Buddhism
Q&A for people practicing or interested in Buddhist philosophy, teaching, and practice
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The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/80747 "POM1: Presume that other minds can be perceived. Then, they shall be like external forms and have no real existence. POM2: Presume that other minds can be perceived and still have real existence. This epistemic realism contradict...
https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/80747
"POM1: Presume that other minds can be perceived. Then, they shall be like external forms and
have no real existence.
POM2: Presume that other minds can be perceived and still have real existence. This epistemic
realism contradicts the idealist position held by the Yogācārins, insofar as there is one type of
really-existed objects that can be directly given to one’s mind and this givenness is independent
of one’s own mind.
POM3: Presume that other minds cannot be perceived. Then, the doctrine of consciousness-
only also becomes untenable, because there is one type of objects that falls outside of the scope
of one’s experience."
"Other minds are then perceived through the second-person perspective."
**That is, when the Yogacarin communicates with other people, does he directly communicate with other minds? Or does he pretend to communicate with other minds, but in fact he knows that only his mind exists, and all other minds are just imaginations created by his mind Thank you.**
Arny
(147 rep)
Apr 10, 2021, 07:31 AM
• Last activity: Apr 19, 2025, 04:05 AM
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What is sameness?
I read [this][1]: > “There are four kinds of sameness (*samata*) for those who discipline > themselves in religious life: appearance, causation, **coming into > being**, and the fourth is egolessness.” Can you describe the experience of "coming into being"? Why is it sameness? Do you think these fou...
I read this :
> “There are four kinds of sameness (*samata*) for those who discipline
> themselves in religious life: appearance, causation, **coming into
> being**, and the fourth is egolessness.”
Can you describe the experience of "coming into being"? Why is it sameness?
Do you think these four kinds of sameness are the same *meaning* described by four different concepts?
nacre
(1901 rep)
Jul 6, 2024, 12:29 AM
• Last activity: Jul 8, 2024, 04:45 AM
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How is Cittamatra practiced in the Gelug school?
I'm new to studying Tibetan Buddhism. I'd like to ask how the Cittamatra doctrine is *practiced* in the Gelug school. I'm not referring to the hierarchy this school establishes of Yogacara as a preliminary step to studying Madhyamika Prasangika, but rather if some of the analyses presupposed by Citt...
I'm new to studying Tibetan Buddhism. I'd like to ask how the Cittamatra doctrine is *practiced* in the Gelug school. I'm not referring to the hierarchy this school establishes of Yogacara as a preliminary step to studying Madhyamika Prasangika, but rather if some of the analyses presupposed by Cittamatra are *practiced yogically*; is it done this way, or is it more of a scholarly, theoretical study, to then assimilate it into a larger framework within Madhyamika?
Thank you for your help.
Ian
(190 rep)
May 7, 2024, 11:04 AM
• Last activity: May 8, 2024, 04:42 PM
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About Vasubandhu and Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya (-saptati)
The dialectics between Buddhism and the philosophy of Sāṅkhya are profoundly recorded especially in Chinese and Tibetan Vāda Grantha-s — this is to the point that most major Sāṅkhya texts extant today are reconstructed from their Chinese and Tibetan translations. Other Buddhist texts are also vast s...
The dialectics between Buddhism and the philosophy of Sāṅkhya are profoundly recorded especially in Chinese and Tibetan Vāda Grantha-s — this is to the point that most major Sāṅkhya texts extant today are reconstructed from their Chinese and Tibetan translations. Other Buddhist texts are also vast sources about the school of thought and its preceptors; the information regarding the early preceptors on the other hand is scarce in Sāṅkhya texts themselves (the outlier being Yuktidīpikā) or in other Hindu works.
One example of this is K'uei Chi's commentary on Vasubandhu's Vijnaptimātratasiddhi where he elucidates about Kapilā, his school of Sāṅkhya, and his successors. He also states about debates between the schools and about Vasubandhu's refutation of Sāṅkhya philosophy. He records this as his master Hiuen-Tsang narrates to him. The *debatable* thing though is he mentions Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya on the Sāṅkhya text of Sāṅkhyakārikā as a work of Vasubandhu. As far as I know, he is not alone here - Yuen Ts'eh in his commentary on Nyāyānusāraśāstra, Tsing Liang (Ching Kuan) in his discourse on the Avataṃsaka and Ju Li too in his commentary on Vasubandhu's Vijnaptimātratasiddhi mentions the same.
The point to note here is that though debatable, traditional Indology doesn't hold any connection between Vasubandu and Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya. J. Takakusu mentioning the same states "There is, however, no reason whatever why a Buddhist should write a commentary on the work of his opponent...", he continues to posit that the mention of Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya in the aforementioned texts is due to confusion - "...and this point too, I think, must be dismissed as a confusion arising from a resemblance of the names, Sāṅkhya saptati, and Paramārthasaptati."
Personally, I don't think these two points hold much merit — (i) We have a plethora of instances against the reasoning. Thousands of works and commentaries are written on rival texts including major works of opposing schools of thought. (ii) There is an intelligible difference between the titles even if the saptati is common. To have confusion between these by multiple people doesn't hold any practical value of reasoning. Also in my opinion the text of Sāṅkhya saptati was pretty well known in the Chinese-Buddhist realm of philosophy, evident from Yuktidīpikā's mention of multiple discussions and debates between the Buddhists and the followers of Sāṅkhya. I am curious to know anything against this.
Supplementing my limited research, **I'd like to know** if Vasubandhu really wrote Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya and if you know any other resources (*primary sources like texts of preceptors or scholarship of modern scholars*) that either sustain the link of Vasubandhu and Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya or go against it. And please let me know if I'm misunderstanding something or am in ignorance of some critical information here.
Padmanābha
(51 rep)
Dec 31, 2023, 08:14 AM
• Last activity: Jan 23, 2024, 02:50 PM
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can MN.43 be my alibi?
“Friend, these five faculties—each with a separate range, a separate domain, not experiencing one another’s range & domain: the eye-faculty, the ear-faculty, the nose-faculty, the tongue-faculty, & the body-faculty—have the intellect as their (common) arbitrator. The intellect is what experiences (a...
“Friend, these five faculties—each with a separate range, a separate domain, not experiencing one another’s range & domain: the eye-faculty, the ear-faculty, the nose-faculty, the tongue-faculty, & the body-faculty—have the intellect as their (common) arbitrator. The intellect is what experiences (all) their ranges & domains.”
Alternative translation for the last line:
- “These five faculties, with their different scopes and ranges, have recourse to the mind. And the mind experiences their scopes and ranges.”
- They are restored in the mind and it partakes the pasture commonly.
- mind is the repository, and mind reacts to their pasture and range.”
what does it mean? Is it yogacara in a nutshell? they say mind-only, mere representation....or maybe it means that the pasture was not good enough to contain my evilness?
here is another wacky one from the wikipedia:
> These internal sense bases (internal faculty) are not the gross organs
> themselves (e.g., the eye, ear, etc.), but subtle matter within them.
nacre
(1901 rep)
Jan 29, 2023, 03:22 PM
• Last activity: Apr 18, 2023, 04:58 PM
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What did Vasubandhu and Asanga say regarding Nagarjunacharya?
Given that Vasubandhu and Asanga came after Nagarjunacharya, who was a proponent of a major Buddhist school with a different philosophy. Did they or thier students like Dignaga say anything about Nagarjunacharya?
Given that Vasubandhu and Asanga came after Nagarjunacharya, who was a proponent of a major Buddhist school with a different philosophy. Did they or thier students like Dignaga say anything about Nagarjunacharya?
user23953
Sep 30, 2022, 03:15 PM
• Last activity: Mar 6, 2023, 02:00 AM
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Is the Alayavijnana momentary?And is it shared in Yogacara?
I am hearing contradictorary things.Is the alayavijnana shared in yogacara?And is it momentary and subject to Kshanabhanga?What does vasubandhu say and the early yogacarins?Please cite sources.
I am hearing contradictorary things.Is the alayavijnana shared in yogacara?And is it momentary and subject to Kshanabhanga?What does vasubandhu say and the early yogacarins?Please cite sources.
johny man
(297 rep)
Aug 10, 2020, 10:48 AM
• Last activity: Jun 25, 2021, 01:43 AM
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What is the difference between Yogacara Buddhism and Idealism?
I've often heard the Yogacara school of Buddhism being described as 'Mind Only'. To my untutored mind this seems reminiscent of the western philosophy of Idealism. So there is a [description of Yogacara][1] which goes > the reality we think we perceive does not exist except as as a process > of know...
I've often heard the Yogacara school of Buddhism being described as 'Mind Only'. To my untutored mind this seems reminiscent of the western philosophy of Idealism.
So there is a description of Yogacara which goes
> the reality we think we perceive does not exist except as as a process
> of knowing. Phenomena, anything that can be experienced, have no
> reality in themselves.
And a description from Idealism which goes
> [..] reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally
> constructed, or otherwise immaterial.
To me they seem similar but actually my feeling is in reality the two philosophies are very different. Can someone help me understand how they are different?
**Note:** I know the two quotes are from sources that have been identified as potentially unreliable (Barbara O'Brien and Wikipedia) but really I'm just want to use them as an illustration of how similar the two philosophies appear to me. I'm not claiming accuracy - in fact they could well lack it.
Crab Bucket
(21181 rep)
Aug 21, 2015, 10:25 AM
• Last activity: May 11, 2021, 03:04 PM
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What do the words of the Mahayana Buddhist mean?
A Mahayana Buddhist said: > Mahayana Buddhists agree that there other sentient beings exist, that > they have discrete mindstreams, and ingest and interpret reality in > accordance to their own karmic dispositions. > > If I encounter you, I believe you are a sentient being, and that you > are not me...
A Mahayana Buddhist said:
> Mahayana Buddhists agree that there other sentient beings exist, that
> they have discrete mindstreams, and ingest and interpret reality in
> accordance to their own karmic dispositions.
>
> If I encounter you, I believe you are a sentient being, and that you
> are not me. But I also recognize that I never interact with you, only
> with the impressions of you that my mind has recreated from sensory
> contact.
>
> So my experience of you is 'imaginary' in the sense that all I have is
> this mental representation that was constructed within my own mind,
> using limited data from where our actions and sense systems have
> interactions.
>
> But you clearly exist on some level, because you can perform actions
> that I did not cause, which means that you are not some kind of
> phantom my mind created.
Can you please explain to me what this means.
What does the following mean?
> But I also recognize that I never interact with you, only with the
> impressions of you that my mind has recreated from sensory contact.
That is, does it mean that when he talks to me, he thinks he is talking to an imaginary person?
Thank you!
Arny
(147 rep)
Apr 28, 2021, 08:45 PM
• Last activity: Apr 30, 2021, 04:22 PM
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Is Mahayana Buddhism a form of idealism?
Do Mahayana Buddhists believe that the whole world and all objects are created by the mind? For example, my friend and I see a train. Do I and my friend see the same train? Tell me if it is correct to say that Mahayana Buddhists believe that the people they see in front of them have consciousness an...
Do Mahayana Buddhists believe that the whole world and all objects are created by the mind? For example, my friend and I see a train. Do I and my friend see the same train?
Tell me if it is correct to say that Mahayana Buddhists believe that the people they see in front of them have consciousness and sensations (individual mindstreams) and exist independently of the imagination of Buddhists, but all of us and our whole world are dependent on all people and their minds, that is, we co-create our world together?
And what about the Yogacara school, which is considered idealism?
Randy
(31 rep)
Mar 24, 2021, 02:42 PM
• Last activity: Mar 24, 2021, 06:03 PM
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Elaboration of Vasubandhu's argument for the possibility of mental appearances to be publicly sharable?
The vivid qualitative experience of a word (or called "quale" as a philosophical jargon, "private language" as a linguistic jargon) formed by each person is intrinsically different due to one's knowledge, environment, mood, past experience, etc, even same person may form completely different private...
The vivid qualitative experience of a word (or called "quale" as a philosophical jargon, "private language" as a linguistic jargon) formed by each person is intrinsically different due to one's knowledge, environment, mood, past experience, etc, even same person may form completely different private language's words at different times for a same public language word.
I once see reference here in Wikipeda , without elaboration, that the famous ancient Buddhist Yogacaraist Vasubandhu
> uses the example of mass hallucinations (in Buddhist hell) to defend against those who would doubt that mental appearances can be shared.
Can anyone elaborate any historical accounts/stories or speculative explanation about Vasubandhu's argument referenced above to argue for the possibility of mental appearances to be publicly sharable? If such sharing cannot be made exactly on the same common ground, then will there always be some confusion and difference between any two people no matter what cognitive level they achieved?
As a side note, I know this is very similar to the *Problem of Other Minds* in modern social science where scholars and philosophers invented a term "intersubjectivity" defined here to objectify the existence of certain social common "thought communities" one unavoidably belongs to explain why people can **share** their private intrinsically different experiences. But I think this community-wise intersubjectivity is just like the sound of a chorus which can be entirely *reduced* to the superposition of individual sounds, thus seems not a necessary concept. Also per Buddhism's doctrine, the source of suffering is from *objectifying* private conscious experience and the following endless craving of such reified object, so I'm also interested in hearing any other different middle-way Madhyamaka-style explanations from Yogacara or any other Buddhist schools... Or does Buddhism never have an answer for such question as it belongs to papañca (conception proliferation) and thus effectively reject true possibility of *exact* mental appearances sharing like in the purely neutral and rational math-like ideal-forms realm?
cinch
(135 rep)
Mar 15, 2021, 06:41 PM
• Last activity: Mar 19, 2021, 05:59 PM
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What is storehouse consciousness?
I've been reading Peter Harvey's [Introduction the Buddhism][1] and I've come across the concept of storehouse consciousness. It's in relation to Yogācāra and Chan Buddhism - originally with Yogācāra. It contains karmic seeds (not sure what they are to be fair). Can anyone give me an explanation of...
I've been reading Peter Harvey's Introduction the Buddhism and I've come across the concept of storehouse consciousness. It's in relation to Yogācāra and Chan Buddhism - originally with Yogācāra. It contains karmic seeds (not sure what they are to be fair). Can anyone give me an explanation of this concept. At the moment it seems to me to be some sort of real existence that underpins reality but I'm sure that's not it.
I appreciate that there is an explanation on wikipedia about it but I'm not finding that hugely illuminating.
Crab Bucket
(21181 rep)
Nov 16, 2014, 01:23 PM
• Last activity: Mar 4, 2021, 10:32 PM
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I don't understand how the yogacara container universe can be possible
The Yogacara container universe model posits that shared reality is due to similar karmic traces or samskaras of sentient beings.this is perfectly fine,as sentient beings with similar karmic dispositions will interact with each other and have theoretically the same reality(theoretically this is poss...
The Yogacara container universe model posits that shared reality is due to similar karmic traces or samskaras of sentient beings.this is perfectly fine,as sentient beings with similar karmic dispositions will interact with each other and have theoretically the same reality(theoretically this is possible,but for this to happen in reality especially without interruption for infinite sentient beings without error is very improbable),but there must have been a time where this series started.ni.e the series of karma-samskara->appearance cannot go into infinite regress.and there must of been a time when infinite sentient beings interacted with all of each other or produced the same samskaras leading to future shared realities before a similar shared reality could occur, to produce the series of a similar reality,but one must ask how this is possible if a shared reality is only due to shared karma or samskaras and past interaction(which is only possible with similar samskaras and karma anyway). As again,you cannot go into infinite regress of samskaras->appearances and appearances-> samskaras ,there must have been a starting point.
if you say that "No" we are fine with infinite Regress and hold unto it,it must be asked how this is possible as william lane craig has shown that infinite Regress is an impossibility as an actual infinite can never be reached,as soon as you reach a point you must keep going as an infinite can not be finite.
the exact same karmic seeds sprouting simultaneously (wich is just as improbable as what I posited earlier,i.e their sprouting simultaneously in infinite numbers of times for infinite group sets of sentient beings)produce a shared reality,but there must have been a time when sentient beings all interacted with each other to produce the same karmic seeds for a future association,but this would have to be before the initial series of samskaras-appearances and appearances samskaras started,but this would be impossible as there could be no shared reality without similar samskaras/ karma .
Again if you claim that samskaras and karma have no beginning point, then it must be shown how this is the case.
And even if it didn't have a beginning point,and infinite regression without a starting point was possible,it must be asked how shared karmic seeds sprouting all happen simultaneously in infinite cases since beginningless time without a single error.even if you assert that there must be specific conditions that create a similar appearance due to a similar samskara creating an appearance,how can this happen simultaneously for multiple sentient beings without interruption?since beginningless time?even if infinite regress were a thing,this occurring would be so improbable that it would be impossible.
I just don't Understand the reasoning behind such models,it would be dependent on literal infinite regress(literally)and even if this were possible winning the lottery infinite number of times without interruption (since although similar samskaras would produce similar realities,no samskara can be exactly the same unless there were prior association which cannot go into infinite regress,and even if it could the chances of this sprouting of the same samskara/karmic trace occurring at the same time in near infinite cases without interruption since beginningless time without end would be so improbable as to be functionally impossible),endlessly forever AT THE SAME TIME.
Again,lets assume shared samskaras exist and that two samskaras can be exactly the same without prior association,their sprouting simultaneously without error infinitely(i.e for near infinite sentient beings) forever would be basically functionally impossible.no error at all?no mismatch between similar but not not same samskaras producing the same realities at all?in any case?since beginningless time?and without end?
By auccessive addition infinity cannot be reached at any point in time,because infinity is not finite.going backwards it cannot be posited in a chain of successive series.I'm not saying that time had a starting point just that for a successive addition causally linked chain to exist,there must be a starting point.
I am not saying that samskaras producing the exact same appearances without fail endlessly for ''infinite''numbers of sentient beings is impossible.it is just HIGHLY improbable as to be functionally useless to myself.its like me being blind and fixing a rubik's cube for trillions of kalpas every 2 minutes without fail,but without end or beginning.its perfectly possible,but highly improbable.
The model that would make most sense would be a realist model like that of the Theravadans wouldn't it?
johny man
(297 rep)
Aug 8, 2020, 10:29 AM
• Last activity: Dec 27, 2020, 05:45 PM
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Do Cittamatra / Yogacara explicitly refute the existence of an external world?
Tibetan texts that belong to the genre of *tenets* (doctrinal classification) usually claim that the Cittamatra school refutes external existence. These texts further claim that Cittamatrin posit that *'the apprehended object and the apprehending consciousness are empty of being different substances...
Tibetan texts that belong to the genre of *tenets* (doctrinal classification) usually claim that the Cittamatra school refutes external existence. These texts further claim that Cittamatrin posit that *'the apprehended object and the apprehending consciousness are empty of being different substances'*. They say that, according to Cittamatrin, the apprehending consciousness and the object it apprehends both arise simultaneously from a seed that was left in the mind-basis-of-all (alaya-vijñana), and that, given so, the object is not a cause of the consciousness apprehending it (as opposed to what Vaïbashikas and Sautrantika posit). Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen writes:
> An illustration of the selflessness of phenomena is, for example, the
> emptiness that is a form and the valid cognizer apprehending that form
> being empty of being different substances.
It is difficult for me to conceive, and to admit, that Cittamatrin refute external existence altogether. It would mean they refute that one is born from a mother and a father, and so forth. Moreover, I doubt Tibetan scholars who claim that 'Cittamatrin refute external existence' because they have an agenda. Tibetan scholars often simplify (if not even caricature) their opponent's positions (in this case, Cittamatrin). So, not sticking to Tibetan literature only, my idea was to seek whether Cittamatrin actually refute external existence by reading works written by proponents of the Cittamatra school. Let us consider Suzuki, in *Studies in the Lankavatara* (p. 114). He writes: > As indeed the idealistic Mahayana does not admit the > existence of an external world, whatever qualities we ordinarily think > as belonging to the latter are creations or constructions of our own > mind. Suzuki seems to say *"Cittamatra refute external existence"*, but **he does not do so explicitly**. He says "they do not admit the existence of an external world" but this does not necessarily amount to "refuting the existence of external world". As far as I know, he could be saying "We can not know anything but the aspects our consciousness takes. We can not see beyond our perceptions. We can not know for sure whether our perceptions are perceptions of something external. So, let us not bother with thinking of an external world - be it to refute its existence or claim its existence - and let us stick with what we know: that the eye-consciousness seeing blue takes the aspect of blue, and that we know nothing else." ---------- Thus, the question is: Do Cittamatra / Yogacara **explicitly** refute the existence of an external world? Or do they simply "not admit, not take into acount" the existence of an external world? References are welcome.
It is difficult for me to conceive, and to admit, that Cittamatrin refute external existence altogether. It would mean they refute that one is born from a mother and a father, and so forth. Moreover, I doubt Tibetan scholars who claim that 'Cittamatrin refute external existence' because they have an agenda. Tibetan scholars often simplify (if not even caricature) their opponent's positions (in this case, Cittamatrin). So, not sticking to Tibetan literature only, my idea was to seek whether Cittamatrin actually refute external existence by reading works written by proponents of the Cittamatra school. Let us consider Suzuki, in *Studies in the Lankavatara* (p. 114). He writes: > As indeed the idealistic Mahayana does not admit the > existence of an external world, whatever qualities we ordinarily think > as belonging to the latter are creations or constructions of our own > mind. Suzuki seems to say *"Cittamatra refute external existence"*, but **he does not do so explicitly**. He says "they do not admit the existence of an external world" but this does not necessarily amount to "refuting the existence of external world". As far as I know, he could be saying "We can not know anything but the aspects our consciousness takes. We can not see beyond our perceptions. We can not know for sure whether our perceptions are perceptions of something external. So, let us not bother with thinking of an external world - be it to refute its existence or claim its existence - and let us stick with what we know: that the eye-consciousness seeing blue takes the aspect of blue, and that we know nothing else." ---------- Thus, the question is: Do Cittamatra / Yogacara **explicitly** refute the existence of an external world? Or do they simply "not admit, not take into acount" the existence of an external world? References are welcome.
Tenzin Dorje
(4976 rep)
Jan 21, 2016, 11:15 AM
• Last activity: Dec 26, 2020, 09:55 PM
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Is the Tathagata 'special'?
Mahayana or Theravada, or any other offshoot. Is a Buddha an exception? Or a personification?
Mahayana or Theravada, or any other offshoot. Is a Buddha an exception? Or a personification?
Ilya Grushevskiy
(1992 rep)
Nov 8, 2020, 04:58 PM
• Last activity: Nov 9, 2020, 04:30 AM
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What are the arguments Yogacara makes to deny the reality of sensory objects?
Yogacara and Vasubandhu etc deny that matter exists by itself but rather that is comes from awareness and is merely a perception of the mind.what are the arguments Yogacarins make to prove their main thesis?
Yogacara and Vasubandhu etc deny that matter exists by itself but rather that is comes from awareness and is merely a perception of the mind.what are the arguments Yogacarins make to prove their main thesis?
johny man
(297 rep)
Jul 31, 2020, 10:07 AM
• Last activity: Jul 31, 2020, 08:15 PM
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Does Yogacara and its Alayavijnana fail compared to a Permanent Self?
So I've been Reading a bit of the Buddhist's boogeyman Shankara and I admit I am maybe biased in writing this(I am open to any refutation of my view,but I have not seen any adequate logical refutation of such),but I'd like to see a buddhist refutation or answer of this following viewpoint of mine ba...
So I've been Reading a bit of the Buddhist's boogeyman Shankara and I admit I am maybe biased in writing this(I am open to any refutation of my view,but I have not seen any adequate logical refutation of such),but I'd like to see a buddhist refutation or answer of this following viewpoint of mine based on a reading of Shankara's writings:
the temporary momentary alaya vijnana in yogachara buddhism is the substratum of momentary impressions,desires and ideas wich give rise to the false perception of external objects in their system.ideas and impressions(vasana samskaras)give rise to the appearance of external objects,wich give rise to further ideas and impressions wich give rise to further objects of external perception.however how can this not be a infinite regress(the appearance of external objects give rise to impressions,impressions give rise to the appearance external objects)?if external objects' (even just initial in some starting point in the past,wich buddhism denies due to its adherance to pratityasamutpada)existance is altogether denied to possibly exist rather than the mere appearance of them,how can impressions and desires come about for such objects ''appearance''?
and if there is no permanent substratum to the mind wherein impressions and desires can leave a mark or effect,how can anything be cognized externally(i.e how can vasana samskaras be configured or accumulated(with out wich it cant exist)without a permanent substratum?
such latent impressions cannot exist in a fresh new substratum (i.e person )each moment,because neither desire would arise from the appearance of external objects nor the appearance of external objects from impressions' desire(and the Yogacarin must admit a certain illogical infinite regress even in the case of a assumed permanent substratum)?
a new subtratum cannot have any impressions nor appearance of external objects to give impressions because the substratum,in this case the Alaya vijnana has no connection with its 'causal' substratum due to kshanabhanga.
if there were no permanent substratum there would literally be no experience or consciousness it seems based on the above.
only if a permanent substratum exists can such infinite regress of impression arising the appearance of external objects and vice versa even have any meaning(and even that is illogical as actual regressive infinites do not exist logically but I know that buddhism believes in infinite regression so I'm Granting you this.but such infinite regress would only 'make sence'within a permanent substratum).
I don't See how the Buddhist Doctrine of alayavijnana does not fail,and how only a permanent self can explain the infinite regress of ideas leading to (the appearance of) external objects and vice versa(wich itself is illogical in my opinion,but I am granting you guys' this for the sake of argument only).
if Kshanabhanga(wich is a Buddhist Tenet fundamental to buddhism) is Denied here,as some may Wish to do,and the substratums have a causal chain wich must be substantial;then how is this not a Permanent Self of the tirthikas for all intents and purposes?
buddhism denies this,and all of buddhism except Jonang would all fail if this were admitted,but if this were the case we have a permanent cognizing substantial 'self'/'person' through all the 3 times.
I don't see how the momentary alayavijnana is not a failure.
johny man
(297 rep)
Mar 18, 2020, 06:41 AM
• Last activity: Mar 18, 2020, 09:13 AM
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What are other peoples minds according to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra?
I read that everything is just my own mind from the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. If everything is my own mind, what about other peoples minds? Are they also my own mind? How can this be understood? For instance in Chapter 7 of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra there is this passage: > The Blessed One replied: There are f...
I read that everything is just my own mind from the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. If everything is my own mind, what about other peoples minds? Are they also my own mind? How can this be understood?
For instance in Chapter 7 of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra there is this passage:
> The Blessed One replied: There are four things by the fulfilling of
> which an earnest disciple may gain self-realization of Noble Wisdom
> and become and Bodhisattva-Mahasattva: **First, he must have a clear
> understanding that all things are only manifestations of the mind
> itself;** second, he must discard the notion of birth, abiding and
> disappearance; third, he must clearly understand the ego-less-ness of
> both things and persons; and fourth, he must have a true conception of
> what constitutes self-realization of Noble Wisdom, provided with these
> four understandings, earnest disciples may become Bodhisattvas and
> attain Transcendental Intelligence.
If all things are manifestations of my own mind, doesn't this mean Buddhism as expressed in this Sutra is the equivalent of solipsism? How do we understand the problem of other minds given this Sutra?
Malik A
(143 rep)
Feb 3, 2020, 06:49 PM
• Last activity: Feb 9, 2020, 11:01 AM
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In Yogacara Buddhism, is discontinuity an illusion, and does change arise?
Buddhists talk about discontinuity > ordinary consciousness consists of the ***discrete*** [cetas][1] and illusion > all is [illusion][2] and the external objects are nothing but the creations > of our mind 1. In Yogacara, are all moments discontinuous -- the idea that nothing is ever the same thing...
Buddhists talk about discontinuity
> ordinary consciousness consists of the ***discrete*** cetas
and illusion
> all is illusion and the external objects are nothing but the creations
> of our mind
1. In Yogacara, are all moments discontinuous -- the idea that nothing is ever the same thing twice and no two times meet -- and an illusion?
2. Does that mean that durations -- even-though consisting of impermanent events -- only *seem* to arise persist decay or cease? Why?
I can intuitively see a link between 1 and 2, and I am in effect asking about that. Put another way: is the flow of time we psychologically experience itself permanent?
user2512
Jan 15, 2020, 12:51 PM
• Last activity: Jan 20, 2020, 04:44 PM
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Resources to learn about yogacara buddhism
What are the best resources to learn about yogacara buddhism? Online resources, books, anything would be fine.
What are the best resources to learn about yogacara buddhism? Online resources, books, anything would be fine.
The crow and the coconut
(313 rep)
Apr 25, 2019, 05:59 PM
• Last activity: Nov 2, 2019, 11:35 AM
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