### Introduction The Genesis narrative of the serpent tempting Adam and Eve and their subsequent expulsion from the Garden of Eve does not seem to indicate overtly that the character known as "Satan" or "the Devil" was involved in any way. The Hebrew bible likewise does not contain any explicit passages co-identifying Satan as the serpent from the garden. However early Christians appear to have identified the Edenic serpent as Satan: **Justin Martyr (c. 100–165 AD), in First Apology §28:** > “For among us the prince of the wicked spirits is called the serpent, and Satan, and the devil...” **Theophilus of Antioch (c. 115–185 AD), *To Autolycus* 2.28:** > “Eve…was deceived by the wicked demon, who also is called Satan, who then spoke to her through the serpent…” **Early Church Tradition (Book of the Cave of Treasures circa 4th–6th century):** > Satan “took up his abode in the serpent… and… watched for the opportunity… and… called [Eve]…” ### Question - What is the origin of this belief? - Does it pre-date Christianity? - What is the earliest written Christian document linking Satan with the serpent? Sources and views from all denominations welcome

The neurochemical work of the brain provides many arguments that question or even refute the concept of the soul as an immaterial entity independent of physiological processes. First, all mental processes, including consciousness, emotions, and decision-making, have a clear neurochemical basis. For example, neurotransmitters such as dopamine, serotonin, and glutamate directly affect our mood, motivation, and perception of reality. Damage or imbalance of these substances leads to personality changes, depression, hallucinations, or memory loss, which indicates that "personality" and "consciousness" are products of the brain, and not manifestations of an immaterial soul. Secondly, experiments with electrical stimulation of the brain (for example, the work of Wilder Penfield) show that artificial exposure to certain areas can evoke memories, emotions, or even religious experiences. If the soul were independent of the brain, such manipulations would not have such an effect. Moreover, in clinical death, when the brain stops receiving oxygen, consciousness turns off almost instantly, and "near-death experiences" are explained by hypoxia and the release of endorphins, rather than the exit of the soul from the body. Thirdly, evolutionary biology shows that consciousness developed gradually as an adaptive mechanism, rather than being "injected" into humans in a supernatural way. Primitive animals with less complex brains show the beginnings of consciousness, emotion, and learning, which contradicts the idea of an exclusively human soul. If there were a soul, it would either have to be absent in animals or manifest itself in some material way, but there is no evidence of this. Finally, the phenomenon of split brain (when the severing of the corpus callosum leads to the emergence of "two consciousnesses" in one body) it calls into question the unity of the soul. How can one soul split into two independent streams of consciousness? All these data indicate that the "soul" is just a metaphor for complex neurochemical processes, and not an independent substance. Logically speaking, there is a neurochemical brain function that completely negates the soul, and which has been proven. She denies it as follows: For example, neurotransmitters such as dopamine, serotonin, and glutamate directly affect our mood, motivation, and perception of reality. Damage or imbalance of these substances leads to personality changes, depression, hallucinations, or memory loss, which indicates that "personality" and "consciousness" are products of the brain, and not manifestations of an immaterial soul. After all, the phenomenon of split brain (when the severing of the corpus callosum leads to the emergence of "two consciousnesses" in one body) it calls into question the unity of the soul. How can one soul split into two independent streams of consciousness? All these data indicate that the "soul" is just a metaphor for complex neurochemical processes, and not an independent substance.

Considering the whole umbrella of Christendom including Eastern Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Coptic Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Protestant, Pentecostal, Abyssinian, has there been any acceptance of people as true "Christian" who refuse to believe in Creation by a God? Can a person, in any of these streams of Christianity, deny the part of the Creeds mentioning Creation, and still be considered legitimate members of the Christian Church? Still be called Christian? Is ***Creation of the universe by a God*** considered an *essential belief*, or a non-essential? This question totally ignores "how" a Creation was carried out; it sets aside the discussion of the "manner or method" of said Creation! Or is this a ***universal prerequisite"*** (along with perhaps other beliefs or doctrines)? ***Verses to consider to help in answering this***: >Thus saith God the LORD, He who created the heavens and stretched them out; He who spread forth the earth, and that which comes out of it; He who gives breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them who walk therein. (Isaiah 42:5) >Giving thanks to the Father...Who has delivered us from the power of darkness, and has translated us into the Kingdom of His dear Son...For by Him were all things created that are in heaven and that are on earth, visible and invisible...all things were created by Him, and for Him. (Colossians 1:12-16)

If a Christian considers that the [burden of proof](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burden_of_proof_(philosophy)) has not been adequately met by any known theological doctrines about God's nature, including mainstream ones such as Trinitarianism, Binitarianism, Unitarianism and Modalism, and in the absence of sufficient evidence they decide to withhold judgement and declare themselves to lack a definite position, would any official label apply to them? Candidate labels I have in mind at the moment include *"neutral"*, *"undecided"*, *"uncertain"*, *"still researching"*, *"skeptical but open-minded"*, and even *"agnostic with respect to God's nature"*, but I'm curious to know if there is anything close to an "official" label out there. _______ #### Appendix: examples of questions evidencing the existing debate - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/49022/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/18043/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/2622/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/33246/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/62297/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/40799/50422

Many Christians who attend church, when confronted by inquirers outside the church, who wonder why they believe in Christianity, simply respond by saying, *I just accept it by faith*. Or they might say, *It was good enough for my grandpa, so it's good enough for me.* But in an age of science and technology, which places a premium on "facts, evidence, proofs, etc., those responses seem hollow--even irrational, or at least unintellectual. Quite inadequate to the modern mind enmeshed in collegiate surroundings. The average church-goer seems oblivious to the biblical aspect of *apologetics*. Nor do they understand the exhortation of Saint Peter: >Sanctify the Lord God in your hearts, and be ready always to give an answer (Gk. apologian) for the reason (Gk. logos) of the hope that is in you with meekness and fear. (1 Peter 3:15) This leaves the Christian, especially the Christian student, in the lurch, susceptible to attacks of doubt by professors, as well as peer pressure from culture. So should pastors and teachers equip their congregations with occasional sermons on the *evidences, infallible proofs (Acts 1:3), metaphysical proofs (Romans 1, Acts 17:18-34), reasons (1 Peter 3:15), supernatural conclusions (John 5:36 miracles), eye-witness testimony (1 John 1:1-3):* things which would provide a "reasonable response" to skeptics who doubt these revolutionary facts"? Or is "faith in faith" without proofs, or "blind faith" as some would call it (uninformed faith, that is), sufficient for Christian believers? Should this be the biblical approach for preparing congregates to survive in modern society? What is the correct definition of "faith"? What is the best definition that would be adequate for the modern mind, and cause him to consider Christ as God?

Evolutionism [claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_psychology_of_religion) that religious beliefs result from their ability to give us a cooperative ability to survive. This, an Evolutionist would argue, would imply that religion comes into existence, not on any truth claim, but from evolution giving us useful, but otherwise untrue beliefs. What is the proper response to this argument? (Here is [another article](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429488818-18/ritual-made-us-human-matt-rossano) on the subject.)

>If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. There is arguably little difference between the lifestyle of the Stoic and the lifestyle of the Christian. Both eschew effeminacy in pursuit of virtue. Both find it best for man to worry about things he can control and to not worry about the things he cannot (Epictetus wrote of this. Christians call this "trusting the plan"; there is also the Christian serenity prayer which expresses this). Both believe in the cardinal virtues of Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance (Christians certainly ought to believe these, and I'd bet most Stoics do believe them as well). I would argue that their way of life is in essence, the same. The question is this: if a Christian and a Stoic both **live the same exact life**, and the **only** difference in their essence is that the Christian believes in the gospel, then why does the Christian go to heaven while the unbelieving Stoic does not? More generally, the question is about the "mechanics" of Christian salvation: when one comes to believe in Christ (esp. when converting from stoicism) what is it that *actually* changes in the person's essence/soul/existence that makes him fit for the Kingdom of God? In other words, what is it about the intellectual position of being Christian that impacts the *state* of someone's soul?

## Introduction From early church fathers such as 2nd Century Justin Martyr (*Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, ch 73*) to the 16th Century Reformer John Calvin (*Commentary on the Book of Psalms, 1:373*), accusations that Jewish scribes "tampered" with the Masoretic Text (the authoritative Hebrew Bible text) to obscure messianic prophecies have circulated for centuries. ## Question Is this belief still held by Christians? Do Christians who believe this provide evidence for this belief? What evidence is there for this accusation?

It seems that those who attack the veracity of the Christian faith also dislike the faith on a qualitative level. They dislike what it fundamentally is about. Similarly, it seems that those who support the veracity of the Christian faith value the faith on a qualitative level. They cherish what it fundamentally is about. I am very curious to learn of any exceptions to this. I think someone who sees the faith as so good that it is worth believing in would probably not need extensive evidentialist support as a precursor to belief. Someone who sees the faith as essentially bad and not worth believing in would probably not need extensive evidentialist support as a precursor to disbelief. (This is not to undermine the value of evidence.) A quote by Thomas Nagel comes to mind: "I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and naturally hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that."

## Background: Christian Trinitarians believe "that there is one eternal being of God – indivisible, infinite. This one being of God is shared by three co-equal, co-eternal persons, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit". Trinitarians generally believe that this doctrine is taught in the New Testament. They also generally believe the trinity is (minimally) simply compatible with the Hebrew bible, or (maximally) also clearly taught in the Hebrew bible. This is in contrast with traditional Jewish belief in a unitary deity. The authors of the Hebrew bible make several statements about the oneness of G-d: > **Deuteronomy 6:4** - "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our G-d, the Lord is one." > **Isaiah 44:6** - "Thus says the Lord, the King of Israel and his Redeemer, the Lord of hosts: 'I am the first and I am the last; besides me there is no god.'" > **Deuteronomy 4:35** - "To you it was shown, that you might know that the Lord is G-d; there is no other besides Him." These authors do not write about distinctions between *being* and *personhood*. ## Unfalsifiable belief? Under trinitarian hermeneutical approaches, the above verses are not contrary to the trinity because they could be interpreted to refer to *the single being of G-d*, and not to the trinitarian *multiplicity of persons*. This is a curious interpretation since concepts of distinction between “person” and “being” only appear in literature which post-date the completion of the Hebrew bible. ## Question If seemingly clear verses attesting to ontological oneness can be used in support of trinitarian doctrine, what could a biblical author have written in the Hebrew bible that would falsify the trinity? Is the trinity only falsifiable with a verse such as *"There is only one person of G-d"*, *"G-d is only one being and one person"*, or even *"The trinity as defined by Christian patristic fathers and ecumenical councils in the 4th Century CE is false"*?

From [Bayesian epistemology (SEP)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/) : > ### Bayesian Epistemology > *First published Mon Jun 13, 2022* > > We can think of belief as an all-or-nothing affair. For example, I believe that I am alive, and I don’t believe that I am a historian of the Mongol Empire. However, often we want to make distinctions between *how strongly* we believe or disbelieve something. I strongly believe that I am alive, am fairly confident that I will stay alive until my next conference presentation, less confident that the presentation will go well, and strongly disbelieve that its topic will concern the rise and fall of the Mongol Empire. The idea that beliefs can come in different strengths is a central idea behind Bayesian epistemology. Such strengths are called *degrees of belief*, or *credences*. Bayesian epistemologists study norms governing degrees of beliefs, including how one’s degrees of belief ought to change in response to a varying body of evidence. Bayesian epistemology has a long history. Some of its core ideas can be identified in Bayes’ (1763) seminal paper in statistics (Earman 1992: ch. 1), with applications that are now very influential in many areas of philosophy and of science. > > [...] > > ### 4.2 Objective Bayesianism > *Objective Bayesians* contend that, in addition to coherence, there is another epistemic virtue or ideal that needs to be codified into a norm for prior credences: freedom from bias and avoidance of overly strong opinions (Jeffreys 1939; Carnap 1945; Jaynes 1957, 1968; Rosenkrantz 1981; J. Williamson 2010). This view is often motivated by a case like this: > >> Example (Six-Faced Die). Suppose that there is a cubic die with six faces that look symmetric, and we are going to toss it. Suppose further that we have no other idea about this die. Now, what should our credence be that the die will come up 6? > > An intuitive answer is 1/6, for it seems that we ought to distribute our credences evenly, with an equal credence, 1/6, in each of the six possible outcomes. While subjective Bayesians would only say that we may do so, objective Bayesians would make the stronger claim that we ought to do so. More generally, objective Bayesians are sympathetic to this norm: > >> **The Principle of Indifference**. A person’s credences in any two propositions should be equal if her total evidence no more supports one than the other (the *evidential symmetry* version), or if she has no sufficient reason to have a higher credence in one than in the other (the *insufficient reason* version). Consider a person who subscribes to *Objective Bayesianism*. According to the principles outlined above, such a person would strive to eliminate bias and avoid overly strong opinions in their priors. They would also adhere to the principle of indifference, assigning equal credence to propositions in the absence of reasons or asymmetries in the evidence to justify favoring one over another. Within these epistemological constraints, can an Objective Bayesian epistemologist become a Christian while remaining consistent with Objective Bayesianism? Can belief in God, miracles, angels, demons, the resurrection, souls, an afterlife, and similar doctrines be justified within the framework of Objective Bayesian Epistemology? Have any Christian authors written about this?

The difference between a person like me who **knows** that God exists and a person who **believes** that God exists is personal experience. For example I have experienced events in my life where mystical beings have spied on me and taken information to a remote human being in control of those beings. I applied my reasoning and logic proved that the only way someone in the US can know what I am doing in Israel is through divination or necromancy, and that otherwise a normal person wouldn't. This is how I arrived at the knowledge that mystical beings indeed exist and are able to do things normal humans wouldn't be able to. > Editor's note: Assume the reasoning above is valid for the sake of answering the question. The Bible says that without faith we do not please God *Hebrew 11:6* >And without faith it is impossible to please God," meaning that in order to be pleasing to God, one must have faith in Him Does that mean a person who **knows** instead of **believes** is in violation of that verse?

I've been looking more and more into the Church of later day saints. I'm obviously not a member, but I am curious about them all the same. My question is about how it appears as if the majority of their answers regarding the first vision* or their angel Moroni are sourced from those entities themselves. Edit: *The first vision as far as I know was experienced only by Joseph Smith. https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/91367/how-do-christians-discern-between-genuine-dreams-visions-from-god-and-false-dr I saw this answer regarding how the LDS are supposed to determine if a vision, angel, etc is from good or evil. And I agree that if the original source was valid, it would all be okay. But from my understanding all the sources listed by the LDS answer are in and of themselves from the beliefs delivered by Moroni or aligned with them in new teachings. How does an LDS believer know these teachings are valid in the first place and not trick? (Or is this the faith part?) Edit: For clarity, I'm not asking for the current teachings of the LDS, I'm asking how is the basis of the LDS faith confirmed as "divine" before their teachings confirmed it? For example: An angel gives you a special book, the book says the angel is definitely not evil. (A proves B, B proves A) How do you prove the source is valid without using the source's own claim?

I have often heard it taught that those living in the time of the Old Testament were saved by the law, but that they also had to have faith that Christ would come. If someone living in the Old Testament era did not believe that Christ would come and denied the future coming of the Messiah, could they still be saved? Or was belief in the future coming of Christ necessary for salvation in that time period?

I'm catholic and I live in Brazil. I believe in the gift of the infallibility in the New Testament, but i'm trying to understand if Jews, in the old covenant (Old Testament) were infallible too. I found some clues, like: 1 Samuel 9,6 ; John 11,51 ; 2 Peter 1,21 seem to teach infallibility of the prophets of the Old testament. However, it is impossible that the old covenant were TOTALLY infallible, because if it was so, they would in the first place, have recognized Jesus Christ as the true Messiah. So where does all this leave us? Were they "sometimes" infallible? Was there a limit to it? I found your link to an article here, but the link is broken :(https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/65996/the-chair-of-moses-and-jewish-clerical-infallibility) And this is the link you put: https://christiantheorist.weebly.com/basics-of-the-holy-faith/category/01-the-church-of-jesus-the-christ-is-one Could you help me with this, sir? I would love to read your insights about this theme!

> Hence it comes that, if there are as many risks on one side as on the > other, the course is to play even; and then the certainty of the stake > is equal to the uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from the fact > that there is an infinite distance between them. And so our > proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in > a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the > infinite to gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of any > truths, this is one. "I confess it, I admit it. But still is there no > means of seeing the faces of the cards?"—Yes, Scripture and the rest, > &c.—"Yes, but I have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to > wager, and am not free. I am not released, **and am so made that I** > **cannot believe**. **What then would you have me do?**" > > ### [The Heart Has Its Reasons] > > True. **But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason** > **brings you to this, and you cannot believe**. **Endeavor then to > convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the > abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not > know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the > remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who > now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way > which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would > be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they > believe, taking the holy water, having masses said, &c. Even this will > naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness**.—"But this is > what I am afraid of"—And why? What have you to lose? > > But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will > lessen the passions, which are your stumbling—blocks. > > **The heart has its reasons which reason does not know**. We feel it in a > thousand things. I say that the heart naturally loves the Universal > Being, and also itself naturally, according as it gives itself to > them; and it hardens itself against one or the other at its will. You > have rejected the one, and kept the other. Is it by reason that you > love yourself? > > **It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then,** > **is faith; God felt by the heart, not by reason.** > > Source: https://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/introbook2.1/x4404.html It seems to me that Blaise Pascal is suggesting that one can "fake it till you make it"—that by acting as if one believes that God exists, genuine belief will eventually follow, thus "curing" unbelief. And this cure will actually take the form of one somehow experiencing God in one's heart (whatever Pascal exactly meant by that), as opposed to a logical/rational conclusion being grasped by reason. Hence the well-known *"The heart has its reasons which reason does not know"*. Is my understanding of Pascal more or less correct? If so, what is the Biblical basis for his approach? --- NOTE. I asked a similar question on Philosophy Stack Exchange: [Is Blaise Pascal's approach to "curing unbelief" in the proposition that God exists philosophically sound?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/113993/66156)

It’s possible that I may be proposing a false trichotomy, but when considering belief in God, I identify at least three distinct possibilities: - **Belief as a Choice**: Belief in God might be a decision of the will, subject to one’s volitional control. This perspective makes sense if libertarian free will exists, allowing individuals to freely choose whether they believe in God. In philosophy, this view is known as [Doxastic Voluntarism](https://iep.utm.edu/doxastic-voluntarism/) . - **Belief as a Gift**: Alternatively, belief in God could be viewed not as an arbitrary choice but as a consequence of receiving the gift of faith, presumably from God. Here, God, rather than human will, is the source of faith. - **Belief as a Result of Reason and Evidence**: Another possibility is that belief in God is neither an arbitrary choice nor an arbitrary gift but a natural result of sound reasoning applied to available evidence. Thus, a person who honestly examines the evidence and uses reason should naturally conclude that God exists. It seems to me that fields like [natural theology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_theology) and [Christian apologetics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_apologetics) are premised upon this assumption. It's possible that I may be overlooking additional possibilities and that the three options I've outlined might not be mutually exclusive. Moreover, I might be conflating *belief* with *faith*, and I welcome any corrections on this point if that’s the case. With all that said, **what is an overview of Christian perspectives on how belief in God arises?** Specifically, I'm interested in the following subquestions: - **Choice of the Will**: Are there specific theological traditions or denominations that view belief in God as a volitional choice? - **Gift from God**: Are there theological perspectives or denominations that consider belief in God a gift from God? - **Result of Reason and Evidence**: Are there groups that see belief in God as a result of reasoned analysis of evidence? - **Other Views**: Are there other theological views on how belief in God comes about that do not fit neatly into the three options I’ve suggested? --- **Clarifications** > I think it's better if the Q clarifies the *cognitive content* of "belief in God" that you're asking about. Even demons believe in the existence and the power of God and they shudder (James 2:19). But then you don't seem to ask about "faith" which demons don't have. Or is "belief in God" in the OP simply refers to the existence of the first mover? The first chapters of *Mere Christianity* talk about moving carefully step by step from mere existence, to awareness of God in the conscience, to dread of what this God might do, to theism (but no relationship), and finally to Christian theism. I like this comment. It emphasizes the distinction between *belief* as mere *intellectual assent*, which the demons possess, and *saving faith*, leading to *relationship with God*, which the demons do not possess. I would very much appreciate answers that split the analysis into these two aspects. > This misses the most common case. Most people grow up believing what they do because that's what their family (and others in their society) believe. It would be crazy not to. This is a good point, although I think this case can be reinterpreted as and reduced to a more primitive version of belief based on "reason + evidence", even if the reasoning process is arguably fallacious or flawed. The potential fallacies involved in this reasoning process might include [*argument ad populum*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentum_ad_populum) , [*argument from authority*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority) , and [*appeal to tradition*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_tradition) , whereas the evidence might take the form of "my parents told me so", "my culture told me so", "my tradition told me so", and so on. One example is how children develop a belief in [Santa Claus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santa_Claus) , because their parents told them so and they regard their parents to be reliable authorities conveyors of truth. Please don't get me wrong, I'm not saying that all beliefs based on tradition or authorities are necessarily comparable to belief in Santa Claus or fallacious (e.g. if all medical institutions and laboratories around the world agreed that certain vaccine is safe and effective against certain virus, I wouldn't necessarily consider trusting their expert judgement to be fallacious). Believing something because X said so is not necessarily a bad reason if X is, for instance, an [expert witness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expert_witness) or a [credible witness](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/credible_witness) .

Some Christians find it essential to validate their beliefs through personal experiences, as discussed in [*How crucial is it for Christians to 'gain a testimony' validating the truth of their beliefs?*](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/99578/61679) . However, there are those who consider this approach objectionable, viewing it as a form of testing God. As one commenter said : > Seeking the type of testimony you describe is a form of putting God to the test. It is antithetical to the faith that saves. This faith is a gift from God as Scripture says. But we are all responsible for whether we believe the truth or reject it. So seeking the type of “testimony” you describe runs counter to what the Bible teaches. As for the other types of testimonies (about specific teachings), the Bible is all we need. Anything that runs counter to it is false no matter what feelings or signs you receive. Demons can grant feelings and work signs to mislead those who reject God’s Word. How is the pursuit of confirmatory experience reconciled with the principle of not putting God to the test? --- As for the biblical basis for not putting God to the test, although not suggested explicitly by the commenter, there is a question already on the site suggesting a few relevant passages: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/9090/61679 --- A question that is closely related to this discussion is [Is Christianity testable?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/105659/66156) , as well as https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/97877/61679

It's my understanding that most Christians have never had an overtly spectacular, extraordinary, supernatural experience themselves, yet they find no problem in holding very specific supernatural beliefs (e.g. the resurrection of Jesus) based on the eyewitness accounts of others (e.g. the apostles, as recorded in the gospels). However, doctrines such Continuationism can find support on the basis of eyewitness accounts as well, [yet Cessationists would object to those as unreliable](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/83141/50422) . Latter-day Saints also appeal to the first-hand accounts of 3 & 8 witnesses as supportive evidence for the supernatural origin of the book of Mormon (see [this answer](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/83978/50422) for an eloquent presentation of this argument), [yet non-LDS Christians would object to those as unreliable](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/84581/50422) as well. When it comes to assessing the reliability of eyewitness accounts as supportive evidence for specific supernatural beliefs, is there anything close to a consensus on how to make these kinds of judgments? Has any denomination or Christian scholar published a set of principles on how to judge the credibility of eyewitness accounts and applied them to concrete cases, such as the apostles (in the case of the resurrection of Jesus) or the eyewitnesses to the golden plates (in the case of Joseph Smith and the book of Mormon)?

I've been reflecting on the interplay between faith and hope, especially when hope entails some degree of uncertainty and lack of intellectual assent but a strong desire for something to be true. Consider a scenario where an individual, exposed to the preaching of the Gospel, the promises of Christianity, and arguments and evidence for its core tenets, might express, "Though I don't know if Christianity is true, and I'm not highly or overwhelmingly confident, in light of the evidence I certainly believe it has potential to be true (i.e., it makes sense and I can't rule it out), and sincerely *wish* and *hope* it is true." Is it possible to redefine faith, traditionally rooted in strong beliefs, to encompass the prospect of being grounded in hope? Can individuals anchor their faith in hope rather than belief or intellectual assent, acknowledging uncertainty yet finding enough motivation rooted in hope in order to act "as if" a belief were true, with the aspiration that their hope-based faith may eventually, at some point in the future, evolve into a more solid belief? I'm interested in exploring whether this nuanced perspective has been discussed in philosophical or theological contexts, and how it might reshape our understanding of *faith* and its relationship to *hope*, *belief*, and *intellectual assent*. --- **Additional food for thought**: The application of [Pascal's wager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager) might be considered as an example of this, where an individual, faced with the uncertainty of the existence of a higher power, may choose to embrace a hopeful faith. In acknowledging the inability to decisively prove or disprove the divine, a fence-sitter on the question might opt for a faith-driven approach, investing in the potential benefits of belief (by acting "as if" the belief were true) while recognizing the inherent uncertainty. **Another related and important question** is whether we can choose to believe something based only (or mostly) on our desire for it to be true and in spite of our prior uncertainty. See [To what extent do we choose our beliefs?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/849/66156) --- **Definition of belief** Someone in the comments asked for a definition of *belief*. I will quote the first paragraph of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [article](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/) on belief: > Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to **the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true**. To believe something, in this sense, needn’t involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it’s the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology. The “mind-body problem”, for example, so central to philosophy of mind, is in part the question of whether and how a purely physical organism can have beliefs. Much of epistemology revolves around questions about when and how our beliefs are justified or qualify as knowledge. --- **Definition of hope** To clarify, I'm using hope in the following sense: > **Faith as hopeful affirmation** > > Now consider hope. James Muyskens (1979), Louis Pojman (1986a; 1986b; 1991), and William Lad Sessions (1994) have each proposed **accounts of faith that take hope as the central cognitive attitude**. Pojman claims that: >> If belief-in, or trusting, can be analyzed in terms of commitment to a course of action or a disposition to act, then it seems that we do not need to believe-that x exists in order to believe-in **or deeply hope in the existence of x**. (Pojman (1986b), 224) > > But what is hope and is this claim plausible? > > **Hope is a complex attitude that involves both evaluation and opinion or, at least, some relatively weak constraints on opinion**. If I hope for sunny weather on my sister’s wedding day, ordinarily this will involve both a desire that the weather be sunny and a belief, say, that this is at least possible. Notice that I can hope for sunny weather even if I believe that alternatives like rain or even snow are more likely. While there are differences of opinion concerning just how hope is to be analysed, quite generally, it seems that, **for any subject S and proposition p, to say that S hopes that p involves at least that (1) S desires that p and (2) S does not believe that p is impossible. Clearly hope is also an attitude one can have towards the existence of an object, entity, or person x (e.g. God) or the obtaining of some state of affairs. These conditions are arguably necessary minima for hope**. It would make little sense to say Dave hopes that his wound will heal quickly and not become infected but has no desire that this be the case or that he believes that this is impossible. But perhaps a religiously significant sense of hope requires a bit more. As stated, the first condition leaves the nature of the desires quite unspecified (e.g. are these emotions, considered value judgments, or what?); ‘impossible’ in the second condition might mean only logically incoherent. **A plausible case could be made, for example, that the second condition for religiously significant hope should be that p is a live option for S or that S believes that the probability that p is true is not so small as to be negligible or that S does not believe not-p**. > > [...] > > Although hopes can be misplaced, the minimal epistemic opinion involved in hope is a very weak one. Indeed, hope is most nakedly apparent in cases where something is hoped for despite its improbability. Moreover, and for this reason, the hope that p requires less, often far less, in the way of evidence to be rational than the belief in that same content p. It can be reasonable to hope that p in cases where belief with the same content would not be. Clearly, I can hope to win the lottery jackpot without believing that I will and indeed while believing that it is extremely unlikely that I will; that the odds of winning are about one in two hundred million. Lying blind and paralysed in a ditch, I might hope to see and walk again. Devastated by the kidnapping of her child, years later, a tearful mother might still hope to be reunited with her son. Enslaved, I might hope one day to be set free. **Similarly, one can hope that God exists without believing that God exists**. > > Source: [Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reason](https://philpapers.org/archive/MCKAFA.pdf) , DANIEL J. MCKAUGHAN. Religious Studies / Volume 49 / Issue 01 / March 2013, pp 101 ­- 124 DOI: 10.1017/S0034412512000200, Published online: 15 June 2012