Whenever we buy something there are many effects, some of which are not good. Some examples include supporting places of work that are rife with immodesty and are an unnecessary near occasion of sin to the people working there, companies supporting sinful behavior, companies doing unethical things, and the government using the tax to fund unjust wars. In these situations we must make use of the principle of double effect. One of the requirements for the action being permissible is that there be a *proportionately grave reason* to do it. I think it's fair to say that nothing other than sustenance and religious activities rises to this level. But since it doesn't, does that mean purchasing anything unnecessary is the mortal sin of scandal (*some word or deed that is itself evil* (funding evil stuff) *or has the appearance of evil* (not caring about funding evil stuff) *and provides an occasion of sin to another* (giving people money for doing evil things))?

Is doubting the truth of Christianity enough to make a proximate occasion of sin necessary (rather than free)? For example, imagine Bob is subject to many proximate occasions of sin against the 6th commandment. He could alter his lifestyle to remove these occasions of sin, however he is also not quite convinced that Catholicism (or even Christianity) is true. But in his situation there is no way for him to continue his inquiries without the danger of these occasions of sin. Does the danger to faith make these occasions of sin necessary and thus permissible?

Given the biblical call to submit to governing authorities (e.g., Romans 13:1–2, 1 Peter 2:13–17), and yet also the examples of godly resistance (e.g., Acts 5:29, Daniel 3, Exodus 1), is it ever appropriate for a Christian to protest government actions? If so, what would such a protest look like in a way that remains faithful to the character and teachings of Christ—especially in light of commands to love enemies, be peacemakers, and turn the other cheek? Are there historical or biblical examples that support the idea of Christ-like protest? How have various Christian traditions understood this tension between submission and resistance?

Isn't the point of the life of Jesus to get us to change our hearts and change our behaviors? Shouldn't then the main defining feature of denominations be essentially to what degree you are asked to love? To renounce this world? To the ethical standards you are held? So e.g. a certain denomination might be defined as people who say they believe in the message of Jesus, sing some songs, eat/drink some food, and go once a week. Another denomination might be defined by being of believers who don't eat meat, are pacifist, share all possessions in common, shave their head/beard, and refrain from 300 other nefarious practices, all while partaking in a high church style liturgy 3 times a day and spending at least 3 hours a day in deep centering prayer. In these example denominations, what really defines them is their behavior. Their behavior is downstream of the love, renunciation, peace, joy etc. present in their hearts. But you really don't need sophisticated beliefs to get your heart right. You need to change your desires and your behavior. So again, why are so many denominations defined by abstract, metaphysical matters of theology? Why aren't they defined solely by the behaviors and the desires they are aiming to cultivate or relinquish? Jesus was no theologian. Jesus was a man of action.

With the rise of brain-computer interface technologies like Elon Musk’s Neuralink , which aim to enhance cognitive functions such as memory, learning speed, and attention, how do Christian theologians and denominations view the use of such implants purely for enhancement rather than healing or therapeutic purposes? Would using such technologies be seen as overstepping the boundaries of God’s design for the human mind, or could they be interpreted as a legitimate form of human innovation and stewardship over creation? Are there any official statements, theological writings, or denominational positions—particularly from Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant perspectives—that address this issue, either directly or through applicable principles?

In Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 11:29 (KJV) it says: >"Bring not every man into thine house: for the deceitful man hath many trains." This verse, from the Deuterocanonical books recognized in the Catholic canon, seems to advise caution in offering hospitality, warning that some people may be deceptive or dangerous. At the same time, Jesus teaches us to love our enemies (Luke 6:27–36), bless those who curse us, and be merciful even as our Father is merciful. How does Catholic teaching reconcile the wisdom of Sirach 11:29 with Jesus' call to radical love and kindness? Is this a contradiction, or a matter of prudence and discernment within charity?

I was in a debate with someone recently who claimed that "God does not require governments to follow Christian behaviour", even if those governments are composed of Christians, are elected by Christians, and explicitly call themselves Christian. The claim is that this means it's OK for Christians to vote for a government that violates Christian behaviour on a regular basis. I'm interested in arguments *against* this position, and in order not to make this question an argument let's restrict ourselves to reasons that governments *should* (in general) follow Christian teaching. I'm aware that there will be some things that governments are permitted to do that a private individual shouldn't, like enforce the law or go to war, but I'm not talking about those. I'm interested in countering the idea that governments may do anything they like, no matter how much it contradicts Christian teaching. Answers from a Protestant viewpoint preferred, especially Evangelical Protestant.

N.b.: I originally posted this question in the Philosophy stack, but then realized it was more appropriate, and might get more informed answers, here. In a famous article, Anscombe castigates "Modern Moral Philosophy" (including but not limited to consequentialism) as "quite incompatible with the Hebrew-Christian ethic. For **it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good; vicarious punishment**...," which in contrast consequentialists can sometimes allow for sufficiently good consequences. (p.10) Many other Christian apologists make similar claims. Yet I have also seen many Christian apologists--and often the same ones--bend over backwards to defend, e.g., the drowning of babies in the Biblical flood, the slaughter of the Canaanite civilian population after a war victory, etc., as well as vicarious punishment: of the Egyptian first-born, of children "to the third and fourth generation" (Num 14:18), etc. Even Christians who do not take these stories literally at least generally say that they reveal something about the character of God and morality, and so have to excuse them away--giving special reasons (consequentialist or otherwise) for why these cases of innocent-killing and vicarious punishment are justified. So my question is, **is Anscombe's quoted claim simply and quite obviously wrong, or can something be said in its defense?** The only thing I sometimes see apologists say about this is that these moral obligations only apply to humans, not to God, though this is odd if God is supposed to be morally good. But even for God, these actions are often excused on account of being part of his "plan," i.e., because in some way (perhaps unknowable to us) these will lead to good consequences. I am not asking whether any of these arguments are plausible, but simply whether they /exist/ and fit Anscombe's description of what Christian ethics supposedly does not do. If so, then these are not innovations of "modern moral philosophy" but old hat strategies which Christian moralists have been using for centuries. So is she just the pot calling the kettle black? Or does she really have a point in saying that there is something novel about modern consequentialist morality which is not present in the history of Christian apologetics? Note that I am well aware that Christian moralists have not historically espoused consequentialism as a general theory, at least before William Paley. But espousing this theory is different from making occasional consequentialist arguments in specific cases. It is also possible that the modern apologists I read giving such arguments are in fact a novelty, and that historical theologians didn't do this, so that perhaps Anscombe's criticism should be extended to "Modern Moral Theology" insofar as she might think it has been infected by a consequentialist thinking anathema to Christian tradition. This is an interesting question; did Augustine, Aquinas, etc., *never* make consequentialist arguments for God's doing or commanding such things? But again, it's not my full question, for Anscombe is claiming that Christians *never* gave justifications for ever doing these things, consequentialist or otherwise. But this seems false, for "I am God," or "I have been commanded by God to do/allow these things" apparently *was* such a justification in some such cases.

Does the Catholic teaching on *remote material cooperation* imply that you should live at the level of bare sustenance? As I understand it there is *formal cooperation*, which is if you share the intention of the sin you are cooperating with, and there is *material cooperation* which is if you don't. There is not an easy distinction between *proximate* and *remote* material cooperation other than that *immediate* material cooperation (cooperation in the execution of the sinful act per se) is always proximate. Otherwise they *"can be distinguished, in relation to the "distance" (be it in terms of temporal space or material connection) between the act of cooperation and the sinful act committed by someone else."* However if it is *immediate* (*"the cooperation is in the execution of the sinful action per se, rather than the agent acting by fulfilling the conditions - either by providing instruments or products - which make it possible to commit the immoral act"*), then it is always proximate and hence(?) forbidden (As far as I know *immediate material* cooperation is always forbidden but as for *mediate proximate material* cooperation I'm not sure). As I understand it *remote material cooperation* is acceptable as long as there is a "proportionate" reason to do so. This is obviously true because it would be impossible to live in the same society as sinners if all *remote material cooperation* were sinful. But this seems to lead to the conclusion that you shouldn't buy or use anything that isn't strictly necessary for survival or religious practice because how could this be a proportionate reason for cooperating with sin?

Is drunkenness necessarily a sin, like hating God, or is it just because God decreed it to be? This is of particular interest to me because Rabbinic Judaism claims that it is not (It's only allowed on Purim) hence one could argue the following: 1. Rabbinic Judaism says that getting drunk is not (always) a sin. 2. But getting drunk is always a sin. 3. :. Rabbinic Judaism is false. Is this a sound argument? I know Aquinas and the Catholic Church would say yes, but advocates of some versions of divine command theory might say no. But it's also true that getting intoxicated can be allowed in a medical context although presumably in that case you're in a sort of controlled environment and there's a proportionate risk of bodily harm. Also Judaism concedes that sins committed due to getting drunk on Purim are still sins hence doing so may be a sin for some people. **Note:** Just for clarification, especially for those who don't speak English natively, we're talking about getting severely intoxicated, not just drinking alcohol.

The [is–ought problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem) was articulated by David Hume. >Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his book, [*A Treatise of Human Nature*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature) (1739): > >> In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason. > >Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how exactly can an "ought" be derived from an "is"? The question, prompted by Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is impossible. > > In modern times, "Hume's law" often denotes the informal thesis that, if a reasoner only has access to non-moral factual premises, the reasoner cannot logically infer the truth of moral statements; or, more broadly, that one cannot infer evaluative statements (including aesthetic statements) from non-evaluative statements. An alternative definition of Hume's law is that "If P implies Q, and Q is moral, then P is moral". This interpretation-driven definition avoids a loophole with the principle of explosion. Other versions state that the is–ought gap can technically be formally bridged without a moral premise, but only in ways that are formally "vacuous" or "irrelevant", and that provide no "guidance". For example, one can infer from "The Sun is yellow" that "Either the Sun is yellow, or it is wrong to murder". But this provides no relevant moral guidance; absent a contradiction, one cannot deductively infer that "it is wrong to murder" solely from non-moral premises alone, adherents argue. Even if we assume the existence of God—along with the claims that God prefers X, opposes Y, rewards those who meet conditions Z, punishes those who meet conditions W, and created a universe that operates according to laws R—these are all merely *is* statements. They describe the state of reality, including God as a part of that reality. We can similarly catalog *is* statements about human nature: what humans like, dislike, what promotes well-being, what causes suffering. We could fill volumes with descriptions drawn from physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, neuroscience, and even alleged spiritual truths about how the divine or supernatural realms function. Yet, no matter how comprehensive this collection of *is* statements becomes, it remains unclear how any *ought* logically emerges from them. It is not clear why we *ought* to act in any specific way based on the facts about how reality *is*. Does Christianity have a robust solution to the *is-ought problem*?

What is God's law mentioned in this article [*Asceticism Vs. Self-Denial*](https://tifwe.org/aceticism-vs-self-denial/) ? Is it referring to the Ten Commandments? I'm new to Christianity, apologies if this is a noob question 😅

I'm looking for a Biblical response to this question. And it's not specific to bin Laden but I'm just using him as an example. I know Jesus said [love your enemies](http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%205:43-48&version=NIV1984) . And [Paul even showed how this can be a form of revenge](http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans%2012:20&version=NIV1984) . But I can't help but wonder if a Christian could at least be relieved or rejoice that the Bin Ladens and Hitlers of the world were killed.

What cannot licitly be bought and sold, according to Thomist Catholic moral theologians? (I know buying/selling relics is forbidden.)

While I’m aware that the Catholic Church teaches that having sex after a vasectomy (or getting your tubes tied for women) is sinful because it is an act of contraception, I was wondering if the church taught that the act of vasectomy itself was sinful. Would a person who got one be sinning even if he never had sex for the rest of his life?

is piracy always a sin ? i have games from old consoles and emulators of arcade and console many of these games are not avaliable anymore but on internet so if i download music games programs am i sinning ? is sharing content a piracy act and a sin against God ? i know we must obey the law but depending on the country is not ilegal (i.e in spain is not illegal downloading )

In Nehemiah 6:10-14, Shemaiah tries to get Nehemiah to meet with him in the temple and close the door, alleging (falsely) that people will try to kill Nehemiah at night otherwise. The goal was to get Nehemiah to sin, but Nehemiah refused, saying that someone like himself could never go to the temple to save his life. Would this contradict situation ethics? If Nehemiah followed situation ethics, wouldn't entering the temple to save his life been permissible?

I've come across people who claim piracy to be a theft that breaks one of the Ten Commandments (a sin against God). Yet, I've considered the matter and opined the following. 1) Equal Opportunities: It is a given, taking into consideration poor countries like India also, that not everyone is in a position to earn as much as his fellow brother, be that due to being born in poor circumstances, in the schooling privileges given him, in mental gifts given him, as in intelligence, ability to learn, ability to carry out work. Everyone has differences in this regard. There is also the point of what he can afford given the economic status of his neighbourhood, wealth and health of his families that he must earn for too. 2) Taking note of the above, Unfair Pricing and Class Distinction: It always amazes me when a person who is well above his means wants to force a doctrine of morality on others, in that piracy is a theft. I will just say, let pricing be governed according to class. Let the poor pay one thing, let the middle class pay one thing, and let the rich pay thrice the amount for his every need than the poor. And let's see if the "fairness" of the hearts of the rich is willing to still cope with such. 3) Is piracy immoral: The Bible does mention that anything that is kept away from you unfairly, you have the right to take it. What I think of that, I will not say, but I mentioned it as it might be related to this. What does the Church think about the morality of piracy?

According to Catholic teaching, would it be a mortal sin if a Catholic were to knowingly pass on their sickness to another person? For example, say that a Catholic has an important project that they have been working on at their workplace and he/she is very close to finishing this project, however, he/she unfortunately comes down with the flu and so he/she needs to take time off from work to recover from the flu. Say that this Catholic were to then decide to return to work before he/she has fully recovered from the flu, because he/she is afraid or paranoid that their project will fail due to their absence, and he/she believes that a failed project could lead to them being terminated from their job. A few days later, several of his/her coworkers come down with the flu and they have to miss work due to coming down with the flu. Has this Catholic commited a mortal sin by knowingly passing on the flu to his/her coworkers?

Recently I heard from my devout religious acquaintance that, according to Christian (Catholic) faith, a cloned individual wouldn't actually be a person. She explained that a human being consists of a body and a soul (it's the philosophy of St Thomas, the conception is derived form Aristotle, I suppose). As the flesh can be created by scientists, only God can grant something (somebody) with a soul. As cloning is — according to her — an artificial way of creating a man, you can't divide the spirit like you can split the cells. So I’m asking you a question: Is this really part of Catholic ethics? I understand that the Church is against cloning, but this is the first time I’ve heard that the “effect” of it is, so to say, punished. The same could apply to *in vitro* conception, but I suppose cloning could be taken as a more radical version of this.