Buddhist logic and Universals

It is generally accepted that Buddhist philosophy, as formalised in the texts of Dignana and Dharmakīrti, is resolutely nominalist in orientation. Briefly, this is because of the following characteristics: **Momentariness and Particularity**: Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics, especially as articulated by Dharmakīrti and his followers, emphasize the concept of "ksana" or momentary existence. Every phenomenon is unique and exists only for a moment, after which it ceases to be. This emphasis on the particularity and fleeting nature of phenomena aligns with a nominalist perspective, as there's no lasting, eternal substance or universal essence behind these phenomena. **Denial of Svabhāva**: Many Buddhist schools, particularly the Madhyamaka, deny the notion of "svabhāva" or inherent existence. Phenomena don't have an inherent, unchanging essence or nature. Instead, they exist interdependently. This challenges the idea that there are stable universals or abstract entities behind the individual particulars. **Use of Concepts and Designations**: While Buddhists accept the practical use of concepts and general terms, they often regard them as mere designations or conventions ("prajñapti") that do not correspond to any real, independent entity in the world. Words and concepts group diverse and ever-changing phenomena under convenient labels for the sake of communication and understanding, but these labels do not capture the ultimate nature of things. **Rejection of a Permanent Self**: At the core of Buddhist teachings is the doctrine of anātman or non-self. Buddhism denies the existence of a permanent, unchanging self or soul. This can be seen as a form of nominalism applied to personal identity, where the concept of a continuous, unified self is rejected in favor of a more fluid and contingent notion of identity. **Functionalism over Essentialism**: In the Dharmakīrti tradition and other Buddhist systems, the function (or causal efficacy) of an entity is more important than any alleged essence. What makes something what it is, is not some inherent essence but its functional role. **Apoha Logic:** The apoha theory avoids the commitment to universals. Instead of saying that all cows share a universal essence of "cow-ness," the apoha approach posits that our concept of "cow" merely excludes everything that isn't a cow. This approach sidesteps the metaphysical commitment to a universal essence shared among individual cows. However, as a long-time student of both Buddhist and Western philosophy, the (heretical?) idea has occurred to me that there is a clear example of a universal right at the centre of the Buddhist tradition. And that is the Buddha! Why? Because, as is well known, Sakyamuni himself was not the only Buddha - there were Buddhas before him, and there will be future Buddhas, such as Maitreya. Something similar can be said of the bodhisattvas, who are exemplifications of a type or form. So in this case, Sakyamuni himself was one instantiation or particular instance of the Universal Buddha. As I admit, it's an heretical suggestion, as Buddhist logic will never admit the reality of universals. But I find it hard to reconcile the 'idea of the Buddha' against their 'apoha logic'. Has this idea occured to anyone else?