In the teaching of dependent origination, ignorance is presented as the initial condition from which the entire cycle of birth, suffering, and death unfolds. This raises a subtle but profound question: why is ignorance placed at the very beginning of this chain? Does this imply an absolute beginning in time, or is it pointing to a structural relationship in how suffering arises? In exploring this question, it may also be worth considering whether ignorance is simply a lack of knowledge, or if it refers to a deeper mis-perception of reality that underlies all conditioned experience. Clarification on how early Buddhist texts and later traditions understand this foundational role of ignorance would be appreciated.

It is commonly claimed in Nyaya and Vedanta circles that Udayanacharya brought an end to the long-standing philosophical debate between Buddhist thinkers and Vaidika traditions. His works, such as Kusumanjali, Atmatattva Viveka, and Nyaya Vartika Tatparya Parishuddhi, are said to have decisively refuted core Buddhist doctrines like shunyavada, kshanikavada, and vigyanavada. A Traditionalist Vedantin author summarizes this viewpoint as follows: > **"Dharmkirti who is well known for his scholarly works, criticized > nyaya doctrines and Vartikam in his Work called “Praman -Vartika”. > After Dharmkirti Buddhism went into decline, last work which was a > considerable criticism was written by a Nalanda professor as > “TatvaSangraha”. In This tatvaSangraha the writer had also tried to > critize BhagvatPad Sankara’ views (verse 330-331). > > Vachaspati misra who was the knower of 12 darshanas, He wrote Nyaya > Vartika Tatparya tika and answered the claims that were made till now > in a very good manner. His refutations are Calm,deep and subtle.** > > **An unexpected refutation came from Kashmir and that was from Jayanta > Bhatt. He wrote an independant commentary on NyayA suTras called > “Nyaya Manjari” He established the authority of the Veda and refuted > the buddhist doctrines mercilessly.** He has quoted everyone be it > DharmaKirti, Dingnaga or Dharmottara. > > Bhasvarajna an other Kashmiri wrote ‘NyayaBhusana’. He criticized > everyone from Nagarjuna till Prajnakara Gupta(writer of > VartikaAlankara). > > Jayanta Has wrote a verse while refuting क्षणिकवाद which goes as > follows :- > > **नास्त्यात्मा फलभोगमात्रमथ च स्वर्गाय चैत्यार्चनं , संस्काराः क्षणिकाः > युगस्थितिभृतश्चैते विहाराः कृताः । सर्व शून्यमिदं वसूनि गुरवे देहीति > चादिश्यते, बौद्धानां चरितं किमन्यदियती दम्भस्य भूमिः परा ॥** > > **You Bauddhas, hold that there is no soul, yet you construct caityas > (towers) to enjoy pleasure in paradise after death; you say that > everything is momentary, yet you build monasteries with the hope that > they will last for centuries; and you say that the world is void, yet > you teach that wealth should be given to spiritual guides. What a > strange character the Bauddhas possess; they are verily a monument of > conceit.** > > **JnanaSariMitra and his disciple RatnaKirti wrote some works answering > Vachaspati and made last tries to save buddhist philosophy from the > attacks of logicians.** > > **UdayanaCharya ended this debate with very strong logics.** He composed > works as “Kusumanajali” “Atma Tatva Viveka” and “Nyaya Vartika > Tatparya Parishuddhi” and refuted ShunyaVada,KshanikVada,VigyanVada. > > There are other works as Bauddha Dhikkara tika(sankara misra) and > Bauddh dhikkar shiromani **but till then Buddhism became a history.**" Source - The Literary debates between Buddhists and Vaidikas Given this narrative, my question is the following: Did any later Buddhist philosophers, either in India, Tibet, Nepal, or elsewhere, directly or indirectly respond to Udayanacharya's arguments? Are there surviving texts or commentaries that attempt to refute or answer his critiques of the Buddhist doctrines of no-self, momentariness, and emptiness? Or did the Buddhist tradition leave Udayana's works unanswered, either due to historical decline or strategic neglect? Any textual, historical, or scholastic leads would be much appreciated.

I’ve been reading quite a bit about both Pyrrhonism (from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Sextus Empiricus) and Madhyamaka Buddhism (especially Nāgārjuna’s teachings), and I’m curious about how deeply their approaches to knowledge, doubt, and emptiness might align. Here are some specific points I’d like clarification on: - Both traditions seem to question the possibility of arriving at certain knowledge. Do Madhyamaka philosophers use skeptical methods purely as a strategy, or do they endorse a form of suspension of belief like Pyrrhonists? - In Pyrrhonism, the goal is ataraxia (tranquility) that arises from suspending judgment. Is this comparable to the nirvana that results from realizing śūnyatā (emptiness)? - Do Madhyamakas arrive at any “ultimate” view, or is even that view deconstructed like any other? - Are there any Buddhist responses to skepticism that help clarify the boundaries between constructive doubt and nihilism? ----------

Buddhism teaches that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence (śūnyatā). This includes not only material objects but also the self, other beings, and even emotions and concepts. Yet, the cultivation of love , compassion, and empathy is central to the Buddhist path. Other philosophical or religious systems offer clear metaphysical grounds for love: - In Advaita Vedānta, love is said to naturally arise from the realization that all beings are ultimately the same Self (ātman). - In Bhakti traditions like Vaishnavism or even other theistic religions like Christianity, love is grounded in the belief that all beings are ' divine eternal souls', either a portion of God, or children of God. But Buddhism does not appear to endorse either of these metaphysical views. If everything is empty from a Buddhist perspective, wouldn’t that imply that emotions like love, compassion, and empathy are also empty and devoid of inherent existence? Then why should one love at all? How can these qualities be understood, justified, or cultivated within the framework of emptiness? Looking for answers grounded in Buddhist philosophy, ideally drawing from classical texts or traditional commentaries, to better understand how this seeming paradox is resolved.

In several discourses, the Buddha is noted for his silence or deliberate non-engagement with certain metaphysical questions—such as whether the universe is created or governed by an absolute deity, or whether an eternal soul exists that can attain liberation by entering an everlasting transcendent spiritual realm such as Brahma-loka or Vishnu-loka. What was the rationale behind this silence? Was his silence due to the fact he actually did not know if they existed? Did he deliberately withhold such teachings, regarding his audience as unprepared to accept these doctrines as truths? Or did he see these views as fundamentally mistaken from the ground up and therefore not worth discussing? Which of these explanations aligns best with canonical teachings and the broader Buddhist philosophical tradition?

I'm a bit confused about the Buddhist doctrine of anatta (non-self). Does this teaching mean that Buddhism denies the existence of any kind of soul or self altogether? Or is it more accurate to say that Buddhism accepts some concept of a self, but denies that it is eternal, unchanging, or independent? I'd appreciate any clarification on whether the rejection is total or just about the soul's permanence.

Numerous philosophical traditions and religious doctrines espouse disparate—and at times, mutually contradictory—conceptions regarding the nature of ‘absolute reality’ or ‘ultimate reality.’ Some schools of thought posit that the entirety of nature constitutes the fundamental substratum of existence, while others ascribe this foundational status to a particular transcendent and personal deity. Still others conceive of absolute reality as an amorphous, omnipresent consciousness that pervades all of existence. With regard to Buddhism, how is ‘absolute reality’ understood within its doctrinal framework? Does Buddhism, in any of its various philosophical interpretations, affirm the existence of an ontologically ultimate reality, or does it reject such a notion altogether?

While going across literature pertaining to buddhism, I came across the following write-up named '*Logical Criticism of Buddhist doctrines*' where the author has Criticized various aspects of Buddhist Philosophy. The question however is meant specifically towards the writer's criticism of the buddhist 'no-self' concept and defense of the soul theory. While Interested readers might look up chapter 17 (Page 303-326) , for brevity's sake I am summarizing the gist of their main points against the no-self concept and highlighting them for ease of reading. > **Just as one would not look for visual phenomena with one’s hearing > faculty or for auditory phenomena with one’s visual faculty, so it is > absurd to look for spiritual things (the soul, and its many acts of > consciousness, will and valuation) with one’s senses or by observing > mental phenomena**. Each kind of appearance has its appropriate organ(s) > of knowledge. For spiritual things, only intuition (or apperception) > is appropriate. > > > **To understand how the soul can exist apparently in midst of the body > and mind (i.e. of bodily and mental phenomena) and yet be invisible, > inaudible, etc. (i.e. non- phenomenal), just imagine a > three-dimensional space (see illustration below). Say that two > dimensions represent matter and mind and the third applies to spirit. > Obviously, the phenomena of mind will not be found in the matter > dimension, or vice versa**. Similarly, the soul cannot be found in the > dimensions of matter and/or mind, irrespective of how much you look > for it there. Why? Simply because its place is elsewhere – in the > spiritual dimension, which is perpendicular to the other two. > **The truth is that it is impossible to formulate a credible theory of > the human psyche without admitting the existence of a soul at its > center.** **Someone has to be suffering and wanting to escape from > suffering. A machine-like entity cannot suffer and cannot engage in > spiritual practices to overcome suffering. Spiritual practice means, > and can only mean, practice by a spiritual entity, i.e. a soul with > powers of cognition, volition and valuation**. These powers cannot be > equated electrical signals in the brain, or to events in the skandhas. > They are sui generis, very miraculous and mysterious things, not > reducible to mechanical processes. Cognition without consciousness by > a subject (a cognizing entity) is a contradiction in terms; volition > without a freely willing agent (an actor or doer) is a contradiction > in terms; valuation without someone at risk (who stands to gain or > lose something) is a contradiction in terms. This is not mere grammar; > it is logic. > > As already mentioned, **a soul is not an essence, but a core > (spiritual) entity. It therefore cannot be viewed as one of the five > skandhas, nor as the sum of those skandhas, as the Buddhists rightly > insist. It can, however, contrary to Buddhist dogma, be viewed as one > of the parts of the complete person, namely the spiritual part; but > more precisely, it should be viewed as the core entity, i.e. as the > specific part that exclusively gives the whole a personality, or > selfhood.** This is especially true if we start wondering where our soul > came from when we were born, whether it continues to exist after we > die, where it goes if it does endure, whether it is perishable, and so > forth. How would a buddhist respond to this critique of the no-self theory?

The Mrgendra Agama, A Saivite Hindu Agama text, in a certain chapter pertaining to the refutation of Rival schools makes the following criticism of the Buddhist position - > **cidyavañjakasya karmādeḥ kṣaṇikatvānmuhurmuhuḥ| vyajyate jāyamāneva > kṣaṇike matā paraiḥ|| 24** > > Due to the functions and operations of those instruments which help > for the manifestation of consciousness, cit (knowledge) appears to be > momentary, since those functions are of fractional duration. Not > knowing this, the Saugatas say that consciousness is momentary. > > **tadasatkarmaṇo bhogādātītānubhavasmṛteḥ| sthitirinanvaye nāśe na > smṛternāpi karmaṇaḥ|| 25||** > > **vināśa lakṣaṇopaiti na muktāvapyupaplavaḥ| na cāstyanubhavaḥ kaścit > bhāvāvasthā varaṃ tataḥ|| 26||** > > This view of momentariness is untenable. If consciousness itself is > momentary, the experience of meritorious and sinful effects and the > remembrance of previous experiences cannot occur. Because > consciousness which occurs at one moment perishes at the next moment > itself. How could the effect of karmas done by one man be experienced > by another man? > > Or, how could the experience attained by one man be > remembered by another man? Because of the ascertained occurrence of > the karmic effects and remembrance, it is to be deduced that the self > is essentially eternal; not momentary. > > There is another defect in the > concept of momentariness of the self. Can the occurrence of > uninterrupted continuity of momentary-self be considered as > liberation? Or, can the pacified and stilled state of consciousness > itself after knowing the object, just like the extinguished beam of a > lamp, be considered as the state of liberation? If it is the case of > former, then, even in the state of liberation, the continuity of the > momentary self frequently gets destroyed. If it is the case of latter, > then, there is no experience of bliss in the extinguished state of the > self. Therefore, when compared to this kind of blissless liberation, > "to be enmeshed in the transmigratory phenomena" is more preferable; > more superior. ~ Mrgendra Agama, Vidya Pada, 2.24-26 How would a Buddhist respond to this critique philosophically?

French philosopher René Descartes is famous for saying "*Je pense, donc je suis.*" (I think, therefore I am.). Is this in fact the exact opposite of the concept of the Buddha nature, with something like "I am. But unfortunately I can think." being the more appropriate idea? --- Descartes seems to be saying that because he can think he is aware that he exists. My (possibly mistaken) impression of Buddha nature is that everything exists, but thinking about one's own existence can disrupt or interfere with that existence.

In SN3:8 ([Mallikā Sutta](https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN3_8.html)) , when asked by King Pasenadi if there is anyone dearer to her than herself, Queen Mallika answered: > “No, great king. There is no one dearer to me than myself. And what about you, great king? Is there anyone dearer to you than yourself?” Likewise, the King answered that he saw himself to be of utmost importance. When the Buddha was informed of this conversation, he affirmed that such is the case with *all beings*. In our modern society, self-centredness (hereby termed as selfishness) has gotten a bad reputation while altruism (selfless concern for others) is widely celebrated. Therefore, I find it interesting and strange that the Buddha did not disapprove of the selfishness as expressed in the above sutra but only stressed that we should restrain from hurting others just as we would not want ourselves to be hurt i.e. [norm of reciprocity](https://www.thebehavioralscientist.com/glossary/reciprocity) . Seeing that selfishness has a tendency to result in [self-obsession as evident in this definition](https://www.berkeleywellbeing.com/selfishness.html) : > the state of being very focused on one’s own needs and well-being with a correspondingly decreased focus on the needs and well-being of others Thus, my questions as below. 1. Why didn’t the Buddha disapprove of selfishness? 2. Isn’t selfishness a cause for people to hurt/harm others either intentionally/consciously or unintentionally/unconsciously. 3. Why didn’t the Buddha encourage his followers to “love thy neighbour as thyself”? Wouldn’t it help reduce self-obsession and potential problems in relationship due to selfish behaviour? 4. Could this be one possible cause for the philosophical difference between Theravada and Mahayana? Whereas the former is neutral on selfishness, the latter encourages compassion and pursuing enlightenment for the benefit of all beings.

I formerly practiced with the local Shambhala group. I took my Refuge Vows there, received some random Buddhist name that had nothing to do with my studies or who I am; and was told I was now a member of Chogyam Trungpa's lineage. Since then I found out about the disgusting sexual and physical abuse perpetrated by Chogyam Trungpa and his son, the current Sakyong, and have not been able to continue with the Shambhala teachings. My question (and I apologize for its being so very basic) is: can a refugee somehow change lineages? I asked this of an older woman there whom I respected,and she said no without any explanation. I now am studying the teachings of H.H. the Dalai Lama, and do not really know what tradition I am in. I have practiced on my own -- with the exception of my few Shambhala years -- for about 20 years, but am not very knowledgeable about the scriptures. Any link to a good beginner's guide would be much appreciated. I hope I have not violated any rules. And thanks in advance for any answers. I really don't want to be associated with Shambhala in any way. If there is a way to change my lineage, I'd really like to know.

I had a quick question in regards to the Buddhist view on the recent pandemic. What would the stance be of a Buddhist towards the government tactics of losing jobs if not vaccinated, being locked down etc and mandating the vaccine? Should we be free to choose based on our personal educated opinion or is it a case of always following authoritative orders even if they can be seen as detrimental by a certain percentage of the population? Would compassion, understanding be the best answer towards all sides? Would it make you 'not a Buddhist' if you choose a certain view? Regards, Nik

I read this : > “There are four kinds of sameness (*samata*) for those who discipline > themselves in religious life: appearance, causation, **coming into > being**, and the fourth is egolessness.” Can you describe the experience of "coming into being"? Why is it sameness? Do you think these four kinds of sameness are the same *meaning* described by four different concepts?

The doctrine of [pratītyasamutpāda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prat%C4%ABtyasamutp%C4%81da) states that: > **all dharmas (phenomena) arise in dependence upon other dharmas**: "if this exists, that exists; if this ceases to exist, that also ceases to exist". **The basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things.** However, on the [Wikipedia page on Nirvana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nirvana_(Buddhism)) , it is stated: > According to Dhammapala, **nibbana is an objective reality** which is the opposite of samsara. **Nibbana has its own nature (sabhava) which is unlike all conditioned phenomena.** From this, I'm curious to know the following inter-related ideas: a) Is all there is to reality these conditioned Dharma and if yes, where does Dhammapala's idea of nibbana fit into this if its a non-conditioned phenomena which an intrinsic essence/nature? b) In the view of Dhammapala, are all conditioned phenomena ultimately dependent on this Absolute and Objective Reality which has an intrinsic nature? Does nibbana originate anything itself or is it merely like a principle? Just as an idea, perhaps the doctrine of the Two Truths is related to this, with nibbana belonging or being identical to the Ultimate Truth.

It is generally accepted that Buddhist philosophy, as formalised in the texts of Dignana and Dharmakīrti, is resolutely nominalist in orientation. Briefly, this is because of the following characteristics: **Momentariness and Particularity**: Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics, especially as articulated by Dharmakīrti and his followers, emphasize the concept of "ksana" or momentary existence. Every phenomenon is unique and exists only for a moment, after which it ceases to be. This emphasis on the particularity and fleeting nature of phenomena aligns with a nominalist perspective, as there's no lasting, eternal substance or universal essence behind these phenomena. **Denial of Svabhāva**: Many Buddhist schools, particularly the Madhyamaka, deny the notion of "svabhāva" or inherent existence. Phenomena don't have an inherent, unchanging essence or nature. Instead, they exist interdependently. This challenges the idea that there are stable universals or abstract entities behind the individual particulars. **Use of Concepts and Designations**: While Buddhists accept the practical use of concepts and general terms, they often regard them as mere designations or conventions ("prajñapti") that do not correspond to any real, independent entity in the world. Words and concepts group diverse and ever-changing phenomena under convenient labels for the sake of communication and understanding, but these labels do not capture the ultimate nature of things. **Rejection of a Permanent Self**: At the core of Buddhist teachings is the doctrine of anātman or non-self. Buddhism denies the existence of a permanent, unchanging self or soul. This can be seen as a form of nominalism applied to personal identity, where the concept of a continuous, unified self is rejected in favor of a more fluid and contingent notion of identity. **Functionalism over Essentialism**: In the Dharmakīrti tradition and other Buddhist systems, the function (or causal efficacy) of an entity is more important than any alleged essence. What makes something what it is, is not some inherent essence but its functional role. **Apoha Logic:** The apoha theory avoids the commitment to universals. Instead of saying that all cows share a universal essence of "cow-ness," the apoha approach posits that our concept of "cow" merely excludes everything that isn't a cow. This approach sidesteps the metaphysical commitment to a universal essence shared among individual cows. However, as a long-time student of both Buddhist and Western philosophy, the (heretical?) idea has occurred to me that there is a clear example of a universal right at the centre of the Buddhist tradition. And that is the Buddha! Why? Because, as is well known, Sakyamuni himself was not the only Buddha - there were Buddhas before him, and there will be future Buddhas, such as Maitreya. Something similar can be said of the bodhisattvas, who are exemplifications of a type or form. So in this case, Sakyamuni himself was one instantiation or particular instance of the Universal Buddha. As I admit, it's an heretical suggestion, as Buddhist logic will never admit the reality of universals. But I find it hard to reconcile the 'idea of the Buddha' against their 'apoha logic'. Has this idea occured to anyone else?