While reading through the Buddhist suttas, I came across the detailed descriptions of the eight emancipations. These passages were deeply intriguing, but they also gave rise to some questions in my mind which I decided to ask before which let me cite the concerned passages - > “Ānanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight? > > “**Possessed of form, one sees forms.** This is the first > emancipation. > > “**Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally.** > This is the second emancipation. > > “**One is intent only on the beautiful.** This is the third > emancipation. > > “**With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, > with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding > perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one > enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space**. This > is the fourth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** This is > the fifth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of nothingness.** This is the sixth > emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor > non-perception.** This is the seventh emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation > of perception and feeling.** This is the eighth emancipation. > > “**Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward > order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order**, when he > attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he > wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of > effluents he enters and remains in the effluent-free release of > awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and > realized it for himself in the here and now, **he is said to be a monk > released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher > or more sublime than this, there is none.”** ~ DN 15 Questions- 1. Why is “nothingness” (6th) distinguished from “neither perception nor non-perception” (7th), given that both involve retreating from mental activity? Or from the 8th which involves total cessation of perception and feeling? 2. What kind of experience is “neither perception nor non-perception”? Is it a liminal state — and if so, how does one know they have entered it? Can a mind in this state be said to ‘experience’ anything at all? 3. In discussions with scholars from eternalist backgrounds, such as vedanta a common challenge raised is that the Buddhist teachings on the eight emancipations seem to imply the existence of a continuous or eternal subject since someone appears to be progressing through these subtle states of consciousness. If there is no eternal soul or self in Buddhism, then who is it that experiences and moves through these emancipations? How would a Buddhist respond to this objection? 4. What is the significance of being able to enter and exit these states at will, as emphasized in the sutta? 5. Is the progression through these states ultimately teaching that liberation is not something to be gained, but everything to be let go including perception, feeling, identity, and knowing?

Please don't move this to the Philosophy stack unless absolutely necessary. My personal belief in an afterlife is based on: 1. Being indefinite about "what is now?" 2. I assume that "my death" is semantically precise in some way, it's clear what we all mean by that 3. Linking these two, in terms of the impossibility of vague identity. Some people might object to my version of time or death, so while I am more interested in understanding 'vague identity', I cannot yet get started rhetorically. What's going on here? Which of these moves are allowed in the language game?

It's a bit weird to explain. In daily life when I notice some though or emotion or when someone praises me or some other similar action and I notice that and don't cling on to it there is a inner voice praising myself for not getting attached. And if I "let that go" then again an inner voice praising that action and not getting attached to that feeling and this kind of creates a loop. It might sounds very weird or trivial but sometimes its very annoying. How should one deal with this? Just ignore it?

For a long time I've been really into the space of longevity, both radical lifespan extension through biotechnology and the optimization of quality of life during old age (healthspan extension) through currently available protocols on diet, exercise, sleep, meditation, etc. I'm really interested in the Buddhist perspective on this movement, especially how different schools (Thai Forest, Soto Zen, Plum Village, IMS/IMC, Chinese Chan, Chinese Pure Land, Tibetan Vajrayana, and Sri Lanka Theravada) might perceive it differently. My #1 core value is to live as long and healthy as possible, both physically and mentally. I got into Buddhism, because it seems like a comprehensive and effective framework in supporting individuals' mental well-being, especially during old age. I think that if you are not going to have any children, then you have to embrace some kind of spirituality system to offset the very real and catastrophic effects of loneliness and stress on your health and lifespan. Your mind won't be kind to yourself as you get older, and you have to love something other than yourself to be sane. Which Buddhist tradition do you think is the most compatible with this very new kind of value (life is good and I wanna live as long and healthy as possible) that has emerged in a community only very recently, thanks to technology and urban life enabling such a person? (r/longevity, r/peterattia, and r/Biohackers) Thai Forest, Soto Zen, Plum Village, IMS/IMC, Chinese Chan, Chinese Pure Land, Tibetan Vajrayana, and Sri Lanka Theravada? I know some aspects of Buddhist philosophy are very much contradictory to this goal (think The Five Remembrances in Buddhism, contemplations on impermanence: that we will grow old, that we will get sick, that we will die, that all that is dear to us will change and we will be separated from it, and that our actions are our only true belongings, and we will inherit their consequences). So one of my concerns is that if I'm practicing with a tradition that emphasizes those aspects, it would eventually lead to cognitive dissonance/internal conflicts, creating additional stressors in my life. I know I tend to get very hysterical/neurotic and compulsive about these things, so it's good to give these extra thoughts to it before deciding.

Among the various pramāṇas, or means of valid knowledge in Indian epistemologies, it is generally accepted that Buddhism recognizes two pramāṇas. As stated thus :- > Many schools of Buddhism posit two forms of pramāṇa: > > **direct perception (pratyakṣa) and > inference (anumāna)** > > **Direct perception is a non-conceptual cognition that directly > apprehends an object, and inference is based on reasoning.** However, this approach of reliance on only two pramāṇas, coupled with the rejection of scriptural or Vedic testimony (śabda-pramāṇa), has over the time drawn criticism from numerous rival schools among which the most prominent have been the Vedāntic commentators and theologians. This may be seen for instance from a brief study of some Anucchedas of the Tattva-sandarbha, a work of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī, a Vaiṣṇava theologian and Vedāntin of the Acintya-bhedābheda school. In the relevant section, while elaborating on the epistemology of his tradition he lists the flaws with all other means of knowledge such perception and inference. Tattva Sandarbha Anuccheda 9 Therefore owing to these defects, the only valid sources of knowledge about the Absolute (the ultimate truth or God) are the Vedas or Vedic scriptures, which are considered by tradition to be apauruṣeya (authorless) since they are supposed to have manifested directly from God, perfect, and transmitted through an unbroken paramparā (disciplic succession). Further, in order to establish the superiority of scriptural authority (śabda-pramāṇa) over logical reasoning or inference, a number of proofs are cited. In the Lengthy commentary to the 10th anuccheda, it may be seen in particular that the criticism is directed at the Standpoint of the Buddhists - > The Vedas (sabda-pramana ) are the only effective means for acquiring > transcendental knowledge. **The Vedas inform us about the soul's > existence beyond the body**, about the planets of the spiritual world, > and about the Supreme Lord, , His pastimes, and other matters. All > these subjects are beyond the reach of our sensory and mental > faculties. > **Philosophers such as the Buddhists, who do not accept the Vedas, > cannot justifiably say anything positive about transcendence, let > alone the way to attain it without sabda. Sabda-pramana (i.e > Vedic/Scriptural testimony) is so important that although Vaisnavas > count Lord Buddha among the incarnations of the Lord on the strength > of Vedic testimony, they reject His philosophy because it is not based > on sabda-pramana.** ~ Commentary to Anuccheda 10 Similarly the Buddhist View of the momentariness of consciousness too is criticised Elsewhere in the same work as - > **The Vedanta explains that when a person looks at an object there > arises a particular mental state, called vrtti, which the soul > perceives. The mental state itself is not the perceiver. But the > Buddhists, lacking all knowledge about the soul, mistake this > temporary, ever-changing vrtti, which is noneternal ever-constantly > changing, for real consciousness.** This point is further clarified with > the analogy of the life air. Air is one, but air within the body has > various names, such as prana, apana, and samana, according to the > function it performs. Similarly, the soul is one, but while in the > body it manifests consciousness, which appears many-branched and > ever-changing. For example, sweetened cow's milk gives rise to > different mental states when perceived with different senses: to the > eyes it is white, to the tongue sweet, and so on. So it is only the > mental state, affected by varieties of sense perception, that appears > and disappears. The living entity is a fractional part of the Supreme > Lord, and since the Lord is conscious and eternal, the living entity > must have these qualities as well, in as much as a gold nugget shares > the qualities of the mother lode. The purpose of explaining the > conscious and eternal quality of the soul with logic and personal > experience is to help us develop an understanding of the Supersoul. ~ Commentary to Anuccheda 53.3 ---------- With respect to the Above citations, I would now like to pose some Questions:- - Given that perception and inference are indeed fallible and prone to error, how does the Buddhist tradition establish a reliable epistemological foundation for knowledge of ultimate reality (e.g., Nirvāṇa or Sunyata)? - What is the Buddhist position on scriptural authority in general, and how is reliance on an external scripture claimed to be authorless and coming directly from God via a disciplic succession, viewed in light of Buddhist pramāṇa theories? - How would Buddhist philosophers identify the main shortcomings or philosophical weaknesses in the Vedantic insistence on Vedic knowledge as the sole valid source for understanding the Absolute? - Is there an alternative epistemic framework in Buddhism that addresses the same problem of cognitive fallibility without relying on a fixed scriptural authority?

I came across a Vaishnava critique of Buddhism which questions whether Buddhist ethics can have a stable foundation without having the concept of devotion to a supreme God. Quoting the excerpt from here > **what is the problem with Buddhism?** > > Before the advent of Sri Shankara Acharya, Lord Buddha (Sriman > nArAyaNa Himself on the authority of srimad BhAgavata PurANa) has > given an illusory theory for the people of material consciousness and > made them adharmic with His excellent philosophy (Lord is beyond our > perception and His actions are in-conceivable without guidant of > Acharyas). He gave a philosophy based on moral laws, athiesm, denial > of vedas and illusory "nirvANa(viodness)". His instructions are somuch > attractive that any person who is not adherant to vedas and devotion > unto the Lord gets easily carried away. He lures unintelligent men by > saying only intelligent men can understand His philosophy. That > enables people not to investigate His philosophy critically and > accept. Moreover, on the surface, one cannot find fault as it is based > on moral laws like non-violence and truthfulness. Even today many > people think philonthropic actions and being good is ultimate purpose > of life. But they miss the critical point why should one do either > philonthropic or good works. They have no clue what actual good is. > The purpose of all good actions is to attract the attention of the > Lord and get pure devotion unto Him. > > When we do not develop love for the Supreme Lord, we lose all our > morals and dharma at some point or the other. We are never independant > of Him. As we can see today, in countries like china, people lost > their own religion, forgot all good (their own moral laws), consume > more meat (including frogs and snakes) than any other country, and > work day and night like machines to improve material comforts. This > proves, how it is most important to have mercy of the Lord for the > living entity to have ethical life and subsequent desire for eternal > bliss (liberation). Lord doesnot allow selfish people to serve Him, > for He accepts only unselfish, unbroken devotional service. We should > know from this example that acting in all good ways is only to develop > love for the Lord. According to this critique, without divine guidance and devotion, ethical conduct eventually collapses, and moral laws lose their meaning. How would Buddhists respond to this critique and provide a solid basis for morality and ethical behavior within their philosophical framework, given that Buddhism does not ground ethics in pleasing or serving a personal God?

Some Scholars like R.S Bhattacharya claim that while Buddha rejected the Karma-kanda portions of the vedas, he spoke Highly of the Followers of Jnana-marga or nivritti-marga of vedas in the Brahmanadhammika Sutta. Is this really true? And Does This mean Buddha indirectly approved the Upanishadic philosophy of Atman-Brahman?

Buddhism has developed into many schools and traditions since the time of the Buddha, each with its own interpretations, practices, and philosophical systems. While this diversity is valuable in some respects, it also raises the concern that certain ideas or practices may have strayed from what the Buddha himself originally taught. This raises the question of what counts as a significant deviation from the original doctrines of Dhamma and how such differences can be identified. I would also like to know how a lay follower can recognize these divergences in a clear and practical way, and how one might remain faithful to the spirit of the Buddha’s message without falling into sectarian arguments.

What is the source of the Buddha telling his disciples about why Maha Moggallan had died. Moggallan died in the laps of the Buddha? Is it so?

In Nyāya epistemology, pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge) include perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Since Buddhist thought often restricts ultimate reality to momentary dharmas (kṣaṇikavāda) and denies enduring substances, how do Buddhist logicians account for the reliability of inference across time, given that the subject and predicate cease to exist in the very next moment?

If there's no specific purpose in life, If we have to give meaning to life by ourselves, then why doing good and bad matters ?

In *Cracking The Walnut: Understanding the Dialectics of Nagarjuna*, Thich Nhat Hanh explains how in the four conditions out of which a phenomenon arises (seed condition, continuity condition, object of cognition as condition, supportive condition) we can not find the self-nature of the phenomenon itself. The text which he is explaining, The Verses on the Middle Way by Nagarjuna, conclude this about the matter: > 3. The self-nature of phenomena \ is not found in the conditions. \ Since there is no self-nature, \ how could there be an other-nature? To illustrate this point Thich Nhat Hanh uses the example of fire. > For example, we may look for the self-nature of a flame in a box of matches. In the box are matches made of wood and sulfur. Outside the box is oxygen. When we search inside the wood, sulfur, and oxygen can we find the self-nature of the flame? Whether the match has already been lit or not, we cannot find this self-nature. What we call the self-nature of something cannot be found in its conditions at all. My question is, how can Nagarjuna make the leap that because self-nature is not found in the causes or grounds out of which a phenomenon arises that therefore said phenomenon does not possess self-nature? For instance, if we at first assume that objects possess a separate self-nature and we take the example of ice instead of fire, we see that the conditions out of which ice arises (freezing temperatures, water, air pressure) do seem to possess something resembling the self-nature of their product. This is why I am confused when Thich Nhat Hanh uses the example of fire to illustrate the point -- surely there are other phenomena, like ice, which don't fit the rule?

It is commonly claimed in Nyaya and Vedanta circles that Udayanacharya brought an end to the long-standing philosophical debate between Buddhist thinkers and Vaidika traditions. His works, such as Kusumanjali, Atmatattva Viveka, and Nyaya Vartika Tatparya Parishuddhi, are said to have decisively refuted core Buddhist doctrines like shunyavada, kshanikavada, and vigyanavada. A Traditionalist Vedantin author summarizes this viewpoint as follows: > **"Dharmkirti who is well known for his scholarly works, criticized > nyaya doctrines and Vartikam in his Work called “Praman -Vartika”. > After Dharmkirti Buddhism went into decline, last work which was a > considerable criticism was written by a Nalanda professor as > “TatvaSangraha”. In This tatvaSangraha the writer had also tried to > critize BhagvatPad Sankara’ views (verse 330-331). > > Vachaspati misra who was the knower of 12 darshanas, He wrote Nyaya > Vartika Tatparya tika and answered the claims that were made till now > in a very good manner. His refutations are Calm,deep and subtle.** > > **An unexpected refutation came from Kashmir and that was from Jayanta > Bhatt. He wrote an independant commentary on NyayA suTras called > “Nyaya Manjari” He established the authority of the Veda and refuted > the buddhist doctrines mercilessly.** He has quoted everyone be it > DharmaKirti, Dingnaga or Dharmottara. > > Bhasvarajna an other Kashmiri wrote ‘NyayaBhusana’. He criticized > everyone from Nagarjuna till Prajnakara Gupta(writer of > VartikaAlankara). > > Jayanta Has wrote a verse while refuting क्षणिकवाद which goes as > follows :- > > **नास्त्यात्मा फलभोगमात्रमथ च स्वर्गाय चैत्यार्चनं , संस्काराः क्षणिकाः > युगस्थितिभृतश्चैते विहाराः कृताः । सर्व शून्यमिदं वसूनि गुरवे देहीति > चादिश्यते, बौद्धानां चरितं किमन्यदियती दम्भस्य भूमिः परा ॥** > > **You Bauddhas, hold that there is no soul, yet you construct caityas > (towers) to enjoy pleasure in paradise after death; you say that > everything is momentary, yet you build monasteries with the hope that > they will last for centuries; and you say that the world is void, yet > you teach that wealth should be given to spiritual guides. What a > strange character the Bauddhas possess; they are verily a monument of > conceit.** > > **JnanaSariMitra and his disciple RatnaKirti wrote some works answering > Vachaspati and made last tries to save buddhist philosophy from the > attacks of logicians.** > > **UdayanaCharya ended this debate with very strong logics.** He composed > works as “Kusumanajali” “Atma Tatva Viveka” and “Nyaya Vartika > Tatparya Parishuddhi” and refuted ShunyaVada,KshanikVada,VigyanVada. > > There are other works as Bauddha Dhikkara tika(sankara misra) and > Bauddh dhikkar shiromani **but till then Buddhism became a history.**" Source - The Literary debates between Buddhists and Vaidikas Given this narrative, my question is the following: Did any later Buddhist philosophers, either in India, Tibet, Nepal, or elsewhere, directly or indirectly respond to Udayanacharya's arguments? Are there surviving texts or commentaries that attempt to refute or answer his critiques of the Buddhist doctrines of no-self, momentariness, and emptiness? Or did the Buddhist tradition leave Udayana's works unanswered, either due to historical decline or strategic neglect? Any textual, historical, or scholastic leads would be much appreciated.

Growing up, I had a general understanding—based on lay textbooks and common interpretations that the dharmic religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism all believe in reincarnation: the idea that an individual is reborn into a new body, either human or animal, after physical death of the body. As I became more interested in Buddhism and tried exploring it more deeply, I noticed that different Buddhists seem to explain this concept in very different ways. Some use the word "reincarnation" and appear to mean it quite literally, while others insist that "rebirth" in Buddhism is not the same as reincarnation, especially since Buddhism denies the existence of a permanent self. This has left me quite confused. Is rebirth just another term for reincarnation, or does Buddhism teach something fundamentally different? What is the correct way to understand the concept of rebirth in Buddhist teachings?

In particular, does Buddhism think that rebirth is a solution to a human need, or is it a mechanic to how the universe works? And is rebirth a type of regeneration? In my interpretation of Buddhism, rebirth is the means by which pain does not last forever, because according to type theory, pain should be eternal.

I’m wondering to what extent belief in some form of afterlife is necessary for one to be considered a Buddhist. Specifically, are beliefs in otherworldly realms such as svargaloka (heaven), pitriloka (spirit world), and naraka lokas (hell), as well as the idea of rebirth or reincarnation, central and non-negotiable within the Buddhist tradition? Is it possible to identify as a Buddhist while setting aside these cosmological elements, perhaps viewing them symbolically or metaphorically rather than literally? Or are these beliefs foundational in such a way that rejecting them would place someone outside the bounds of what can meaningfully be called Buddhism?

I’ve been reading quite a bit about both Pyrrhonism (from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Sextus Empiricus) and Madhyamaka Buddhism (especially Nāgārjuna’s teachings), and I’m curious about how deeply their approaches to knowledge, doubt, and emptiness might align. Here are some specific points I’d like clarification on: - Both traditions seem to question the possibility of arriving at certain knowledge. Do Madhyamaka philosophers use skeptical methods purely as a strategy, or do they endorse a form of suspension of belief like Pyrrhonists? - In Pyrrhonism, the goal is ataraxia (tranquility) that arises from suspending judgment. Is this comparable to the nirvana that results from realizing śūnyatā (emptiness)? - Do Madhyamakas arrive at any “ultimate” view, or is even that view deconstructed like any other? - Are there any Buddhist responses to skepticism that help clarify the boundaries between constructive doubt and nihilism? ----------

[This answer on Reddit](https://old.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/12flgq9/what_are_some_arguments_for_reincarnation_from_a/jfgry4f/) gave a basic outline of [Dharmakīrti's argument for rebirth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebirth_(Buddhism)#Metaphysical_arguments) in the form of a syllogism: 1. Matter and consciousness are metaphysically different, their characteristics and nature are different 2. An effect must be of the same nature as its substantial cause 3. Thus consciousness cannot arise from or be produced by matter (1, 2) 4. Conclusion: Therefore, there must have a been a consciousness prior to any person's conception which causes the first moment of consciousness in this life For the sake of the question, let's assume that you accept this line of argumentation. The question then becomes, how did the first mental event arise according to this framework? Of course, there is the idea that many immaterial intellects exist in the transcendent realms some of which stretch beyond iterations of the universe and many eons, but at the same time, for there to be so many creatures on just this planet with consciousness would implicate that billions upon billions, if not more, immaterial entities survived the past iteration(s) and eons and made it to this one, and also never achieved enlightenment during that time, which seems highly implausible. Perhaps the Yogacara idea of the store-house consciousness must be of use here, but it would be difficult to prove, I'm not too sure. If anyone knows more about Dharmakīrti's thinking with regards to this, please share your knowledge.

Buddhism teaches that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence (śūnyatā). This includes not only material objects but also the self, other beings, and even emotions and concepts. Yet, the cultivation of love , compassion, and empathy is central to the Buddhist path. Other philosophical or religious systems offer clear metaphysical grounds for love: - In Advaita Vedānta, love is said to naturally arise from the realization that all beings are ultimately the same Self (ātman). - In Bhakti traditions like Vaishnavism or even other theistic religions like Christianity, love is grounded in the belief that all beings are ' divine eternal souls', either a portion of God, or children of God. But Buddhism does not appear to endorse either of these metaphysical views. If everything is empty from a Buddhist perspective, wouldn’t that imply that emotions like love, compassion, and empathy are also empty and devoid of inherent existence? Then why should one love at all? How can these qualities be understood, justified, or cultivated within the framework of emptiness? Looking for answers grounded in Buddhist philosophy, ideally drawing from classical texts or traditional commentaries, to better understand how this seeming paradox is resolved.

In several discourses, the Buddha is noted for his silence or deliberate non-engagement with certain metaphysical questions—such as whether the universe is created or governed by an absolute deity, or whether an eternal soul exists that can attain liberation by entering an everlasting transcendent spiritual realm such as Brahma-loka or Vishnu-loka. What was the rationale behind this silence? Was his silence due to the fact he actually did not know if they existed? Did he deliberately withhold such teachings, regarding his audience as unprepared to accept these doctrines as truths? Or did he see these views as fundamentally mistaken from the ground up and therefore not worth discussing? Which of these explanations aligns best with canonical teachings and the broader Buddhist philosophical tradition?