I'm reading Rob Burbea's book Seeing That Frees. The book is about ways of working with emptiness. In the book, he says that things lack inherent existence. I'm fairly sure this isn't the same as not being real. Is that right? Can things be real and lack inherent existence? I appreciate the real answer will be to meditate on this, but I find exploring such issues more intellectually to be helpful too.

The Buddhist doctrinal term svasaṃvedana (literally “self-awareness” or reflexive awareness) plays a central role in classical Indian epistemology and Yogācāra theory of mind as defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. On their view, every act of intentional consciousness is non-conceptually self-aware in addition to being aware of its object, serving as the basis for memory, inference, and perceptual continuity. This reflexivity is often analogized to a lamp that illuminates both objects and itself. However, later Madhyamaka expositors, especially in the Gelug Prāsaṅgika tradition, critique or deny svasaṃvedana even at the conventional level, arguing that positing intrinsic reflexive awareness undermines the two truths and reifies mind. Other Madhyamaka authors, like Śāntarakṣita and Ju Mipham, articulate a more nuanced position where reflexive awareness may be accepted conventionally but denied ultimately. Is there a consistent way within Buddhist epistemology to reconcile Dharmakīrti’s reflexive awareness with Madhyamaka critiques without collapsing into either realism about mind or nihilism about experience? In other words, can svasaṃvedana be framed in a two-truths schema that satisfies both pramāṇa and madhyamaka concerns, and if so, how?

Some Scholars like R.S Bhattacharya claim that while Buddha rejected the Karma-kanda portions of the vedas, he spoke Highly of the Followers of Jnana-marga or nivritti-marga of vedas in the Brahmanadhammika Sutta. Is this really true? And Does This mean Buddha indirectly approved the Upanishadic philosophy of Atman-Brahman?

I asked this question on the Philosophy StackExchange, as some belief systems have deep belief that everything is on a spectrum of polarity/opposites: - [What philosophies don't say things boil down to polarities (opposites)?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/118562/what-philosophies-dont-say-things-boil-down-to-polarities-opposites) What does Buddhism say about polarities/opposites? Does everything have an opposite? If so, how? I have several examples in my linked question, of what I think cannot be polarities: > I have thought a little about this and it appears that there are not > just polarities, but at least 3 classes of property values: > > 1. [On-off values](https://gist.github.com/lancejpollard/aa3b2eb6d03c997c6c42c214bf8c6701) > (not opposites, but a single property like "itchy" or "spikey", which > can have "more" or "less" of an intensity. _There is no opposite to > itchy or spikey._ At least the way I look at things. If you say > "non-itchy" as an opposite, what does that even mean? Basically it > boils down to "no value" or "some value", of one property. > 2. [Opposite values](https://gist.github.com/lancejpollard/5cd76ba84a1773fcd9228565baeb3423) . > These are your typical "polarities" like hot/cold, bright/dim, > heavy/light, etc.. Each is a single property with a pair of values on > a spectrum, ranging from one side to the other. > 3. Multidimensional values. These are things like "color", which has at least red/blue/green (rgb, 3 values ranging from 0-255 on modern > computers), or hue/saturation/lightness (hsl). I think most > "properties" belong to this category TBH, but I can't think of many > more. In coding, these are "data models" or "types with attributes".

Prajñākaragupta (ca. 8th–9th century) was a Buddhist philosopher of the epistemological school and the author of the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, an extensive commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. In his epistemic interpretations, the wisdom of non‑duality (advaya‑jñāna) is presented as “the ultimate means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).” To quote from here :- > **At the core of Prajñākaragupta’s thought is the wisdom of non-duality > (advaya-jñana) which is the ultimate means of valid cognition > (pramāṇa).** Dharmakīrti had further defined "pramāṇa" as that which > illuminates unknown objects (ajñātārthaprakāśo vā) and as that which > is a "knowledge without deception" (avisaṃvādi jñānam). > **Prajñākaragupta states that "unknown objects" ultimately refers to the > ultimate object (paramārtha) which is a non-dual form (advaitarūpatā) > (PVA 79,15-17). This non-dual perception (advaita-dṛṣṭi) is what > ultimately leads to the end of suffering.** Prajñākaragupta identifies > it with what Dharmakīrti calls the insight (yukti) that leads to the > end of suffering (Pramāṇavārttika chapter II v. 139). Previous > commentators had mainly aligned this with not-self. Prajñākaragupta > agrees, but also gives an alternative explanation: "yukti is union > (yoga), which means that all phenomena are interconnected beyond all > differences, that is, non-duality (advaita)" (PVA 116,16-19). **For > Prajñākaragupta, all other forms of Buddhist epistemology which do not > discuss non-duality are ways to gradually lead a person to higher and > subtler levels of wisdom, culminating in the nondual cognition** > (advaitāvabodha). ---------- Questions for Discussion:- 1. Does Prajñākaragupta’s non‑dual reading implicitly reify a kind of absolute awareness or self‑like substratum that diverges from the Buddha’s teaching of anatta? Given that Prajñākaragupta uses advaitarūpatā to characterize the ultimate object of cognition and posits an ultimate lack of distinction between knower and known, is this formulation closer to a form of non‑dual eternalism rather than strict Buddhist no‑self? 2. Can his interpretation genuinely be reconciled with the early Buddhist elimination of a permanent self? ----------

Among the various pramāṇas, or means of valid knowledge in Indian epistemologies, it is generally accepted that Buddhism recognizes two pramāṇas. As stated thus :- > Many schools of Buddhism posit two forms of pramāṇa: > > **direct perception (pratyakṣa) and > inference (anumāna)** > > **Direct perception is a non-conceptual cognition that directly > apprehends an object, and inference is based on reasoning.** However, this approach of reliance on only two pramāṇas, coupled with the rejection of scriptural or Vedic testimony (śabda-pramāṇa), has over the time drawn criticism from numerous rival schools among which the most prominent have been the Vedāntic commentators and theologians. This may be seen for instance from a brief study of some Anucchedas of the Tattva-sandarbha, a work of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī, a Vaiṣṇava theologian and Vedāntin of the Acintya-bhedābheda school. In the relevant section, while elaborating on the epistemology of his tradition he lists the flaws with all other means of knowledge such perception and inference. Tattva Sandarbha Anuccheda 9 Therefore owing to these defects, the only valid sources of knowledge about the Absolute (the ultimate truth or God) are the Vedas or Vedic scriptures, which are considered by tradition to be apauruṣeya (authorless) since they are supposed to have manifested directly from God, perfect, and transmitted through an unbroken paramparā (disciplic succession). Further, in order to establish the superiority of scriptural authority (śabda-pramāṇa) over logical reasoning or inference, a number of proofs are cited. In the Lengthy commentary to the 10th anuccheda, it may be seen in particular that the criticism is directed at the Standpoint of the Buddhists - > The Vedas (sabda-pramana ) are the only effective means for acquiring > transcendental knowledge. **The Vedas inform us about the soul's > existence beyond the body**, about the planets of the spiritual world, > and about the Supreme Lord, , His pastimes, and other matters. All > these subjects are beyond the reach of our sensory and mental > faculties. > **Philosophers such as the Buddhists, who do not accept the Vedas, > cannot justifiably say anything positive about transcendence, let > alone the way to attain it without sabda. Sabda-pramana (i.e > Vedic/Scriptural testimony) is so important that although Vaisnavas > count Lord Buddha among the incarnations of the Lord on the strength > of Vedic testimony, they reject His philosophy because it is not based > on sabda-pramana.** ~ Commentary to Anuccheda 10 Similarly the Buddhist View of the momentariness of consciousness too is criticised Elsewhere in the same work as - > **The Vedanta explains that when a person looks at an object there > arises a particular mental state, called vrtti, which the soul > perceives. The mental state itself is not the perceiver. But the > Buddhists, lacking all knowledge about the soul, mistake this > temporary, ever-changing vrtti, which is noneternal ever-constantly > changing, for real consciousness.** This point is further clarified with > the analogy of the life air. Air is one, but air within the body has > various names, such as prana, apana, and samana, according to the > function it performs. Similarly, the soul is one, but while in the > body it manifests consciousness, which appears many-branched and > ever-changing. For example, sweetened cow's milk gives rise to > different mental states when perceived with different senses: to the > eyes it is white, to the tongue sweet, and so on. So it is only the > mental state, affected by varieties of sense perception, that appears > and disappears. The living entity is a fractional part of the Supreme > Lord, and since the Lord is conscious and eternal, the living entity > must have these qualities as well, in as much as a gold nugget shares > the qualities of the mother lode. The purpose of explaining the > conscious and eternal quality of the soul with logic and personal > experience is to help us develop an understanding of the Supersoul. ~ Commentary to Anuccheda 53.3 ---------- With respect to the Above citations, I would now like to pose some Questions:- - Given that perception and inference are indeed fallible and prone to error, how does the Buddhist tradition establish a reliable epistemological foundation for knowledge of ultimate reality (e.g., Nirvāṇa or Sunyata)? - What is the Buddhist position on scriptural authority in general, and how is reliance on an external scripture claimed to be authorless and coming directly from God via a disciplic succession, viewed in light of Buddhist pramāṇa theories? - How would Buddhist philosophers identify the main shortcomings or philosophical weaknesses in the Vedantic insistence on Vedic knowledge as the sole valid source for understanding the Absolute? - Is there an alternative epistemic framework in Buddhism that addresses the same problem of cognitive fallibility without relying on a fixed scriptural authority?

In Buddhist epistemology, Dharmakīrti develops a sophisticated theory of perception and inference, emphasizing pramāṇa (valid cognition) as the means to apprehend reality. Central to his system is the idea that perception provides direct, non-conceptual access to particulars, while inference allows us to understand universals and causal relations. At the same time In the early Buddhist texts, the Buddha too repeatedly emphasizes “seeing things as they are” (yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti), a form of direct awareness that is often described as immediate and non-conceptual. I am interested in exploring how Dharmakīrti’s framework relates to this epistemological stance of the Buddha. To what extent can Dharmakīrti’s pramāṇic approach be interpreted as a systematic elaboration of the Buddha’s notion of direct cognition? Are there points of convergence or divergence between Dharmakīrti’s epistemic theories and the original suttas?

I’ve been reading quite a bit about both Pyrrhonism (from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Sextus Empiricus) and Madhyamaka Buddhism (especially Nāgārjuna’s teachings), and I’m curious about how deeply their approaches to knowledge, doubt, and emptiness might align. Here are some specific points I’d like clarification on: - Both traditions seem to question the possibility of arriving at certain knowledge. Do Madhyamaka philosophers use skeptical methods purely as a strategy, or do they endorse a form of suspension of belief like Pyrrhonists? - In Pyrrhonism, the goal is ataraxia (tranquility) that arises from suspending judgment. Is this comparable to the nirvana that results from realizing śūnyatā (emptiness)? - Do Madhyamakas arrive at any “ultimate” view, or is even that view deconstructed like any other? - Are there any Buddhist responses to skepticism that help clarify the boundaries between constructive doubt and nihilism? ----------

In Buddhist epistemology, valid cognition (pramāṇa) is typically defined as cognition that is non-deceptive, with direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) accepted as its principal means.However, this raises several questions about how such validity is actually determined from within the epistemic framework itself. How does Buddhism determine that a particular perception is genuinely valid rather than merely appearing so? In cases of perception, what criteria distinguish a non-deceptive perception from an illusory or mistaken one, especially given that illusion and error are also experienced directly? If validity is established by causal efficacy or successful activity, does this not risk circularity, where correctness is judged only after the fact? Similarly, in the case of inference, how is non-deceptiveness guaranteed when inferences rely on conceptual constructions and prior cognitions that may themselves be flawed? Is the criterion of non-deceptiveness purely pragmatic, or is there a more principled account of why certain cognitions are trusted as pramāṇa while others are excluded? These questions become sharper when viewed in light of classical Mīmāṃsā critiques particularly Kumārila Bhaṭṭa ’s objections in the Ślokavārttika which challenge the Buddhist appeal to Yogic perception and the authority of the Buddha’s cognition itself. Here Are some excerpts - Aphorism 2 > > *And then too, there results the absurdity of (your Scripture proving) > the authenticity of subjects other than either Duty or Non-Duty. And > so long as the Sankhya and the rest continue to exist, your instance > too is hard to be got at.* > > *Because, while being a human assertion, it refers to supersensuous > subjects ; — therefore too, on account of mutual dependence, the > Scripture of Buddha and others would come to be false.* > > *Explanation* - The assertion of Buddha with regard to the momentary > character of all external objects, has been said to conform with our > own experience, which fact has been made the ground of proving his > veracity. But the Sankhya has established, beyond the least doubt, > that all that exists is eternal, and exists for ever. Under such > circumstances, so long as you have not fully refuted the arguments of > the Sankhyas, you cannot hope to establish the authority of your > Author, on the grounds that you have urged. > > Just as human speech, when referring to transcendental objects is > almost always sure to be false, so, the speech of Buddha too could not > but be false. And when his assertions with regard to transcendental > objects come to be false, those with regard to perceptible objects too > (such as the momentary character of all objects, &c.), become false. > And as his veracity was sought by you to be proved on the ground of > his latter assertions being true, it falls to the ground unsupported. Here Kumārila argues that the Buddha’s statements are human testimony about supersensuous matters, and thus epistemically unreliable. Attempting to establish the Buddha’s authority by appealing to doctrines like momentariness results in mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya), since the doctrines are justified by the Buddha’s authority and the authority by the doctrines. Competing systems (e.g. Sāṃkhya) offer rival metaphysical claims like eternalism, preventing any unique validation of Buddhist cognition. Aphorism 5 (Niralamba vada) > *87-88. If a cognition be false, would it not be liable to rejection ? > If it were to be false even without being rejected, then there would > be no restriction (as to the reality or unreality of a cognition).* > > *88-89. For us, dream-cognition would certainly be falsified by the > perception of a waking- cognition contradicting it; while for you, > what would constitute the difference (between the reality of > waking-cognition and that of dream-consciousness, both of which are > held by you to be equally false) ?* > > *89-90. Of waking cognition as such, there is no proper (correct) > contradictory cognition, — the perception whereof would establish the > falsity of such (waking) cognitions as those of the post and the like.* > > *90-91. The fact of waking cognitions being the contradictory of dream > cognition is known to all persons, and, as such they differ from dream > cognition (which is known only to particular individuals), just like > the cognition, which serves to reject (a particular dream-cognition).* > > *91-93. Objection. : " Of such waking cognitions as those of the post, > &c., invalidating cognitions do arise in the shape of those of the > true Yogis (who know all things worldly to be false) ; and this would > certainly make these waking cognitions equal to dream-cognitions (in > point of falsity). And such invalidating cognitions too (as those of > Yogis) would belong to all living creatures when they reach the Yogic > stage ; and hence the fact of waking cognitions having invalidating > counter-cognitions becomes established."* > > *93-94. Resp:- But, such Yogic cognition is not found to belong to any > person in this life ; and as for those who have reached the Yogic > state, we know not what happens to them.* > > *94-95. Our Yogis too could have only such invalidating cognitions as > would be either subversive of or contrary to your assertion.* > > *Explanation:- If you urge the cognition of your Bauddha Yogi against > our theory, so could we also bring forward the cognitions of our own > Yogis, as invalidating your theory.* Kumārila’s point here is a symmetry objection: He posits rival schools can equally posit their own yogins whose supersensuos perceptions contradict Buddhist claims. Without an independent criterion for privileging Bauddha yogic cognition, the appeal to yogic pratyakṣa fails to establish non-deceptiveness. Given these critiques, how do Buddhist schools justify the epistemic status of valid perception and yogic cognition? Is pramāṇa self-authenticating, confirmed by later cognition, or grounded in pragmatic success? How would various schools such as Theravāda, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the Dignāga–Dharmakīrti tradition respond to the charge of circularity and symmetry raised by Kumārila?

Owen Flanagan in this podcast argued while Buddhism has an extremely well developed notion of compassion, it doesn't have a significant notion of justice. He contrasts this with ancient Greek philosophies which he states have a strong notion of justice and weak or absent notion of compassion. So is this correct? Does Buddhism really not have decent (or any) notion of justice. Can anyone perhaps provide examples of justice from the texts (Pali Canon, Mayahana etc..). Or is Owen right - no justice in Buddhism?

Growing up, I had a general understanding—based on lay textbooks and common interpretations that the dharmic religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism all believe in reincarnation: the idea that an individual is reborn into a new body, either human or animal, after physical death of the body. As I became more interested in Buddhism and tried exploring it more deeply, I noticed that different Buddhists seem to explain this concept in very different ways. Some use the word "reincarnation" and appear to mean it quite literally, while others insist that "rebirth" in Buddhism is not the same as reincarnation, especially since Buddhism denies the existence of a permanent self. This has left me quite confused. Is rebirth just another term for reincarnation, or does Buddhism teach something fundamentally different? What is the correct way to understand the concept of rebirth in Buddhist teachings?

While reading through the Buddhist suttas, I came across the detailed descriptions of the eight emancipations. These passages were deeply intriguing, but they also gave rise to some questions in my mind which I decided to ask before which let me cite the concerned passages - > “Ānanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight? > > “**Possessed of form, one sees forms.** This is the first > emancipation. > > “**Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally.** > This is the second emancipation. > > “**One is intent only on the beautiful.** This is the third > emancipation. > > “**With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, > with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding > perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one > enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space**. This > is the fourth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** This is > the fifth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of nothingness.** This is the sixth > emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor > non-perception.** This is the seventh emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation > of perception and feeling.** This is the eighth emancipation. > > “**Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward > order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order**, when he > attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he > wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of > effluents he enters and remains in the effluent-free release of > awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and > realized it for himself in the here and now, **he is said to be a monk > released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher > or more sublime than this, there is none.”** ~ DN 15 Questions- 1. Why is “nothingness” (6th) distinguished from “neither perception nor non-perception” (7th), given that both involve retreating from mental activity? Or from the 8th which involves total cessation of perception and feeling? 2. What kind of experience is “neither perception nor non-perception”? Is it a liminal state — and if so, how does one know they have entered it? Can a mind in this state be said to ‘experience’ anything at all? 3. In discussions with scholars from eternalist backgrounds, such as vedanta a common challenge raised is that the Buddhist teachings on the eight emancipations seem to imply the existence of a continuous or eternal subject since someone appears to be progressing through these subtle states of consciousness. If there is no eternal soul or self in Buddhism, then who is it that experiences and moves through these emancipations? How would a Buddhist respond to this objection? 4. What is the significance of being able to enter and exit these states at will, as emphasized in the sutta? 5. Is the progression through these states ultimately teaching that liberation is not something to be gained, but everything to be let go including perception, feeling, identity, and knowing?

Please don't move this to the Philosophy stack unless absolutely necessary. My personal belief in an afterlife is based on: 1. Being indefinite about "what is now?" 2. I assume that "my death" is semantically precise in some way, it's clear what we all mean by that 3. Linking these two, in terms of the impossibility of vague identity. Some people might object to my version of time or death, so while I am more interested in understanding 'vague identity', I cannot yet get started rhetorically. What's going on here? Which of these moves are allowed in the language game?

It's a bit weird to explain. In daily life when I notice some though or emotion or when someone praises me or some other similar action and I notice that and don't cling on to it there is a inner voice praising myself for not getting attached. And if I "let that go" then again an inner voice praising that action and not getting attached to that feeling and this kind of creates a loop. It might sounds very weird or trivial but sometimes its very annoying. How should one deal with this? Just ignore it?

For a long time I've been really into the space of longevity, both radical lifespan extension through biotechnology and the optimization of quality of life during old age (healthspan extension) through currently available protocols on diet, exercise, sleep, meditation, etc. I'm really interested in the Buddhist perspective on this movement, especially how different schools (Thai Forest, Soto Zen, Plum Village, IMS/IMC, Chinese Chan, Chinese Pure Land, Tibetan Vajrayana, and Sri Lanka Theravada) might perceive it differently. My #1 core value is to live as long and healthy as possible, both physically and mentally. I got into Buddhism, because it seems like a comprehensive and effective framework in supporting individuals' mental well-being, especially during old age. I think that if you are not going to have any children, then you have to embrace some kind of spirituality system to offset the very real and catastrophic effects of loneliness and stress on your health and lifespan. Your mind won't be kind to yourself as you get older, and you have to love something other than yourself to be sane. Which Buddhist tradition do you think is the most compatible with this very new kind of value (life is good and I wanna live as long and healthy as possible) that has emerged in a community only very recently, thanks to technology and urban life enabling such a person? (r/longevity, r/peterattia, and r/Biohackers) Thai Forest, Soto Zen, Plum Village, IMS/IMC, Chinese Chan, Chinese Pure Land, Tibetan Vajrayana, and Sri Lanka Theravada? I know some aspects of Buddhist philosophy are very much contradictory to this goal (think The Five Remembrances in Buddhism, contemplations on impermanence: that we will grow old, that we will get sick, that we will die, that all that is dear to us will change and we will be separated from it, and that our actions are our only true belongings, and we will inherit their consequences). So one of my concerns is that if I'm practicing with a tradition that emphasizes those aspects, it would eventually lead to cognitive dissonance/internal conflicts, creating additional stressors in my life. I know I tend to get very hysterical/neurotic and compulsive about these things, so it's good to give these extra thoughts to it before deciding.

I came across a Vaishnava critique of Buddhism which questions whether Buddhist ethics can have a stable foundation without having the concept of devotion to a supreme God. Quoting the excerpt from here > **what is the problem with Buddhism?** > > Before the advent of Sri Shankara Acharya, Lord Buddha (Sriman > nArAyaNa Himself on the authority of srimad BhAgavata PurANa) has > given an illusory theory for the people of material consciousness and > made them adharmic with His excellent philosophy (Lord is beyond our > perception and His actions are in-conceivable without guidant of > Acharyas). He gave a philosophy based on moral laws, athiesm, denial > of vedas and illusory "nirvANa(viodness)". His instructions are somuch > attractive that any person who is not adherant to vedas and devotion > unto the Lord gets easily carried away. He lures unintelligent men by > saying only intelligent men can understand His philosophy. That > enables people not to investigate His philosophy critically and > accept. Moreover, on the surface, one cannot find fault as it is based > on moral laws like non-violence and truthfulness. Even today many > people think philonthropic actions and being good is ultimate purpose > of life. But they miss the critical point why should one do either > philonthropic or good works. They have no clue what actual good is. > The purpose of all good actions is to attract the attention of the > Lord and get pure devotion unto Him. > > When we do not develop love for the Supreme Lord, we lose all our > morals and dharma at some point or the other. We are never independant > of Him. As we can see today, in countries like china, people lost > their own religion, forgot all good (their own moral laws), consume > more meat (including frogs and snakes) than any other country, and > work day and night like machines to improve material comforts. This > proves, how it is most important to have mercy of the Lord for the > living entity to have ethical life and subsequent desire for eternal > bliss (liberation). Lord doesnot allow selfish people to serve Him, > for He accepts only unselfish, unbroken devotional service. We should > know from this example that acting in all good ways is only to develop > love for the Lord. According to this critique, without divine guidance and devotion, ethical conduct eventually collapses, and moral laws lose their meaning. How would Buddhists respond to this critique and provide a solid basis for morality and ethical behavior within their philosophical framework, given that Buddhism does not ground ethics in pleasing or serving a personal God?

Buddhism has developed into many schools and traditions since the time of the Buddha, each with its own interpretations, practices, and philosophical systems. While this diversity is valuable in some respects, it also raises the concern that certain ideas or practices may have strayed from what the Buddha himself originally taught. This raises the question of what counts as a significant deviation from the original doctrines of Dhamma and how such differences can be identified. I would also like to know how a lay follower can recognize these divergences in a clear and practical way, and how one might remain faithful to the spirit of the Buddha’s message without falling into sectarian arguments.

What is the source of the Buddha telling his disciples about why Maha Moggallan had died. Moggallan died in the laps of the Buddha? Is it so?

In Nyāya epistemology, pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge) include perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Since Buddhist thought often restricts ultimate reality to momentary dharmas (kṣaṇikavāda) and denies enduring substances, how do Buddhist logicians account for the reliability of inference across time, given that the subject and predicate cease to exist in the very next moment?

If there's no specific purpose in life, If we have to give meaning to life by ourselves, then why doing good and bad matters ?