How would a buddhist respond to the following arguments that critcize the no-self thesis of buddhism?

While going across literature pertaining to buddhism, I came across the following write-up named '*Logical Criticism of Buddhist doctrines*' where the author has Criticized various aspects of Buddhist Philosophy. The question however is meant specifically towards the writer's criticism of the buddhist 'no-self' concept and defense of the soul theory. While Interested readers might look up chapter 17 (Page 303-326) , for brevity's sake I am summarizing the gist of their main points against the no-self concept and highlighting them for ease of reading. > **Just as one would not look for visual phenomena with one’s hearing > faculty or for auditory phenomena with one’s visual faculty, so it is > absurd to look for spiritual things (the soul, and its many acts of > consciousness, will and valuation) with one’s senses or by observing > mental phenomena**. Each kind of appearance has its appropriate organ(s) > of knowledge. For spiritual things, only intuition (or apperception) > is appropriate. > > > **To understand how the soul can exist apparently in midst of the body > and mind (i.e. of bodily and mental phenomena) and yet be invisible, > inaudible, etc. (i.e. non- phenomenal), just imagine a > three-dimensional space (see illustration below). Say that two > dimensions represent matter and mind and the third applies to spirit. > Obviously, the phenomena of mind will not be found in the matter > dimension, or vice versa**. Similarly, the soul cannot be found in the > dimensions of matter and/or mind, irrespective of how much you look > for it there. Why? Simply because its place is elsewhere – in the > spiritual dimension, which is perpendicular to the other two. > **The truth is that it is impossible to formulate a credible theory of > the human psyche without admitting the existence of a soul at its > center.** **Someone has to be suffering and wanting to escape from > suffering. A machine-like entity cannot suffer and cannot engage in > spiritual practices to overcome suffering. Spiritual practice means, > and can only mean, practice by a spiritual entity, i.e. a soul with > powers of cognition, volition and valuation**. These powers cannot be > equated electrical signals in the brain, or to events in the skandhas. > They are sui generis, very miraculous and mysterious things, not > reducible to mechanical processes. Cognition without consciousness by > a subject (a cognizing entity) is a contradiction in terms; volition > without a freely willing agent (an actor or doer) is a contradiction > in terms; valuation without someone at risk (who stands to gain or > lose something) is a contradiction in terms. This is not mere grammar; > it is logic. > > As already mentioned, **a soul is not an essence, but a core > (spiritual) entity. It therefore cannot be viewed as one of the five > skandhas, nor as the sum of those skandhas, as the Buddhists rightly > insist. It can, however, contrary to Buddhist dogma, be viewed as one > of the parts of the complete person, namely the spiritual part; but > more precisely, it should be viewed as the core entity, i.e. as the > specific part that exclusively gives the whole a personality, or > selfhood.** This is especially true if we start wondering where our soul > came from when we were born, whether it continues to exist after we > die, where it goes if it does endure, whether it is perishable, and so > forth. How would a buddhist respond to this critique of the no-self theory?