> Mark 6 4-6: > > > 4 Then Jesus said to them, “People everywhere give honor to a prophet, > except in his own town, with his own people, or in his home.” 5 **Jesus > was not able** to do any miracles there except the healing of some sick > people by laying his hands on them. 6 He was surprised that the people > there had no faith. Then he went to other villages in that area and > taught. Like above, there are several examples where He can't heal people because of their unbelief. However, there is a difference: He **won't** vs. He **cannot** - heal someone because of their unbelief and this concept is usually overlooked. Is there anyway to determine if His power was drained or weakened by others and what does that mean for a believer today? Does this mean my level of faith (or vice versa) is analogous to this phenomenon described above? Here we see Jesus only recognizes and heals certain people based on their faith or to demonstrate God's will: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/10192/why-does-jesus-feel-only-certain-people-that-come-into-physical-contact-with-him Any studies, papers, speeches on this?

I've been reflecting on the interplay between faith and hope, especially when hope entails some degree of uncertainty and lack of intellectual assent but a strong desire for something to be true. Consider a scenario where an individual, exposed to the preaching of the Gospel, the promises of Christianity, and arguments and evidence for its core tenets, might express, "Though I don't know if Christianity is true, and I'm not highly or overwhelmingly confident, in light of the evidence I certainly believe it has potential to be true (i.e., it makes sense and I can't rule it out), and sincerely *wish* and *hope* it is true." Is it possible to redefine faith, traditionally rooted in strong beliefs, to encompass the prospect of being grounded in hope? Can individuals anchor their faith in hope rather than belief or intellectual assent, acknowledging uncertainty yet finding enough motivation rooted in hope in order to act "as if" a belief were true, with the aspiration that their hope-based faith may eventually, at some point in the future, evolve into a more solid belief? I'm interested in exploring whether this nuanced perspective has been discussed in philosophical or theological contexts, and how it might reshape our understanding of *faith* and its relationship to *hope*, *belief*, and *intellectual assent*. --- **Additional food for thought**: The application of [Pascal's wager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager) might be considered as an example of this, where an individual, faced with the uncertainty of the existence of a higher power, may choose to embrace a hopeful faith. In acknowledging the inability to decisively prove or disprove the divine, a fence-sitter on the question might opt for a faith-driven approach, investing in the potential benefits of belief (by acting "as if" the belief were true) while recognizing the inherent uncertainty. **Another related and important question** is whether we can choose to believe something based only (or mostly) on our desire for it to be true and in spite of our prior uncertainty. See [To what extent do we choose our beliefs?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/849/66156) --- **Definition of belief** Someone in the comments asked for a definition of *belief*. I will quote the first paragraph of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [article](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/) on belief: > Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to **the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true**. To believe something, in this sense, needn’t involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it’s the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology. The “mind-body problem”, for example, so central to philosophy of mind, is in part the question of whether and how a purely physical organism can have beliefs. Much of epistemology revolves around questions about when and how our beliefs are justified or qualify as knowledge. --- **Definition of hope** To clarify, I'm using hope in the following sense: > **Faith as hopeful affirmation** > > Now consider hope. James Muyskens (1979), Louis Pojman (1986a; 1986b; 1991), and William Lad Sessions (1994) have each proposed **accounts of faith that take hope as the central cognitive attitude**. Pojman claims that: >> If belief-in, or trusting, can be analyzed in terms of commitment to a course of action or a disposition to act, then it seems that we do not need to believe-that x exists in order to believe-in **or deeply hope in the existence of x**. (Pojman (1986b), 224) > > But what is hope and is this claim plausible? > > **Hope is a complex attitude that involves both evaluation and opinion or, at least, some relatively weak constraints on opinion**. If I hope for sunny weather on my sister’s wedding day, ordinarily this will involve both a desire that the weather be sunny and a belief, say, that this is at least possible. Notice that I can hope for sunny weather even if I believe that alternatives like rain or even snow are more likely. While there are differences of opinion concerning just how hope is to be analysed, quite generally, it seems that, **for any subject S and proposition p, to say that S hopes that p involves at least that (1) S desires that p and (2) S does not believe that p is impossible. Clearly hope is also an attitude one can have towards the existence of an object, entity, or person x (e.g. God) or the obtaining of some state of affairs. These conditions are arguably necessary minima for hope**. It would make little sense to say Dave hopes that his wound will heal quickly and not become infected but has no desire that this be the case or that he believes that this is impossible. But perhaps a religiously significant sense of hope requires a bit more. As stated, the first condition leaves the nature of the desires quite unspecified (e.g. are these emotions, considered value judgments, or what?); ‘impossible’ in the second condition might mean only logically incoherent. **A plausible case could be made, for example, that the second condition for religiously significant hope should be that p is a live option for S or that S believes that the probability that p is true is not so small as to be negligible or that S does not believe not-p**. > > [...] > > Although hopes can be misplaced, the minimal epistemic opinion involved in hope is a very weak one. Indeed, hope is most nakedly apparent in cases where something is hoped for despite its improbability. Moreover, and for this reason, the hope that p requires less, often far less, in the way of evidence to be rational than the belief in that same content p. It can be reasonable to hope that p in cases where belief with the same content would not be. Clearly, I can hope to win the lottery jackpot without believing that I will and indeed while believing that it is extremely unlikely that I will; that the odds of winning are about one in two hundred million. Lying blind and paralysed in a ditch, I might hope to see and walk again. Devastated by the kidnapping of her child, years later, a tearful mother might still hope to be reunited with her son. Enslaved, I might hope one day to be set free. **Similarly, one can hope that God exists without believing that God exists**. > > Source: [Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reason](https://philpapers.org/archive/MCKAFA.pdf) , DANIEL J. MCKAUGHAN. Religious Studies / Volume 49 / Issue 01 / March 2013, pp 101 ­- 124 DOI: 10.1017/S0034412512000200, Published online: 15 June 2012

If someone carries with them a longstanding doubt constantly throughout the entirety of their life, regarding if they can be saved. Do they have enough faith to be saved? This applies to me personally, and I would love to hear your thoughts. Is there a difference between faith and belief? And in my personal context I think there is a relatively small chance I have blasphemed against the Holy Spirit, and if true, I would be unforgivable. If I carry with me the belief that there is a small chance I am not saveable, do I really have enough faith to be saved?

### Background I am intrigued by this conversation between God and Devil in the Book of Job: > "One day the angels came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan also came with them. The Lord said to Satan, “Where have you come from?” > > Satan answered the Lord, “From roaming throughout the earth, going back and forth on it.” If Job was a historical person and the conversation between God and Devil is the verbatim reproduction of what really happened, I wish to believe that they were not such sworn enemies as we have been trained to believe. I prefer to believe that heaven is the place where the faithful who choose to live for ever with God go, and hell on the other hand, is that state of continued existence which the people who consciously choose to ignore God are assigned to be in. The very fact that those who choose the 'adversary' above God are deprived of God's presence, itself becomes their agony after death. ### Question Has there has been a historical development of the 'image' of devil through the history of the Church?

### Background The phrase מַלְאַךְ יְהוָה (angel of Y-H-V-H) is found several times in the Hebrew bible: > Then the **angel of the Lord** said, “O Lord of hosts, how long will you withhold mercy from Jerusalem and the cities of Judah, with which you have been angry these seventy years?” Then the Lord replied with gracious and comforting words to **the angel** who spoke with me. (Zechariah 1:12-13) > But when **the angel** stretched out his hand toward Jerusalem to destroy it, the Lord relented concerning the evil and said to **the angel** who was bringing destruction among the people, “It is enough; now stay your hand.” **The angel of the Lord** was standing by the threshing floor of Araunah the Jebusite. (2 Samuel 24:16) > **The angel of the Lord** found her by a spring of water in the wilderness, the spring on the way to Shur. 8 And he said, “Hagar, slave of Sarai, where have you come from and where are you going?” She said, “I am running away from my mistress Sarai.” (Genesis 16:7-8) ### Question It is a relatively common (if not mainstream) Christian belief among most denominations that the "angel of the Lord" found in the Hebrew bible is a pre-incarnate form of Jesus. However this belief appears to post-date the Bible since the New Testament does not make this claim. - When was the angel of the Lord first explicitly identified as Jesus/a person of the Trinity? - Who first made this claim and where did they make it? - What's the history of the co-identification of the "angel of the Lord" with Jesus?

## Introduction From early church fathers such as 2nd Century Justin Martyr (*Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, ch 73*) to the 16th Century Reformer John Calvin (*Commentary on the Book of Psalms, 1:373*), accusations that Jewish scribes "tampered" with the Masoretic Text (the authoritative Hebrew Bible text) to obscure messianic prophecies have circulated for centuries. ## Question Is this belief still held by Christians? Do Christians who believe this provide evidence for this belief? What evidence is there for this accusation?

Evolutionism [claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_psychology_of_religion) that religious beliefs result from their ability to give us a cooperative ability to survive. This, an Evolutionist would argue, would imply that religion comes into existence, not on any truth claim, but from evolution giving us useful, but otherwise untrue beliefs. What is the proper response to this argument? (Here is [another article](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429488818-18/ritual-made-us-human-matt-rossano) on the subject.)

### Introduction The Genesis narrative of the serpent tempting Adam and Eve and their subsequent expulsion from the Garden of Eve does not seem to indicate overtly that the character known as "Satan" or "the Devil" was involved in any way. The Hebrew bible likewise does not contain any explicit passages co-identifying Satan as the serpent from the garden. However early Christians appear to have identified the Edenic serpent as Satan: **Justin Martyr (c. 100–165 AD), in First Apology §28:** > “For among us the prince of the wicked spirits is called the serpent, and Satan, and the devil...” **Theophilus of Antioch (c. 115–185 AD), *To Autolycus* 2.28:** > “Eve…was deceived by the wicked demon, who also is called Satan, who then spoke to her through the serpent…” **Early Church Tradition (Book of the Cave of Treasures circa 4th–6th century):** > Satan “took up his abode in the serpent… and… watched for the opportunity… and… called [Eve]…” ### Question - What is the origin of this belief? - Does it pre-date Christianity? - What is the earliest written Christian document linking Satan with the serpent? Sources and views from all denominations welcome

The neurochemical work of the brain provides many arguments that question or even refute the concept of the soul as an immaterial entity independent of physiological processes. First, all mental processes, including consciousness, emotions, and decision-making, have a clear neurochemical basis. For example, neurotransmitters such as dopamine, serotonin, and glutamate directly affect our mood, motivation, and perception of reality. Damage or imbalance of these substances leads to personality changes, depression, hallucinations, or memory loss, which indicates that "personality" and "consciousness" are products of the brain, and not manifestations of an immaterial soul. Secondly, experiments with electrical stimulation of the brain (for example, the work of Wilder Penfield) show that artificial exposure to certain areas can evoke memories, emotions, or even religious experiences. If the soul were independent of the brain, such manipulations would not have such an effect. Moreover, in clinical death, when the brain stops receiving oxygen, consciousness turns off almost instantly, and "near-death experiences" are explained by hypoxia and the release of endorphins, rather than the exit of the soul from the body. Thirdly, evolutionary biology shows that consciousness developed gradually as an adaptive mechanism, rather than being "injected" into humans in a supernatural way. Primitive animals with less complex brains show the beginnings of consciousness, emotion, and learning, which contradicts the idea of an exclusively human soul. If there were a soul, it would either have to be absent in animals or manifest itself in some material way, but there is no evidence of this. Finally, the phenomenon of split brain (when the severing of the corpus callosum leads to the emergence of "two consciousnesses" in one body) it calls into question the unity of the soul. How can one soul split into two independent streams of consciousness? All these data indicate that the "soul" is just a metaphor for complex neurochemical processes, and not an independent substance. Logically speaking, there is a neurochemical brain function that completely negates the soul, and which has been proven. She denies it as follows: For example, neurotransmitters such as dopamine, serotonin, and glutamate directly affect our mood, motivation, and perception of reality. Damage or imbalance of these substances leads to personality changes, depression, hallucinations, or memory loss, which indicates that "personality" and "consciousness" are products of the brain, and not manifestations of an immaterial soul. After all, the phenomenon of split brain (when the severing of the corpus callosum leads to the emergence of "two consciousnesses" in one body) it calls into question the unity of the soul. How can one soul split into two independent streams of consciousness? All these data indicate that the "soul" is just a metaphor for complex neurochemical processes, and not an independent substance.

Considering the whole umbrella of Christendom including Eastern Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Coptic Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Protestant, Pentecostal, Abyssinian, has there been any acceptance of people as true "Christian" who refuse to believe in Creation by a God? Can a person, in any of these streams of Christianity, deny the part of the Creeds mentioning Creation, and still be considered legitimate members of the Christian Church? Still be called Christian? Is ***Creation of the universe by a God*** considered an *essential belief*, or a non-essential? This question totally ignores "how" a Creation was carried out; it sets aside the discussion of the "manner or method" of said Creation! Or is this a ***universal prerequisite"*** (along with perhaps other beliefs or doctrines)? ***Verses to consider to help in answering this***: >Thus saith God the LORD, He who created the heavens and stretched them out; He who spread forth the earth, and that which comes out of it; He who gives breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them who walk therein. (Isaiah 42:5) >Giving thanks to the Father...Who has delivered us from the power of darkness, and has translated us into the Kingdom of His dear Son...For by Him were all things created that are in heaven and that are on earth, visible and invisible...all things were created by Him, and for Him. (Colossians 1:12-16)

If a Christian considers that the [burden of proof](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burden_of_proof_(philosophy)) has not been adequately met by any known theological doctrines about God's nature, including mainstream ones such as Trinitarianism, Binitarianism, Unitarianism and Modalism, and in the absence of sufficient evidence they decide to withhold judgement and declare themselves to lack a definite position, would any official label apply to them? Candidate labels I have in mind at the moment include *"neutral"*, *"undecided"*, *"uncertain"*, *"still researching"*, *"skeptical but open-minded"*, and even *"agnostic with respect to God's nature"*, but I'm curious to know if there is anything close to an "official" label out there. _______ #### Appendix: examples of questions evidencing the existing debate - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/49022/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/18043/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/2622/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/33246/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/62297/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/40799/50422

Many Christians who attend church, when confronted by inquirers outside the church, who wonder why they believe in Christianity, simply respond by saying, *I just accept it by faith*. Or they might say, *It was good enough for my grandpa, so it's good enough for me.* But in an age of science and technology, which places a premium on "facts, evidence, proofs, etc., those responses seem hollow--even irrational, or at least unintellectual. Quite inadequate to the modern mind enmeshed in collegiate surroundings. The average church-goer seems oblivious to the biblical aspect of *apologetics*. Nor do they understand the exhortation of Saint Peter: >Sanctify the Lord God in your hearts, and be ready always to give an answer (Gk. apologian) for the reason (Gk. logos) of the hope that is in you with meekness and fear. (1 Peter 3:15) This leaves the Christian, especially the Christian student, in the lurch, susceptible to attacks of doubt by professors, as well as peer pressure from culture. So should pastors and teachers equip their congregations with occasional sermons on the *evidences, infallible proofs (Acts 1:3), metaphysical proofs (Romans 1, Acts 17:18-34), reasons (1 Peter 3:15), supernatural conclusions (John 5:36 miracles), eye-witness testimony (1 John 1:1-3):* things which would provide a "reasonable response" to skeptics who doubt these revolutionary facts"? Or is "faith in faith" without proofs, or "blind faith" as some would call it (uninformed faith, that is), sufficient for Christian believers? Should this be the biblical approach for preparing congregates to survive in modern society? What is the correct definition of "faith"? What is the best definition that would be adequate for the modern mind, and cause him to consider Christ as God?

>If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. There is arguably little difference between the lifestyle of the Stoic and the lifestyle of the Christian. Both eschew effeminacy in pursuit of virtue. Both find it best for man to worry about things he can control and to not worry about the things he cannot (Epictetus wrote of this. Christians call this "trusting the plan"; there is also the Christian serenity prayer which expresses this). Both believe in the cardinal virtues of Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance (Christians certainly ought to believe these, and I'd bet most Stoics do believe them as well). I would argue that their way of life is in essence, the same. The question is this: if a Christian and a Stoic both **live the same exact life**, and the **only** difference in their essence is that the Christian believes in the gospel, then why does the Christian go to heaven while the unbelieving Stoic does not? More generally, the question is about the "mechanics" of Christian salvation: when one comes to believe in Christ (esp. when converting from stoicism) what is it that *actually* changes in the person's essence/soul/existence that makes him fit for the Kingdom of God? In other words, what is it about the intellectual position of being Christian that impacts the *state* of someone's soul?

It seems that those who attack the veracity of the Christian faith also dislike the faith on a qualitative level. They dislike what it fundamentally is about. Similarly, it seems that those who support the veracity of the Christian faith value the faith on a qualitative level. They cherish what it fundamentally is about. I am very curious to learn of any exceptions to this. I think someone who sees the faith as so good that it is worth believing in would probably not need extensive evidentialist support as a precursor to belief. Someone who sees the faith as essentially bad and not worth believing in would probably not need extensive evidentialist support as a precursor to disbelief. (This is not to undermine the value of evidence.) A quote by Thomas Nagel comes to mind: "I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and naturally hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that."

## Background: Christian Trinitarians believe "that there is one eternal being of God – indivisible, infinite. This one being of God is shared by three co-equal, co-eternal persons, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit". Trinitarians generally believe that this doctrine is taught in the New Testament. They also generally believe the trinity is (minimally) simply compatible with the Hebrew bible, or (maximally) also clearly taught in the Hebrew bible. This is in contrast with traditional Jewish belief in a unitary deity. The authors of the Hebrew bible make several statements about the oneness of G-d: > **Deuteronomy 6:4** - "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our G-d, the Lord is one." > **Isaiah 44:6** - "Thus says the Lord, the King of Israel and his Redeemer, the Lord of hosts: 'I am the first and I am the last; besides me there is no god.'" > **Deuteronomy 4:35** - "To you it was shown, that you might know that the Lord is G-d; there is no other besides Him." These authors do not write about distinctions between *being* and *personhood*. ## Unfalsifiable belief? Under trinitarian hermeneutical approaches, the above verses are not contrary to the trinity because they could be interpreted to refer to *the single being of G-d*, and not to the trinitarian *multiplicity of persons*. This is a curious interpretation since concepts of distinction between “person” and “being” only appear in literature which post-date the completion of the Hebrew bible. ## Question If seemingly clear verses attesting to ontological oneness can be used in support of trinitarian doctrine, what could a biblical author have written in the Hebrew bible that would falsify the trinity? Is the trinity only falsifiable with a verse such as *"There is only one person of G-d"*, *"G-d is only one being and one person"*, or even *"The trinity as defined by Christian patristic fathers and ecumenical councils in the 4th Century CE is false"*?

From [Bayesian epistemology (SEP)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/) : > ### Bayesian Epistemology > *First published Mon Jun 13, 2022* > > We can think of belief as an all-or-nothing affair. For example, I believe that I am alive, and I don’t believe that I am a historian of the Mongol Empire. However, often we want to make distinctions between *how strongly* we believe or disbelieve something. I strongly believe that I am alive, am fairly confident that I will stay alive until my next conference presentation, less confident that the presentation will go well, and strongly disbelieve that its topic will concern the rise and fall of the Mongol Empire. The idea that beliefs can come in different strengths is a central idea behind Bayesian epistemology. Such strengths are called *degrees of belief*, or *credences*. Bayesian epistemologists study norms governing degrees of beliefs, including how one’s degrees of belief ought to change in response to a varying body of evidence. Bayesian epistemology has a long history. Some of its core ideas can be identified in Bayes’ (1763) seminal paper in statistics (Earman 1992: ch. 1), with applications that are now very influential in many areas of philosophy and of science. > > [...] > > ### 4.2 Objective Bayesianism > *Objective Bayesians* contend that, in addition to coherence, there is another epistemic virtue or ideal that needs to be codified into a norm for prior credences: freedom from bias and avoidance of overly strong opinions (Jeffreys 1939; Carnap 1945; Jaynes 1957, 1968; Rosenkrantz 1981; J. Williamson 2010). This view is often motivated by a case like this: > >> Example (Six-Faced Die). Suppose that there is a cubic die with six faces that look symmetric, and we are going to toss it. Suppose further that we have no other idea about this die. Now, what should our credence be that the die will come up 6? > > An intuitive answer is 1/6, for it seems that we ought to distribute our credences evenly, with an equal credence, 1/6, in each of the six possible outcomes. While subjective Bayesians would only say that we may do so, objective Bayesians would make the stronger claim that we ought to do so. More generally, objective Bayesians are sympathetic to this norm: > >> **The Principle of Indifference**. A person’s credences in any two propositions should be equal if her total evidence no more supports one than the other (the *evidential symmetry* version), or if she has no sufficient reason to have a higher credence in one than in the other (the *insufficient reason* version). Consider a person who subscribes to *Objective Bayesianism*. According to the principles outlined above, such a person would strive to eliminate bias and avoid overly strong opinions in their priors. They would also adhere to the principle of indifference, assigning equal credence to propositions in the absence of reasons or asymmetries in the evidence to justify favoring one over another. Within these epistemological constraints, can an Objective Bayesian epistemologist become a Christian while remaining consistent with Objective Bayesianism? Can belief in God, miracles, angels, demons, the resurrection, souls, an afterlife, and similar doctrines be justified within the framework of Objective Bayesian Epistemology? Have any Christian authors written about this?

The difference between a person like me who **knows** that God exists and a person who **believes** that God exists is personal experience. For example I have experienced events in my life where mystical beings have spied on me and taken information to a remote human being in control of those beings. I applied my reasoning and logic proved that the only way someone in the US can know what I am doing in Israel is through divination or necromancy, and that otherwise a normal person wouldn't. This is how I arrived at the knowledge that mystical beings indeed exist and are able to do things normal humans wouldn't be able to. > Editor's note: Assume the reasoning above is valid for the sake of answering the question. The Bible says that without faith we do not please God *Hebrew 11:6* >And without faith it is impossible to please God," meaning that in order to be pleasing to God, one must have faith in Him Does that mean a person who **knows** instead of **believes** is in violation of that verse?

I've been looking more and more into the Church of later day saints. I'm obviously not a member, but I am curious about them all the same. My question is about how it appears as if the majority of their answers regarding the first vision* or their angel Moroni are sourced from those entities themselves. Edit: *The first vision as far as I know was experienced only by Joseph Smith. https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/91367/how-do-christians-discern-between-genuine-dreams-visions-from-god-and-false-dr I saw this answer regarding how the LDS are supposed to determine if a vision, angel, etc is from good or evil. And I agree that if the original source was valid, it would all be okay. But from my understanding all the sources listed by the LDS answer are in and of themselves from the beliefs delivered by Moroni or aligned with them in new teachings. How does an LDS believer know these teachings are valid in the first place and not trick? (Or is this the faith part?) Edit: For clarity, I'm not asking for the current teachings of the LDS, I'm asking how is the basis of the LDS faith confirmed as "divine" before their teachings confirmed it? For example: An angel gives you a special book, the book says the angel is definitely not evil. (A proves B, B proves A) How do you prove the source is valid without using the source's own claim?

I have often heard it taught that those living in the time of the Old Testament were saved by the law, but that they also had to have faith that Christ would come. If someone living in the Old Testament era did not believe that Christ would come and denied the future coming of the Messiah, could they still be saved? Or was belief in the future coming of Christ necessary for salvation in that time period?

I'm catholic and I live in Brazil. I believe in the gift of the infallibility in the New Testament, but i'm trying to understand if Jews, in the old covenant (Old Testament) were infallible too. I found some clues, like: 1 Samuel 9,6 ; John 11,51 ; 2 Peter 1,21 seem to teach infallibility of the prophets of the Old testament. However, it is impossible that the old covenant were TOTALLY infallible, because if it was so, they would in the first place, have recognized Jesus Christ as the true Messiah. So where does all this leave us? Were they "sometimes" infallible? Was there a limit to it? I found your link to an article here, but the link is broken :(https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/65996/the-chair-of-moses-and-jewish-clerical-infallibility) And this is the link you put: https://christiantheorist.weebly.com/basics-of-the-holy-faith/category/01-the-church-of-jesus-the-christ-is-one Could you help me with this, sir? I would love to read your insights about this theme!