> Hence it comes that, if there are as many risks on one side as on the > other, the course is to play even; and then the certainty of the stake > is equal to the uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from the fact > that there is an infinite distance between them. And so our > proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in > a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the > infinite to gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of any > truths, this is one. "I confess it, I admit it. But still is there no > means of seeing the faces of the cards?"—Yes, Scripture and the rest, > &c.—"Yes, but I have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to > wager, and am not free. I am not released, **and am so made that I** > **cannot believe**. **What then would you have me do?**" > > ### [The Heart Has Its Reasons] > > True. **But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason** > **brings you to this, and you cannot believe**. **Endeavor then to > convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the > abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not > know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the > remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who > now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way > which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would > be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they > believe, taking the holy water, having masses said, &c. Even this will > naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness**.—"But this is > what I am afraid of"—And why? What have you to lose? > > But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will > lessen the passions, which are your stumbling—blocks. > > **The heart has its reasons which reason does not know**. We feel it in a > thousand things. I say that the heart naturally loves the Universal > Being, and also itself naturally, according as it gives itself to > them; and it hardens itself against one or the other at its will. You > have rejected the one, and kept the other. Is it by reason that you > love yourself? > > **It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then,** > **is faith; God felt by the heart, not by reason.** > > Source: https://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/introbook2.1/x4404.html It seems to me that Blaise Pascal is suggesting that one can "fake it till you make it"—that by acting as if one believes that God exists, genuine belief will eventually follow, thus "curing" unbelief. And this cure will actually take the form of one somehow experiencing God in one's heart (whatever Pascal exactly meant by that), as opposed to a logical/rational conclusion being grasped by reason. Hence the well-known *"The heart has its reasons which reason does not know"*. Is my understanding of Pascal more or less correct? If so, what is the Biblical basis for his approach? --- NOTE. I asked a similar question on Philosophy Stack Exchange: [Is Blaise Pascal's approach to "curing unbelief" in the proposition that God exists philosophically sound?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/113993/66156)

The Wikipedia page for Blaise Pascal's apologetic work *Pensées* says that the Catholic Church banned the book: > However as conflicting with the orthodoxy of the Catholic Church it has been forbidden to print or read by the Index Librorum Prohibitorum. Source: [Pensées - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pens%C3%A9es) Following Wikipedia's citations, [Beacon for Freedom of Expression](https://beta.nb.no/extrip/beacon/9800645) says the book was banned for religious reasons in 1789, but offers no other information. Following Beacon for Freedom of Expression's sources again brings you to [FileRoom](https://www.thefileroom.org/documents/dyn/DisplayCase.cfm/id/80) , but that mostly discusses one of Pascal's other works. FileRoom cites another source, *Banned Books 387 B.C. to 1978 A.D.*, but it is a physical book that I don't have access to. So why was *Pensées* banned? I've read articles online about the book, but they all praise it and don't mention anything about it being heretical. The only thing I could think of would be that the French Revolution was happening the same year it was banned, but I don't know how that would affect Pascal's works.

> Pascal contends that a rational person should adopt a lifestyle consistent with the existence of God and actively strive to believe in God. The reasoning behind this stance lies in the potential outcomes: if God does not exist, the individual incurs only finite losses, potentially sacrificing certain pleasures and luxuries. However, if God does indeed exist, they stand to gain immeasurably, as represented for example by an eternity in Heaven in Abrahamic tradition, while simultaneously avoiding boundless losses associated with an eternity in Hell. > > (source: [Pascal's wager - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager)) > Let us now gather together all of these points into a single argument. We can think of Pascal’s Wager as having three premises: the first concerns the decision table of rewards, the second concerns the probability that you should give to God’s existence, and the third is a maxim about rational decision-making. Specifically: > > 1. Either God exists or God does not exist, and you can either wager for God or wager against God. The utilities of the relevant possible outcomes are as follows, where f1, f2, and f3 are numbers whose values are not specified beyond the requirement that they be finite: > | | *God exists* | *God does not exist* | | :-: | :-: | :-: | | ***Wager for God*** | ∞ | f1 | | ***Wager against God*** | f2 | f3 | > 2. Rationality requires the probability that you assign to God existing to be positive (and finite). > 3. Rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility (when there is one). > 4. Conclusion 1. Rationality requires you to wager for God. > 5. Conclusion 2. You should wager for God. > > (source: [Pascal’s Wager - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/)) Is there any biblical basis for encouraging non-believers to consider embracing Christianity with the hopeful anticipation that, if it proves to be true, they may experience the promised reward of an afterlife characterized by eternal bliss in Heaven and avoid a potential infinite loss of an eternity in Hell? Note: I'm asking this question as a follow-up to https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/99793/61679 ---- **Appendix** *Pascal's views on faith and reason* > **Pascal begins by painting a situation where both the existence and non-existence of God are impossible to prove by human reason**. So, supposing that reason cannot determine the truth between the two options, one must "wager" by weighing the possible consequences. Pascal's assumption is that, when it comes to making the decision, no one can refuse to participate; withholding assent is impossible because we are already "embarked", effectively living out the choice. > **Inability to believe** > Pascal addressed the difficulty that reason and rationality pose to genuine belief by proposing that "acting as if [one] believed" could "cure [one] of unbelief": >> But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavor then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness. > > (source: [Pascal's wager - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager))

[Pascal's Wager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager) frames the discussion in terms of the possible benefits and costs of betting that God does or does not exist. In this sense, if one bets that God exists and He actually does, the reward for the wagerer would begin either immediately upon death or on judgement day with the resurrection of the dead (depending on which afterlife theology turns out to be true). In any case, notice that there is no explicit expectancy of extraordinary rewards in *this life* (before death), at least not in the standard formulation of the wager. But what if we make the wager a bit stronger and specific? What if instead of wagering that Christianity is true (in a general sense), we wager that [continuationism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cessationism_versus_continuationism) specifically is true? I posit that this is a stronger version of the wager because it would require not only committing oneself to the belief that Christianity is true, **but also that a continuationist version of Christianity is true**. I foresee three possible outcomes for this wager: 1. *If continuationism is true and the wager works*, then one would get to experience a continuationist version of Christianity *in this life* (no need to wait until death in order to confirm whether Christianity was actually true or not). 2. *If continuationism is true and the wager doesn't work*, this would indicate that the wager was not performed correctly (depending on the actual details of the specific version of continuationism that is true). 3. *If continuationism is false*, then the wager should not work (unless some kind of demonic counterfeit version of continuationism is experienced, but at least this would confirm that the supernatural is true). Additionally, there is always the option of falling back on a traditional version of Pascal's wager and settling for a cessationist version of Christianity (if the wagerer is willing to do so, of course). Has anyone come up with this modified version of Pascal's wager (or anything similar) already? Is there a name for it in the Christian literature? ____ **Note**: In order to avoid semantic misunderstandings (my apologies for being unclear), when I claim that I'm proposing a *stronger* version of Pascal's wager, by *stronger* I meant to say that my modified version demands a *stronger epistemic commitment* from the wagerer, because the wagerer not only has to commit themselves to believe that the Christian God exists, but also that the Christian God *continues* to operate and manifest in ways documented in the Book of Acts (aka *continuationism*). It's a more risky gamble (the odds of being right diminish as we add more constraints), but the rewards in *this life* could be greater if *continuationism* turns out to be true and the wager to work.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager describes Pascal's wager: >If God does not actually exist, such a person will have only a finite loss (some pleasures, luxury, etc.), whereas if God does exist, he stands to receive infinite gains (as represented by eternity in Heaven) and avoid infinite losses (eternity in Hell). According to Pascal, hypothetically, if God does not exist, it is not too bad for us Christians who have believed wrongly. However, on the other hand, according to Paul, hypothetically, if Christ has not been raised, it is really bad for us Christians. 1 Corinthians 15: >17 And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins. 18Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost. 19If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are of all people **most** to be pitied. According to Pascal, we would only suffer finite loss. According to Paul, we would be the most pitiful people. Didn't Pascal agree with Paul that we would be pitiful? Pascal must have read 1 Corinthians, how are we reconcile these two concepts from Pascal and Paul? What about the possibility that we would be sent to hell while others who supposedly have believed properly would go to heaven?

I'm not asking about a justification or an attack on Pascal's Wager. I'm just curious how/if Blaise Pascal, being an intelligent and analytical fellow, reconciled his famous gambit with 2 Corinthians 9:7 and Psalm 50 in which we are effectively instructed not to give out of compulsion? I presume many here are more versed in his writings than I am. **UPDATE:** To expand a bit on what discrepancy I see, Pascal deduced that belief was a logical choice based on the risk of infinite loss. Yet a "faith" predicated on fear of loss is hardly the sort which interests God.
I paraphrase the verses referenced that God doesn't want "risk averse" faith.
Indeed, Kierkegaard seems to come by the **opposite** approach as Pascal: that faith does and should involve chosen risks.