In the early strata of the Pāli Canon,in discussions of dependent origination in the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta and the Mahānidāna Sutta, consciousness or viññāṇa is repeatedly characterized as dependently arisen (paṭiccasamuppanna), specific to its object (e.g., cakkhuviññāṇa, sotaviññāṇa), and lacking any underlying unity apart from causal continuity. In contrast, Yogācāra sources such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and systematic expositions in the Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra systematize a layered model of consciousness introducing the concept of ālayavijñāna as a subliminal, foundational consciousness that serves as the repository of karmic seeds (bīja) and the basis for the arising of the six manifest cognitive consciousnesses. Though described as momentary and dependently arisen, it appears to function as a unifying and enduring āśraya (support) for saṃsāric continuity. The question, which then arises is that Do the Nikāyan materials when interpreted without later Theravāda Abhidhamma categories contain any conceptual space for a structurally analogous substrate, or is Yogācāra’s ālayavijñāna a divergent theoretical innovation? Further Does the mutual conditioning of viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa in DN 15 imply a recursive continuity that could support a proto-ālaya interpretation, or is this reading anachronistic?

Is this Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN 5.230)sutta true? Is it translated to English from the Pali correctly? >AN 5.230 Numbered Discourses 5.230 >23. Long Wandering Black Snakes (2nd) “Mendicants, there are these five drawbacks of a black snake. What five? It’s irritable, acrimonious, venomous, fork-tongued, and treacherous. These are the five dangers of a black snake. >In the same way there are five drawbacks of a lady. What five? She’s irritable, acrimonious, venomous, fork-tongued, and treacherous. This is a lady’s venom: usually she’s very lustful. This is a lady’s forked tongue: usually she speaks divisively. This is a lady’s treachery: usually she’s an adulteress. These are the five drawbacks of a lady.” https://suttacentral.net/an5.230/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none¬es=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin Ajahn Sujato says it's just wrong, but I wonder if its mistranslated. Are there any other suttas where the Buddha appears to believe things that seem to be born of kilesa. Do any Buddhists believe this sutta? How old is this sutta? I am thinking that that it must be a bad teaching that maybe some monk with too much kilesa slipped in there? >Ajahn Sujato: "And no, I don’t think this was really spoken by the Buddha. Deal with it. What I’m interested in is to subject this text to the same elementary standard that the Buddha himself insisted on, and that we would apply to any other truth claims: does it stack up against the evidence? I assume it doesn’t, but I’d like to see the proof. Does anyone know of any objective, empirically based psychological studies that statistically examine possible gender differences between men and women in these traits?"... https://sujato.wordpress.com/2010/12/05/is-this-sutta-true/ Unless I am just too unenlightened to understand, that sutta doesn't sound like the Buddha I follow. Is it in the context of meditation against sensual desire? Does this damage the reputation of the Buddha? Does the Buddha have to be completely perfect within our unenlightened understanding? That sutta seems impossible though. The Buddha did ordain Bhikkhunis so I was thinking this sutta must be a fraud, right?

*Sorry; part of this question is described in Chinese, as I cannot find their Pali or Sanskrit script; even if I can, I can't read them.* The Saddharmapundarika Sutra (法华经) quoted Buddha (Sakyamuni himself) once said about "Saddharma Vipralopa (末法)", the Ending Era in which Buddhism would become unpopular and weak (转复微末，谓末法时). Later commentary scripts claimed Buddha said "there is 500 years of correct Buddism, 1000 years of similar Buddhism and 3000 years of Ending Buddhism after my nirvana" (然佛所说，我灭度后，正法五百年，像法一千年，末法三千年). This saying is believed to be real but also there are different interpretation. Some source said Samyuktagama (杂阿含经) mentioned Ending Era (Saddharma Vipralopa) much earlier, but I didn't find. Based on the idea that Buddha said "500+1000 years after his nirvana, it is the Ending Era", the Mahayana Jingtu faction (净土宗) and 净土-influenced Tiantai faction (天台宗) thus believe we are now in the Ending Era of Buddhism, and developed a full system of getting liberated in this current era. These are, however, not accepted by Zen faction (禅宗), another major Mahayana faction in China. Zen believe the Ending Era is real but it is not that bad and the timetable is not referring to real time. > 末世众生愚痴钝根，不解如来三大阿僧祇秘密之说，遂言成佛尘劫未期，岂不疑误行人退菩提道。 I want to know, are these 3 creeds (below) also accepted in other factions of Buddhism, especially different factions of Theravada out of Sinosphere? Or, are these thoughts denied or left intentionally not to discuss? 1. There is an Ending Era of Buddhism after Buddha's nirvana. 2. The Ending Era is very bad, Buddhism becomes unpopular and wrong, and people are too stupid to get nirvana by themselves. 3. We are currently in this Ending Era. --------------- I think maybe some faction may deny the idea of Ending Era; for example, another translated book named "Ekottara Āgama (增壹阿含经)" said the Buddhism after Buddha will last forever and gain billions of believers. > 佛告阿难曰。我灭度之后。法当久存......东方弟子无数亿千。南方弟子无数亿千。是故。阿难。当建此意。我释迦文佛寿命极长。所以然者。肉身虽取灭度。法身存在。此是其义。当念奉行。 Maybe some of them is fake, wrong, or intepreted mistakenly. I don't know, and don't want to discuss which is correct and which is wrong, they are all ancient and said to be translated from India. My question is only, is there any other faction believe "it's the Ending Era now, the End is nigh!".

I have been practicing Vipassana for quite a while (2 and a half years). Now, I want to also dwell into the teachings of Buddha as presented in Suttas and apply those teaching in my everyday life. I have read a bit about the Majjhima Nikaya and the Samyutta Nikaya but I'm in a dilemma and not sure whether or not other Nikayas are suitable for a beginner. With which Sutta (Nikaya) should I start with?

In the Tevijja Sutta (DN 13 ), the Buddha addresses Brahmin students who are described as being learned in the Vedas and belonging to specific Brahmanical lineages. The sutta explicitly situates its interlocutors within the orthodox Vedic tradition, often identified within the Yajurvedic and Sāmavedic recensions:- > Even though brahmins describe different paths—the Adhvaryu brahmins, > the **Taittirīya brahmins, the Chāndogya brahmins**, the Cāndrāyaṇa > brahmins, and the Bahvṛca brahmins—all of them still lead someone who > practices them to the company of Divinity These Brahmins understood as followers of what I suppose were the Taittirīya and Chāndogya Upaniṣadic traditions of the time claim knowledge of the path to union or “company with Brahmā” (brahmasahavyatā). The Buddha responds by redefining the path to Brahmā not through birth, sacrifice, or Vedic recitation, but through the cultivation of the four brahmavihāras. > “So it seems that that mendicant is not encumbered with possessions, > and neither is the Divinity. Would a mendicant who is not encumbered > with possessions join together and converge with the Divinity, who > isn’t encumbered with possessions?” > > “Yes, worthy Gotama.” > > “Good, Vāseṭṭha! **It’s quite possible that a mendicant who is not > encumbered with possessions will, when the body breaks up, after > death, be reborn in the company of Divinity, who isn’t encumbered with > possessions.** Is the Buddha’s teaching of “Brahmasahavyatā” in the Tevijja Sutta intended as a normative soteriological teaching for Buddhists, or is it better understood as a skillful means (upāya) directed specifically at non-Buddhist Brahmins or Followers of Upanishadic traditions, reframing their own theological goal in ethical and meditative terms without endorsing it as final liberation (nibbāna)?

In the Aggivacchasutta (MN 72 ), the Buddha responds to Vacchagotta’s inquiry about the status of a tathāgata after the attainment of cessation by invoking the simile of a fire that has become quenched due to the exhaustion of its fuel:- > “But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you: ‘This fire in front of you > that is quenched: in what direction did it go—east, south, west, or > north?’ How would you answer?” > > “It doesn’t apply, worthy Gotama. The fire depended on grass and logs > as fuel. When that runs out, and no more fuel is added, the fire is > reckoned to have become quenched due to lack of fuel.” > > “In the same way, Vaccha, any form by which a realized one might be > described has been given up, cut off at the root, made like a palm > stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future. A realized one > is freed from reckoning in terms of form. They’re deep, immeasurable, > and hard to fathom, like the ocean. **‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not > reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn > nor not reborn’—none of these apply.** > > Any feeling … perception … choices … consciousness by which a realized > one might be described has been given up, cut off at the root, made > like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future. A > realized one is freed from reckoning in terms of consciousness. > They’re deep, immeasurable, and hard to fathom, like the ocean. > **‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not > reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn nor not reborn’—none of these apply.”** I have questions about how this functions at a technical level within early Buddhist thought. 1. If the aggregates are indeed the sole conditions under which an individual can emerge and be identified, what is the precise significance of the Buddha’s negation of all four alternatives - reborn, not reborn, both, and neither? 2. Is the primary function of this passage to dissolve only to speculative fixation that obstructs liberation, or does it also imply a principled metaphysical account of why post-liberation or even post-mortem identity claims fail at the level of causal analysis? 3. Does the fire simile warrant the conclusion that once causal supports or aggregates are exhausted, questions framed in terms of existence or non-existence become category errors rather than unanswered questions?

> “There is, monks, an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned. If, > monks there were not that unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned, you > could not know an escape here from the born, become, made, and > conditioned. But because there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, > unconditioned, therefore you do know an escape from the born, become, > made, and conditioned.” ~ Ud 8.3 In contemporary discussions—particularly outside of Buddhist contexts, this passage is sometimes interpreted in a theistic or metaphysical sense, as pointing to an eternal, uncreated reality or an absolute ground of being that exists independently and “allows” for liberation.From this perspective, the statement “if there were not that unborn…” is read as implying a foundational ontological ground upon which conditioned phenomena depend. Within a Buddhist doctrinal framework, however, Nibbāna is often said to be neither a self nor a substance, and Buddhism explicitly rejects a creator God and eternal metaphysical essences. - Within early Buddhist doctrine, why is Nibbāna described using terms such as “unborn” and “unconditioned,” rather than simply as the cessation of suffering or defilements? - How should the conditional phrasing “If there were not that unborn…” be understood without reifying Nibbāna into an eternal substance or theistic absolute? - How do traditional Buddhist commentaries address or guard against eternalist or theistic readings of this passage?

In the Cūḷasuññatasutta (MN 121) , the Buddha discusses a meditative attainment characterized by “nothingness” which is then used as a predicate in an analysis of emptiness. > Furthermore, a mendicant—ignoring the perception of the dimension of > infinite space and the perception of the dimension of infinite > consciousness—focuses on the oneness dependent on the perception of > the dimension of nothingness. Their mind leaps forth, gains > confidence, settles down, and becomes decided in that perception of > the dimension of nothingness. They understand: ‘Here there is no > stress due to the perception of the dimension of infinite space or the > perception of the dimension of infinite consciousness. There is only > this modicum of stress, namely the oneness dependent on the perception > of the dimension of nothingness.’ They understand: ‘This field of > perception is empty of the perception of the dimension of infinite > space. It is empty of the perception of the dimension of infinite > consciousness. There is only this that is not emptiness, namely the > oneness dependent on the perception of the dimension of nothingness.’ > And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what > remains they understand that it is present. That’s how emptiness > manifests in them—genuine, undistorted, and pure. I am interested in an investigation that addresses such issues as: **Ontological status of “nothingness”:** ---------------------------------------- Is the sphere of nothingness presented as a phenomenal object of experience, a negation of specified classes of objects (e.g., form, infinite space, infinite consciousness), or as a structural absence of cognitive content? Phenomenological description: ----------------------------- In the Cūḷasuññatasutta, the meditator attends to the dimension of nothingness. How is it possible for the mind to intentionally “perceive” something that is, by definition, an absence? Does the sutta imply a particular structure of consciousness that allows an absence to be an object of experience? Nothingness and self-reference ------------------------------ In perceiving nothingness, does the meditator’s mind retain any self-referential awareness, or is subjectivity suspended? How does the sutta articulate the boundaries of selfhood and cognitive agency in relation to the sphere of nothingness? Temporal and spatial character of nothingness --------------------------------------------- The sutta uses the term āyatana, often translated as “dimension” or “sphere.” Does this imply that this nothingness has a kind of temporal or spatial extension, or is it entirely devoid of such characteristics?

While reading through the Buddhist suttas, I came across the detailed descriptions of the eight emancipations. These passages were deeply intriguing, but they also gave rise to some questions in my mind which I decided to ask before which let me cite the concerned passages - > “Ānanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight? > > “**Possessed of form, one sees forms.** This is the first > emancipation. > > “**Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally.** > This is the second emancipation. > > “**One is intent only on the beautiful.** This is the third > emancipation. > > “**With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, > with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding > perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one > enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space**. This > is the fourth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** This is > the fifth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of nothingness.** This is the sixth > emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor > non-perception.** This is the seventh emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation > of perception and feeling.** This is the eighth emancipation. > > “**Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward > order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order**, when he > attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he > wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of > effluents he enters and remains in the effluent-free release of > awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and > realized it for himself in the here and now, **he is said to be a monk > released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher > or more sublime than this, there is none.”** ~ DN 15 Questions- 1. Why is “nothingness” (6th) distinguished from “neither perception nor non-perception” (7th), given that both involve retreating from mental activity? Or from the 8th which involves total cessation of perception and feeling? 2. What kind of experience is “neither perception nor non-perception”? Is it a liminal state — and if so, how does one know they have entered it? Can a mind in this state be said to ‘experience’ anything at all? 3. In discussions with scholars from eternalist backgrounds, such as vedanta a common challenge raised is that the Buddhist teachings on the eight emancipations seem to imply the existence of a continuous or eternal subject since someone appears to be progressing through these subtle states of consciousness. If there is no eternal soul or self in Buddhism, then who is it that experiences and moves through these emancipations? How would a Buddhist respond to this objection? 4. What is the significance of being able to enter and exit these states at will, as emphasized in the sutta? 5. Is the progression through these states ultimately teaching that liberation is not something to be gained, but everything to be let go including perception, feeling, identity, and knowing?

In Kd 6 , We come across the following:- > On one occasion a monk was possessed by a spirit. His teacher and > preceptor who were nursing him were not able to cure him. He then went > to a pigs’ slaughterhouse to eat raw meat and drink blood. As a > result, he became well. They told the Buddha. > > “For one who is possessed, I allow raw meat and raw blood.” I had never heard of this before. I only encountered it because a polemical blog quoted it in an attempt to criticize Buddhist scripture by highlighting passages that seem negative or problematic when taken at face value. Since their intent of quoting the above was obviously hostile I’d like to understand the background of these from those familiar with the Vinaya:- My questions are: 1. Is the translation accurate? Does the Pali genuinely say that the Buddha allowed raw meat and raw blood in such circumstances? 2. Is this passage considered authentic and canonical within mainstream Theravāda? 3. If both of the above are true, How is this interpreted by traditional Buddhists today? Is it taken literally, regarded as a narrowly defined medicinal or exceptional allowance, or understood in some other way? And if it is accepted, how is it justified within Buddhist ethics and discipline?

I’ve been reflecting on ***the slide*** of the practice—that threshold where the "Doer" or the "Agent" seems to fall away and you’re just left with the flow of the process. Suttas like **AN 11.2 (the Cetana Sutta)** describe this beautifully. They show the path as a series of mental qualities that "flow on and fill up" through dhammatā (natural law), without needing an act of will (cetanā) to push them along. It's one thing to know the "map" of these links intellectually, but I'm curious about the specific point where that knowledge flips into a direct "Aha!" moment—witnessing the mechanics run themselves. How do the Suttas (or the broader tradition) describe this shift from just knowing the mechanics (ñāṇa) to actually seeing them unfold (dassana)? Is there a specific term for that tipping point?

Why is consciousness not discussed as internal and external in the Dhathu-vibhanga sutta (MN 140)? > "And what is the space property? **The space property may be either internal or external.** What is the internal space property? Anything internal, belonging to oneself, that's space, spatial, & sustained: the holes of the ears, the nostrils, the mouth, the [passage] whereby what is eaten, drunk, consumed, & tasted gets swallowed, and where it collects, and whereby it is excreted from below, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's space, spatial, & sustained: This is called the internal space property. Now both the internal space property & the external space property are simply space property. And that should be seen as it actually is present with right discernment: 'This is not mine, this is not me, this is not my self.' When one sees it thus as it actually is present with right discernment, one becomes disenchanted with the space property and makes the space property fade from the mind. > > "**There remains only consciousness: pure & bright.** What does one cognize with that consciousness? One cognizes 'pleasure.' One cognizes 'pain.' One cognizes 'neither pleasure nor pain.' In dependence on a sensory contact that is to be felt as pleasure, there arises a feeling of pleasure. When sensing a feeling of pleasure, one discerns that 'I am sensing a feeling of pleasure.' One discerns that 'With the cessation of that very sensory contact that is to be felt as pleasure, the concomitant feeling — the feeling of pleasure that has arisen in dependence on the sensory contact that is to be felt as pleasure — ceases, is stilled.' In dependence on a sensory contact that is to be felt as pain... In dependence on a sensory contact that is to be felt as neither pleasure nor pain, there arises a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain. When sensing a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, one discerns that 'I am sensing a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain.' One discerns that 'With the cessation of that very sensory contact that is to be felt as neither pleasure nor pain, the concomitant feeling — the feeling of neither pleasure nor pain that has arisen in dependence on the sensory contact that is to be felt as neither pleasure nor pain — ceases, is stilled.' > > https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.140.than.html

As per title. To be more specific: The rule, or the working way of Karma - is it part of the world and thus uniquely determined within the formation of our world? Or is the working way of Karma some superior rule higher than the formation of our world, that all worlds (we know Buddhism believe there are many parallel worlds in time and space) follow a same set of Karma rule? Take as an example, SA 527 , which says: > a novice monk stole monk's 7 fruits, so he was punished by Karma, that he fell into hell for many lives, and even if he reincarnate into a human after these sufferings, hot iron bullets will penetrate his body from time to time Is such karmaphala penalty for stealing monk's fruits (i.e. falling into hell and later becoming a human penetrated by bullets), - (a) the same or similar across all worlds, or - (b) unique of our world, or - (c) unique only to Sakyamuni Buddha's era in our world? There is a similar question but not well-answered either. ------------------- Note this question is not "is Karma part of materialistic world". Karma itself is obviously bound with sentients in this world, but I want to know whether the rule of Karma also bound to us.

My mother grows organic vegetables so she doesn't spray pesticides. I warned her that killing snails would add to her karma of taking life; she said, "If I don't kill them, what will I eat?" So she no longer smashes the snails on the ground to kill them — she puts the snails into a plastic bag and throws them in the trash. Is that the right way to handle it? What other alternatives are there?

In the Dīgha Nikāya 15 (DN 15), the Mahānidāna Sutta, the Buddha outlines a a complex stratification of "seven stations of consciousness" and "two dimensions" > “Ānanda, there are these seven stations of consciousness and two > dimensions. Which seven? > > “There are **beings with multiplicity of body and multiplicity of > perception,4 such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the > lower realms. This is the first station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with multiplicity of body and singularity of > perception, such as the Devas of Brahmā’s Retinue generated by the > first (jhāna) and (some) beings in the four realms of deprivation.5 > This is the second station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with singularity of body and multiplicity of > perception, such as the Radiant Devas. This is the third station of > consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with singularity of body and singularity of > perception, such as the Beautiful Black Devas. This is the fourth > station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings who, with the complete transcending of perceptions > of (physical) form, with the disappearance of perceptions of > resistance, and not heeding perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) > ‘Infinite space,’ arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of space. > This is the fifth station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension > of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ > arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** **This is > the sixth station of consciousness.** > > “There are beings who, **with the complete transcending of the dimension > of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ > arrive at the dimension of nothingness. This is the seventh station of > consciousness.** > > **“The dimension of non-percipient beings and, second, the dimension of > neither perception nor non-perception. [These are the two dimensions.]** ~ DN 15 Is the Buddha here describing subjective, internal states of consciousness that can be directly known in meditation, or externally existing cosmological realms that other beings inhabit? This ambiguity is especially pronounced in the case of the “dimension of infinite consciousness.” Is this to be understood as a temporary mental perception - an internal expansion of awareness beyond form - or does it point to a more ontological reality in which consciousness itself is experienced as boundless? If so, what does this imply about the nature of consciousness: is it something objectively infinite by nature, or is any perception of “infinite consciousness” merely a constructed meditative perception, still within the conditioned world, and thus ultimately impermanent?

In AN 8.70 , the Buddha lists eight causes for an earthquake. The passages read as follows:- > Then Venerable Ānanda went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one > side, and said to him, “Sir, that was a really big earthquake! That > was really a very big earthquake; awe-inspiring and hair-raising, and > thunder cracked the sky! **What’s the cause, what’s the reason for a > great earthquake?”** > > “Ānanda, **there are these eight causes and reasons for a great > earthquake**. What eight? > > **This great earth is established on water, the water is established on > air, and the air stands in space. At a time when a great wind blows, > it stirs the water, and the water stirs the earth. This is the first > cause and reason for a great earthquake.** > > Furthermore, there is an ascetic or brahmin with psychic power who has > achieved mastery of the mind, or a god who is mighty and powerful. > They’ve developed a limited perception of earth and a limitless > perception of water. They make the earth shake and rock and tremble. > This is the second cause and reason for a great earthquake. > > Furthermore, when the being intent on awakening passes away from the > host of joyful gods, he’s conceived in his mother’s belly, mindful and > aware. Then the earth shakes and rocks and trembles. This is the third > cause and reason for a great earthquake. > > Furthermore, when the being intent on awakening comes out of his > mother’s belly mindful and aware, the earth shakes and rocks and > trembles. This is the fourth cause and reason for a great earthquake. > > Furthermore, when the Realized One awakens to the supreme perfect > awakening, the earth shakes and rocks and trembles. This is the fifth > cause and reason for a great earthquake. > > Furthermore, when the Realized One rolls forth the supreme Wheel of > Dhamma, the earth shakes and rocks and trembles. This is the sixth > cause and reason for a great earthquake. > > Furthermore, when the Realized One, mindful and aware, surrenders the > life force, the earth shakes and rocks and trembles. This is the > seventh cause and reason for a great earthquake. > > Furthermore, when the Realized One becomes fully extinguished in the > element of extinguishment with no residue, the earth shakes and rocks > and trembles. This is the eighth cause and reason for a great > earthquake. > > These are the eight causes and reasons for a great earthquake.” Seven of these eight causes are clearly supernatural (e.g., divine beings, psychic powers, events related to a Buddha) while the first and the only natural explanation of earth resting on water stirred by cosmic winds being the cause of earthquakes does not align with what we understand today as the geological and entirely naturalistic explanation of earthquakes. My question is:- How do Buddhists, especially those who identify with traditional or orthodox readings of the suttas understand these earthquake causes today? Do they:- - Reject the modern scientific understanding of earthquakes and accept the sutta’s description literally? - Interpret these causes allegorically or symbolically? If so, how? I’m curious how different Buddhist traditions (Theravāda, Mahāyāna, etc.) approach this apparent conflict between scripture and modern scientific understanding.

I often see the Abhidhamma referenced as a framework for interpreting the teachings of the suttas. However, opinions vary widely: some say it is essential for proper interpretation, while others argue that it is a later analytical system not required for understanding the early discourses. How exactly does the Abhidhamma function within Buddhist hermeneutics? Do canonical or commentarial texts explicitly state how the Abhidhamma should be used to interpret other teachings? And if yes How do traditional commentaries justify its authority? Furthermore Are there examples where Abhidhamma exegesis diverges from sutta usage? If so How do scholarly commentators resolve such differences?

Udāna 8.1 describes what appears to be a radically transcendent “dimension” — one beyond the elements, the formless attainments, and even beyond movement, time, and dualistic perception. It is characterized entirely by negation, culminating in the phrase: "just this is the end of stress/suffering."- > There is that dimension where there is neither earth, nor water, nor > fire, nor wind; neither dimension of the infinitude of space, nor > dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, nor dimension of > nothingness, nor dimension of neither perception nor non-perception; > neither this world, nor the next world, nor sun, nor moon. And there, > I say, there is neither coming, nor going, nor staying; neither > passing away nor arising: unestablished, unevolving, without support > (mental object). This, just this, is the end of stress. Have any advanced practitioners, past or present, claimed to have directly realized this dimension? If so: - How was the realization described? Was it marked by total cessation, a kind of knowing without content, or something altogether ineffable? - Was there awareness during the experience? Or did it resemble the cessation of perception and feeling (nirodha-samāpatti), with no consciousness during and only retrospective insight after? - How was the transition into and out of this dimension understood? Did it feel like a gradual absorption, a sudden drop, or a shift beyond all experience? - Did practitioners interpret it as a momentary event or as the uncovering of a timeless truth? In other words, is this dimension entered, or is it recognized as always already the case? - What changed after the experience? Were there shifts in perception, identity, or sense of reality that aligned with the description of “no coming, no going” and “no this world or another world”? ---------- I understand that language may fall short in describing such a realization, but I’m curious whether any teachings or testimonies exist that give practical or phenomenological insight into what this “dimension” might entail — and whether realization is framed as a momentary insight or an ongoing mode of liberation.

I have read some early Buddhism sutras where the Buddha says birth doesn't make one noble, conduct does. Is there any sutra in Mahayana Buddhism that explicitly rejected "noble" status just by birth? Or at least rebuking casteism? I have found verses that conform to the caste based society like for example Lalitavistara Sutra that says Bodhisattvas are only born in upper two castes (Priest and Warriors). It does not say a person who rises to become a king, no, he should be from a "royal lineage" (caste). I have found no which eases the caste tension.

The wikipedia page for [Buddhist Cosmology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhist_cosmology#Origins) has a section titled "Origins" in which the following sentence occurs: >No single sūtra sets out the entire structure of the universe, but in several sūtras the Buddha describes other worlds and states of being, and other sūtras describe the origin and destruction of the universe. I am interested in reading these sūtras, in which the Buddha describes other worlds and states of being, but I am not sure what they are. Does anyone know what sūtras the author of the article is referring to?