It also offers a thorough treatment of each of the key divine attributes—unity, simplicity, eternity, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and so forth—showing that they must be possessed by the God whose existence is demonstrated by the proofs. Finally, it answers at length all of the objections that have been leveled against these proofs. > > This work provides as ambitious and complete a defense of traditional natural theology as is currently in print. Its aim is to vindicate the view of the greatest philosophers of the past— thinkers like Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, and many others— **that the existence of God can be established with certainty by way of purely rational arguments**. It thereby serves as a refutation both of atheism and of the fideism that gives aid and comfort to atheism. > ## Editorial Reviews > > **Review** > > "A watershed book. Feser has completely severed the intellectual legs > upon which modern atheism had hoped to stand." **— Matthew Levering**, > James N. and Mary D. Perry Jr. Chair of Theology, Mundelein Seminary > > "A powerful and important book. The concluding chapter, where Feser > replies to possible objections to his arguments, is a gem; it alone is > worth the price of this excellent work." **— Stephen T. Davis**, Russell > K. Pitzer Professor of Philosophy, Claremont McKenna College > > "Edward Feser is widely recognized as a top scholar in the history of > philosophy in general, and in Thomistic and Aristotelian philosophy in > particular. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in natural > theology. I happily and highly recommend it." **— J. P. Moreland**, > Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Biola University > > "Refutes with devastating effect the standard objections to theistic > proofs, from David Hume to the New Atheists." **— Robert C. Koons**, > Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin > > "Yet another fine book by Edward Feser. He replies to (literally) all > of the objections and shows convincingly how the most popular > objections (the kind one hears in Introduction to Philosophy courses) > are very often completely beside the point and, even when they're not, > are 'staggeringly feeble and overrated'." **— Alfred J. Freddoso**, > Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame > > **About the Author** > > **Edward Feser, Ph.D.**, is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena > City College in Pasadena, California. Called by National Review "one > of the best contemporary writers on philosophy", he is the author of > The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, Aquinas, > Scholastic Meta- physics, By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed, and many > other books and articles. For illustrative purposes, the following is a brief excerpt from chapter 6 of Feser's book: > ### The Nature of God and of His Relationship to the World > > We have now examined five arguments for the existence of God, which can be summarized briefly as follows. The Aristotelian proof begins with the fact that there are potentialities that are actualized and argues that we cannot make sense of this unless we affirm the existence of something which can actualize the potential existence of things without itself being actualized, a *purely actual actualizer*. The Neo-Platonic proof begins with the fact that the things of our experience are composed of parts and argues that such things could not exist unless they have an *absolutely simple* or *noncomposite cause*. The Augustinian proof begins with the fact that there are abstract objects like universals, propositions, numbers, and possible worlds, and argues that these must exist as ideas in a *divine intellect*. The Thomistic proof begins with the real distinction, in each of the things of our experience, between its essence and its existence, and argues that the ultimate cause of such things must be something which is *subsistent existence itself*. The rationalist proof begins with the principle of sufficient reason and argues that the ultimate explanation of things can only lie in an *absolutely necessary being*. Note that Edward Feser's five proofs never resort to evidence of design or complexity in nature. Those sorts of arguments, which look at nature for evidence of design (and, therefore, of a designer), are commonly referred to as [*teleological arguments*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/) . In order to illustrate this point, and to present steelman versions of this line of reasoning, the following are two important books in this area: [*Return of the God Hypothesis: Three Scientific Discoveries That Reveal the Mind Behind the Universe*](https://www.amazon.com/Return-God-Hypothesis-Compelling-Scientific/dp/0062071505/) , by Stephen C. Meyer. > **The *New York Times* bestselling author of *Darwin’s Doubt*, Stephen Meyer, presents groundbreaking scientific evidence of the existence of God, based on breakthroughs in physics, cosmology, and biology.** > > Beginning in the late 19th century, many intellectuals began to insist that scientific knowledge conflicts with traditional theistic belief—that science and belief in God are “at war.” Philosopher of science Stephen Meyer challenges this view by examining three scientific discoveries with decidedly theistic implications. Building on the case for the intelligent design of life that he developed in *Signature in the Cell* and *Darwin’s Doubt*, Meyer demonstrates how discoveries in cosmology and physics coupled with those in biology help to establish the identity of the designing intelligence behind life and the universe. > > Meyer argues that theism—with its affirmation of a transcendent, intelligent and active creator—best explains the evidence we have concerning biological and cosmological origins. Previously Meyer refrained from attempting to answer questions about “who” might have designed life. Now he provides an evidence-based answer to perhaps the ultimate mystery of the universe. In so doing, he reveals a stunning conclusion: the data support not just the existence of an intelligent designer of some kind—but the existence of a personal God. [*A Mousetrap for Darwin: Michael J. Behe Answers His Critics*](https://www.amazon.com/Mousetrap-Darwin-Michael-Answers-Critics/dp/1936599910) , by Michael J. Behe. > In 1996 Darwin’s Black Box thrust Lehigh University biochemist Michael Behe into the national spotlight. The book, and his subsequent two, sparked a firestorm of criticism, and his responses appeared in everything from the New York Times to science blogs and the journal Science. His replies, along with a handful of brand-new essays, are now collected in A Mousetrap for Darwin. In engaging his critics, Behe extends his argument that much recent evidence, from the study of evolving microbes to mutations in dogs and polar bears, shows that blind evolution cannot build the complex machinery essential to life. Rather, evolution works principally by breaking things for short-term benefit. It can’t construct anything fundamentally new. What can? **Behe’s money is on intelligent design**. --- What is the biblical basis for proving God's existence using reason alone? Moreover, if reason alone is enough for proving God's existence, what's the point of faith? How are faith and reason reconciled?

The discoveries in modern science by Einstein and Hubble assert that the universe is expanding, and that if the "clock" were rolled back, the universe would come to a "Singularity Point." They stop, scientifically, and cannot speak as to where the "plasma" of that Point came from. But they do raise the inescapable need for a "Cause." The scientific Law requires one: *Every thing that came to be must have a Cause for its coming onto being.* (Law of Causation) And common sense dictates: *ex nihilo, nihil fit* (From nothing, nothing comes.) Of course, science does not name the Source (God) even though it does require a Cause with the attributes of a "Cause" that matches the Christian God. **In the Beginning God** is the beginning of the revelation by God to mankind. In this statement lies the Cause, purpose, and meaning of all creation! And this revelatory FACT is the basis for the Christian doctrine in Christianity. This query asks nothing about the mode or method of Creation nor the process of speciation, nor the development of stars, planes, galaxies, etc. But only focuses on the original **Source, Cause, Creator** of this vast universe. And if modern science gives any **factual input** that would help settle this dilemma that perplexes the human mind. This question asks neither for opinion or traditional folklore, but only for the application of **scientific Laws** recognized by modern researchers, that confirm the biblical Doctrine of Creation. This question is ***neither philosophical nor sociological*** but references well-accepted *scientific facts* in relates them to well-taught *Christian doctrines* in Christianity.

Previously, I inquired on https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/100110/61679 . Now, I would like to shift the focus to Christian responses to the **Evidential Problem of Evil**. For an in-depth exploration of this argument, a comprehensive article is available at [The Evidential Problem of Evil | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/) . I'll provide a short version with the gist of William Rowe's formulation of the argument, followed by a longer version with multiple excerpts from the original article for those seeking deeper insights. ## Short version > 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some > greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. > 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse. > 3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (Rowe 1979: 336) ## Longer version > Evidential arguments from evil seek to show that the presence of evil in the world inductively supports or makes likely the claim that God (or, more precisely, the God of orthodox theism) does not exist. A variety of evidential arguments have been formulated in recent years, but here I will concentrate on one very influential formulation, namely, that provided by William Rowe. **Rowe’s version of the evidential argument has received much attention since its formal inception in 1978, for it is often considered to be the most cogent presentation of the evidential problem of evil**. James Sennett (1993: 220), for example, views Rowe’s argument as “the clearest, most easily understood, and most intuitively appealing of those available.” Terry Christlieb (1992: 47), likewise, thinks of Rowe’s argument as “the strongest sort of evidential argument, the sort that has the best chance of success.” It is important to note, however, that Rowe’s thinking on the evidential problem of evil has developed in significant ways since his earliest writings on the subject, and two (if not three) distinct evidential arguments can be identified in his work. Here I will only discuss that version of Rowe’s argument that received its first full-length formulation in Rowe (1978) and, most famously, in Rowe (1979), and was successively refined in the light of criticisms in Rowe (1986), (1988), (1991), and (1995), before being abandoned in favour of a quite different evidential argument in Rowe (1996). > > **An Outline of Rowe’s Argument** > > In presenting his evidential argument from evil in his justly > celebrated 1979 paper, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of > Atheism”, Rowe thinks it best to focus on a particular kind of evil > that is found in our world in abundance. He therefore selects “intense > human and animal suffering” as this occurs on a daily basis, is in > great plenitude in our world, and is a clear case of evil. More > precisely, it is a case of intrinsic evil: it is bad in and of itself, > even though it sometimes is part of, or leads to, some good state of > affairs (Rowe 1979: 335). Rowe then proceeds to state his argument for > atheism as follows: > > 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some > greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. > 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse. > 3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (Rowe 1979: 336) > > This argument, as Rowe points out, is clearly valid, and so if there > are rational grounds for accepting its premises, to that extent there > are rational grounds for accepting the conclusion, that is to say, > atheism. > **The Factual Premise** > > Criticisms of Rowe’s argument tend to focus on its first premise, sometimes dubbed “the factual premise,” as it purports to state a fact about the world. Briefly put, the fact in question is that there exist instances of intense suffering which are gratuitous or pointless. As indicated above, an instance of suffering is gratuitous, according to Rowe, if an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented it without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. A gratuitous evil, in this sense, is a state of affairs that is not (logically) necessary to the attainment of a greater good or to the prevention of an evil at least as bad. > > **Rowe’s Case in Support of the Factual Premise** > > Rowe builds his case in support of the factual premise by appealing to particular instances of human and animal suffering, such as the following: > > **E1: the case of Bambi** >> “In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering” (Rowe 1979: 337). > > Although this is presented as a hypothetical event, Rowe takes it to be “a familiar sort of tragedy, played not infrequently on the stage of nature” (1988: 119). > > **E2: the case of Sue** >> This is an actual event in which a five-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan was severely beaten, raped and then strangled to death early on New Year’s Day in 1986. The case was introduced by Bruce Russell (1989: 123), whose account of it, drawn from a report in the Detroit Free Press of January 3 1986, runs as follows: >> >> The girl’s mother was living with her boyfriend, another man who was unemployed, her two children, and her 9-month old infant fathered by the boyfriend. On New Year’s Eve all three adults were drinking at a bar near the woman’s home. The boyfriend had been taking drugs and drinking heavily. He was asked to leave the bar at 8:00 p.m. After several reappearances he finally stayed away for good at about 9:30 p.m. The woman and the unemployed man remained at the bar until 2:00 a.m. at which time the woman went home and the man to a party at a neighbor’s home. Perhaps out of jealousy, the boyfriend attacked the woman when she walked into the house. Her brother was there and broke up the fight by hitting the boyfriend who was passed out and slumped over a table when the brother left. Later the boyfriend attacked the woman again, and this time she knocked him unconscious. After checking the children, she went to bed. Later the woman’s 5-year old girl went downstairs to go to the bathroom. The unemployed man returned from the party at 3:45 a.m. and found the 5-year old dead. She had been raped, severely beaten over most of her body and strangled to death by the boyfriend. > > Following Rowe (1988: 120), the case of the fawn will be referred to > as “E1”, and the case of the little girl as “E2”. Further, following > William Alston’s (1991: 32) practice, the fawn will be named “Bambi” > and the little girl “Sue”. > > Rowe (1996: 264) states that, in choosing to focus on E1 and E2, he is > “trying to pose a serious difficulty for the theist by picking a > difficult case of natural evil, E1 (Bambi), and a difficult case of > moral evil, E2 (Sue).” Rowe, then, is attempting to state the > evidential argument in the strongest possible terms. As one > commentator has put it, “if these cases of evil [E1 and E2] are not > evidence against theism, then none are” (Christlieb 1992: 47). > However, Rowe’s almost exclusive preoccupation with these two > instances of suffering must be placed within the context of his belief > (as expressed in, for example, 1979: 337-38) that even if we > discovered that God could not have eliminated E1 and E2 without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse, it would still be unreasonable to believe this of all cases > of horrendous evil occurring daily in our world. E1 and E2 are thus > best viewed as representative of a particular class of evil which > poses a specific problem for theistic belief. This problem is > expressed by Rowe in the following way: > > - (P) No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s > permitting E1 or E2. Therefore, > > - (Q) It is likely that no good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that > being in permitting E1 or E2. > > P states that no good we know of justifies God in permitting E1 and > E2. From this it is inferred that Q is likely to be true, or that > probably there are no goods which justify God in permitting E1 and E2. > Q, of course, corresponds to the factual premise of Rowe’s argument. > Thus, Rowe attempts to establish the truth of the factual premise by > appealing to P. > > > **The Inference from P to Q** > > On what grounds does Rowe think that P is true? Rowe (1988: 120) states that “we have *good reason* to believe that no good state of affairs we know of would justify an omnipotent, omniscient being in permitting either E1 or E2” (emphasis his). The good reason in question consists of the fact that the good states of affairs we know of, when reflecting on them, meet one or both of the following conditions: either an omnipotent being could obtain them without having to permit E1 or E2, or obtaining them would not morally justify that being in permitting E1 or E2 (Rowe 1988: 121, 123; 1991: 72). > > This brings us, finally, to Rowe’s inference from P to Q. This is, of course, **an inductive inference**. Rowe does not claim to know or be able to prove that cases of intense suffering such as the fawn’s are indeed pointless. For as he acknowledges, it is quite possible that there is some familiar good outweighing the fawn’s suffering and which is connected to that suffering in a way unbeknown to us. Or there may be goods we are not aware of, to which the fawn’s suffering is intimately connected. **But although we do not know or cannot establish the truth of Q, we do possess rational grounds for accepting Q, and these grounds consist of the considerations adumbrated in P. Thus, the truth of P is taken to provide strong evidence for the truth of Q** (Rowe 1979: 337).

I have been studying the Trinity recently, and most of my studies have been from St. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologiae*, and he would agree that the persons are the divine Essence. One thing that confuses me is that Aquinas says the divine relations are the divine essence in the sense that we can use the terms "person" and "essence" interchangeably. [*Summa Theologicae*, Q. 28](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm#article3) , but, if the relations (the subsistent persons) are the divine essence, how does one get out of the idea that the "essence of God is begotten" or "spirated"? Even though Aquinas rejected this view, that the essence of God can be begotten, it just seems a bit confusing to say "Jesus (as the divine relation 'filiation') is the divine essence of God, but at the same time, the essence of God isn't begotten?" this seems to be violating the classical laws of logic that x=x.

The following is a more succinct presentation of the **Logical Problem of Evil** based on the original presentation found in the introduction of the article [Logical Problem of Evil | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://iep.utm.edu/evil-log/) : > **Logical Problem of Evil** > > The existence of evil and suffering in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that happen in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil and suffering. Furthermore, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. And yet we find that our world is filled with countless instances of evil and suffering. These facts about evil and suffering seem to conflict with the orthodox theist claim that there exists a perfectly good God. The challenge posed by this apparent conflict has come to be known as the problem of evil. > > This article addresses one form of that problem that is prominent in recent philosophical discussions–that the conflict that exists between the claims of orthodox theism and the facts about evil and suffering in our world is a logical one. This is the “logical problem of evil.” > **Formal argument** > 1. God is omnipotent (that is, all-powerful). > 2. God is omniscient (that is, all-knowing). > 3. God is perfectly good. > 4. Evil exists > 5. If God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world. > 6. If God is omniscient, he would know about all of the evil and suffering in the world and would know how to eliminate or prevent it. > 7. If God is perfectly good, he would want to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world. > 8. If God knows about all of the evil and suffering in the world, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent > it, and yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good. > 9. If God knows about all of the evil and suffering, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, wants to prevent it, and yet does not do so, > he must not be all- powerful. > 10. If God is powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and suffering, wants to do so, and yet does not, he must not know about > all of the suffering or know how to eliminate or prevent it—that is, > he must not be all-knowing. > 11. If evil and suffering exist, then God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. (from 8-10) > 12. God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. (from 4 and 11) > 13. God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. (from 1-3) > > There is no way that (12) and (13) could both be true at the same > time. These statements are logically inconsistent or contradictory. > > Statement (13) is simply the conjunction of (1) through (3) and > expresses the central belief of classical theism. However, > atheologians claim that statement (12) can also be derived from (1) > through (3). [Statements (5) through (11) purport to show how this is > done.] (12) and (13), however, are logically contradictory. Because a > contradiction can be deduced from statements (1) through (4) and > because all theists believe (1) through (4), atheologians claim that > theists have logically inconsistent beliefs. They note that > philosophers have always believed it is never rational to believe > something contradictory. So, the existence of evil and suffering makes > theists’ belief in the existence of a perfect God irrational. What are Christian responses, in terms of defenses and theodicies, to this specific presentation of the Logical Problem of Evil? Do they specifically challenge certain premises or steps in the argument's reasoning process? Answers that provide detailed insights into the challenged steps of the argument would be greatly appreciated.

This question is related to https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/97517/objections-to-natural-theology-at-the-time-of-vatican-i In contrast to the observance of natural phenomena in order to arrive at the conclusion that God exists, an [*ontological argument*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument) is one which draws the same conclusion from some source other than observation of the world; e.g., from reason alone. The first such well-known argument, I believe, is the one attributed to St. Anselm, which (though multiple versions exist) I paraphrase as: "God is that Being Whom nothing greater can be conceived" — the proof of which can be assembled by reading his *Proslogion*. His argument which one may infer therein became famous; and then criticized a century or so later by St. Thomas Aquinas. Many variations of Anselm's demonstration, as well as many criticisms, followed throughout the centuries. In the twentieth century, the great logician Kurt Gödel (probably following the writings of Leibniz rather than that of Anselm), formalized a logical argument (with parallels to Anselm) which has been hailed as correct. For those familiar with logical symbols, see, for example, [*Gödel Says God Exists and Proves It*](https://mindmatters.ai/2021/06/godel-says-god-exists-and-proves-it/) ; and his proof is this: Of course, the validity of [Gödel's argument](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_ontological_proof) (which is now widely accepted) depends on acceptance of his definitions (the Df.'s) and the inherent truth of his axioms (the Ax.'s). QUESTION: What (if anything) has the Catholic Church declared (by say, either Council or papal encyclical) about affirming God's existence by reason alone; i.e., by some (apparently correct) ontological argument?

**To clarify**, I'm not asking why God allows evil. I believe there are sufficient arguments for that. What I would like to know is: how can a righteous God **tolerate** evil without it affecting His nature as righteous? Are there any arguments for that, and is there any supporting evidence from the Bible to provide a basis for that belief? This question is based on a few passages: > Genesis 15:16 (NASB) : 16 Then in the fourth generation they will > return here, for the iniquity of the Amorite is not yet complete." This verse makes it clear that God tolerates evil, at least to some degree. > Psalm 5:4-5 (NASB) : 4 For You are not a God who takes pleasure in > wickedness; No evil can dwell with You. 5 The boastful will not stand > before Your eyes; You hate all who do injustice. This verse indicates that no evil can dwell with God. Righteousness cannot dwell with unrighteousness. However, what is the significance of God tolerating sin outside his dwelling as opposed to inside it? Not to mention that the omnipresence of God is taught in several places in scripture. Ex. > Psalm 139:7-10 (NASB) > > 7 Where can I go from Your Spirit? Or where can I flee from Your > presence? 8 If I ascend to heaven, You are there; If I make my bed > in Sheol, behold, You are there. 9 If I take up the wings of the > dawn, If I dwell in the remotest part of the sea, 10 Even there Your > hand will lead me, And Your right hand will take hold of me. I bring in this verse not to ask a second question but to show that even though evil is not in God's dwelling, it is still within the scope of His presence. This is to emphasize the question: how can a righteous God tolerate sin (for any duration of time) without being evil? Let me make the distinction more clear. **Why God Allows Evil:** This question concerns theodicy, which seeks to identify any conflict between a benevolent, omnipotent God and the evil and suffering in the world; in other words, it asks why a God who is good and powerful will allow evil to exist. **Why God Tolerates Evil on Earth:** This question focuses primarily on the evil that continues on earth, which means that God will allow or have some tolerance. Connecting to the broader question of why God permits evil, this question narrows the focus to understanding why God continues to tolerate its presence within our world.

God is the cause of all things, and the creator of all things. God is eternal, never ending and timeless, with no beginning or end. Him and all of his attributes are eternal and never ending. This might help you understand this question. Do you understand eternality in the abstract sense, do you have any abstraction that allows you to understand eternality? To put it, eternality here means never ending , however its the timeless eternality, something with no beginning and no end, God has no beginning and no end, if something has no beginning you can't apply seconds to it to count how long its existed because that doesn't apply to it. Unfortunately I've argued with lots of really dumb people, so I'm just going to say right now that the fact I'm showing a seeming contradiction is showing that I am starting to feel God isn't real, because him being the first cause seems to violate the law of non contradiction. This post is showing a contradiction in the existence of a first cause, meaning maybe its not possible for it to exist. You might not get this immediately so look at the second paragraph and read again, for now just read this:can you get this: a first cause is eternal, meaning it is timeless, never ending. You can't apply seconds to it if it is eternal, all of its processes are eternal, its process of causation is also eternal,, all of its processes are eternal, and its process of causation is eternal, thus since its causation process doesn't end, it will continue to cause forever and ever, being eternal in the timeless sense, without a beginning and end. Now, I say this: if a first causes causation doesn't end, it will continue to cause and cause the exact same thing as its causation of that thing doesn't end, however, this means that the law of identity would be violated, because how can there be two of the same thing , if it continues to cause that thing then that would mean there are two things that are the same, but everything is equal to itself, it would go agains't the law of identity, so how do we overcome this contradiction? I thought of something like,non beings don't have properties, and this is important because of the fact that we can say that our abstract understanding is wrong, but then I thought of this: maybe we can't define the being abstractly since its trancendent, and other things but it seems i need help from smeone else on this. Mind you, an inherent aspect of a first cause is its ability to cause, and its actual act of causing is also never ending, inherent here means it exists as a permanent aspect of it, because we know causation is an aspect of the first cause that is inherent to it, as if it wasn't permanent it would mean it had an aspect that was added to it, which is impossible because is eternal and timeless and can't change. So its causation being an inherent aspect of it is also eternal, and the process, non timely process which takes place in causing it is also never ending. There we go

This is a huge question. Do let me know if its immensity makes it off-topic for this site. I will start out my question with a quote from Schopenhauer: > *A man can do what he wills, but not will what he wills.* *The Basic Argument* logically proves how *free will* defined as *will over one's will* is logically impossible due to the infinite regress it entails. If we have this definition of free will, and we exercised will to shape our will, then this meta-will must also have been shaped by our meta-meta-will, and so on. So, if one wants to be logical, this sense of *free will* must be abandoned. What we are left with then is the definition of free will implicit in Schopenhauer's quote; *free will* is the ability to do what you want. That's not as clear-cut as it sounds like, as there are many additional details that needs hashing out. However, regardless of those details, we are left with the very counter-intuitive idea of a supposedly benevolent being punishing us for things that are, **ultimately**, beyond our will. What we want at any given moment is determined by who we are and our environment (and the randomness inherent in both of those). We do not have ultimate control over these things. If I could create a sentient, conscious robot that is programmed to want to destroy things around it, and it is given free reign to do so, then it has free will, yet to punish it for being destructive would be ridiculous. It chose to, but it didn't choose to choose to. So, if we do not will what we will, why does God punish us for our will?

Edit: The proposed duplicate cannot possibly be a duplicate, because I attempted to clarify the answer to this question in the proposed duplicate's comments, but was told to ask another official question. ----------------------------------------------- [This answer](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/89637/56378) follows temporal logic to reason that the Real Presence in the Eucharist is logically impossible: >Logically, it would be impossible for Jesus to be holding in his hand a piece of bread that had become his broken, sacrificial body, prior to that body having died in sacrifice. This is a defense of the statement [here](https://normangeisler.com/does-the-nt-support-the-rc-view-of-communion/) by [Norman Geisler](http://normangeisler.com/about/) : >It is not *possible* since Jesus would be holding himself in his own hand (when He said, “this is my body”). We know that Jesus is not bound by the physics that would prevent a man from walking on water (Matthew 14:25). Who teaches, and where can one find a defense, that Jesus is bound by the physics of time?

In his book *Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview*, William Lane Craig offers three arguments against Relative Identity. The first argument regards the alleged "spurious" nature of relative identity. Craig, quoting Peter Van Inwagen, argues that there are no known cases of relative identities that cannot be analyzed in terms of classical identity > Peter van Inwagen has sought to defend the coherence of such creedal > affirmations by appeal to relative identity. According to this notion, > the identity relation is not absolute but is relative to a sort of > thing. For example, we say, “The couch is the same color as the chair” > (not “The couch is the chair”) or “The Lord Mayor John is the same > person as the schoolboy Johnny” (not “The Lord Mayor is the schoolboy > Johnny”)... The fundamental problem with the appeal to relative > identity, however, is that the very notion of relative identity is > widely recognized to be spurious. Van Inwagen himself admits that > apart from trinitarian theology, there are no known cases of allegedly > relative identities that cannot be analyzed in terms of classical > identity. Our example of the couch and the chair is not any kind of > identity statement at all, for neither piece of furniture literally is > a color; rather, they have the same color as a property. The example > of the Lord Mayor is solved by taking seriously the tense of the > sentence; we should say, “The Lord Mayor was the schoolboy Johnny. The second argument is that if x and y can be the same N but not the same P in a relative identity statement, they also can't be the same anything. > Suppose that two things x and y could be the same N but could not be > the same P. In such a case x could not fail to be the same P as x > itself, but y could. Therefore, x and y are discernible and so cannot > be the same thing. But then it follows that they cannot be the same N, > since they cannot be the same anything. Identity must therefore be > absolute. Craig's third argument is that it is doubtful that x and y can be the same being without being the same person. > [E]ven granted relative identity, its application to trinitarian > doctrine involves highly dubious assumptions. For example, it must be > presupposed that x and y can be the identical being without being the > identical person. Notice how different this is from saying that x and > y are parts of the same being but are different persons. The latter > statement is like the affirmation that x and y are parts of the same > body but are different hands; the former is like the affirmation that > x and y are the identical body but are different hands. Van Inwagen > confesses that he has no answer to the questions of how x and y can be > the same being without being the same person or, more generally, how x > and y can be the same N without being the same P. It seems, then, that > the ability to state coherently the trinitarian claims under > discussion using the device of relative identity is a hollow victory. Are these valid critiques of Relative Identity Trinitarianism?

Arguments for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus strongly rely on testimonial evidence. Defenders of Jesus' resurrection as a historical fact typically argue that the writings of the New Testament are reliable first- or second-hand [eyewitness testimonies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eyewitness_testimony) in support of the resurrection, despite arguments to the contrary pointing out the implausibility of miracles (according to scientific common sense), the degree of uncertainty introduced by the antiquity of the writings (they were written about 2000 years ago) and the impossibility to interview the primary sources (all self-proclaimed eyewitnesses have long since died). Simply put, the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus consists of (1) the alleged first/second-hand eyewitness accounts compiled in the NT and (2) the willingness of early Christians to withstand persecution and martyrdom for what they believed to be true. Many find these two pieces of evidence put together compelling enough to warrant their belief in the resurrection. Others, more skeptical, would remain unwilling to accept the claim unless higher standards of evidence were to be presented. To the best of my knowledge, cessationists have no issue whatsoever in accepting Jesus' miraculous resurrection on the basis of this "testimonial argument" referenced above. That said, when it comes to the testimonial evidence of the spiritual gifts **after the apostolic age**, especially in modern times, an implicit double standard seems to be at play on the cessationist side. Contemporary firsthand accounts about how the spiritual gifts are still active abound. Unlike previous generations, in this internet era we have a privilege as never before to access an endless supply of firsthand eyewitness accounts witnessing to all kinds of miracles and supernatural experiences, including spiritual gifts such as tongues, words of knowledge, healings, etc. See the appendix below for a more exhaustive list of examples. Surprisingly, despite the abundancy, recency and accessibility of contemporary firsthand eyewitness testimonies, cessationists usually disregard this evidence altogether, judging it to be unreliable, while paradoxically believing the eyewitness accounts for the resurrection of Jesus. Isn't this a case of double standard? What kind of logically consistent epistemology can simultaneously regard (1) limited 2000-year-old testimonial evidence as reliable and (2) abundant, recent and accessible testimonial evidence as unreliable? ___________________ ### Appendix **Examples of evidence for the continuation of the spiritual gifts after the apostolic age:** - [Is there any historical evidence that the supernatural gifts of the Spirit were still in operation after the apostolic age?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/84305/50422) - [Charismatic Gifts in the Early Church: An Exploration into the Gifts of the Spirit During the First Three Centuries of the Christian Church](https://www.amazon.com/dp/0913573094) - [Are there any documented cases of Xenoglossy (i.e. “Acts 2:1-13 type” tongues, understood by a foreigner) in recent history (19th century on)?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/80486/50422) - [Are there any accounts of “words of knowledge” taking place outside of Pentecostal and Charismatic denominations?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/80327/50422) - [Are there or have there been Christian healing ministries that have documented healing cases with supporting medical records?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/82583/50422) - [Miracles Never Ceased: The History of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit to Today](https://www.kylewinkler.org/articles/miracles-never-ceased/) - [Why I Am Still Surprised by the Power of the Spirit: Discovering How God Speaks and Heals Today](https://rads.stackoverflow.com/amzn/click/com/031010811X) - [The Case for Miracles: A Journalist Investigates Evidence for the Supernatural](https://www.amazon.com/Case-Miracles-Journalist-Investigates-Supernatural/dp/0310259185) - [Miracles : 2 Volumes: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts](https://www.amazon.com/Miracles-volumes-Credibility-Testament-Accounts-ebook/dp/B007KOI2PY/) - [Miracles: Eyewitness to Some of the Greatest Miracles of Our Time](https://www.amazon.com/Miracles-R-W-Shambach/dp/0768428300/) - [The Miracles: A Medical Doctor Says Yes to Miracles!](https://www.amazon.com/Miracles-Medical-Doctor-Says-Yes/dp/B007RXEG58) - [The Shantung Revival (The Greatest Revival in Baptist Church History)](https://www.amazon.com/Shantung-Revival-Greatest-Baptist-History/dp/0974075612) - [Authentic Fire: A Response to John MacArthur's Strange Fire](https://www.amazon.com/Authentic-Fire-Response-MacArthurs-Strange/dp/1629984558) - [How often do Christian missionaries report occurrences of miracles while on the mission field?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/79994/50422) - [Listen to Me, Satan!](https://www.amazon.com/Listen-Me-Satan-Carlos-Annacondia/dp/1599792346) - Etc.