What are Christian responses to the Logical Problem of Evil?

The following is a more succinct presentation of the **Logical Problem of Evil** based on the original presentation found in the introduction of the article [Logical Problem of Evil | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://iep.utm.edu/evil-log/) : > **Logical Problem of Evil** > > The existence of evil and suffering in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that happen in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil and suffering. Furthermore, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. And yet we find that our world is filled with countless instances of evil and suffering. These facts about evil and suffering seem to conflict with the orthodox theist claim that there exists a perfectly good God. The challenge posed by this apparent conflict has come to be known as the problem of evil. > > This article addresses one form of that problem that is prominent in recent philosophical discussions–that the conflict that exists between the claims of orthodox theism and the facts about evil and suffering in our world is a logical one. This is the “logical problem of evil.” > **Formal argument** > 1. God is omnipotent (that is, all-powerful). > 2. God is omniscient (that is, all-knowing). > 3. God is perfectly good. > 4. Evil exists > 5. If God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world. > 6. If God is omniscient, he would know about all of the evil and suffering in the world and would know how to eliminate or prevent it. > 7. If God is perfectly good, he would want to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world. > 8. If God knows about all of the evil and suffering in the world, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent > it, and yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good. > 9. If God knows about all of the evil and suffering, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, wants to prevent it, and yet does not do so, > he must not be all- powerful. > 10. If God is powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and suffering, wants to do so, and yet does not, he must not know about > all of the suffering or know how to eliminate or prevent it—that is, > he must not be all-knowing. > 11. If evil and suffering exist, then God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. (from 8-10) > 12. God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. (from 4 and 11) > 13. God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. (from 1-3) > > There is no way that (12) and (13) could both be true at the same > time. These statements are logically inconsistent or contradictory. > > Statement (13) is simply the conjunction of (1) through (3) and > expresses the central belief of classical theism. However, > atheologians claim that statement (12) can also be derived from (1) > through (3). [Statements (5) through (11) purport to show how this is > done.] (12) and (13), however, are logically contradictory. Because a > contradiction can be deduced from statements (1) through (4) and > because all theists believe (1) through (4), atheologians claim that > theists have logically inconsistent beliefs. They note that > philosophers have always believed it is never rational to believe > something contradictory. So, the existence of evil and suffering makes > theists’ belief in the existence of a perfect God irrational. What are Christian responses, in terms of defenses and theodicies, to this specific presentation of the Logical Problem of Evil? Do they specifically challenge certain premises or steps in the argument's reasoning process? Answers that provide detailed insights into the challenged steps of the argument would be greatly appreciated.