In other words, when does association with public sinners become itself a sin or make you a participant in others' sins? Association is not one of the 9 ways of participating in others' sins : 1. By counsel 1. By command 1. By consent 1. By provocation 1. By praise or flattery 1. By concealment 1. By partaking 1. By silence 1. By defense of the ill done

In Catholicism is it a serious sin to make major decisions as if you don't believe in Catholicism? >"844. Negative doubt is the state of mind in which one remains suspended between the truth contained in an article of faith and its opposite, without forming any positive judgment either of assent to or dissent from the article, or its certainty or uncertainty >(a) If this suspension of decision results from a wrong motive of the will, which directs one not to give assent on the plea that the intellect, while not judging, offers such formidable difficulties that deception is possible, then it seems that the doubter is guilty of implicit heresy, or at least puts himself in the immediate danger of heresy. >(b) If this suspension of judgment results from some other motive of the will (e.g. from the wish to give attention here and now to other matters), the guilt of heresy is not incurred, for no positive judgment is formed. Neither does it seem, apart from the danger of consent to positive doubt or from the obligation of an affirmative precept of faith then and there (see 925), that any serious sin in matters of faith is committed by such a suspension of judgment. Examples: Titus, being scandalized by the sinful conduct of certain Catholics, is tempted to doubt the divinity of the Church. He does not yield to the temptation by deciding that the divinity of the Church is really doubtful, but the difficulty has so impressed him that he decides to hold his judgment in abeyance. It seems that there is here an implicit judgment (i.e., one contained in the motive of the doubt) in favor of the uncertainty of the divinity of the Church. Balbus has the same difficulty as Titus, and it prevents him from eliciting an act of faith on various occasions. But the reason for this is that an urgent business matter comes up and he turns his attention to it, or that he does not wish at the time to weary his brain by considering such an important question as that of faith, or that he thinks he can conquer a temptation more easily by diverting his thoughts to other subjects (see 257), or that he puts off till a more favorable moment the rejection of the difficulty. In these cases there is not heretical doubt, since Balbus forms no positive judgment, even implicitly, but there may be a sin against faith. Thus, Balbus would sin seriously if his suspension of assent should place him in immediate danger of positive doubt; he would sin venially, if that suspension be due to some slight carelessness." (McHugh & Callan, *Moral Theology* Vol. I) For example, suppose Bob is dating a Catholic woman and would like to marry her as soon as possible. However, he has some doubts about whether Catholicism is true or not and whether he will ultimately remain Catholic although he continues to practice Catholicism in the mean time. For this reason he is delaying getting married. What will happen to Bob if he dies suddenly? Sure he is theoretically a Catholic in good standing, but he is living as if he doesn't believe in it.

N.b.: I originally posted this question in the Philosophy stack, but then realized it was more appropriate, and might get more informed answers, here. In a famous article, Anscombe castigates "Modern Moral Philosophy" (including but not limited to consequentialism) as "quite incompatible with the Hebrew-Christian ethic. For **it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good; vicarious punishment**...," which in contrast consequentialists can sometimes allow for sufficiently good consequences. (p.10) Many other Christian apologists make similar claims. Yet I have also seen many Christian apologists--and often the same ones--bend over backwards to defend, e.g., the drowning of babies in the Biblical flood, the slaughter of the Canaanite civilian population after a war victory, etc., as well as vicarious punishment: of the Egyptian first-born, of children "to the third and fourth generation" (Num 14:18), etc. Even Christians who do not take these stories literally at least generally say that they reveal something about the character of God and morality, and so have to excuse them away--giving special reasons (consequentialist or otherwise) for why these cases of innocent-killing and vicarious punishment are justified. So my question is, **is Anscombe's quoted claim simply and quite obviously wrong, or can something be said in its defense?** The only thing I sometimes see apologists say about this is that these moral obligations only apply to humans, not to God, though this is odd if God is supposed to be morally good. But even for God, these actions are often excused on account of being part of his "plan," i.e., because in some way (perhaps unknowable to us) these will lead to good consequences. I am not asking whether any of these arguments are plausible, but simply whether they /exist/ and fit Anscombe's description of what Christian ethics supposedly does not do. If so, then these are not innovations of "modern moral philosophy" but old hat strategies which Christian moralists have been using for centuries. So is she just the pot calling the kettle black? Or does she really have a point in saying that there is something novel about modern consequentialist morality which is not present in the history of Christian apologetics? Note that I am well aware that Christian moralists have not historically espoused consequentialism as a general theory, at least before William Paley. But espousing this theory is different from making occasional consequentialist arguments in specific cases. It is also possible that the modern apologists I read giving such arguments are in fact a novelty, and that historical theologians didn't do this, so that perhaps Anscombe's criticism should be extended to "Modern Moral Theology" insofar as she might think it has been infected by a consequentialist thinking anathema to Christian tradition. This is an interesting question; did Augustine, Aquinas, etc., *never* make consequentialist arguments for God's doing or commanding such things? But again, it's not my full question, for Anscombe is claiming that Christians *never* gave justifications for ever doing these things, consequentialist or otherwise. But this seems false, for "I am God," or "I have been commanded by God to do/allow these things" apparently *was* such a justification in some such cases.

According to Catholic moral theologians, does voting for a pro-abortion candidate constitute formal cooperation in the politician's crime of promoting child killing? My question is very similar to "Does the Catholic Church teach that it is sinful to vote for a pro-abortion politician? ", but I am more interested whether such an action is formal or material cooperation .

St. Thomas writes in the *Summa Theologiæ* II-II q. 72 a. 2 *sed contra*: >Now railing or reviling (*convicium vel contumelia*) deserves the punishment of hell, according to Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother… Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing or reviling is a mortal sin. I am having trouble understanding what these words mean. I take it they would include what we would call bullying or verbal abuse, but would disclosure of another's faults in the presence of them and others be contumely, or would that just be detraction, or would that be detraction for the disclosure and contumely because it was in their presence? I am also having trouble distinguishing railing and reviling. *Summa Theologiæ* II-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 3: >Railing and taunts (*convicium et improperium*) consist in words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man’s faults are exposed to the detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt, which is exposed by reviling words. Second, there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by taunts (*convicium*), because vice is commonly spoken of in connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts (*convicium dicit*) but does not revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but also reviles him If reviling (*contumelia*) exposes the fault of guilt and railing (*convicium*) exposes the fault of guilt and punishment then it would follow that all railing is reviling, but then he says that spitefully calling a blind man blind is railing (*convicium*) but not reviling which has left me confused. I also don't understand what mocking a blind person has to do with guilt or punishment.

In the New Law, is the death penalty for sodomy (or other sins of lust, like fornication or adultery) a proportionate punishment? In other words, do Catholic theologians say legislators are morally permitted to write a law requiring the death penalty for homosexual or other acts of lust? Under the Old Law, Lev 20:13 did proscribe sodomy with capital punishment. cf. this post to the CathInfo thread "What Trump policies show he is pro-abortion or pro-sodomy? "

*Quodlibet* III, q. 12 a. 2 co. : >it must be said that every conscience, whether right or erroneous, whether in things evil in themselves or in things indifferent, is obligatory, such that he who acts against conscience sins. > >Latin :
Et ideo dicendum est quod omnis conscientia, sive recta, sive erronea, sive in per se malis, sive in indifferentibus, est obligatoria; ita quod qui contra conscientiam facit, peccat. > >Davies, O.P. & Nevitt transl. :
conscience is always binding, whether it is mistaken or not, and whether it is a question of things evil in themselves or morally neutral. Therefore, it is a sin to act against one’s conscience.

Is a Catholic morally obliged to defend his reputation (against, e.g., calumny, detraction, etc.)? If so, how is he to go about defending his reputation?

Is usury a form of extortion? St. Paul lists extortion among the mortal sins in 1 Cor. 6:10 : "…nor extortioners (άρπαγες, *rapaces*, "the rapacious"), shall possess the kingdom of God." Ex. 22:25 relates extortion and usury: "If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner [*exactor*], nor oppress them with usuries."

McHugh & Callan, O.P., *Moral Theology* says >292. […] rights and duties are correlative—there being a duty that corresponds to every right, and vice versa To what duties do author's rights (*ius auctoris*) correlate?

Why is intellectual work not considered servile work prohibited by the 3rd Commandment on Sundays and feast days? Doesn't the soul need rest just as much as the body those days? St. Thomas, defending the necessity of recreation , said "weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul"; intellectual work can be physically exhausting ; and the *Primitive Constitutions of the Order of Friars Preachers* (c. 1228) prohibits writing manuscripts on Sundays and feast days. Why has servile work come to mean solely heavy manual (bodily) labor?

A rough estimate of the time will do. To refer to mortal sins, the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* uses *peccatum mortale* ([CCC 1856-1857](https://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism_lt/p3s1c1a8_lt.htm#ARTICULUS%208%C2%A0%20PECCATUM)) , as does Saint Thomas Aquinas ([ST II-I Q88](http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/Summa_Theologiae/Part_IIa/Q88) cf. [New Advent](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2088.htm)) . However, the Code of Canon Law refers to *peccati gravis* ([Can 916](https://canonlaw.ninja/?v=sbs&nums=916)) . These are translated mortal sin and grave sin, respectively. In my experience, many people will make a distinction between grave sin, which is a sin of grave matter, and mortal sin, which is a sin of grave matter carried out with full knowledge and intention. But St. Thomas says in the same question cited above, article 6: >Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said above (Article 2). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is destroyed. This seems to me to indicate that he thought mortal sin just referred to any sin which constituted grave matter, and that those sins could be made venial instead of mortal because of a lack of knowledge or intention, any circumstance which provides "subtraction... of deliberate reason." Because of this, I'm suspicious of the term "***peccatum gravis***,” or "grave sin." I suspect it is a modernist invention meant to muddy the waters on sin and confuse the faithful into thinking that they can generally still be saved when in habitual mortal sin. This is verified when I hear anecdotes about priests telling penitents that they may receive communion prior to confession of "grave sins" because those sins are habitual, and thus not really *mortal* sins. Of course, even this advice appears to contradict the plain words of canon law, which appears to me as even further evidence that this distinction was introduced in order to confuse. Does any pre-modern orthodox theologian, especially a Doctor of the Church, use the term "***peccatum gravis***?" And do they use it in this manner?