What are Christian responses to Graham Oppy's argument for atheism from naturalism?

## Short version I'm specifically referring to [Graham Oppy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Oppy) 's paper [An Argument for Atheism from Naturalism](https://philarchive.org/rec/OPPAAF) : > **Abstract** This paper outlines an argument for atheism from naturalism that I have developed in more detail elsewhere (in particular, in *The Best Argument against God*). The overall shape of the argument is as follows: first, naturalism is simpler than theism; second, there is no data that naturalism does not explain at least as well as theism; and, third, naturalism entails atheism; so we have good reason to prefer atheism to theism. Note that this statement of the shape of the argument is NOT a statement of the argument itself. In short, Oppy argues that *naturalism is simpler than theism*, and that, all else being equal, we should always rationally prefer a simpler explanation of the data. How do Christians rebut Graham Oppy's position? ## Longer version A few relevant quotes from the [paper](https://philpapers.org/archive/OPPAAF.pdf) : > Theists differ in the ways that they depart from naturalism. Some theists believe in a God who created our universe ex nihilo. Some theists believe in a God whose actions preserve our universe in existence. Some theists believe in a God who inhabits an eternal realm that has no spatiotemporal relation to our universe. Some theists believe in an intelligent and active God who is neither a natural organism nor an artificial intelligence created by natural organisms. Some theists believe in a God that is a non-personal supernatural power or supernatural force that exerts influence on our universe. Some theists believe that the universe possesses the non-natural property of being divine, or that the non-natural property of being divine ‘permeates’ the universe. And so on. > > **Although theists differ in the ways in which they depart from naturalism, there is a common feature** **to theistic departures from naturalism. In every case, theists differ from naturalists by believing in** **something additional**: either believing in one or more additional intelligent agents, or believing in one or more additional forces or powers, or believing in one or more additional non-natural properties of the universe. > > > Suppose that we are comparing a particular version of theism with a particular version of naturalism. Suppose, further, that these versions of theism and naturalism agree in their beliefs about which natural entities, and natural powers, and natural forces, and natural properties, and natural laws there are. In this case, it’s not just that the theist has beliefs in something over and above the things the atheist believes in; it’s also the case that the naturalist does not have beliefs in anything over and above the things the theist believes in. **From the standpoint of the naturalist, the theistic beliefs** **of the theist are pure addition; and, from the standpoint of the theist, the naturalistic beliefs of the** **naturalist are pure subtraction**. > > **In this case, if all else is no better than equal, then there is clear reason to prefer naturalism to** **theism. For, if all else is no better than equal, then there is no reason to have the additional theistic beliefs**. Hence, in this case, in order to decide between theism and naturalism, we just need to determine whether all else is no better than equal. ... > **The burden of the rest of this chapter is to argue that there are no features of the natural universe** **that have a better explanation on theism than they do on naturalism**. Of course, I won’t be able to examine every feature of the natural universe that might be thought to have a better explanation on theism than it does on naturalism. However, I shall try to examine all of the most prominent features of the natural universe that have been widely supposed to have a better explanation on theism than on naturalism. Given the treatment of the cases that I do discuss, it should be obvious how to extend the discussion to features of the natural universe that I do not examine here. He then goes on to explain how 8 features of the world commonly used to argue for theism can be better accounted for under naturalism. Namely: - Existence - Causation - Fine-Tuning - Morality - Consciousness - Miracles - Religious Experiences - Meaning and Purpose > 9\. **Conclusion** > As I mentioned at the outset, I cannot claim to have considered all of the data that bears on the decision between theism and naturalism (and not can I claim to have given a fully adequate assessment of any of the data that I have considered). However, I hope that I have done enough to indicate how my argument for naturalism would look if it were set out in full and complete detail. (I give a fuller—but still incomplete—exposition of the argument in The Best Argument against God, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013.) > > 10\. **Note about Evil** > Of course, there is data that at least some theists suppose favours naturalism over theism—e.g. data about horrendous suffering, data about non-belief, and data about the scale of our universe. Some naturalists think that data about horrendous suffering is logically inconsistent with theism. As Epicurus argued long ago: >> Is God willing to prevent evil but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God? > > Other naturalists think that data about horrendous suffering renders theism highly improbable: given the major horrors of the twentieth century alone, isn’t it incredible to suppose that our universe is the work of an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good being? I have focussed on data that many theists suppose favour theism over naturalism because my argument requires only that, on any piece of data, naturalism does at least as well as theism in explaining that data. Even if it is true, for example, that naturalism affords a better explanation of horrendous suffering in our universe than is given by theism, that truth makes no contribution to the argument that I have been advancing here. --- **NOTE**: Graham Oppy's formulation of the argument is arguably one of the strongest available in the literature, given Oppy's reputation as one of the most respected contemporary atheist philosophers. For instance, William Lane Craig once said about Oppy's book *Arguing about Gods*: > Oppy's book is not merely recommended but essential reading for anyone interested in natural theology today. No one can pretend to a successful theistic argument unless he has dealt with Oppy's criticisms first. ([source](https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/the-existence-of-god/arguing-successfully-about-god-a-review-essay-of-graham-oppys-arguing-about)) However, the claim that naturalism is "simpler" than theism is thrown around quite frequently in informal discussions with atheists. For example, take a look at some of the answers to [Could Occam's Razor ever favor theism?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/110026/66156) .