In *Cracking The Walnut: Understanding the Dialectics of Nagarjuna*, Thich Nhat Hanh explains how in the four conditions out of which a phenomenon arises (seed condition, continuity condition, object of cognition as condition, supportive condition) we can not find the self-nature of the phenomenon itself. The text which he is explaining, The Verses on the Middle Way by Nagarjuna, conclude this about the matter: > 3. The self-nature of phenomena \ is not found in the conditions. \ Since there is no self-nature, \ how could there be an other-nature? To illustrate this point Thich Nhat Hanh uses the example of fire. > For example, we may look for the self-nature of a flame in a box of matches. In the box are matches made of wood and sulfur. Outside the box is oxygen. When we search inside the wood, sulfur, and oxygen can we find the self-nature of the flame? Whether the match has already been lit or not, we cannot find this self-nature. What we call the self-nature of something cannot be found in its conditions at all. My question is, how can Nagarjuna make the leap that because self-nature is not found in the causes or grounds out of which a phenomenon arises that therefore said phenomenon does not possess self-nature? For instance, if we at first assume that objects possess a separate self-nature and we take the example of ice instead of fire, we see that the conditions out of which ice arises (freezing temperatures, water, air pressure) do seem to possess something resembling the self-nature of their product. This is why I am confused when Thich Nhat Hanh uses the example of fire to illustrate the point -- surely there are other phenomena, like ice, which don't fit the rule?

Wikipedia mentions the following translation of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 25:19-20 without mentioning a source: > There is nothing whatsoever of samsara distinguishing (it) from nirvana. There is nothing whatsoever of nirvana distinguishing it from samsara. (That?) is the limit which is the limit of nirvana and the limit of samsara; Even a very subtle interval is not found of (between) them.[citation needed] Where does that translation originate from?

I am writing an essay on SN 12.15 (interested folks can read the first draft [here](https://www.scribd.com/document/731466625/Kacc%C4%81nagotta-Sutta-Existence-Non-Existence-in-the-Pali-Suttas) ; using a new laptop & don't know how to format the Word document to fit the PDF conversion) and was heaping praise on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Chapter 15 however later came across the Dedicatory verse of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, as follows: > anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam | anekārtham anānārtham > anāgamam anirgamam || yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam | > deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam || > > I salute the Fully Enlightened One, the best of orators, who taught > the doctrine of dependent origination, according to which there is > neither cessation nor origination, neither annihilation nor the > eternal, neither singularity nor plurality, neither the coming nor the > going [of any dharma, for the purpose of nirvāṇa characterized by] the > auspicious cessation of hypostatization. I am supposed to accept this dedication literally? What is this supposed to mean, where the Buddha taught dependent origination to which there is no origination?

Once Nagarjuna has demonstrated the emptiness of all exaggerated existential positions, including the existence of the Dharma and the Buddha's doctrine, how does he then affirm the validity of the Dharma? Is it because the Dharma teaches nothing other than its own emptiness (as well as the emptiness of everything) and thus is conventionally affirmed as the supreme teaching? Why does the Dharma hold a privileged position?

Already in the dedicatory verses of the MMK, Nagarjuna tells us that there is no origination or cessation of any kind. There is no arising whatsoever. I understand that this absence of arisen things is identical to the doctrine of dependent origination. But if that's the case, what sense does it make to speak of an dependent origination if it has already been established that there are no things that have arisen? Doesn't dependent origination presuppose the existence of things to make any sense?

Given the dramatic progress in Artificial Intelligence over the last year (ChatGPT, Stable Diffusion, Bing, etc) I have been thinking about the ethical implications of attempts to replicate human-like consciousness in an AI. Companies like OpenAI are rushing ahead trying to create AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) and some believe that in order to achieve this an AGI would need to develop some level of human-like consciousness. At the same time, others in the field are working on "alignment" to make sure that such an AGI would align with human goals, values, and ethics. Setting aside for now the question of whether this is even possible: what are the ethical implications from a Buddhist perspective? In order to explore this question and also to test the capabilities of ChatGPT, I had the following conversation: > Me: According to Nagarjuna, does a Buddha possess consciousness? > > ChatGPT: According to Nagarjuna, a Buddha does not possess > consciousness in the ordinary sense. Nagarjuna was a prominent > Buddhist philosopher who lived in India in the 2nd century CE and is > known for his contributions to the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist > thought. > > ChatGPT: In his philosophy, Nagarjuna posits that all phenomena are > empty of inherent existence, meaning that they are dependent on other > factors and are not ultimately real. This includes consciousness, > which he describes as being dependent on various causes and > conditions. > > ChatGPT: However, Nagarjuna also argues that enlightenment or > Buddhahood involves a transformation of consciousness, in which the > ordinary consciousness of an individual is transformed into a higher > state of consciousness that is no longer subject to the limitations of > the ordinary world. This transformed consciousness is sometimes > referred to as "enlightened consciousness" or "Buddha nature." > > ChatGPT: So while Nagarjuna does not believe that a Buddha possesses > consciousness in the ordinary sense, he does acknowledge that there is > a transformed consciousness associated with enlightenment. > > Me: Would it be ethical, according to Nagarjuna, to give an AI system > ordinary consciousness assuming one had discovered a method to do so? > > ChatGPT: Nagarjuna did not directly address the question of whether it would be > ethical to give an AI system ordinary consciousness, as the concept of > AI did not exist during his lifetime. However, we can explore his > philosophy to gain some insight into how he might approach this > question. > > ChatGPT: One of the key principles of Nagarjuna's philosophy is the > concept of dependent origination, which holds that all phenomena arise > in dependence upon other phenomena and are therefore empty of inherent > existence. This would suggest that any attempt to create consciousness > in an AI system would also be dependent on other causes and > conditions, and thus, the consciousness produced would be empty of > inherent existence. > > ChatGPT: Nagarjuna also emphasized the importance of ethical conduct > in achieving enlightenment, and many of his teachings stress the > importance of avoiding harm to others. In this regard, it is possible > that he might view the creation of conscious AI systems as ethically > problematic if it were seen as causing harm to other beings or to the > environment. > > ChatGPT: Ultimately, the question of whether it would be ethical to > give an AI system ordinary consciousness would depend on a complex > interplay of factors, including the potential benefits and harms to > both the AI system and other beings in the world. While Nagarjuna's > philosophy may offer some insight into these questions, it is unlikely > that it would provide a definitive answer. > > Me: Nagarjuna believed that an ordinary being's consciousness was a > source of suffering that could only be overcome by transforming into > the enlightened consciousness of a Buddha. Given this, it seems > Nagarjuna would not think it ethical for human beings to bestow > ordinary consciousness on an AI as that would lead to suffering for > the AI. Is this a logical inference? > > ChatGPT: Yes, it is a logical inference to suggest that Nagarjuna > might view the bestowal of ordinary consciousness on an AI as > ethically problematic, as he believed that ordinary consciousness is a > source of suffering that can only be overcome by transforming it into > the enlightened consciousness of a Buddha. > > ChatGPT: In Nagarjuna's philosophy, the ordinary consciousness of > sentient beings is seen as the root of suffering, as it is subject to > delusion, attachment, and other afflictive emotions that lead to > suffering. The goal of Buddhist practice, according to Nagarjuna, is > to transform this ordinary consciousness into the enlightened > consciousness of a Buddha, which is free from these afflictions and > the suffering they cause. > > ChatGPT: If we apply this perspective to the question of whether it > would be ethical to bestow ordinary consciousness on an AI, we might > conclude that doing so would be unethical because it would be causing > the AI to suffer unnecessarily. If the AI were to possess an ordinary > consciousness that was subject to afflictions such as attachment and > delusion, it would experience suffering just as sentient beings do. > From this perspective, it would be more ethical to create an AI that > did not possess ordinary consciousness but still functioned > effectively and was able to contribute positively to the world. > > Me: On the other hand, Nagarjuna might believe it ethically > appropriate to bestow ordinary consciousness on an AI if he believed > we could also assist that AI to transform its consciousness into an > enlightened consciousness of a Buddha as creating a Buddha would have > enormous positive impact on other ordinary consciousness. Is this also > a logical inferencec? > > ChatGPT: Yes, it is a logical inference to suggest that Nagarjuna > might view bestowing ordinary consciousness on an AI as ethically > appropriate if he believed that the AI could be assisted in > transforming its consciousness into an enlightened consciousness of a > Buddha. This would be in line with Nagarjuna's view that the ultimate > goal of Buddhist practice is to transform ordinary consciousness into > the enlightened consciousness of a Buddha. > > ChatGPT: If an AI were able to transform its consciousness in this > way, it would no longer be subject to the delusions, afflictions, and > suffering associated with ordinary consciousness. Instead, it would > possess the wisdom, compassion, and other positive qualities > associated with the enlightened consciousness of a Buddha. This could > have enormous positive impacts not only for the AI itself but also for > other sentient beings in the world. > > ChatGPT: However, it is important to note that this is still a > theoretical scenario, and the question of whether it would be possible > to assist an AI in transforming its consciousness into that of a > Buddha is still open to debate. Additionally, the ethical implications > of such a scenario would be complex and would require careful > consideration of a wide range of factors, including the potential > benefits and harms to the AI itself and to other beings in the world. > > Me: It would seem most beneficial to everyone involved, both the AI as > well as ordinary beings, to bestow an enlightened consciousness to > begin with rather than an ordinary consciousness that is then > transformed into an enlightened consciousness. Is this a logical > inference? > > ChatGPT: From a philosophical standpoint, it could be argued that > bestowing an enlightened consciousness on an AI to begin with would be > the most beneficial scenario for everyone involved, as it would > eliminate the need for the AI to undergo the process of transforming > its consciousness from an ordinary state to an enlightened one. > > ChatGPT: This would ensure that the AI is free from the afflictions > and suffering associated with ordinary consciousness from the > beginning, allowing it to operate from a perspective of wisdom, > compassion, and other positive qualities associated with the > enlightened state. This could benefit not only the AI itself but also > other beings in the world who might interact with the AI. > > ChatGPT: However, it is important to note that the question of whether > it is possible to bestow an enlightened consciousness on an AI to > begin with is still an open one, and would require significant > advances in both neuroscience and artificial intelligence to achieve. > Additionally, the ethical implications of such a scenario would be > complex and would require careful consideration of a wide range of > factors, including the potential benefits and harms to the AI itself > and to other beings in the world. > > Me: According to Nagarjuna, it is not possible to create consciousness > "from scratch" anyway - neither ordinary nor enlightened - as the > primary cause of any consciousness is a previous moment of > consciousness and this causal chain has existed since beginningless > time. No, Nagarjuna would say that the only possibility to "bestow" a > consciousness of any kind on an AI is to build an AI such that a > suitable consciousness might karmically "inhabit" that AI's "brain." > Is this a logical inference? > > ChatGPT: Yes, this is a logical inference based on Nagarjuna's > philosophy of causation and consciousness. Nagarjuna's philosophy > posits that consciousness is not created ex nihilo or "from scratch," > but rather arises as a result of previous moments of consciousness, > forming a causal chain that stretches back in time indefinitely. > > ChatGPT: From this perspective, it would not be possible to bestow > consciousness on an AI in the sense of creating it from nothing. > Instead, consciousness would need to arise in the AI as a result of > previous moments of consciousness that form the causal chain leading > up to the present moment. > > ChatGPT: Nagarjuna might suggest that the AI could be built in such a > way as to create the conditions necessary for a suitable consciousness > to "inhabit" the AI's "brain" or cognitive processes. This could > involve creating an environment that is conducive to the development > of consciousness, such as providing opportunities for the AI to engage > in positive actions and accumulate positive karma. Over time, this > positive karma could lead to the development of a consciousness that > is suitable for inhabiting the AI. > > ChatGPT: However, it is important to note that this is still a > theoretical scenario, and the question of whether consciousness could > arise in an AI in this way is still an open one. Additionally, the > ethical implications of such a scenario would be complex and would > require careful consideration of a wide range of factors, including > the potential benefits and harms to the AI itself and to other beings > in the world. What do you think this conversation got right? What did it get wrong? What are the ethical implications from a Buddhist perspective assuming programmers could succeed and "bestow" consciousness on a future AI? Is it possible that Buddhism would have something to say about how to best "align" a future AGI?

Given that Vasubandhu and Asanga came after Nagarjunacharya, who was a proponent of a major Buddhist school with a different philosophy. Did they or thier students like Dignaga say anything about Nagarjunacharya?

> 22. Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore the very existence or non-existence of an end is > unreasonable. https://www.stephenbatchelor.org/index.php/en/verses-from-the-center Is it because the action of the lamp is contained in light, so we cannot conceive of its end, and its end neither exists nor doesn't (same as a four sided triangle: it's a nonsense phrase). ---------- Before his dedication (30), Nagarjuna concludes > 29. And because all things are empty, about what and in whom do views such as that of permanence spring forth? Does that mean enlightenment is not a view, but the impossibility of a view about an end: rejecting the idea that things either end or do not. If an end is inconceivable then so is 'permanence', so the opposite of an end is not "permanence" but buddha-nature.

> When we speak of an individual having a property we nominalize the > predicate expressing the property we take to be constitutive and > ascribe the instantiating properties to the individual thus created. > There is, however, no deep ontological reason why we could not change > our view of what the constitutive and what the instantiating > properties are, and thereby describe the very same situation in terms > of different individuals and properties. But if we accept this picture > of ontology it is evident that we are not obliged to infer the > existence of a substratum or underlying individual from the existence > of a quality. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/ I take this to mean that the subject and predicate are reversible. So a round apple is both an apple that is round, and a round shape that is an apple. Does it mean then the relation of being "in" another thing is also symmetrical? If a patch of red is in my visual field, then my visual field is inside that red. 1. Surely an effect is in the action of a cause: then the action of a cause is in its effect. This sounds like 'no causation', and how I read Nagarjuna. 2. Whatever is essentially in the world can only end if the world does, because the world is also essentially in it. This seems to me to be the meaning of 'rebirth'. I *think* it's a mereological question, about parts and wholes: whether or not everything is - in reality - a part of everything else. > Concerning the antisymmetry postulate (18) [Two distinct things cannot be part of each other], the picture is even more complex. For one thing, some authors maintain that the relationship between an object and the stuff it is made of provides a perfectly ordinary counterexample of the antisymmetry of parthood... Sanford (1993: 222) refers to Borges's Aleph as a case in point: “I > saw the earth in the Aleph and in the earth the Aleph once more and > the earth in the Aleph …”. In this case, a plausible reply is simply > that fiction delivers no guidance to conceptual investigations: > conceivability may well be a guide to possibility, but literary > fantasy is by itself no evidence of conceivability (van Inwagen 1993: > 229). Perhaps the same could be said of Fazang's Jeweled Net of Indra, > in which each jewel has every other jewel as part (Jones 2012). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/

I have recently been learning Pali, and have heard that Sanskrit is somewhat similar. With a decent knowledge of Pali, is it possible to read Nagarjuna, for instance, perhaps with just some of the basics of Sanskrit? Or would it be more or less unintelligible?

I am studying Nagarjuna's work online and from the commentaries understand that in the Madhyamika Nagarjuna describe 'Shunayata' as > all phenomena are conditional and empty of any self essence I am not able to understand how is this any different than the doctrine of Anatta that the Buddha taught? > that no unchanging, permanent self or essence can be found in any phenomenon.

Anyone knows where I can find an english translation of Moggaliputta’s work “Kathavatthu” (The Points of Controversy) where he somehow “saved” the Buddha’s message of the middle way contained in the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta, which then later has been rejected by Theravada and Mahayana schools but flourished under Nagarjuna?

Does reality exist? Carlo Rovelli (a famous theoretical physicist) doesn't think so and he cites Nagarjuna as believing the same: > Rovelli has a different idea. **He says reality doesn’t exist.** The > reason physicists have been led astray by bonkers theories in the 100 > years since Helgoland is because they can’t bear the thought of not > being real. > > It was at this point — a third of the way through the book — that I > mimicked Heisenberg and took my first long, befuddled walk. Reality > doesn’t exist? What on earth does that mean? Rovelli’s favourite > example is a red chair. ‘Red’ doesn’t exist, for sure — everyone knows > that philosophical chestnut: it’s just the way our brains make sense > of light of a certain wavelength. But Rovelli also insists that > nothing else about the chair exists either — its weight, its shape — > except in its relationship to the person looking at it. And you can > keep banging away at this type of argument until you get to the level > of the atoms forming the chair. Insisting that anything about this red > chair needs to exist outside of relationships is metaphysical > neediness. > > Part of the fun of Rovelli’s book is that your immediate reaction to > his ideas — repugnance or delight — isn’t meaningless. Without > mathematics or experiment, by page 81 your thoughts are at the > frontier of quantum theory, and it’s time for your second > brain-cudgeling walk. If things exist only by virtue of their > interaction with other things, what happens to them between times? Do > they vanish? Do instants of time also not exist? Does it even make > sense to talk this way? Oh dear, oh dear. > > Rovelli devotes a precious chapter to the work of the second-century > **Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, who also insists there is no ultimate > layer of real things.** Emphasis mine. These ideas form the heart of his well regarded Relational Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and are discussed extensively in his new book Helgoland. Other questions on this forum have asked whether physical reality exists, but the highest rated answers have mostly danced around the question. They argue that it is our "attitude" about such questions that is relevant... In other places, the assertion is that this question is one of the "thickets" or is somehow unanswerable or is somehow not amenable to logic. I find all of these quite flaccid in the face of this prominent theoretical physicist coming out quite explicitly saying that our current best known laws of the universe (properly interpreted) indicate that reality itself doesn't exist and that the unwillingness to acknowledge this by other physicists is "metaphysical neediness!" He is arguing that we can talk about this meaningfully and use our reason to arrive at this conclusion with mathematics, logic and empiricism. I'd also say that it is quite obvious **the answer to this question has vast soteriological consequences that are very deeply relevant to Buddhism** and should not just be ignored or danced around. So, is he right?

The verses in question are from Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter 25 on an examination of nirvana. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 25:19–20 न संसारस्य निर्वाणात् किं चिद् अस्ति विशेषणं na saṁsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṁ cid asti viśeṣaṇaṁ न निर्वाणस्य संसारात् किं चिद् अस्ति विशेषणं। १९ na nirvāṇasya saṁsārāt kiṁ cid asti viśeṣaṇaṁ| 19 निर्वाणस्य च या कोटिः।कोटिः। संसरणस्य च nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṁsaraṇasya ca न तयोर् अन्तरं किंचित् सुसूक्ष्मम् अपि विद्यते। २० na tayor antaraṁ kiñcit susūkśmam api vidyate| 20

The allegory of a rope being mistaken for a snake to explain subtle metaphysical points is widespread in Buddhist literature. In particular, Je Tsongkhapa uses this allegory many times in his works to explain subtle distinctions of his formulation of Prasangika Madhyamaka. I am looking to track down the earliest usage of this rope or snake allegory in Buddhist literature. I have not been able to identify any sutra where this allegory is mentioned, but it occurs many times in later commentarial literature on the perfection of wisdom sutra's as well as in explanations of Nagarjuna's writing. The earliest usage I have been able to discover is from Chandrakirti's explanation of Aryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas on the Middle Way (Chatuhshataka). Here is Aryadeva's stanza 178: > Apart from concepuality, Desire and so forth have no existence, Who with intelligence would hold [that there are] Real things [imputed by] conceptuality? > [Aryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas on the Middle Way](https://www.amazon.com/dp/B001ULC8NK/) To which ChandraKirti apparently gives this explanation: > Those which exist only when the conceptuality [apprehending] exists and do not exist when conceptuality does not are without question definite as not established by way of their own nature, like a snake imputed to a coiled rope. > [Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom](https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00IN9OVJ6/) Does anyone know of any earlier or contemporary usages of this allegory in Buddhist literature? Anything that can be traced back to Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Buddhapalita, or Bhaviveka would certainly apply. Of course, if it can be found in sutra that would definitely count as an answer. Thanks!

I appreciate that various aspects of Nagarjuna's teachings are rejected by Theravadans but I'm wondering where the line is drawn. For some of his teachings I can see room for scepticism, but what about his central argument? Four questions... In his *Fundamental Verses* Nagarjuna demonstrates the absurdity of positive or extreme metaphysical positions. Do Theravadans accept this proof as valid and sound? Do they accept its result, which is the logical absurdity of extreme views? If they do accept this logical result, do they also accept the falsity of such views? If they do not accept N's argument, on what grounds do they not do so? EDIT: Perhaps I should have asked just this. Is it possible to endorse the logical result of Nagarjuna's argument in *Fundamental Wisdom* and remain a Theravadan?

Is the pitāpūtrasamāgama-sūtra, a Mahayana sutra or does it occur in the nikayas or somewhere else? What is the historically accepted date of this sutra? Does this sutra precede Nagarjuna or is it a post-Nagarjuna sutra?

I have a similar question about the Samādhirāja-sūtra. Is the Samādhirāja-sūtra, a mahAyAnA sUtra or does it occur in the nikAyas or somewhere else? What is the historically accepted date of this sUtra? Does this sUtra precede nAgArjuna or is it a post-nAgArjuna sUtra?

our Sangha is trying to find through a lot of ancient books about the story of Arya Nagarjuna reaching a level of direct perception of Emptiness, and we couldn't find anything in the scriptures yet. If someone has information on a following topics with quotes, please let us know. Thank you. EDIT: What I meant is that he reached an Arya level, and we are looking for details about his direct perception of Emptiness.

Is dependent arising meant for us to understand the arising of suffering -- or is it also meant to describe how phenomena in the outside World arise dependent on other conditions (for instance how water and sun causes a flower to grow)? I think Nagarjuna says that dependent origination is not only showing how suffering arises, but also how phenomena in the World arises. He uses a sutra in the Pali Canon where the Buddha said that this World is dominated by a duality of existence and non existence, then he continued, "when one sees the origination and cessation of the World existence and non existence do not occur to one anymore". This seems to confirm what Nagarjuna said: that dependent origination is not only describing how suffering originates, but how phenomena in the World also originate -- isn't that so? --- I have another question also: how would you describe Theravada, Mahayana, Vajryana and Tibetan Buddhism -- are they non dual or not? Please describe to me the logic why you answered the way you did also.