In Udana 8.3 , The following passage is to be seen- > There is, monks, an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned. If, monks > there were not that unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned, you could > not know an escape here from the born, become, made, and conditioned. > But because there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned, > therefore you do know an escape from the born, become, made, and > conditioned. I have seen many individuals on the internet quote this passage from the sutta to state Buddha directly affirmed the existence of A Theistic God. For Instance, A Non-dual, Vedanta Leaning Blogger Claims here - > **A closer reading of the Buddhist texts reveals that the Buddha did > actually acknowledge in many places the existence of what in Vedanta > would be called ‘The Self’ (Sanskrit: Atman) and what others may even > call God. Here is just one example from the Nibbana Sutta verse 3 > (Udana 8.3), which is from the Pali Canon:** > > There is, bhikkhus [monks], that which is unborn, that which is > unmanifest [or has not come into being], that which is not > fabricated/created, that which is unconditioned. > > If there were not, bhikhus, that which is unborn, that which is > unmanifest, that which is not fabricated/created, that which is > unconditioned, there would not be escape from that which is born, from > that which is manifest, from that which is fabricated/created, from > that which is conditioned – that therefore would not have been clearly > known/experienced/seen. > > But because, bhikhus, there is indeed that which is unborn, that which > is unmanifest, that which is not fabricated/created, that which is > unconditioned, therefore escape from that which is born, from that > which is manifest, from that which is fabricated, from that which is > conditioned, is [or can be] clearly known/experienced/seen. > > **We can clearly see that the Buddha is categorically stating that there > is something that is beyond birth and creation, beyond manifestation > and that which is conditioned (ie. all objects).** Similiarly A Baha’i writer uses Ud 8.3 to argue Buddhism implies a transcendent God behind liberation here > **The understanding that God chooses us echoes throughout every > religion. In Judaism, it is God who carries His people on eagles’ > wings and brings them to Himself (Exodus 19:4). In Christianity, it is > God, who with His amazing grace, “saves a wretch like me.” In Islam it > is God who brings us out from the depths of darkness into light: and > it is He who is full of mercy to those who believe (Qur’an 33:43). In > Hinduism, the greatest proponent of Vaishnavism to the West in my > lifetime, A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami wrote: “We can only understand > Krsna by acquiring the grace of Krsna,” and in Buddhism, it is very > clear that God, the “unborn, unarisen, and unconditioned” is the One > who frees us, for as Buddhist scripture says:** > > Were there not an unborn, unarisen, and unconditioned, there would be > no escape for those born, arisen and conditioned. Because there is > the unborn, unarisen, unconditioned, there is escape for those born, > arisen, and conditioned. – Udana, 8.3. > > **Salvation is not something we achieve on our own; it is given to be > achieved.** Is there any merit to these claims? Is this Sutta really implying the existence of an Unborn Theistic God, Without whose grace we cannot attain liberation?

In Hindu cosmology, time is divided into four Yugas (Satya, Treta, Dvapara, Kali), with Satya Yuga, the first epoch described as a kind of utopian golden age and Kali Yuga as an age of decline and moral degradation—the one we are said to be living in now. My question is: - Does Buddhism have a similar concept of cyclical ages, especially a notion of a "golden age" vs. an "age of decline"? - If so, how is this described in Buddhist texts?

Psychedelic substances such as psilocybin or LSD often induce experiences described as "ego death," where the usual sense of self dissolves and a feeling of unity or boundlessness arises. Some interpret these states as glimpses of spiritual truth, potentially similar to Buddhist insights into anattā (non-self) or śūnyatā (emptiness). From a Buddhist perspective, are these chemically induced experiences considered valid insights into the nature of self and reality, or are they fundamentally different from the realizations attained through traditional Buddhist practice? Are there teachings or commentaries that address the nature or value of such experiences?

In the teaching of dependent origination, ignorance is presented as the initial condition from which the entire cycle of birth, suffering, and death unfolds. This raises a subtle but profound question: why is ignorance placed at the very beginning of this chain? Does this imply an absolute beginning in time, or is it pointing to a structural relationship in how suffering arises? In exploring this question, it may also be worth considering whether ignorance is simply a lack of knowledge, or if it refers to a deeper mis-perception of reality that underlies all conditioned experience. Clarification on how early Buddhist texts and later traditions understand this foundational role of ignorance would be appreciated.

It is commonly claimed in Nyaya and Vedanta circles that Udayanacharya brought an end to the long-standing philosophical debate between Buddhist thinkers and Vaidika traditions. His works, such as Kusumanjali, Atmatattva Viveka, and Nyaya Vartika Tatparya Parishuddhi, are said to have decisively refuted core Buddhist doctrines like shunyavada, kshanikavada, and vigyanavada. A Traditionalist Vedantin author summarizes this viewpoint as follows: > **"Dharmkirti who is well known for his scholarly works, criticized > nyaya doctrines and Vartikam in his Work called “Praman -Vartika”. > After Dharmkirti Buddhism went into decline, last work which was a > considerable criticism was written by a Nalanda professor as > “TatvaSangraha”. In This tatvaSangraha the writer had also tried to > critize BhagvatPad Sankara’ views (verse 330-331). > > Vachaspati misra who was the knower of 12 darshanas, He wrote Nyaya > Vartika Tatparya tika and answered the claims that were made till now > in a very good manner. His refutations are Calm,deep and subtle.** > > **An unexpected refutation came from Kashmir and that was from Jayanta > Bhatt. He wrote an independant commentary on NyayA suTras called > “Nyaya Manjari” He established the authority of the Veda and refuted > the buddhist doctrines mercilessly.** He has quoted everyone be it > DharmaKirti, Dingnaga or Dharmottara. > > Bhasvarajna an other Kashmiri wrote ‘NyayaBhusana’. He criticized > everyone from Nagarjuna till Prajnakara Gupta(writer of > VartikaAlankara). > > Jayanta Has wrote a verse while refuting क्षणिकवाद which goes as > follows :- > > **नास्त्यात्मा फलभोगमात्रमथ च स्वर्गाय चैत्यार्चनं , संस्काराः क्षणिकाः > युगस्थितिभृतश्चैते विहाराः कृताः । सर्व शून्यमिदं वसूनि गुरवे देहीति > चादिश्यते, बौद्धानां चरितं किमन्यदियती दम्भस्य भूमिः परा ॥** > > **You Bauddhas, hold that there is no soul, yet you construct caityas > (towers) to enjoy pleasure in paradise after death; you say that > everything is momentary, yet you build monasteries with the hope that > they will last for centuries; and you say that the world is void, yet > you teach that wealth should be given to spiritual guides. What a > strange character the Bauddhas possess; they are verily a monument of > conceit.** > > **JnanaSariMitra and his disciple RatnaKirti wrote some works answering > Vachaspati and made last tries to save buddhist philosophy from the > attacks of logicians.** > > **UdayanaCharya ended this debate with very strong logics.** He composed > works as “Kusumanajali” “Atma Tatva Viveka” and “Nyaya Vartika > Tatparya Parishuddhi” and refuted ShunyaVada,KshanikVada,VigyanVada. > > There are other works as Bauddha Dhikkara tika(sankara misra) and > Bauddh dhikkar shiromani **but till then Buddhism became a history.**" Source - The Literary debates between Buddhists and Vaidikas Given this narrative, my question is the following: Did any later Buddhist philosophers, either in India, Tibet, Nepal, or elsewhere, directly or indirectly respond to Udayanacharya's arguments? Are there surviving texts or commentaries that attempt to refute or answer his critiques of the Buddhist doctrines of no-self, momentariness, and emptiness? Or did the Buddhist tradition leave Udayana's works unanswered, either due to historical decline or strategic neglect? Any textual, historical, or scholastic leads would be much appreciated.

Growing up, I had a general understanding—based on lay textbooks and common interpretations that the dharmic religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism all believe in reincarnation: the idea that an individual is reborn into a new body, either human or animal, after physical death of the body. As I became more interested in Buddhism and tried exploring it more deeply, I noticed that different Buddhists seem to explain this concept in very different ways. Some use the word "reincarnation" and appear to mean it quite literally, while others insist that "rebirth" in Buddhism is not the same as reincarnation, especially since Buddhism denies the existence of a permanent self. This has left me quite confused. Is rebirth just another term for reincarnation, or does Buddhism teach something fundamentally different? What is the correct way to understand the concept of rebirth in Buddhist teachings?

What is the acceptability of the Jataka literature across various Buddhist traditions? Please answer with references from both traditional and modern perspectives if possible.

I’m wondering to what extent belief in some form of afterlife is necessary for one to be considered a Buddhist. Specifically, are beliefs in otherworldly realms such as svargaloka (heaven), pitriloka (spirit world), and naraka lokas (hell), as well as the idea of rebirth or reincarnation, central and non-negotiable within the Buddhist tradition? Is it possible to identify as a Buddhist while setting aside these cosmological elements, perhaps viewing them symbolically or metaphorically rather than literally? Or are these beliefs foundational in such a way that rejecting them would place someone outside the bounds of what can meaningfully be called Buddhism?

In traditional Buddhist texts, Solar and lunar eclipses are often seen as being caused by a demon named Rāhu who attempts to seize the sun or moon, as seen for example in the SN 2.9 and 2.10 where the Buddha speaks of Rāhu releasing the sun or moon after the Buddha’s intervention. This is pretty similar to the mythical explanation of eclipses found in Hindu puranas. Today in light of modern science, eclipses are understood as natural events governed by the movement and alignment of the earth, moon, and sun. There is no magical phenomenon behind it and no gods or demons involved. Is there room within Buddhist philosophy for integrating or accepting the astronomical explanation of eclipses, or would that be seen as rejecting scriptural authority?

I’ve been trying to understand what happens to consciousness or awareness when someone fully attains Nirvana. From what I gather, Nirvana is described as the end of suffering and the cessation of the cycle of rebirth. But I’m unclear on whether this also means that all forms of consciousness or awareness whether in a physical body or any other 'purified' or 'disembodied' form come to a complete end. Is it correct to say that after Nirvana, there is no remaining experience, presence, or awareness in any sense? Or is this question itself based on a misunderstanding of what Nirvana actually is?

In several discourses, the Buddha is noted for his silence or deliberate non-engagement with certain metaphysical questions—such as whether the universe is created or governed by an absolute deity, or whether an eternal soul exists that can attain liberation by entering an everlasting transcendent spiritual realm such as Brahma-loka or Vishnu-loka. What was the rationale behind this silence? Was his silence due to the fact he actually did not know if they existed? Did he deliberately withhold such teachings, regarding his audience as unprepared to accept these doctrines as truths? Or did he see these views as fundamentally mistaken from the ground up and therefore not worth discussing? Which of these explanations aligns best with canonical teachings and the broader Buddhist philosophical tradition?

In various sources belonging to non Buddhist traditions that have historically been rivals to Buddhism like Vedanta and Nyaya, one often finds claims that their philosophers defeated Buddhist thinkers in formal debates. These accounts are often cited to highlight the intellectual strength and argumentative success of their respective schools over buddhism. I am interested in knowing whether Buddhist sources such as texts or inscriptions contain similar records of Buddhist scholars successfully engaging and defeating prominent non-Buddhist philosophers from vedanta or nyaya backgrounds in philosophical debates. Are there any such documented instances from the Buddhist side, and if so, could you provide references or examples?

While reading through the Buddhist suttas, I came across the detailed descriptions of the eight emancipations. These passages were deeply intriguing, but they also gave rise to some questions in my mind which I decided to ask before which let me cite the concerned passages - > “Ānanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight? > > “**Possessed of form, one sees forms.** This is the first > emancipation. > > “**Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally.** > This is the second emancipation. > > “**One is intent only on the beautiful.** This is the third > emancipation. > > “**With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, > with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding > perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one > enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space**. This > is the fourth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** This is > the fifth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of nothingness.** This is the sixth > emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor > non-perception.** This is the seventh emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation > of perception and feeling.** This is the eighth emancipation. > > “**Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward > order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order**, when he > attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he > wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of > effluents he enters and remains in the effluent-free release of > awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and > realized it for himself in the here and now, **he is said to be a monk > released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher > or more sublime than this, there is none.”** ~ DN 15 Questions- 1. Why is “nothingness” (6th) distinguished from “neither perception nor non-perception” (7th), given that both involve retreating from mental activity? Or from the 8th which involves total cessation of perception and feeling? 2. What kind of experience is “neither perception nor non-perception”? Is it a liminal state — and if so, how does one know they have entered it? Can a mind in this state be said to ‘experience’ anything at all? 3. In discussions with scholars from eternalist backgrounds, such as vedanta a common challenge raised is that the Buddhist teachings on the eight emancipations seem to imply the existence of a continuous or eternal subject since someone appears to be progressing through these subtle states of consciousness. If there is no eternal soul or self in Buddhism, then who is it that experiences and moves through these emancipations? How would a Buddhist respond to this objection? 4. What is the significance of being able to enter and exit these states at will, as emphasized in the sutta? 5. Is the progression through these states ultimately teaching that liberation is not something to be gained, but everything to be let go including perception, feeling, identity, and knowing?

What are most authentic scriptures within the buddhist tradition? Do all sub sects of buddhism believe in the same set of scriptures or are there differences there too?

I have heard Buddhist literature Mentions Maha Brahma, a diety attributed with creation but he is still held as a conditioned being. Does any literature of the buddhist canon (Any tripitaka or sutta) mention vishnu or shiva as deities? If so, what position are they accorded? Are they held to be conditioned beings similar to Brahma or something else?

Numerous philosophical traditions and religious doctrines espouse disparate—and at times, mutually contradictory—conceptions regarding the nature of ‘absolute reality’ or ‘ultimate reality.’ Some schools of thought posit that the entirety of nature constitutes the fundamental substratum of existence, while others ascribe this foundational status to a particular transcendent and personal deity. Still others conceive of absolute reality as an amorphous, omnipresent consciousness that pervades all of existence. With regard to Buddhism, how is ‘absolute reality’ understood within its doctrinal framework? Does Buddhism, in any of its various philosophical interpretations, affirm the existence of an ontologically ultimate reality, or does it reject such a notion altogether?

In [this comment](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/51562/was-the-buddha-neutral-on-self-centredness-or-selfishness#comment84938_51575) it was pointed out as per [AN 4:95](https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/AN/AN4_95.html) that one who practises solely for one’s benefits is better than one who practises solely for others’ benefits. While the best of the 4 types of individuals is those who practise for theirs and others’ benefits. It seems strange that a selfless and altruistic intention is seen as lower and less refined than a selfish one by the Buddha. This [answer](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28527/if-you-cannot-can-save-others-then-why-is-your-practice-more-worthy-than-anythin/28658#28658) proposed possible reasons why type 3 (solely for oneself) is better than type 2 (solely for others). In short, by practising for oneself, the individual indirectly confer protection to others as well as to oneself. But won’t the same effect be achieved with type 2? Is this right or is there something else? By logical extension from the above, if one is practising for oneself and others there should be additional benefits as this type is the best of all according to the Buddha. Are there additional advantages and what are they? The last question is somewhat related to [an earlier post](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/51562/was-the-buddha-neutral-on-self-centredness-or-selfishness) . If intentions are not to be judged on the basis of selfishness versus selflessness, what is the proper Buddhist criteria for deciding if an intention is noble/refine versus ignoble/base? Any insight is much appreciated.

While going across literature pertaining to buddhism, I came across the following write-up named '*Logical Criticism of Buddhist doctrines*' where the author has Criticized various aspects of Buddhist Philosophy. The question however is meant specifically towards the writer's criticism of the buddhist 'no-self' concept and defense of the soul theory. While Interested readers might look up chapter 17 (Page 303-326) , for brevity's sake I am summarizing the gist of their main points against the no-self concept and highlighting them for ease of reading. > **Just as one would not look for visual phenomena with one’s hearing > faculty or for auditory phenomena with one’s visual faculty, so it is > absurd to look for spiritual things (the soul, and its many acts of > consciousness, will and valuation) with one’s senses or by observing > mental phenomena**. Each kind of appearance has its appropriate organ(s) > of knowledge. For spiritual things, only intuition (or apperception) > is appropriate. > > > **To understand how the soul can exist apparently in midst of the body > and mind (i.e. of bodily and mental phenomena) and yet be invisible, > inaudible, etc. (i.e. non- phenomenal), just imagine a > three-dimensional space (see illustration below). Say that two > dimensions represent matter and mind and the third applies to spirit. > Obviously, the phenomena of mind will not be found in the matter > dimension, or vice versa**. Similarly, the soul cannot be found in the > dimensions of matter and/or mind, irrespective of how much you look > for it there. Why? Simply because its place is elsewhere – in the > spiritual dimension, which is perpendicular to the other two. > **The truth is that it is impossible to formulate a credible theory of > the human psyche without admitting the existence of a soul at its > center.** **Someone has to be suffering and wanting to escape from > suffering. A machine-like entity cannot suffer and cannot engage in > spiritual practices to overcome suffering. Spiritual practice means, > and can only mean, practice by a spiritual entity, i.e. a soul with > powers of cognition, volition and valuation**. These powers cannot be > equated electrical signals in the brain, or to events in the skandhas. > They are sui generis, very miraculous and mysterious things, not > reducible to mechanical processes. Cognition without consciousness by > a subject (a cognizing entity) is a contradiction in terms; volition > without a freely willing agent (an actor or doer) is a contradiction > in terms; valuation without someone at risk (who stands to gain or > lose something) is a contradiction in terms. This is not mere grammar; > it is logic. > > As already mentioned, **a soul is not an essence, but a core > (spiritual) entity. It therefore cannot be viewed as one of the five > skandhas, nor as the sum of those skandhas, as the Buddhists rightly > insist. It can, however, contrary to Buddhist dogma, be viewed as one > of the parts of the complete person, namely the spiritual part; but > more precisely, it should be viewed as the core entity, i.e. as the > specific part that exclusively gives the whole a personality, or > selfhood.** This is especially true if we start wondering where our soul > came from when we were born, whether it continues to exist after we > die, where it goes if it does endure, whether it is perishable, and so > forth. How would a buddhist respond to this critique of the no-self theory?

The ultimate teaching of Buddhism is that of anatta or that there is no permanent soul or self as is there no creator Godhead. However across the vast tapestry of spiritual traditions, there are many which not only actively assert the God/soul beliefs but also have many individuals who say they have attained realizations of soul or God. While the nature of the experiences many vary radically the common thread in all of them is the belief in the soul. An everlasting soul at that. Listing some examples for instance - - The spiritual experiences of an Advaita vedantist, where the practictioner realizes oneself as spirit/consciousness and one with all the cosmos/existence - The spiritual experiences of a Vaishnava involving realizing oneself as a soul, and a part and parcel of a personal God , Vishnu/Krishna. - The spiritual experiences of a Shaivite involving realising oneself as a soul/spirit and identical with the personal God Shiva. Now my question is If an individual attains such realizations/experiences which convince them that they are an eternal soul or are in some way linked/related to some personal or impersonal God, How will such an experience be viewed under the lens of buddhism? Will buddhism view such Soul/God experiences as mental confabulations or accept them having some degree of truth to them?

In the book: '*Origins Of Om Mani padme Hum A Study Of The Karandavyuha Sutra *', Alexander Studholme mentions a hymn to Avalokitesvara that curiously carries several epithets commonly associated with Vishnu and Shiva such as Hari,Narasimha, Nilakantha, sankara etc. How would a buddhist explain these epithets in relation to Avalokitevara? Does this mean the deity was appropriated from the Puranic fold by appropriating the qualities of vishnu/shiva within it?