In the Upanisa Sutta it is said: > So, mendicants: ignorance is the vital condition for choices. Choices are the vital condition for consciousness. Consciousness is the vital condition for name and form… I’m not sure I understand the meaning of “choices” here and how ignorance causes choices to arise. Does this mean *poor* choices, or does it mean any choices at all? Without ignorance would there be no choosing? Also does “choices are the vital condition for consciousness” mean something like, once a baby realizes they can choose what to do, they develop a sense of self and consciousness?

Buddhist accounts frequently assert that phenomena (dharmas) are empty of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva, asvabhāva), and that their arising, functioning, and cessation occur solely through dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). However, causal efficacy seems to require at least minimal stability of a phenomenon’s defining features. This raises some questions. 1. If dharmas have no intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva), how can they still perform functions ? Doesn't causal power require at least some stable feature, and if not, what does “causal efficacy” actually mean for empty dharmas? 2. Dharmas are described as momentary and empty. How do empty, momentary events form a causal continuum (saṃtāna) without presupposing some underlying stability?

Was dependent-origination (Pratityasamutpada) revealed to Buddha with enlightenment? If not, when? AI says: > First Sermon: The first formal teaching of this doctrine occurred > during the Buddha's first sermon at Sarnath, shortly after his > enlightenment. This sermon is known as the Dhammacakkappavattana > Sutta, **where he introduced the Four Noble Truths and the concept of > dependent origination**. Okay, but there is only a brief reference to anything resembling dependent-arising in sn56.11 . > Bhikkhus, for however long the wisdom that sees in accordance with > reality - having three modes and twelve aspects - regarding these four > noble truths was not well purified in us,..- And what exactly "the three rounds, twelve aspects" means is still unclear. Does it refer to the Four Noble Truths? > The Buddha turned three times the Dharma wheel of the Four Noble > Truths. During the first turning for indication, the Buddha revealed, > “This is suffering; this is accumulation of afflictions; this is > cessation of suffering; this is the path.” During the second turning > for persuasion, He advised, “This is the suffering you should know; > this is the accumulation of afflictions you should destroy; this is > the cessation of suffering you should achieve; this is the path you > should take.” During the third turning for confirmation, He testified, > “This is the suffering I have known; this is the accumulation of > afflictions I have destroyed; this is the cessation of suffering I > have achieved; this is the path I have completed.” It's summary : > It is the path of understanding and practice, whereby the truth can > become known (sacca-ñāṇa), its function understood (kicca-ñāṇa), so > that its accomplishment may be realized (kata-ñāṇa). Another theory: > The three rounds refer to the three watches of night described in >Mahāsaccakasutta, and the twelve aspects are indeed the twelve links of > Pratityasamutpada.. Was DO developed logically, with effort, or was it a spontaneous arising of his enlightenment?

How is the connection between *bhava* (as *kamma-bhava* and *upapatti-bhava*) and *jāti* as links in the twelve link formula of dependant arising to be understood?

Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 CE) was one of the foremost philosophers of Kashmir Śaivism , whose magnum opus Tantrāloka is widely regarded as the most comprehensive exposition of non‑dual Śaiva tantric thought. In the chapter of Tantrāloka dealing with causality , Abhinavagupta and the commentator Jayaratha mount a sustained critique of Buddhist theories of causality and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), which they present as inadequate to account for real causal efficiency outside a unified conscious agent. Below are verbatim formulations from the Tantrāloka alongside an academic paper (based on Tantrāloka and Jayaratha’s commentary) mentioning Abhinavagupta’s key objections to the Buddhist theories of causality . ***Important disclaimer:-*** The paper contains a large volume of tightly argued material, textual citations, and sub-arguments. For the sake of clarity and length, I am summarising the main objections rather than citing every verse or passage. Any readers attempting to answer should ideally consult from Page 12 onwards of the said paper alongside the other provided citations alongside the text of Tantraloka from 9.10 to 9.37 for a thorough and accurate understanding of the opponent's objections. ---------- 1:- Causality and succession ---------------------------------------------- Abhinavagupta asserts that Buddhist theory causality is only succession of discrete events with no substantial connection, and therefore cannot explain real causal relations. Especially between phenomena independent of one another The direct Excerpt from the tantraloka 9.11-13 Jayaratha, the commentator, gives the example of Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī (the constellations Pleiades and Taurus): if mere succession were enough to establish causation, Kṛttikā would be the cause of Rohiṇī, since the latter always rises after the former. Yet despite this regular sequence, there is no causal relationship between them.The Śaiva critique here seems to be that Buddhist theory relies too heavily on perceptual succession to define causation. 2: True causality requiring an agent and agency: ----------------------------------------------------- Abhinavagupta argues that because Buddhists emphasize momentary entities, they lack a real connection between cause and effect. Abhinavagupta claims that “the relation of cause and effect is really that of agent and agency” and that the ultimate cause is a conscious agent whose will underlies causation. Excerpt from Tantraloka 9.14-18 Further Jayaratha asks that surely succession and simultaneity are not character- istics in the nature of the things themselves; they are attributes of perception. But it is consciousness which establishes the succession and non-succession when it per- ceives that a cloth is after a pot. The things themselves are not endowed with succession or non-succession as something super added to their natures. So the Buddhists cannot avoid the fact that they are superimposing contradictory attributes upon a single entity even though they are trying to get away by introducing succession (TĀV 9.18). 3: Multiple causes and unity of effects ---------- The concept of complex causality (Sāmagrī ) is used by both Naiyāyikas and Buddhists in their discussions about causality. Abhinavagupta accepts the Buddhist notion of causal totality but maintains that Śiva, as consciousness, is the ultimate agent. While a pot is said to arise from an aggregate of causes (TĀ 9.30ab), this aggregate must form a unity. Without such unity, diverse causes would produce multiple effects. Jayaratha clarifies how This unity has to be grounded in a single, all-pervasive agent of cognition, which alone makes a single effect possible. Excerpt from Tantraloka 9.29-37 ---------- Questions based on the above - ========= 1. How does Buddhist dependent origination avoid collapsing causality into simple succession with no real dependence? How would Buddhists justify dependent origination so that true causal relations are distinguished from mere chronological succession? 2. How do Buddhists account for singular effects arising from multiple interdependent conditions without a unified causal agent or totality? 3. How would Buddhists respond to the claim that causal succession and simultaneity are merely perceptual constructs rather than objective causal relations? 4. How do Buddhist theories of dependent origination articulate “necessity” such that effects follow causes for reasons beyond mere adjacency? 5. How would a Buddhist articulate the concept of momentariness and dependent origination without collapsing into either metaphysical nihilism or affirmation of a first, self‑existent cause? What logic would show that conditionality implies neither absolute self nor random succession? 6. Specifically address whether the criticism shows a misunderstanding of pratītyasamutpāda or momentariness, and why. ----------

In many Buddhist explanations, pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) states that all phenomena arise dependent on causes and conditions. However, a common philosophical objection is that if every phenomenon depends on a prior cause, this seems to imply an infinite regress of causes, with no ultimate grounding. If every conditioned phenomenon requires another conditioned phenomenon to give rise to it, how does Buddhism avoid either: an infinite regress of causes, or the need for some first, unconditioned cause (which most schools reject)?

In the teaching of dependent origination, ignorance is presented as the initial condition from which the entire cycle of birth, suffering, and death unfolds. This raises a subtle but profound question: why is ignorance placed at the very beginning of this chain? Does this imply an absolute beginning in time, or is it pointing to a structural relationship in how suffering arises? In exploring this question, it may also be worth considering whether ignorance is simply a lack of knowledge, or if it refers to a deeper mis-perception of reality that underlies all conditioned experience. Clarification on how early Buddhist texts and later traditions understand this foundational role of ignorance would be appreciated.

Finding resources to better understand the meaning of the 12 links of dependent origination has been challenging for me. The best resource I've been able to find to decipher the meaning thus far is this dharma talk. 2009-06-21: Gil Fronsdal: Dependent Origination In it, the first 9 links are described in a fashion that makes sense and rings true but the last 3 are still fuzzy to me. 1: ignorance the choice to ignore that which is uncomfortable (i.e The biological purpose of "pain" is to provide the sensory motor brain with feedback that its predictive model of the world is incorrect. It contains a wrong view about the world which leads to unskillful movements in the world. This wrong view should be investigated and replaced with a more skillful view which makes more skillful movements in the world possible. e.g. You burn your hand on the stove. Within this context, the choice to IGNORE the discomfort, to cling to views, gives rise to suffering. Suffering is the persistent pressure by the sensory motor brain to pay attention to the feedback and correct the wrong view in its sensory-motor predictive model of the world.) ignorance is the condition for 2: unwise intention is the condition for 3: unwise attention is the condition for 4: unwise mobilization of body and mind is the condition for 5: the 6 sense bases directed to receive and interpret sensory input (perhaps unwisely) is the condition for 6: contact the sensory experience. which may be interpreted unwisely is the condition for 7: feeling tone (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral) is the condition for 8: craving (to pull towards or push away) is the condition for 9: clinging is the condition for 10: becoming is the condition for 11: birth is the condition for 12: old age and death The speaker suggests that “birth and becoming” refer to the creation of an identity associated with suffering and that “old age and death” is a synonym for suffering. This is too fuzzy for my liking and I desire a clearer and more precise understanding. I *think* this means The wrong view that “happiness depends upon the satiation of THIS desire for THIS sensory experience”, when clung to, gives BIRTH to an identity whose mission is to attain that sensory experience by BECOMING the identity required to attain it. So “birth and becoming” kind of make sense to me, though I am still somewhat uncertain if this is the meaning the Buddha intended. “Old age and death” however does not make sense to me. If this is just a synonym for suffering, why didn't the Buddha just say “suffering”. My impression is that he chose his words very carefully.

Dependent origination is interpreted by users of this platform to mean that craving and grasping can give rise to a sense of self. It's also advised on this platform to reflect on not-self of various things like mind and body. Not-self is described elsewhere as "not in control of", although people caution against conceptualizing not-self. I take this to mean that whenever I feel I "am", that "I" is an illusion built on a layer of craving and grasping. So, whenever I feel I "am", I reflect on an inability of me as an illusion to change anything - to move a body part, to breathe in a different way, to change thoughts, to prevent something, etc. Is this a wrong view?

i read this on a website: "...Nama is the appearance of Rupa, 'what it looks like' and not 'how it is',.." is it correctly said?

How would one explain when Buddha said in Mahānidāna Sutta, that "rūpakāye adhivacanasamphasso" and "nāmakāye paṭighasamphasso". The meaning of this?

In saccapabba of mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta:

1. Jāti is "khandhānaṃ patubhāvo" and "āyatanānaṃ paṭilābho".
2. Khandhānaṃ patubhāvo included viññāṇa-khandha.
1. Viññāṇa-khandha is viññāṇa-paṭiccasamuppāda.
2. Rūpa-paṭiccasamuppāda is rūpa-khandha.
3. Nāma-paṭiccasamuppāda is vedanā-, saññā-, saṇkhāra-khandha (cetana, phassa, manasikāra; see: sammādiṭṭhisuttaṃ).
3. Those nāma- and rūpa-paṭiccasamuppāda are piyarūpa/sātarūpa.
1. 60 piyarūpa/sātarūpa: 6 outer āyatana, 6 āyatana-paṭiccasamuppāda, 6 viññāṇa-paṭiccasamuppāda, and 42 nāma-paṭiccasamuppāda (6 vedana-paṭiccasamuppāda, 6 saññā-khandha, 6x5 saṇkhāra-khandha [phassa-paṭiccasamuppāda, cetanā-paṭiccasamuppāda, vitakka, vicāra, taṇhā-paṭiccasamuppāda]).

So jāti-paṭiccasamuppāda is viññāna-paṭiccasamuppāda. The difference is: Jāti-paṭiccasamuppāda is 5 khandha. So jāti is a conclusion of viññāna, nāma+rūpa, āyatana, phassa, vedanā, taṇhā, upādāna and bhavā-paṭiccasamuppāda. But viññāṇa-paṭiccasamuppāda is an explanation of jhāti. So sacca-pabba is the reason that commentary commented "Viññāṇa Is Jāti And Paṭisandhi", right?

In MN 38, a monk named Sati The Fisherman's Son has some wrong views about 'samsara', as follows: > “tathāhaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi yathā tadevidaṁ viññāṇaṁ > sandhāvati **saṁsara**ti anaññan”ti. > > “As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, it is this very same > consciousness that roams and transmigrates, not another.” (Sujato translation) > > “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another.” (Bodhi translation) > > As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is this very consciousness which wanders in Saṁsāra, and nothing else. ([Suddhāso](https://suttacentral.net/mn38/en/suddhaso?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false) translation) > > As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is just this consciousness that runs and wanders on [from birth to birth], not another. (Thanissaro translation) The translation of [MN 38 by Sujato](https://suttacentral.net/mn38/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=linebyline&reference=none¬es=sidenotes&highlight=false&script=latin) includes a footnote asserting the view "*the primary locus of transmigration is consciousness (viññāṇa)*": > Sāti attributes three teachings to the Buddha. First, that there is a > “transmigration” (saṁsāra) from one life to another. Second, that **the > primary locus of transmigration is “consciousness” (viññāṇa)**. And > thirdly, that the consciousness that transmigrates remains “this very > same” (tadevidaṁ), not another (anaññaṁ); in other words, it retains > its self-same identity through the process of rebirth. **The Buddha did > in fact teach the first two of these ideas**, but not the third, as he > will explain below. | The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says that as death > approaches, the senses and vital energies withdraw into the heart > (hṛdaya), from the top of which the self departs. That same > consciousness proceeds to a new body (4.4.2: savijñāno bhavati, > savijñānamevānvavakrāmati). This core Upaniṣadic chapter on rebirth > reflects Sāti’s wording as well as his meaning. Sāti asserts emphatic > identity using doubled demonstrative pronouns conjoined with (e)va > (tadevidaṁ), and identical constructions are found throughout the > Bṛhadāraṇyaka chapter: sa vā ayam (4.4.5), sa vā eṣa (4.4.22, 4.4.24, > 4.4.25); see also tameva (4.4.17). For anaññaṁ we find the inverse anya for the “other” body (4.4.3, 4.4.4). For the Pali verbs > sandhāvati saṁsarati we have instead avakrāmati (4.4.1, 4.4.2). But > the connection with saṁsarati is made in the Brahmanical tradition > itself, for it says below, “That self is indeed divinity, made of > consciousness” (sa vā ayamātmā brahma vijñānamayo; 4.4.5, see too > 4.4.22), which the commentator Śaṅkara explains as “the transmigrating self” (saṁsaratyātmā) Here, does the footnote asserting "*the primary locus of transmigration (samsara) is consciousness*" have the same wrong view as Sati The Fisherman's Son? In other words, in the Pali Suttas, did the Buddha really teach the primary locus of samsara is “consciousness” (viññāṇa)?

I have often seen the [Anguttara Nikaya 4.77](https://accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.077.than.html) being quoted as in [this post](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/49150/causes-of-specific-illnesses-death) against pondering on the precise workings of karma. **My question:** is there a misunderstanding of the Buddha’s words thus misconstruing his intentions. My understanding on the Buddha’s caution on karma (in AN 4.77) is that we should not try to figure out its exact/precise/detailed workings if 1) we don’t have the tools (i.e. divine eye faculty or recollection of past lives) and 2) we don’t have the discernment or wisdom to see anicca and anatta in the process. The danger is that we may draw the wrong conclusion as was the case with [certain mentioned recluse](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.01.0.bodh.html#fnt-5) in Brahmajala sutta. But the Buddha did not prevent anyone from having a deep understanding of paticca-samuppada (dependent-arising or conditionality) which is the basis of karma. And through the insights on conditionality, have a deeper understanding of karma; why it works in general. I believe a deeper understanding of karma is within our abilities as ordinary humans as we have the ability to observe, recall and analyse conditions and events in our lives. For example, if I am staring at the ceiling at 2 a.m. in the morning, unable to sleep and I tried to recall what I did to cause this, I may then remember giving in to temptation and drinking a nice cup of coffee after dinner. So, there was an unskillful craving involving certain pleasure and a bad consequence. This is observing karma-in-action and anyone can do it. Incidentally, I have friends who claimed to be able to drink coffee or tea just before hitting the bed and still sleep like a log. One common theme is that they don’t experience the caffeine-high like I do. Although I always find it strange why people drink coffee if they don’t get any pleasures from it. Whether we talk about karma or the other four niyamas, conditionality is their foundation. Millions of scientists, researchers and engineers all over the world are working hard daily, trying to tease out the conditioned causes that govern the phenomena of the world we lived in, from climate change to superconductivity. They are trying to harness their understanding to improve the lot of humanity. We should also deepen our understanding of karma for our own long-lasting well-being and happiness. If one is not in samsara, they need not bother with the rule of the game i.e. karma. But what choice do we have? Surely, the Buddha understand this and would want us to have a better grasp of karma to improve our own lives. ### Addendum: ### *Suppose we assume the Buddha intended for us to investigate the workings of karma through proper verification by keen observation, analysis and even experimenting on ourselves and not by mere speculation. Furthermore, if we assume this is possible because not all karmic fruits are from our or others’ past lives, many are the results of this life. Would we be doing an injustice to the Buddha by quoting him out-of-context with AN 4.77? Also, wouldn’t discouraging investigations into the workings of karma be totally inconsistent with the entire teachings of the Buddha?* *If we postulate the above is correct, how can we quote AN 4.77 in the right context without giving the wrong impression that the Buddha discouraged investigating and understanding the workings of karma?*

Is there a compelling reason, those that draw diagrams for visualization of pratityasamutpada (dependent origination), don't want to include anusaya/asava, obviously not to misrepresent Dhamma? Because from my search, only MN9 details these hidden layers of anusaya/asava as conditioning ignorance, vice-versa? > Ignorance originates from defilement. Ignorance ceases when defilement > ceases. The practice that leads to the cessation of ignorance is > simply this noble eightfold path …” > Defilement originates from ignorance. Defilement ceases when ignorance > ceases. The practice that leads to the cessation of defilement is > simply this noble eightfold path,

According to this law, every phenomenon owes its origin to another phenomenon prior to it. It may simply be expressed as “depending on this, this originates”. An example of Dependent Origination in nature is given below: There being clouds in the sky it rains. It having rained, the road becomes slippery. The road becoming slippery, a man falls down. The man having fallen down becomes injured. Here a shower of rain depends on the clouds in the sky. The road becoming slippery depends on the rain. The fall of the man depends on the road becoming slippery. The injury of the man depends upon his fall: Conversely: If there were no clouds in the sky, it would not have rained. Then the road would not have become slippery. Then the man would not have fallen. Then he would not have become injured. So this is understandable and clear to anyone. So can anyone explain (in simplified way)dependent origination step by step with practical examples?

If I am not mistaken, Tenzen Gyatzo HHDL is translated by Tupten Jinpa in quoting ‘another Amado Master’ as stating “Emptiness does not mean the absence of functionality”. Meaning, that although the phenomenon we experience in our ordinary human existence does not have inherent existence, but evolves in and out of existence, because of many causes and conditions (dependent origination), that does not imply that the reality that we experience is not real in the human sense. This insight is fundamentally important in the liberation from suffering, and in this context, the attainment of the direct experiential knowledge of emptiness is facilitated by syllogistic reasoning. This post was stated as a question because I wanted to earn reputation points in order to respond to another question on the nature of emptiness.

In the book *The Meaning of Life from a Buddhist Perspective* links eight, nine, ten of dependent origination , *pratityasamutpada *, are mentioned as attachment, grasping, existence. I am accustomed to seeing eight, nine, ten, as craving (desire), clinging (attachment), becoming, respectively. What are the ramifications of the swap - if I might infer it that way? On a side note, along with the mentioning of the above, there is the mention of "multiple rounds of dependent-arising occurring simultaneously"

I ask a similar question here , but why is it that dependent origination is not part of the Satipathanasutta ? There are a few references to the origin of the body in section 1 (considering the body) but not section 4 (teachings & techniques)...would it be useful if it were?

In SN 35.93 quoted below, it reads intellect-consciousness arises in dependence on the intellect and ideas, but if this consciousness is also a thinking about the work of intellect on ideas then it in itself is an intellect. and if so we have to look for another consciousness which higher and the search continues ad-infinitum. This, of course, is not my own though it's a classic platonic thinkers response to Descartes's misguided saying Cogito ergo sum ( I think, therefore I am), quoted below is from Plotinos Ennead Book Nine explaining the relation of intellect and consciousness. ---------- SN 35.93 Dvaya Sutta: A Pair > "In dependence on the intellect & ideas, there arises > intellect-consciousness. The intellect is inconstant, changeable, of a > nature to become otherwise. Ideas are inconstant, changeable, of a > nature to become otherwise. Thus this pair is both wavering & > fluctuating — inconstant, changeable, of a nature to become otherwise. ---------- *PLOTINOS: - SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.* > Though there be a difference between thinking, and thinking that one > thinks, these two nevertheless constitute a single intuitive > consciousness of its actualizations. It would be ridiculous to deny > such a consciousness to veritable Intelligence. It is, therefore, the > same Intelligence that thinks, and that thinks that it thinks. > Otherwise, there would be two principles, of which the one would have > thought, and the other consciousness of thought. The second would > doubtless differ from the first, but would not be the real thinking > principle. A mere logical distinction between thought and > consciousness of thought would not establish the (actual) differences > between two . Further, we shall have to > consider whether it be possible to conceive of an Intelligence which > would exclusively think, without any accompanying consciousness of its > thought. If we ourselves who are entirely devoted to practical > activity and discursive reason were in such a condition, we would, > even if otherwise considered sensible, be insane. But as true > Intelligence thinks itself in its thoughts, and as the > intelligible, far from being outside of Intelligence, is Intelligence > itself, Intelligence, by thinking, possesses itself, and necessarily > sees itself. When Intelligence sees itself, it does not see itself > as unintelligent, but as intelligent. Therefore in the first > actualization of thought, Intelligence has the thought and > consciousness of thought, two things that form but a single one; not > even logically is this a duality. If Intelligence always thinks what > it is, is there any reason to separate, even by a simple logical > distinction, thought from the consciousness of thought? The absurdity > of the doctrine we are controverting will be still more evident if we > suppose that a third intelligence is conscious that the second > intelligence is conscious of the thought of the first; we might thus > go on to infinity