In Buddhist philosophy, particularly in traditions like the Madhyamaka, the catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) operates as a dialectical tool that rejects the four extremes of affirmation and negation (“is,” “is not,” “both,” “neither”) to demonstrate the emptiness (śūnyatā) of any inherent essence (svabhāva). But conversely, Advaita Vedānta employs a similar deconstructionist method, the neti neti (“not this, not this”) utilising it as an epistemic negation process in order to systematically exclude all contingent identifications such as body, senses, mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), and ego (ahaṅkāra) — to arrive at Ātman, the absolute self conceived as pure awareness, distinct from all phenomenal processes. From a Buddhist philosophical standpoint, can the catuṣkoṭi be coherently applied to the Vedāntic conception of Ātman—understood as pure awareness beyond mind,ego and intellect? Would such an analysis deconstruct this posited ultimate subject , or does the Vedāntic notion of Ātman represent a category that eludes Madhyamaka negation?

In his book Buddhist Illogic: A Critical Analysis of Nāgārjuna's Arguments , Avi Sion makes strong criticisms of Nāgārjuna and the Madhyamaka school. Have any Madhyamaka scholars (either traditional or academic) directly responded to Avi Sion’s arguments in this book? If not specifically to Sion, are there published scholarly works that address similar critiques of Nāgārjuna’s reasoning (e.g. accusations of sophistry or inconsistency)?

In Madhyamaka and other Buddhist schools, emptiness (śūnyatā) is a central doctrine: all phenomena are said to lack inherent existence. But at the same time, many Buddhist traditions place significant emphasis on knowledge and valid cognition (pramāṇa), as developed in the epistemological works of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers. This raises an important philosophical issue: if all phenomena including concepts, perceptions, and inferences too are ultimately empty, Would this not imply epistemological nihilism , where no knowledge of any sort of 'absolute truth' is possible? Are there specific texts or commentaries where Buddhist philosophers explicitly address the concern that asserting emptiness might undermine knowledge itself? I’m looking for explanations that clarify how Buddhism maintains a coherent epistemology without contradicting its central teaching of emptiness.

I’ve been reading quite a bit about both Pyrrhonism (from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Sextus Empiricus) and Madhyamaka Buddhism (especially Nāgārjuna’s teachings), and I’m curious about how deeply their approaches to knowledge, doubt, and emptiness might align. Here are some specific points I’d like clarification on: - Both traditions seem to question the possibility of arriving at certain knowledge. Do Madhyamaka philosophers use skeptical methods purely as a strategy, or do they endorse a form of suspension of belief like Pyrrhonists? - In Pyrrhonism, the goal is ataraxia (tranquility) that arises from suspending judgment. Is this comparable to the nirvana that results from realizing śūnyatā (emptiness)? - Do Madhyamakas arrive at any “ultimate” view, or is even that view deconstructed like any other? - Are there any Buddhist responses to skepticism that help clarify the boundaries between constructive doubt and nihilism? ----------

I would like to ask about interpretations of Mādhyamaka (non-Gelugpa) that affirm the possibility of predicating svabhāva of śūnyatā—understood as something self-sufficient, free, and complete. I assume that readings in line with Madhyamaka Shentong may be more open to this perspective, as opposed to Rangtong interpretations. But I would like to learn more about this. Thank you!

Professor VV Gokhale in a paper titled "The Vedanta-Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakahrdaya" (Indo-Iranian Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1958) discusses a work named mAdhyamakahridaya by Bhavya, a sixth century mAdhyamaka buddhist. In the discussion, He refers to a situation where the mahAyAna school is criticised as being similar to vedAnta in the said work. In reply, Apparently Bhavya says that whatever is good in the upaniShads has also been taught by the Buddha. To cite- > In one of the chapters of the **Madhyamakahridaya** dealing with the > hInayAna objections to mahAyAna, the hInayAna-buddhist criticises the > mahAyAna buddhist saying;- > > **न बुद्धोक्तिर्महायानं सूत्रान्तादावसंग्रहात् | मार्गान्तरोपदेषात् वा > यथा वेदान्तदर्शनम् ||** > > The mAhAyAna teaching was not spoken of by the Buddha, either because > it is not included in the sUtrAntas, or because like the vedAnta > darshana, it teaches heretic paths to salvation. > > To this attack, the mahAyAnist replies - > > **वेदान्ते च हि यत् सूक्तम् तत् सर्वं बुद्धभाषितम् | दृष्टान्तन्यूनता > तस्मात् संदिग्धं वा परीक्ष्यताम् ||** > > **Whatever is well said in the vedAnta (upaniShads) has been taught by > the Buddha.** The various examples cited by the hInayAna are faulty and > what is doubtful must be examined. Questions- 1. Is that a unanimous view among the Mahayana Buddhists that Buddha's teachings were inspired from vedanta? 2. How would adherents from other schools of buddhism view the statements of Bhavya?

Tsongkhapa and the Gelug school in general place great emphasis on the analysis of the emptiness of each thing. However, after this analysis, they also insist on having an "insight" into this object. It is, so to speak, like seeing "floaters" in my eyes and my doctor telling me that it is an ocular problem, not actual flies. I still have the experience of seeing flies, but I know that the object of this perception is an ocular condition. If I undergo surgery, this object is also confirmed subjectively, phenomenologically, and my experience aligns with the object. Something similar happens with the method Tsongkhapa proposes. What I want to know is: what kind of *act* does Tsongkhapa understand this to be? Is it a non-conceptual *perception*? Is it an *intuition*?