Is doubting the truth of Christianity enough to make a proximate occasion of sin necessary (rather than free)? For example, imagine Bob is subject to many proximate occasions of sin against the 6th commandment. He could alter his lifestyle to remove these occasions of sin, however he is also not quite convinced that Catholicism (or even Christianity) is true. But in his situation there is no way for him to continue his inquiries without the danger of these occasions of sin. Does the danger to faith make these occasions of sin necessary and thus permissible?

Recent personal experiences have made a close relative question their Christian beliefs to a far extent. They still believe in the possibility of an all-knowing God but question specific characteristics of Protestant-Christianity such as Priesthood. They strongly believe every Christian should have equal and direct access to God, preferring to align towards agnosticism. From the perspective of protestant-catholicism (Anglicanism) can this individual be said to be an unbeliever?

We Christians say the devil is responsible for our sins and temptations. However, I don't see how this can coexist with scientific knowledge. Specifically, we know that life has adapted over time to surviving and reproducing as much as possible (after all, that is what causes more similar lifeforms to arise - it's called natural selection). This includes hormonal systems in the brain that create a positive response to things like reproduction (sex) or eating (gluttony), along with other behaviors like the challenging of authority, or the seeking of (evil) novelties to carry out, which positively impact the species' prosperity. However, this also extends to "rational" (non-chemical) sins as well. In the end, every lie, every insult and even every murder comes from an underlying reasoning (in the latter case, it comes from a reasoning which has been heavily corrupted by the conditions in which one has developed, but the point still holds). Bearing in mind all this, how can we say that there is an external influence "creating" these sins and temptations when it is the internal systems of the brain that are? Saying so would be like saying that demons are responsible for our survival, or like saying that they created these systems in the first place (which, inevitable as they are due to the conditions of the Earth, would imply that they would have created the Earth itself!) Where does this reasoning go wrong?

Every time I revisit questions about God's nature on Biblical Hermeneutics Stack Exchange I can't help but come out with more doubts than convictions. For example, take a look at the following questions: - [Is Paul suggesting in Eph. 4:6 that Jesus and the Holy Spirit are not God?](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/q/70188/38524) - [Is 2 Corinthians 13:11-14 an assertion that God is three equal Persons?](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/q/55344/38524) - [“Very truly, I tell you, before Abraham was, I am.” - why did the Jews want to throw stones at Jesus for saying this?](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/q/55803/38524) - [What does it mean to be "equal with God" in John 5:18?](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/q/60302/38524) - [What does "equality with God" mean, and how can it be "exploited"? Philippians 2:6](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/q/55612/38524) - [What can we learn about the relationship between "God" and "the Spirit of God" ontologically from 1 Corinthians 2:6-16?](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/q/55640/38524) - [Is the Son second in authority under God the Father? 1 Corinthians 15:24-28](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/q/55872/38524) When questions about Christology, Pneumatology and the nature of God in general can cause so much debate and doctrinal division among Christians, with arguments both for and against each conceivable position, it is very hard for me to accept the idea that one has to embrace a particular doctrinal position about God's nature **as an essential condition for salvation**, as opposed to simply withholding judgement. Personally, I see no other way to hold a strong conviction about the nature of God than God Himself revealing these details about Himself in a crystal clear manner to the individual, through a special revelation. **Question**: Are there any Christian groups or denominations that do not see having a definite doctrinal position on God's nature as essential for salvation, even if they, personally, have one? Or in more colloquial terms, are there any Christian groups or denominations that either lack a definite doctrinal position on God's nature OR believe in one but say *"we believe that God's nature is best described by X, but if you are not sure or have doubts about X, that's okay, you can still be saved"* ? ___ Related: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/86199/50422

In 1842, Joseph Smith, the founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS) acquired writings in Egyptian hieroglyphics.These writings were genuine hieroglyphs and were the bases for his translation, the Book of Abraham (see sample in Wikipedia). But, after the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, linguists ascertained that Joseph Smith's translation of the hieroglyphs was not only inaccurate, but better described as fraudulent. His hieroglyphs contained no theological information and nothing about the biblical Patriarch Abraham. Thus,the main question arises,if Joseph Smith fraudulently translated his Book of Abraham, then what is the probability that he also committed fraud in his Book of Mormon, the very centerpiece of LDS?

Sometimes Christians will doubt their faith and I was wondering is the doubt come from God or Satan? Is there evidence to back up your answer?

Human emotions and reasoning doubt every proof that is given under Christian theology. Why do not they have definite prove that eliminates all sources of doubts? Like in mathematics * "1 + 1 = 2" * "All right angles are equal to each other" * "The sum of two sides in a triangle is greater than the third side." All these statements above can be definitely proved and leave no room for doubt (another possible condition in which statement could be false is impossible). Now, If I choose to disbelieve the biblical message then I will have to face eternal punishment (if it is true). I cannot confirm it or deny it through any means present to me for 100 percent surety. ***Why did not God gave a definite proof that eliminates all sources of doubts to the biblical message, so that other conditions are not even possible in reality? Has any Christian theologist commented on this?*** Please do not call any proof as definite in the answer as if one really looks at the current status of proofs, they are debatable. Example: Every creation has a creator. Problem: We do not know universe was created or it existed for infinite time with no beginning. also do not use this verse as an answer > “What I am doing, you do not understand now, but you will understand > later.” > > John 13:7

[Leonard Susskind - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonard_Susskind) : > Leonard Susskind (/ˈsʌskɪnd/; born June 16, 1940) is an American theoretical physicist, Professor of theoretical physics at Stanford University and founding director of the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Physics. His research interests are string theory, quantum field theory, quantum statistical mechanics and quantum cosmology. He is a member of the US National Academy of Sciences, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, an associate member of the faculty of Canada's Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, and a distinguished professor of the Korea Institute for Advanced Study. Susskind was interviewed for the program [Closer to Truth](https://closertotruth.com/video/susle-002/?referrer=8041) , where he explained his reasons for *agnosticism* regarding the question of God’s existence. The video lasts 7 minutes (you need to click on the *Long Video* option in the *FORMATS* section), but below is my attempt to summarize the essence of his reasons for being agnostic: > Susskind is agnostic about God because, if God exists, He remains hidden behind a metaphorical "curtain" of knowledge. In front of this curtain lies all the scientific understanding we have accumulated from studying nature, while behind it are open questions we have yet to answer—such as the origin of the universe, what happened before the Big Bang, and so forth. Susskind believes we currently have no way to investigate these mysteries, including the concept of God. For him, God is a hypothesis that cannot be confirmed or falsified by any known scientific means. Since the question of God remains undecidable and beyond our current ways of acquiring knowledge, Susskind remains agnostic. Are there Christian responses to this agnostic perspective, which views God as a mysterious hypothesis hidden "behind a curtain" and beyond the reach of scientific investigation? What might Christians suggest to someone like Susskind, a theoretical physicist, as a meaningful way to "investigate" God beyond the limits of scientific inquiry?

I asked this question: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/103636/81556 . The question references the conversion of Blaise Pascal as an example. In response, a user commented the following: > The question assumes that Pascal was in fact directly converted by God. **What reason is there to believe the Christian God decided to do this to him, as opposed to someone else's similar experience by a Hindu god?** The experiences can't both be real. But are they both delusional? How can you know? ¶ This isn't a site for asking about truth. The question should present some denomination's view of the situation, and the question should be about how that denomination thinks God makes his decisions. A good answer will be equally acceptable to a Christian, a Hindu, and an Atheist. Are there Christians who are skeptical of conversion stories like Blaise Pascal's? If yes, why?

[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apatheism#Apathetic_agnosticism) defines *apathetic agnosticism* as follows: >### Apathetic agnosticism >A view related to apatheism, apathetic agnosticism claims that no amount of debate can prove or disprove the existence of one or more deities, and if one or more deities exist, they do not appear to be concerned about the fate of humans; therefore, their existence has little to no impact on personal human affairs. This view has also been called *Pragmatic Agnosticism*. The Wikipedia article also provides a reference to a [source](https://web.archive.org/web/20070807021506/http://www.apatheticagnostic.com/ourchurch/faith.html) which further elaborates upon the concept: >### Commentary on the Articles of Faith > This section contains all that is really important. All the rest of this extensive website is mere expansion on these fundamentals, or filler and amusements. (That is not intended to imply that you would not find it interesting to explore some of the other sections.) If you understand and accept these Articles of Faith, then you are an Apathetic Agnostic, whether or not you can be bothered to actually join the Church. > > **1. The existence of a Supreme Being is unknown and unknowable.** > > To believe in the existence of a god is an act of faith. To believe in the nonexistence of a god is likewise an act of faith. There is no evidence that there is a Supreme Being nor is there evidence there is not a Supreme Being. Faith is not knowledge. We can only state with assurance that we do not know. > > **2. If there is a Supreme Being, then that being appears to act as if apathetic to events in our universe.** > > All events in our Universe, including its beginning, can be explained with or without the existence of a Supreme Being. Thus, if there is indeed a God, then that god has had no more impact than no god at all. To all appearances, any purported Supreme Being is indifferent to our Universe and to its inhabitants. > > **3. We are apathetic to the existence or nonexistence of a Supreme Being.** > > If there is a God, and that God does not appear to care, then there is no reason to concern ourselves with whether or not a Supreme Being exists, nor should we have any interest in satisfying the purported needs of that Supreme Being. However, our apathy to the question of God's existence does not necessarily mean we are apathetic about promoting agnosticism. What reasons does Christianity offer to reject one or more main tenets of *apathetic agnosticism*? For instance, are there compelling reasons to *care* about (rather than remain apathetic toward) the question of a Supreme Being's existence? Or, are there reasons to reject agnosticism (*we don’t know*) in favor of a more definitive stance on either side (*theism* vs. *atheism*)?

> Hence it comes that, if there are as many risks on one side as on the > other, the course is to play even; and then the certainty of the stake > is equal to the uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from the fact > that there is an infinite distance between them. And so our > proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in > a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the > infinite to gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of any > truths, this is one. "I confess it, I admit it. But still is there no > means of seeing the faces of the cards?"—Yes, Scripture and the rest, > &c.—"Yes, but I have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to > wager, and am not free. I am not released, **and am so made that I** > **cannot believe**. **What then would you have me do?**" > > ### [The Heart Has Its Reasons] > > True. **But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason** > **brings you to this, and you cannot believe**. **Endeavor then to > convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the > abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not > know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the > remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who > now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way > which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would > be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they > believe, taking the holy water, having masses said, &c. Even this will > naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness**.—"But this is > what I am afraid of"—And why? What have you to lose? > > But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will > lessen the passions, which are your stumbling—blocks. > > **The heart has its reasons which reason does not know**. We feel it in a > thousand things. I say that the heart naturally loves the Universal > Being, and also itself naturally, according as it gives itself to > them; and it hardens itself against one or the other at its will. You > have rejected the one, and kept the other. Is it by reason that you > love yourself? > > **It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then,** > **is faith; God felt by the heart, not by reason.** > > Source: https://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/introbook2.1/x4404.html It seems to me that Blaise Pascal is suggesting that one can "fake it till you make it"—that by acting as if one believes that God exists, genuine belief will eventually follow, thus "curing" unbelief. And this cure will actually take the form of one somehow experiencing God in one's heart (whatever Pascal exactly meant by that), as opposed to a logical/rational conclusion being grasped by reason. Hence the well-known *"The heart has its reasons which reason does not know"*. Is my understanding of Pascal more or less correct? If so, what is the Biblical basis for his approach? --- NOTE. I asked a similar question on Philosophy Stack Exchange: [Is Blaise Pascal's approach to "curing unbelief" in the proposition that God exists philosophically sound?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/113993/66156)

In a Christian worldview, is Satan the main force behind atheism? If so, how exactly does this occur? I'm intrigued by this conundrum because if Satan actively influences individuals to adopt atheism, he must achieve two objectives simultaneously: 1. He (or his demonic agents) must intervene in the physical world somehow to convince a person to embrace atheism. 2. He must execute this influence in a masterfully subtle manner, ensuring the individual remains completely unaware of the spiritual manipulation prompting their atheistic beliefs. Think of notable atheists, such as [Richard Dawkins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins) , and notable agnostics, such as [Carl Sagan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Sagan) . If Satan indeed played a role in shaping Dawkins' atheism and Sagan's agnosticism, this would suggest a sophisticated mastery of subliminal manipulation. Because both Dawkins and Sagan never acknowledged any Satanic influence behind their beliefs, and in fact, if they were presented with the hypothetical manipulation scenario I'm entertaining, they would likely dismiss it with a laugh, seeing it as nothing more than a far-fetched thought experiment. How do Satan and his demons manipulate individuals into embracing atheism (or agnosticism) while remaining completely undetected? What are the mechanisms behind this imperceptible and subconscious manipulation, and is there a means within Christianity to unveil and expose this influence, bringing it to the individual's conscious awareness?

Most atheists & agnostics are known for practicing [scientific skepticism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_skepticism) . They reject any miracle/supernatural claims unless solid scientific evidence is provided. A consequence of this epistemological standard is that most atheists end up discounting all testimonies of the supernatural, which unfortunately also includes all known arguments for the resurrection of Jesus (the cornerstone miracle of Christianity) that are grounded in historical/testimonial evidence. But what about Christians? How much epistemological value do Christians ascribe to testimonial accounts? How much respect do they have for scientific skepticism? Are Christians more willing to accept extraordinary claims based on testimonial accounts, even if no scientific evidence is provided? **Note**: if different Christian denominations or groups have different epistemological standards, I would appreciate an overview of these (main differences and similarities). ____ **Related questions (food for thought)** - [Epistemic value of multiple eyewitness accounts: single event vs. multiple events given a fixed number of eyewitnesses?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/93007/48437) (<<<< HIGHLY RECOMMENDED) - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/89886/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/84581/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/90292/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/83141/50422

I have previously asked two questions about the "Skeptic's Prayer": - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/99697/61679 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/99731/61679 Upon reflection, I find that while complete certainty regarding the validity of this form of prayer may not be fully established, I'm highly persuaded that a reasonable case in favor of the legitimacy of the "Skeptic's Prayer" can be constructed based on Scripture. However, I encountered an [article](https://infidels.org/library/modern/robby-berry-skeprayr/) articulating a distinct set of objections to the prayer. The author, an atheist, contends that the prayer falls short of fulfilling the criteria for a valid scientific test. I will quote the first paragraphs of the article: > **A Response To “The Skeptic’s Prayer”** > > **Robby Berry** > > “The Skeptic’s Prayer” is a tract taken from the Handbook Of Christian Apologetics, by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli. > I first learned of the tract when Jeff Lowder posted it to the Usenet > newsgroup, alt.atheism. What follows is my response to the tract. > > > **Introduction** > > *The following prayer is based on Jeremiah 29:12,13: “Then you will call upon me and come and pray to me, and I will listen to you. You > will seek me and find me when you seek me with all your heart.”* > > > > **Concept** > > *If you are an honest scientist, here is a way to find out whether Christianity is true or not. Perform the relevant experiment. To test > the hypothesis that someone is behind the door, knock. To test the > Christian hypothesis that Christ is behind the door, knock.* > > > > *How do you knock? Pray! Tell Christ you are seeking the truth– seeking him, if he is truth. Ask him to fulfill his promise that all > who seek him will find him. In his own time, of course. He promised > that you would find, but he didn’t promise a schedule. He’s a lover, > not a train.* > > There is a serious problem with this “scientific” experiment. Suppose > you try the experiment, and nothing happens right away. How long do > you wait until you conclude that the experiment has failed to reveal > the existence of God? If nothing happens, is it because God does not > exist, or because God simply hasn’t gotten around to answering yet, or > because God is for some reason unable to contact us, or because God > does not wish to contact us, or because of some other reason? > > > *But, you man reply, I don’t know whether Christ is God. I don’t even know whether there is a God. That’s all right; you can pray the prayer* > *of the skeptic*. > > > > **Skeptic’s Prayer** > > *“God, I don’t know whether you even exist. I’m a skeptic. I doubt. I think you may be only a myth. But I’m not certain (at least when I’m > completely honest with myself). So if you do exist, and if you really > did promise to reward all seekers, you must be hearing me now. So I > hereby declare myself a seeker, a seeker of the truth, whatever it is > and wherever it is. I want to know the truth and live the truth. If > you are the truth, please help me.”* > > > > *If Christianity is true, he will. Such a prayer constitutes a scientifically fair test of the Christian hypotheses– that is, if you > do not put unfair restrictions of God, like demanding a miracle (your > way, not his) or certainly by tomorrow (your time, not his). The > demand that God act like your servant is hardly a scientifically fair > test of the hypothesis that there is a God who is your King.* The rest of the article contains language that may be perceived as too offensive, and including it would also make the quote excessively long. However, the gist of the objections presented in the article can be summarized as follows: **1. Lack of Specific Criteria for an Answered Prayer:** The Skeptic's Prayer lacks clarity on what specific results would indicate an answered prayer, making the experiment vague and inconclusive. **2. Absence of Scientific Methodology:** The tract claims to present a scientifically fair test but fails to adhere to the principles of the scientific method by not defining clear criteria for success or failure. **3. Rejection of Specificity as "Unfair Restrictions":** The authors dismiss the idea of specifying criteria for an answered prayer as "unfair restrictions," but this rejection of specificity hinders the experiment's meaningfulness and objectivity. **4. Ambiguity in Recognizing God's Revelation:** The experiment does not provide a clear definition of what circumstances or events would constitute God revealing Himself, leaving room for subjective interpretation. **5. Failure to Exclude Alternative Hypotheses:** The experiment does not account for alternative explanations for an answered prayer, such as luck, psychological factors, or other supernatural forces, leading to potential misinterpretations. **6. Skepticism as a Positive Sign:** The author suggests that the attempt to frame religious claims within a scientific context, as seen in the Skeptic's Prayer, reflects a shift towards skepticism, which is *"slowly but surely taking the place of faith."* **7. Overall Ineffectiveness of the Skeptic's Prayer as a Definitive Experiment:** The critique concludes that the Skeptic's Prayer falls short as a conclusive experiment for proving or disproving God's existence, emphasizing the need for more rigorous and specific scientific approaches to settle such questions. Quote: *"Perhaps someday, real scientists will devise an experiment capable of detecting God and settling this issue once and for all. But the Skeptic’s Prayer isn’t it."* I have two questions: - Can we legitimately categorize the Skeptic's Prayer as a "scientific experiment"? Interestingly, the attempt to portray this prayer in a 'scientific' light brings to mind John Lennox's assertion that Christianity can be tested (see *https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/97877/61679*) . - What counterarguments or responses can be provided to address the objections raised in the article? --- EDIT: More objections to the scientific status of the prayer are presented by many of the answers to [Is the Skeptic's Prayer a legitimate scientific experiment? - Philosophy Stack Exchange](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/108053/66156)

The "Skeptic's Prayer" is introduced on page 411 of [*Handbook of Catholic Apologetics: Reasoned Answers to Questions of Faith*](https://www.amazon.com/Handbook-Catholic-Apologetics-Reasoned-Questions/dp/1586172794) , by Peter Kreeft & Fr. Ronald Tacelli. > ### The Skeptic's Prayer > > This claim---that all seekers find---is testable by experience, by > experiment. If you are an honest scientist, here is a way to find out > whether Christianity is true or not. Perform the relevant experiment. > To test the hypothesis that someone is behind the door, knock. To test > the Christian hypothesis that Christ is behind the door, knock. > > How do you knock? Pray! Tell Christ you are seeking the > truth---seeking *him*, if he is the truth. Ask him to fulfill his > promise that all who seek him will find him. In his own time, of course. He > promised that you would find, but he didn't promise a schedule. He's a > lover, not a train. > > But---you may reply---I don't know whether Christ is God. I don't even > know whether there is a God. That's all right; you can pray the > prayer of the skeptic: > > > God, I don't know whether you even exist. I'm a skeptic. I doubt. I think you may be only a myth. But I'm not certain (at least when I'm > completely honest with myself). So, if you do exist, and if you really > did promise to reward all seekers, you must be hearing me now. So I > hereby declare myself a seeker, a seeker of the truth, whatever it is and wherever it is. I want to know the truth and live the truth. If you are the truth, > please help me. > > If Christianity is true, He will. Such a prayer constitutes a > scientifically fair test of the Christian "hypothesis"---that is, if > you do not put unfair restrictions on God, like demanding a miracle > (your way, not his) or certainty by tomorrow (your time, not his). The > demand that God act like your servant is hardly a scientifically fair > test of the hypothesis that there is a God who is your King. > > But all this King asks for at first is honesty, not faking a faith you > do not have. Honesty is a choice of the will---the choice to seek the > truth no matter what or where. This is the most momentous choice you > can make. It is the choice of light over darkness, ultimately heaven > over hell. > > Honesty is infinitely more momentous than we often think. It is also > much harder than we think. Our culture trivializes honesty into merely > "sharing your feelings", telling others about the state of our nerve > ends. That's not the opposite of dishonesty, that's just the opposite > of *shame* or shyness. Shallow honesty seeks "sharing"; deep honesty > seeks truth. Shallow honesty stands in the presence of others; deep > honesty stands in the presence of God. An often-raised critique of this prayer's presentation is its perceived vagueness regarding conditions and expectations (see examples of critiques [here](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/108053/66156) and [here](https://infidels.org/library/modern/robby-berry-skeprayr/)) . According to proponents of this form of prayer, how much additional specificity and detail can be added beyond what Peter Kreeft and Fr. Ronald Tacelli have presented? In particular, I'm interested in the following aspects: *Conditions* For the Skeptic's Prayer to be effective, are there unstated implicit conditions beyond those mentioned by Peter and Ronald? For instance: - Is a single invocation sufficient, or does it require daily repetition over a few days, multiple times a day for an extended period, or even years or decades? The clarification on this aspect is not provided by Peter and Ronald. At a minimum, it seems they endorse trying the prayer at least once. However, they provide no guidance on frequency, intensity, or similar factors. - Are there thresholds to the level of skepticism a person must have before attempting the prayer? Can one be "too skeptical" for the prayer's effectiveness, and if so, are there strategies to overcome this limitation? - Is the skeptic supposed to undertake additional practices during the Skeptic's Prayer "experiment," like attending specific church services, fasting, reading the Bible, studying natural theology, or anything else? Or is merely praying for a few minutes sufficient, with no specified changes to one's daily life? While Peter and Ronald overlook this aspect, I presume it holds significant importance. *Expectations* How explicit can expectations be in the Skeptic's Prayer "experiment"? What should the seeker anticipate? Is an event expected, and if so, will it be clear and unmistakable? Can specific examples of this event be given to enhance the expectation's specificity, clarity, and detail? Peter and Ronald caution against expecting miracles, but what reasonable outcome can the seeker envision in their mind as something to anticipate with hopeful expectation?

> Pascal contends that a rational person should adopt a lifestyle consistent with the existence of God and actively strive to believe in God. The reasoning behind this stance lies in the potential outcomes: if God does not exist, the individual incurs only finite losses, potentially sacrificing certain pleasures and luxuries. However, if God does indeed exist, they stand to gain immeasurably, as represented for example by an eternity in Heaven in Abrahamic tradition, while simultaneously avoiding boundless losses associated with an eternity in Hell. > > (source: [Pascal's wager - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager)) > Let us now gather together all of these points into a single argument. We can think of Pascal’s Wager as having three premises: the first concerns the decision table of rewards, the second concerns the probability that you should give to God’s existence, and the third is a maxim about rational decision-making. Specifically: > > 1. Either God exists or God does not exist, and you can either wager for God or wager against God. The utilities of the relevant possible outcomes are as follows, where f1, f2, and f3 are numbers whose values are not specified beyond the requirement that they be finite: > | | *God exists* | *God does not exist* | | :-: | :-: | :-: | | ***Wager for God*** | ∞ | f1 | | ***Wager against God*** | f2 | f3 | > 2. Rationality requires the probability that you assign to God existing to be positive (and finite). > 3. Rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility (when there is one). > 4. Conclusion 1. Rationality requires you to wager for God. > 5. Conclusion 2. You should wager for God. > > (source: [Pascal’s Wager - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/)) Is there any biblical basis for encouraging non-believers to consider embracing Christianity with the hopeful anticipation that, if it proves to be true, they may experience the promised reward of an afterlife characterized by eternal bliss in Heaven and avoid a potential infinite loss of an eternity in Hell? Note: I'm asking this question as a follow-up to https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/99793/61679 ---- **Appendix** *Pascal's views on faith and reason* > **Pascal begins by painting a situation where both the existence and non-existence of God are impossible to prove by human reason**. So, supposing that reason cannot determine the truth between the two options, one must "wager" by weighing the possible consequences. Pascal's assumption is that, when it comes to making the decision, no one can refuse to participate; withholding assent is impossible because we are already "embarked", effectively living out the choice. > **Inability to believe** > Pascal addressed the difficulty that reason and rationality pose to genuine belief by proposing that "acting as if [one] believed" could "cure [one] of unbelief": >> But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavor then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness. > > (source: [Pascal's wager - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager))

I've been reflecting on the interplay between faith and hope, especially when hope entails some degree of uncertainty and lack of intellectual assent but a strong desire for something to be true. Consider a scenario where an individual, exposed to the preaching of the Gospel, the promises of Christianity, and arguments and evidence for its core tenets, might express, "Though I don't know if Christianity is true, and I'm not highly or overwhelmingly confident, in light of the evidence I certainly believe it has potential to be true (i.e., it makes sense and I can't rule it out), and sincerely *wish* and *hope* it is true." Is it possible to redefine faith, traditionally rooted in strong beliefs, to encompass the prospect of being grounded in hope? Can individuals anchor their faith in hope rather than belief or intellectual assent, acknowledging uncertainty yet finding enough motivation rooted in hope in order to act "as if" a belief were true, with the aspiration that their hope-based faith may eventually, at some point in the future, evolve into a more solid belief? I'm interested in exploring whether this nuanced perspective has been discussed in philosophical or theological contexts, and how it might reshape our understanding of *faith* and its relationship to *hope*, *belief*, and *intellectual assent*. --- **Additional food for thought**: The application of [Pascal's wager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager) might be considered as an example of this, where an individual, faced with the uncertainty of the existence of a higher power, may choose to embrace a hopeful faith. In acknowledging the inability to decisively prove or disprove the divine, a fence-sitter on the question might opt for a faith-driven approach, investing in the potential benefits of belief (by acting "as if" the belief were true) while recognizing the inherent uncertainty. **Another related and important question** is whether we can choose to believe something based only (or mostly) on our desire for it to be true and in spite of our prior uncertainty. See [To what extent do we choose our beliefs?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/849/66156) --- **Definition of belief** Someone in the comments asked for a definition of *belief*. I will quote the first paragraph of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [article](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/) on belief: > Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to **the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true**. To believe something, in this sense, needn’t involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it’s the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology. The “mind-body problem”, for example, so central to philosophy of mind, is in part the question of whether and how a purely physical organism can have beliefs. Much of epistemology revolves around questions about when and how our beliefs are justified or qualify as knowledge. --- **Definition of hope** To clarify, I'm using hope in the following sense: > **Faith as hopeful affirmation** > > Now consider hope. James Muyskens (1979), Louis Pojman (1986a; 1986b; 1991), and William Lad Sessions (1994) have each proposed **accounts of faith that take hope as the central cognitive attitude**. Pojman claims that: >> If belief-in, or trusting, can be analyzed in terms of commitment to a course of action or a disposition to act, then it seems that we do not need to believe-that x exists in order to believe-in **or deeply hope in the existence of x**. (Pojman (1986b), 224) > > But what is hope and is this claim plausible? > > **Hope is a complex attitude that involves both evaluation and opinion or, at least, some relatively weak constraints on opinion**. If I hope for sunny weather on my sister’s wedding day, ordinarily this will involve both a desire that the weather be sunny and a belief, say, that this is at least possible. Notice that I can hope for sunny weather even if I believe that alternatives like rain or even snow are more likely. While there are differences of opinion concerning just how hope is to be analysed, quite generally, it seems that, **for any subject S and proposition p, to say that S hopes that p involves at least that (1) S desires that p and (2) S does not believe that p is impossible. Clearly hope is also an attitude one can have towards the existence of an object, entity, or person x (e.g. God) or the obtaining of some state of affairs. These conditions are arguably necessary minima for hope**. It would make little sense to say Dave hopes that his wound will heal quickly and not become infected but has no desire that this be the case or that he believes that this is impossible. But perhaps a religiously significant sense of hope requires a bit more. As stated, the first condition leaves the nature of the desires quite unspecified (e.g. are these emotions, considered value judgments, or what?); ‘impossible’ in the second condition might mean only logically incoherent. **A plausible case could be made, for example, that the second condition for religiously significant hope should be that p is a live option for S or that S believes that the probability that p is true is not so small as to be negligible or that S does not believe not-p**. > > [...] > > Although hopes can be misplaced, the minimal epistemic opinion involved in hope is a very weak one. Indeed, hope is most nakedly apparent in cases where something is hoped for despite its improbability. Moreover, and for this reason, the hope that p requires less, often far less, in the way of evidence to be rational than the belief in that same content p. It can be reasonable to hope that p in cases where belief with the same content would not be. Clearly, I can hope to win the lottery jackpot without believing that I will and indeed while believing that it is extremely unlikely that I will; that the odds of winning are about one in two hundred million. Lying blind and paralysed in a ditch, I might hope to see and walk again. Devastated by the kidnapping of her child, years later, a tearful mother might still hope to be reunited with her son. Enslaved, I might hope one day to be set free. **Similarly, one can hope that God exists without believing that God exists**. > > Source: [Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reason](https://philpapers.org/archive/MCKAFA.pdf) , DANIEL J. MCKAUGHAN. Religious Studies / Volume 49 / Issue 01 / March 2013, pp 101 ­- 124 DOI: 10.1017/S0034412512000200, Published online: 15 June 2012

**No –** > Luke 4:12 ... **Do not** put the Lord your God to the **test**. **Yes –** > Judges 6:39 “Allow me **one more test** with the fleece, but this time > make the fleece dry and let the ground be covered with dew.” **No -** > Matthew 12:39 A wicked and **adulterous generation asks for** a miraculous > **sign**! **Yes -** > 2 Kings 20:8 Meanwhile, Hezekiah had said to Isaiah, "**What sign** will > the LORD give **to prove** that he will heal me and that I will go to the > Temple of the LORD three days from now?" **No –** > Deuteronomy 6:16 You shall **not test** the LORD your God, as you tested > him in Massah. **Yes –** > Genesis 15:8 But Abram said, "O Sovereign LORD, **how can I know** that I > will gain possession of it?

From *Nonresistant Nonbelief*, by J. L. Schellenberg: > One might fail to believe in God even while God is open to a belief-entailing personal relationship if one prevents oneself from believing in God through self-deceptive resistance of God. **So the hiddenness argument needs to show that not all nonbelief is of this sort: that there is (or has in the past been) nonresistant nonbelief**. Chapter 6 shows how this may be done. It does so by reference to humans in the early days of human evolution **as well as those today who are in doubt over whether such a God exists after careful reflection on the idea**. With this job completed, we can add a third premise: **Some finite persons are or have been nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists**. And from this premise together with the previous conclusion, a second conclusion can be drawn: No perfectly loving God exists. > > ([source](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198733089.001.0001/acprof-9780198733089-chapter-6)) Other authors refer to nonresistant nonbelief as "blameless" disbelief or "inculpable" nonbelief. For example, [this article](https://philpapers.org/browse/divine-hiddenness) says: > “Divine Hiddenness” in contemporary philosophy of religion may refer to the supposed fact that the existence of God is less than obvious, or to an argument against theism based on this supposed fact. The argument begins with the observation that many people of apparently good will and at least average intelligence have investigated the claims of theism, and yet still do not believe that God exists. Suppose, as many theists do, that the greatest human good is found in a personal relationship with God. **Not believing that God exists seems an obvious barrier to such a relationship; but many of those who do not believe in God seem morally and epistemically blameless in their lack of belief**. If the God of theism—an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good personal being—did exist, then surely those who genuinely seek God would find God: an omnipotent God would be capable of providing clear self-revelation to those who genuinely seek, and a perfectly good God would want to provide such revelation. **That so many of those who do seek or have sought God persist in unbelief is therefore itself evidence that God does not exist. Or so claims the advocate of the “argument from divine hiddenness.”** Some philosophers have responded by argued that “the problem of divine hiddenness” is simply a special case of the more general problem of evil, adding nothing new to the case against the existence of God, nor any new challenge to extant responses to the problem of evil. For example, it could be that there is some outweighing good that can only be obtained by God allowing **blameless disbelief** to continue in a person’s life. Other philosophers have argued that a good God might provide only “purposive evidence”; i.e., evidence that may only be made available to one if it would accomplish God’s purpose in one’s life (e.g., that one would respond to the evidence not just by believing that God exists, but also by loving and obeying God). There are contemporary individuals who identify themselves as "nonresistant nonbelievers". For example, in a [recent debate](https://youtu.be/rnIQFI1pYLM?t=1406) titled *DEBATE: Theism vs Atheism | Jonathan McLatchie vs Alex O’Connor*, Alex O'Connor said in his opening statement: > [...] I'm going to be making the claim, specifically, that atheism or naturalism provides better account for 3 facts of our universe: > - The first being the hiddenness of God. > - The second being the geographical, statistical arrangement of religious belief. > - And the third will be the problem of gratuitous suffering and we'll see if we get time to finish it off. > > Far from being unable to escape God, there is a very real contingent of nonbelievers, and I would count myself among their number, who are unable by any means to discover Him. Who seek and do not find, who knock and receive, as it were, no answer. This strange phenomenon is known as the problem of divine hiddenness. If there is a God, then simply why is He hidden from so many of us so much of the time? If theism is to offer a sufficient account of reality, then it must offer an account of what J. L. Schellenberg has famously labeled "nonresistant nonbelief", which he distinguishes from "resistant nonbelief" [...] **Question**: From a Christian perspective, what are Alex and others who identify themselves as "nonresistant nonbelievers" doing wrong that is preventing them from finding God and attaining genuine belief in Him? What are plausible reasons for why God may appear hidden to them despite their alleged nonresistance? **Note**: for scoping purposes, I'd be interested in answers that accept the following premises: - *Universalism* is false - Human beings possess some form of freedom of the will (i.e. full determinism is false, e.g. Molinists and Arminians would be welcome to answer this question) ___ Related: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/81266/50422

On April 8, 2021, during a debate between [Matt Dillahunty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matt_Dillahunty) and Catholic Apologist [Trent Horn](https://www.trenthorn.com/) titled [Is belief in the Resurrection reasonable? Trent Horn Vs Matt Dillahunty Debate](https://youtu.be/7V6UNSvHVDM) , hosted by [Pints With Aquinas](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UClh4JeqYB1QN6f1h_bzmEng) , Matt Dillahunty said: [20:56](https://youtu.be/7V6UNSvHVDM?t=1256) : > It's important for people to recognize **there is a difference between verification and falsification**. Verification is the concept that we should produce the thing. If we were to say that all intelligent beings are on planet earth, verification you could run around "hey, there's an intelligent being on earth, there's one on earth and there's one on earth, there's one on earth", but verifying it exhaustively could be completely impractical because you would have to search every planet at all times in order to determine in fact that all intelligent beings are on planet earth. But falsification is a separate issue. Falsification is whether or not it is theoretically able to be shown to be false. And so, whole we may never be able to verify that all intelligent beings are in fact on planet earth, we could at least in theory falsify it because if we produced an intelligent being that wasn't on earth, that would falsify the claim. Now that would show that the claim is wrong. **But if we have a claim that is unverifiable, unfalsifiable, it is essentially untestable**. **And my foundation is that if you have an untestable claim, it'd better be mundane, trivial and consistent with the facts of reality before you should ever risk believing that it is in fact the case**. **Well, we can't really believe, or we can't argue that it's rational to believe something that we can't test at all**. So we do the best we can when it comes to history, **and so when we take a look at history all we have are reports**. Somebody said they saw this, somebody said they knew this person, somebody said this other thing. That's all well and good when we're trying to put together the best understanding of history we can. **But we shouldn't be proclaiming it as truth, and we shouldn't be necessarily saying that this particular version of history is particularly reasonable**. As history tends to be written by the victors. **So history is always suspect**. And there are two quotes from David Hume that are the cornerstone how and why I go about determining if something is or should be considered reasonable ... [Matt then proceeds to quote/paraphrase David Hume on why miracle claims are unreasonable to be believed on insufficient evidence.] [24:56](https://youtu.be/7V6UNSvHVDM?t=1496) > **So if a claim isn't falsifiable and there's no way to show it's wrong, we can't reasonably accept that it's correct**. **And if we're left with no physical evidence about the existence of Jesus, or the interactions of Jesus, or his death and resurrection, what we are left with is ... testimony**. Now, I'm not willing to dig in on whether or not the gospels were written by eyewitnesses. I don't think they were, I don't think that most reasonable scholars aren't going to say these are witnesses but it doesn't matter to me because even if they were all eyewitnesses, **we already know that eyewitness testimony is unreliable under the best circumstances**. In this case we don't know whose testimony, eyewitness second or third hand, and we can't investigate it at all. **All the things they say happened don't have corroborating evidence. They don't have supporting physical evidence. We don't have any way to question them about their reliability. We don't have any way to talk to them to determine**, you know, **are these stories accurate**, you know, **do they overlap**. [...] [27:29](https://youtu.be/7V6UNSvHVDM?t=1649) > [...] I have a hard time going through some of these things and saying "yes, that's being reported as this has actually happened". **So what evidence do we have? Copies of copies of translations of copies from unknown sources that may have been but probably weren't eyewitnesses, and if they had been eyewitnesses it wouldn't be sufficient to confirm that someone actually rose from the dead**. What sort of evidence would we expect for a claim that someone rose from the dead? Depends on the time frame. Sure, back in 1st century Judea, probably not a lot! You don't have a way to test for sure that somebody's dead. You don't have like x-rays, you don't have DNA. Well, the question is: if this story is true, then Jesus was divine, and God exists. **And what sort of evidence could a God provide? God could provide the best evidence possible such that there would be no reasonable debate to be had at all** [...] [49:32](https://youtu.be/7V6UNSvHVDM?t=2972) : > And I'm not here for interesting. I'm here to find out what's reasonable. And here is the crux of it, which we can have this discussion afterwards because I don't have any follow-up questions after this. And that is this: **you are willing to accept that an extraordinary miraculous event occurred based only on testimony, and I'm not. That's it! That is the foundational difference between our epistemology. I will not accept that the physical understanding of the universe was suspended for an individual based only on testimonial accounts. It is unreasonable. That is how you get conned. That is how magicians fool you [...]** How do Christians rebut Matt Dillahunty's objection that the resurrection of Jesus is unverifiable, unfalsifiable, untestable, lacking supporting physical evidence beyond mere reports, and therefore unreasonable to believe? ___ **Note**: my question is about Jesus' resurrection, not about Jesus' existence. One could concede that Jesus existed and still be skeptical of his resurrection and other related supernatural claims. For Dillahunty's position on the existence of Jesus, see [Did Jesus Exist? | David - Oklahoma City, OK | Atheist Experience 21.25](https://youtu.be/apS_679ru50) . Here is the transcript of an excerpt from the video in case it gets taken down: > Caller: *Well, what do you believe? Do you believe he actually existed in history or not?* > > Matt: *I think it's very likely that there was a historical figure that the stories are tied to, but we don't know much at all about him and there may actually have been a number of different people molded into one after the fact. I don't ... I have no idea*. > > Jen: *I'm unconvinced that there was a single individual on which the stories are based.* > > Matt: *And even if we were convinced that there was a single individual. I don't know how we would know anything about that person specifically because if you, if you go through for example the gospel stories and ... there is no way to verify anything right down to, you know, the name or the date or anything.*