Anscombe on Christian vs. "Modern" Moral Philosophy

N.b.: I originally posted this question in the Philosophy stack, but then realized it was more appropriate, and might get more informed answers, here. In a famous article, Anscombe castigates "Modern Moral Philosophy" (including but not limited to consequentialism) as "quite incompatible with the Hebrew-Christian ethic. For **it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good; vicarious punishment**...," which in contrast consequentialists can sometimes allow for sufficiently good consequences. (p.10) Many other Christian apologists make similar claims. Yet I have also seen many Christian apologists--and often the same ones--bend over backwards to defend, e.g., the drowning of babies in the Biblical flood, the slaughter of the Canaanite civilian population after a war victory, etc., as well as vicarious punishment: of the Egyptian first-born, of children "to the third and fourth generation" (Num 14:18), etc. Even Christians who do not take these stories literally at least generally say that they reveal something about the character of God and morality, and so have to excuse them away--giving special reasons (consequentialist or otherwise) for why these cases of innocent-killing and vicarious punishment are justified. So my question is, **is Anscombe's quoted claim simply and quite obviously wrong, or can something be said in its defense?** The only thing I sometimes see apologists say about this is that these moral obligations only apply to humans, not to God, though this is odd if God is supposed to be morally good. But even for God, these actions are often excused on account of being part of his "plan," i.e., because in some way (perhaps unknowable to us) these will lead to good consequences. I am not asking whether any of these arguments are plausible, but simply whether they /exist/ and fit Anscombe's description of what Christian ethics supposedly does not do. If so, then these are not innovations of "modern moral philosophy" but old hat strategies which Christian moralists have been using for centuries. So is she just the pot calling the kettle black? Or does she really have a point in saying that there is something novel about modern consequentialist morality which is not present in the history of Christian apologetics? Note that I am well aware that Christian moralists have not historically espoused consequentialism as a general theory, at least before William Paley. But espousing this theory is different from making occasional consequentialist arguments in specific cases. It is also possible that the modern apologists I read giving such arguments are in fact a novelty, and that historical theologians didn't do this, so that perhaps Anscombe's criticism should be extended to "Modern Moral Theology" insofar as she might think it has been infected by a consequentialist thinking anathema to Christian tradition. This is an interesting question; did Augustine, Aquinas, etc., *never* make consequentialist arguments for God's doing or commanding such things? But again, it's not my full question, for Anscombe is claiming that Christians *never* gave justifications for ever doing these things, consequentialist or otherwise. But this seems false, for "I am God," or "I have been commanded by God to do/allow these things" apparently *was* such a justification in some such cases.