Can the idea of a pure witnessing Self (Ātman) be deconstructed through the Buddhist tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi)?

In Buddhist philosophy, particularly in traditions like the Madhyamaka, the catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) operates as a dialectical tool that rejects the four extremes of affirmation and negation (“is,” “is not,” “both,” “neither”) to demonstrate the emptiness (śūnyatā) of any inherent essence (svabhāva). But conversely, Advaita Vedānta employs a similar deconstructionist method, the neti neti (“not this, not this”) utilising it as an epistemic negation process in order to systematically exclude all contingent identifications such as body, senses, mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), and ego (ahaṅkāra) — to arrive at Ātman, the absolute self conceived as pure awareness, distinct from all phenomenal processes. From a Buddhist philosophical standpoint, can the catuṣkoṭi be coherently applied to the Vedāntic conception of Ātman—understood as pure awareness beyond mind,ego and intellect? Would such an analysis deconstruct this posited ultimate subject , or does the Vedāntic notion of Ātman represent a category that eludes Madhyamaka negation?