In the teaching of dependent origination, ignorance is presented as the initial condition from which the entire cycle of birth, suffering, and death unfolds. This raises a subtle but profound question: why is ignorance placed at the very beginning of this chain? Does this imply an absolute beginning in time, or is it pointing to a structural relationship in how suffering arises? In exploring this question, it may also be worth considering whether ignorance is simply a lack of knowledge, or if it refers to a deeper mis-perception of reality that underlies all conditioned experience. Clarification on how early Buddhist texts and later traditions understand this foundational role of ignorance would be appreciated.

Is there a compelling reason, those that draw diagrams for visualization of pratityasamutpada (dependent origination), don't want to include anusaya/asava, obviously not to misrepresent Dhamma? Because from my search, only MN9 details these hidden layers of anusaya/asava as conditioning ignorance, vice-versa? > Ignorance originates from defilement. Ignorance ceases when defilement > ceases. The practice that leads to the cessation of ignorance is > simply this noble eightfold path …” > Defilement originates from ignorance. Defilement ceases when ignorance > ceases. The practice that leads to the cessation of defilement is > simply this noble eightfold path,

In his book Breath by Breath Larry Rosenberg writes about meditating on the three kleshas directly i.e. meditating on craving, aversion and delusion. He is talking in the context of the Anapanasati Sutta . I can understand how one could recognise aspects their own hatred or craving. But how could someone recognise their own delusion in that moment of meditation? Specifically, I can see that anger would be very obvious and one would become very familiar with the burning, energetic, dominating quality of this. In the same way, one's own craving and desire could become recognisable - we are familiar with what wanting actually feels like. However what does delusion actually feel like. What bodily sensations are associated with it. What does the mental quality actually feel like. I can imagine looking back and with hindsight been able to see that at that point in time I was very deluded and thinking some very strange things. But how can the deluded mind see itself as deluded in that moment? How can we meditate on this? What does delusion feel like and how can we learn to recognise it?

I was reading Wikipedia about the extinction of Buddhism in Afghanistan, which said the Mongols ended Buddhism in Afghanistan. I found this difficult to believe because reputedly, many Mongols, including at times asserting Genghis Khan himself, were Tibetan Buddhists. I found a webpage by HHDL's friend [Alexander Berzin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Berzin_(scholar)) , which says: > Five years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, in 637, the Arabs > defeated the Persian Sassanids and founded the Umayyad Caliphate in > 661. It ruled over Iran and much of the Middle East. In 663, they attacked Bactria, which the Turki Shahis had taken from the Western > Turks by this time. The Umayyad forces captured the area around Balkh, > including Nava Vihara Monastery, causing the Turki Shahis to retreat > to the Kabul Valley. > > The Arabs allowed followers of non-Muslim religions in the lands they conquered to keep their faiths if they submitted peacefully and paid a poll tax (Ar. jizya). Although some Buddhists in Bactria and even an abbot of Nava Vihara converted to Islam, **most Buddhists in the region accepted this dhimmi status as loyal non-Muslim protected subjects within an Islamic state. Nava Vihara remained open and functioning. The Han Chinese pilgrim Yijing (I-ching) visited Nava Vihara in the 680s and reported it flourishing as a Sarvastivada center of study**. > > An Umayyad Iranian author, al-Kermani, wrote a detailed account of Nava Vihara at the beginning of the **8th century**, preserved in the 10th-century work Book of Lands (Ar. Kitab al-Buldan) by al-Hamadhani. He described it in terms readily understandable to Muslims by drawing the analogy with the Kaaba in Mecca, the holiest site of Islam. He explained that the main temple had a stone cube in the center, draped with cloth, and that devotees circumambulated it and made prostration, as is the case with the Kaaba. The stone cube referred to the platform on which a stupa stood, as was the custom in Bactrian temples. The cloth that draped it was in accordance with the Iranian custom for showing veneration, applied equally to Buddha statues as well as to stupas. **Al-Kermani’s description indicates an open and respectful attitude by the Umayyad Arabs in trying to understand the non-Muslim religions, such as Buddhism, that they encountered in their newly conquered territories**. > > In 1215, Chinggis Khan, the founder of the Mongol Empire, conquered Afghanistan from the Ghurids. As was his policy elsewhere, Chinggis destroyed those who opposed his takeover and devastated their lands. It is unclear how the vestiges of Buddhism still left in Afghanistan fared at this time. Chinggis was tolerant of all religions, so long as its leaders prayed for his long life and military success. > > After Chinggis’ death in 1227 and the division of his empire among his > heirs, his son Chagatai inherited the rule of Sogdia and Afghanistan > and established the Chagatai Khaganate. In 1258, Hulegu, a grandson of > Chinggis, conquered Iran and overthrew the Abbasid Caliphate in > Baghdad. He established the Ilkhanate and soon invited to his court in > northwestern Iran Buddhist monks from Tibet, Kashmir, and Ladakh. The > Ilkhanate was more powerful than the Chagatai Khaganate and, at first, > it dominated its cousins there. Since the Buddhist monks had to pass > through Afghanistan on their way to Iran, they undoubtedly received > official support on their way. > > According to some scholars, the Tibetan monks who came to Iran were > most likely from the Drikung (Drigung) Kagyu School and Hulegu’s > reason for inviting them may have been political. In 1260, his cousin > Khubilai (Kublai) Khan, the Mongol ruler of northern China, declared > himself Grand Khan of all the Mongols. Khubilai supported the Sakya > Tradition of Tibetan Buddhism and gave its leaders nominal suzerainty > over Tibet. Prior to this, the Drikung Kagyu leaders had been in > political ascendance in Tibet. Khubilai’s main rival was another > cousin, Khaidu, who ruled East Turkistan and supported the Drikung > Kagyu line. Hulegu may have been wishing to align himself with Khaidu > in this power struggle. > > Some speculate that the reason for Khubilai and Khaidu’s turning to > Tibetan Buddhism was to gain the supernatural backing of Mahakala, the > Buddhist protector practiced by both the Sakya and Kagyu traditions. > Mahakala had been the protector of the Tanguts, who had ruled the > territory between Tibet and Mongolia. After all, their grandfather, > Chinggis Khan, had been killed in battle by the Tanguts, who must have > received supernatural help. It is unlikely that the Mongol leaders, > including Hulegu, chose Tibetan Buddhism because of its deep > philosophical teachings. > > After the death of Hulegu in 1266, the Chagatai Khaganate became more > indepen­dent of the Ilkhans and formed a direct alliance with Khaidu > in his struggle against Khubilai Khan. **Meanwhile, the line of Hulegu’s > successors alternated in their support of Tibetan Buddhism and Islam**, > apparently also for political expediency. **Hulegu’s son Abagha > continued his father’s support of Tibetan Buddhism. Abagha’s brother > Takudar, however, who succeeded him in 1282, converted to Islam to > help gain local support** when he invaded and conquered Egypt. Abagha’s > son **Arghun** defeated his uncle and became Ilkhan in 1284. He **made > Buddhism the state religion of Iran** and founded several monasteries > there. When Arghun died in 1291, his brother Gaihatu became the > Ilkhan. Tibetan monks had given Gaihatu the Tibetan name Rinchen > Dorje, but he was a degenerate drunkard and hardly a credit to the > Buddhist faith. He introduced paper money to Iran from China, which > caused economic disaster. > > Gaihatu died in 1295, one year after the death of Khubilai Khan. > **Arghun’s son Ghazan succeeded to the throne. He reinstated Islam as > the official religion of the Ilkhanate and des­troyed the new Buddhist > monasteries there**. Some scholars assert that Ghazan Khan’s reversal of > his father’s religious policy was to distance himself from his uncle’s > reforms and beliefs, and to assert his independence from Mongol China. > > Despite ordering the destruction of Buddhist monasteries, it seems that the Ghazan Khan did not wish to destroy everything associated with Buddhism. For example, he commissioned Rashid al-Din to write Universal History (Ar. Jami’ al-Tawarikh), with versions both in Persian and Arabic. In its section on the history of the cultures of the people conquered by the Mongols, **Rashid al-Din included The Life and Teachings of Buddha**. To assist the historian in his research, Ghazan Khan invited to his court Bakshi Kamalashri, a Buddhist monk from Kashmir. Like the earlier work by al-Kermani, Rashid’s work presented Buddhism in terms that Muslims could easily understand, such as **calling Buddha a Prophet**, the deva gods as angels, and Mara as the Devil. > > Rashid al-Din reported that in his day, **eleven Buddhist texts in Arabic translation were circulating in Iran**. These included Mahayana texts such as The Sutra on the Array of the Pure Land of Bliss (Skt. Sukhavativyuha Sutra, concerning Amitabha’s Pure Land), The Sutra on the Array Like a Woven Basket (Skt. Karandavyuha Sutra, concerning Avalokiteshvara, the embodiment of compassion) and An Exposition on Maitreya (Skt. Maitreyavyakarana, concerning Maitreya, the future Buddha and embodiment of love). These texts were undoubtedly among those translated under the patronage of the Abbasid caliphs at the House of Knowledge in Baghdad starting in the 8th century. > > Rashid al-Din finished his history in 1305, during the reign of Ghazan’s successor Oljaitu. It seems that Buddhist monks were still present in Iran, however, at least until Oljaitu’s death in **1316**, since **monks unsuccessfully tried to win the Mongol ruler back to Buddhism**. Thus, at least up until then, Buddhist monks still passed back and forth through Afghanistan and thus might still have been welcomed at the Chagatai court. > > In 1321, the Chagatai Empire split into two. The Western Chagatai Khaganate included Sogdia and Af­ghanistan. From the start, its khans converted to Islam. The Ilkhanate in Iran fragmented and fell apart in 1336. After this, there is no indication of the **continuing presence of Buddhism in Afghanistan. It had lasted there nearly nineteen hundred years**. Nevertheless, knowledge of Buddhism did not die out. Timur (Tamerlaine) conquered the Western Chagatai Khaganate in 1364 and the small successor states of the Ilkhanate in 1385. Timur’s son and successor, Shah Rukh, commissioned the historian, Hafiz-i Abru, to write in Persian A Collection of Histories (Ar. Majma’ al-Tawarikh). Completed in **1425** in Shahrukh’s capital, Herat, Afghanistan, the history **contained an account of Buddhism** modeled after Rashid al-Din’s work a century earlier > > [History of Buddhism in Afghanistan Dr. Alexander Berzin ](https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/history-culture/buddhism-in-central-asia/history-of-buddhism-in-afghanistan) In the Pali Suttas or Bhikkhu Vinaya, did the Buddha ever warn of dangers of royal benefaction that could bring Buddhism into peril and destruction?

I've become aware through sutta study that avijja (the fetter of ignorance) refers to ignorance of the Four Noble Truths. Is there a specific canonical sutta that says that avijja is ignorance of the anatta doctrine? I know inferentially if anatta is part of the Four Noble Truths, then that would follow, however sometimes the various connections are hard to hold in the mind at the same time. Thanks.

Arahants have eliminated the conceit of, "better," amongst other aspects of conceit and other fetters. However, if they are perfected people, that would mean they are perfect. Other people are not perfect, by very virtue of not being arahants. How do we explain the fact that an arahant doesn't feel better than anyone, though in reality they are better, morally, spiritually, and emotionally? Doesn't an arahant also lack ignorance? It seems knowing what you are and where you stand is a lack of ignorance.

This applies to all superstitious people in general, but especially to someone very close. My mom is extremely ignorant and superstitious. She comes from an uneducated village background from a third world country. Due to ignorance of facts and lack of experience, she falls for any hearsay and produces strong emotions based on them, chiefly fear and worry. Example, she would read in the newspaper that somewhere in the Western world there was a homicide of someone from our country and she would get worried for me. she doesn't understand I am thousands of miles away from the place she has read about. The way she would spin stories out of what is actually written is truly fascinating. For example, 'A homicide of our countryman in the West' becomes 'the people in the West kill our countrymen and throw them out on the streets!' She also, unconsciously, tries to nudge me and manipulate me into seeing the bad aspects of the western world - when in fact the "bad" aspects she tries to tell me are due to her lack of understanding of facts and they are unfounded in reality. An example, she would tell semi-fabricated stories like that to me over call like the homicide one above. I have pointed out this mechanism to her multiple times to make her conscious of the fact-manipulation etc. even with examples. But I am now thinking she doesn't have the awareness to grasp this kind of "theoretical" understanding. Anyways, usually I just point out the falsehoods and switch topics. But last call I was dumbfounded by the extent of this and in order to really make her aware of this I may have said some words which were true but may be hurtful. Something like "you are acting like a 5 yo child who doesn't understand the basic knowledge and gets scared like that". I remember persisting on it a little because I wanted her to see the mistake there, and I feel pity towards her for suffering constantly on these untrue things. Now she is hurt from me because of this incident. I feel guilty and sad to hurt her with words and I have been crying. But at the same time I feel sorry for her for tormenting herself day after day and year after year due to ignorance of basic understanding of science and world. What should be done in this case? Should I ignore her manipulating and let her suffer although that doesn't seem right..? But I can't either try to show her truth for that either is ineffective or it involves hurt. Have you been in similar situation before?

Given that awakening is accomplished by the destruction of the āsava, understanding what precisely the āsava are (and what they are not) is a key to unraveling the mystery of the Buddha's teaching. At the 13:29 mark of this talk, 2016-11-16: Ajahn Sucitto: Asava and Careful Attention Ajahn Sucitto made the following claim: > The āsava are the saṅkhāra that are encoded with ignorance [avijjā] IMHO, this simple statement is profound. It places the āsava here: **paṭiloma-paṭiccasamuppāda:** 1: avijjā 2: saṅkhāra ** knowledge** I am 99% convinced that this interpretation is correct. It just fits. However, if possible, I would like some evidence from the suttas to corroborate this interpretation. Does such evidence exist? Ajahn Sucitto kindly responded to my request for information on this matter, thusly: > “'Avjijja paccaya sankhāra’ is the frequently reiterated beginning of > the paticcasamuppada (dependent origination) sequence. If you google > this you’ll find many sutta references. This means: ‘with ignorance as > a condition, formative energies arise’. These sankhara formulate > consciousness - the outward-looking intelligence that formulates data > in terms of labels and forms (nāma-rupa). The motivation behind this > formulating is to generate a substantial and enduring reality out of > them. This is the asava of ‘existence/becoming’ (bhava). There is also > the motivation towards stimulation; this is ‘sensuality’ (kāma). > Ignorance as the other of the three asava is the motivation to ignore > the others and just keep adding more proliferation to the mix. This > conclusion has arisen through prolonged study and practice."

According to dependent origination , ignorance is at the root of suffering. What are the various ways in which we can get rid of ignorance?

This question arises from [this previous post](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/29818/why-does-one-suffer-because-of-ignorance-if-ignorance-is-unintentional) . The questioner seems perplexed that a person should suffer for not knowing or possessing certain knowledge i.e. simply for being unaware. While there is an active component in desire (us wanting or craving) and aversion (us disliking or hating). However, ignorance is not something we can control or actively avoid. So, my question is there an active component in ignorance i.e. do we intentionally ignore and/or indulge in ignorance? Perhaps, by understanding this process better, we can also answer [this question on how to get rid of it](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/49878/how-to-get-rid-of-ignorance) .

Bearing in mind that ignorance is in opposition to knowledge and the starting point for all the suffering, it seems still unbelievable that there were people contemporary to the Buddha that contradicted and refused his teaching. Considering that he was the culmination of human intellect and the embodiment of pure knowledge, how is it possible to be in such stubborn opposition with the truth?

The five hindrances or obstacles of common buddhism are: 1. worry/restlessness/regret /distraction 2. hate (ill-will) 3. sensual desire 4. skeptical doubt (ignorance?) 5. lazy/lethargy Ignorance is not listed. Do all 5 together imply ignorance? It says: > These are the five obstacles and hindrances, corruptions of the heart > that weaken wisdom. Another theory might be that ignorance (confusion) is the same as doubt. If one doesn’t know any better, the opportunity to gain *access* to concentration (right meditation) are more slim. If one misunderstands that is also ignorance. If one is skeptical that might be ignorance. Perhaps the five hindrances are primarily a technical manual, a means to access concentration or develop tranquility/equanimity/energy (seven factors); in which case ignorance has an indirect role. Why (How) is or isn’t ignorance one of the five hindrances?

Wikipedia describes ignorance and delusions. This appears to be academic and do not find examples that are easily related. - What is ignorance? - How is it different to delusions or are they the same? - What are real world examples of ignorance?

This answer stated that: > Even if you sit in the dark and do nothing, you can still be creating > bad Kamma. It depends on whether you have Samma Sati or not. Whatever > you do can create bad Karma as long as your thoughts are defiled with > craving, aversion and ignorance. So ALL thoughts that are defiled with craving, aversion and ignorance (lobha, dosa, moha) create bad karma? So does it mean when we want something (for example, I want to go to X country for my next vacation), does that thought creates bad karma because such thought is rooted in lobha (craving)?

I read the following comment on the secular internet in relation to the closing paragraphs of DN 2, where a King or layperson made an admission of a moral transgression/sin to the Buddha: > Yes that confession is especially by and to monks -- "the discipline" > as you quoted it is the Vinaya. Does the Pali word "vinaya" in the suttas always refer to the Vinaya Piṭaka, i.e., the Pāṭimokkha rules made exclusively for monks & nuns?

What is moha (delusion)? What is avijja or avidya (ignorance)? What is the difference between moha (delusion) and avijja or avidya (ignorance)?

In relation to the question: "*Is there is no benefit and there is no intrinsic positive nature in a pleasant sensation?*", I read the following quote from SN 36.5 on the internet: > A mendicant who sees pleasure as pain, one who has seen the pleasant as painful, who sees the pain in happiness, Yo sukhaṃ dukkhato adda, > > and suffering as a dart, the painful as a dart, views the painful feeling as a thorn, dukkhamaddakkhi sallato; > > and that peaceful, neutral feeling adukkhamasukhaṃ santaṃ, > > as impermanent, addakkhi naṃ aniccato. > > sees rightly; sa ve sammaddaso bhikkhu, > > they completely understand feelings. parijānāti vedanā; > > Completely understanding feelings, So vedanā pariññāya, > > they’re without defilements in this very life. diṭṭhe dhamme anāsavo; Not necessarily adhering to the literal translations above: 1. What is the meaning of the Pali in verse above from Datthabba Sutta? 2. Does the Datthabba Sutta support the idea: '*there is no benefit and there is no intrinsic positive nature in a pleasant sensation*'? 3. How does the above verse in the Datthabba Sutta reconcile with the Pali verse: "*Nibbanam paramam sukham: Nibbana is the supreme happines*s"? 4. Are any of the translations above of the three Western monks accurate so to inspire faith in these ordained Westerners?

Lord Buddha said that we should practise Asubha sanna (perception of the non-beautiful). Does it mean that we have to let go Subha sanna (perception of the beautiful) completely ? Are there anything that is Subha in this world? As I know, The world is a Asubha thing. We can not find any subha thing in this world at all. So anything that is not related to the world is Subha. Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha help us to get rid of this world. That means they are Subha things. The conclusion is that we shouldn't have any Subha sanna towards anything other than Triple jems. Am I right?

According to the ten fetters model, one of the five fetters which are only removed at attaining arahantship is ignorance (avijja). This means that anagamis are still subject to ignorance in some way. But it's also evident that anagamis possess a lot less ignorance than ordinary people. For example, belief in a self (sakkaya-ditthi) is abandoned at the first stage of enlightenment. So which forms of ignorance would an anagami still experience, and which forms not? Or is ignorance something that only sometimes arises in an anagami, the same way ill-will is only sometimes present in ordinary people? Thanks in advance for your answers!

I read the following intentional thought on the internet: > Intention is directed conscious energy. When we think about doing > something, where does that energy go? Thoughts like these are created > before every conscious action as a means to mitigate the quantity and > quality of the repercussion. If an individual cultivates an intention > enough, the chances of inadvertently performing the action is more > within reason. 1. What is "conscious energy" in Buddhism? 2. In Buddhism, does "conscious intention" mean "wise intention"? 2. If cultivating intention leads to action more within reason, are ignorant actions without intention or unintentional in Buddhism?