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Buddhism

Q&A for people practicing or interested in Buddhist philosophy, teaching, and practice

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0 votes
1 answers
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How did the original mental event arise according to Dharmakīrti's argument for rebirth?
[This answer on Reddit](https://old.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/12flgq9/what_are_some_arguments_for_reincarnation_from_a/jfgry4f/) gave a basic outline of [Dharmakīrti's argument for rebirth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebirth_(Buddhism)#Metaphysical_arguments) in the form of a syllogism: 1. M...
[This answer on Reddit](https://old.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/12flgq9/what_are_some_arguments_for_reincarnation_from_a/jfgry4f/) gave a basic outline of [Dharmakīrti's argument for rebirth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebirth_(Buddhism)#Metaphysical_arguments) in the form of a syllogism: 1. Matter and consciousness are metaphysically different, their characteristics and nature are different 2. An effect must be of the same nature as its substantial cause 3. Thus consciousness cannot arise from or be produced by matter (1, 2) 4. Conclusion: Therefore, there must have a been a consciousness prior to any person's conception which causes the first moment of consciousness in this life For the sake of the question, let's assume that you accept this line of argumentation. The question then becomes, how did the first mental event arise according to this framework? Of course, there is the idea that many immaterial intellects exist in the transcendent realms some of which stretch beyond iterations of the universe and many eons, but at the same time, for there to be so many creatures on just this planet with consciousness would implicate that billions upon billions, if not more, immaterial entities survived the past iteration(s) and eons and made it to this one, and also never achieved enlightenment during that time, which seems highly implausible. Perhaps the Yogacara idea of the store-house consciousness must be of use here, but it would be difficult to prove, I'm not too sure. If anyone knows more about Dharmakīrti's thinking with regards to this, please share your knowledge.
setszu (324 rep)
May 4, 2024, 11:04 PM • Last activity: Jun 20, 2025, 01:09 PM
-1 votes
3 answers
118 views
What is wrong with this reasoning about final nirvana?
1. anicca: things only exist for a moment: I infer that every rebirth that occurs does so in a present moment. 2. dukkha: I am suffering: I infer that I am conclusively not in final nirvana. 3. anatta: there is no soul: I infer that I am nothing in addition to what is reborn. 4. ***we cannot fully e...
1. anicca: things only exist for a moment: I infer that every rebirth that occurs does so in a present moment. 2. dukkha: I am suffering: I infer that I am conclusively not in final nirvana. 3. anatta: there is no soul: I infer that I am nothing in addition to what is reborn. 4. ***we cannot fully establish when now occurs***. I think 1 and 4 mean that the time of rebirth is vague, because every rebirth occurs in the present and it's borderline when that is. **Assuming, then, that every rebirth has a vague truth value for occurring at some time, then all times have a vague truth value for being when some rebirth occurs, because if some time has a sharp truth value for being when some rebirth occurs (which must be the case if the conclusion if false) then some rebirth has a sharp truth value for occurring at some time (which cannot by the case if the assumption is true).** Given A. I have not at this time borderline realised final nirvana (see 2) B. I am borderline reborn at this time (see above) I might conclude: C. Not being reborn is not identical to final nirvana. Seeing as I am nothing in addition to what is reborn (see 3), I might conclude that ***final nirvana is nothing***. ---------- The section in bold is the part that I am most confused about: and I would especially want an answer that refutes its reasoning. The italics are my own asusmption and conclusion. Answering that 1-3 are poor descriptions of their terms would be unhelpful in this instance, but worth commenting about.
user25078
Apr 28, 2024, 11:37 PM • Last activity: May 30, 2024, 08:17 PM
2 votes
4 answers
92 views
Arguments against ascetism
Buddhism is often said to prescribe a middle way - avoiding ascetism on one hand, and avoiding indulging in sense pleasures on the other. What are some of the **arguments** that Buddhism offers against the efficacy of ascetism (denial of sense pleasures) to bring lasting happiness?
Buddhism is often said to prescribe a middle way - avoiding ascetism on one hand, and avoiding indulging in sense pleasures on the other. What are some of the **arguments** that Buddhism offers against the efficacy of ascetism (denial of sense pleasures) to bring lasting happiness?
Sam (154 rep)
Mar 21, 2024, 05:13 PM • Last activity: Mar 29, 2024, 05:28 PM
3 votes
4 answers
798 views
What are the traditional Buddhist arguments for rebirth?
According to Buddhist philosophy, there are two Pramanas or means of valid knowledge: Pratyaksha or sensory perception and Anumana or inference. (This is in contrast to most Hindus who believe in three or more Pramanas.) My question is, what are the traditional Buddhist arguments for the existence o...
According to Buddhist philosophy, there are two Pramanas or means of valid knowledge: Pratyaksha or sensory perception and Anumana or inference. (This is in contrast to most Hindus who believe in three or more Pramanas.) My question is, what are the traditional Buddhist arguments for the existence of rebirth? Now at least ordinary humans don't observe rebirth directly, so I assume that these arguments will rely on Anumana. I've seen Hindu arguments that use Anumana to prove the existence of rebirth, but those arguments are about establishing the existence of the Atma or soul, which Buddhists reject. So I assume that traditional Buddhist works have a different Anumana-based argument than the one Hindus use.
Keshav Srinivasan (477 rep)
Sep 2, 2017, 05:56 PM • Last activity: Mar 22, 2024, 09:08 PM
1 votes
3 answers
1480 views
Buddhism and Mathematics
Have there been any Buddhist texts addressing geometry, calculation or abstract algebra? I recently read a composite biography of several mathematicians through history. While some had schizophrenia, few had serious mood disorders. Cardano was mentioned as a possibility. Proofs require a mindfulness...
Have there been any Buddhist texts addressing geometry, calculation or abstract algebra? I recently read a composite biography of several mathematicians through history. While some had schizophrenia, few had serious mood disorders. Cardano was mentioned as a possibility. Proofs require a mindfulness of thought. There is also the stereotype of ivory tower nerds being emotionless or stoic. There seem to be therapeutic effects of learning mathematics or minds resistant to emotional pains are better at math than average. Buddhism has a lot to do with handling emotional pain. Has me wondering if mathematics might have been a point of interest. Numbers seem to be. Four Noble Truths, Eightfold Path, Three Marks if Existence. On the other hand, a straight forward, linear, literal approach to understanding doesn't quite feel like Buddhism .
R. Romero (209 rep)
Dec 27, 2019, 09:53 PM • Last activity: Dec 29, 2019, 06:25 PM
2 votes
2 answers
230 views
Why do Buddhists argue that nirvana is nothing in addition to the skandhas?
Why do Buddhists argue that nirvana is nothing in addition to the skandhas? I found this, and I hope it suffices to demonstrate that's what the Buddha taught: > "[What do you think][1]: Do you regard the Tathagata as being in > form?... Elsewhere than form?... In feeling?... Elsewhere than > feeling...
Why do Buddhists argue that nirvana is nothing in addition to the skandhas? I found this, and I hope it suffices to demonstrate that's what the Buddha taught: > "What do you think : Do you regard the Tathagata as being in > form?... Elsewhere than form?... In feeling?... Elsewhere than > feeling?... In perception?... Elsewhere than perception?... In > fabrications?... Elsewhere than fabrications?... In consciousness?... > Elsewhere than consciousness?" > > "No, my friend." > > "What do you think: Do you regard the Tathagata as > form-feeling-perception-fabrications-consciousness?" > > "No, my friend." > > "Do you regard the Tathagata as that which is without form, without > feeling, without perception, without fabrications, without > consciousness?" > > "No, my friend." > > "And so, my friend Yamaka — when you can't pin down the Tathagata as a > truth or reality even in the present life — is it proper for you to > declare, 'As I understand the Teaching explained by the Blessed One, a > monk with no more effluents, on the break-up of the body, is > annihilated, perishes, & does not exist after death'?" The quote seems to say that the Tathagata is not without form feeling etc.. If nirvana were something in addition to the aggregates, then I'm thinking the Tathagata would be *without the aggregates*. On the grounds that nirvana is all that the Tathagata is.
user2512
May 19, 2017, 04:27 AM • Last activity: May 20, 2017, 01:33 PM
0 votes
3 answers
116 views
Which Buddhists say that there are no conventionally existent wholes, and for what reasons?
Which Buddhists say that there are no conventionally existent wholes, and what's the best reason for the claim? My "whole" I mean something more than the sum of its parts, an object that does not reduce to its parts.
Which Buddhists say that there are no conventionally existent wholes, and what's the best reason for the claim? My "whole" I mean something more than the sum of its parts, an object that does not reduce to its parts.
user2512
Jan 25, 2017, 05:03 PM • Last activity: Feb 1, 2017, 12:54 PM
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