Note: I want to preface this by saying I am not a Christian. Everything I write comes from me trying to understand the topic from within my (mis)understanding of the Christian perspective. I am trying to understand if the Seven Capital Vices really is a comprehensive list of the bases of all sin, where all the bases are truly distinct. I can definitely recognize all of the vices as progenitors of sin, and they do seem basic, quite comprehensive, and fairly distinct. But I'd like to see that more logically. The arguments for such a view will differ, given that the topic has been looked at differently by various scholars. Take a look at this table shown in *Glittering Vices* by Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung. | Evagrius (4th c.)\* | Cassian (4th/5th c.)† | Gregory (6th c) | Aquinas (13th c.) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1\. Gluttony | 1\. Gluttony | *Pride = root* | Pride = root | | 2\. Lust | 2\. Lust | 1\. Vainglory | 1\. Vainglory | | 3\. Avarice | 3\. Avarice | 2\. *Envy* | 2\. Envy | | 4\. Sadness | 4\. Wrath‡ | 3\. *Sadness* | 3\. *Sloth* | | 5\. Anger‡ | 5\. Sadness | 4\. Avarice | 4\. Avarice | | 6\. Sloth (Acedia) | 6\. Sloth | 5\. Wrath | 5\. Wrath | | 7\. Vainglory | 7\. Vainglory | 6\. Lust | 6\. Lust | | 8\. Pride | 8\. Pride | 7\. Gluttony | 7\. Gluttony | \* Evagrius did not maintain a consistent order for his list. † Cassian's list is the same as Evagrius's but is ordered from carnal to spiritual. ‡ "Anger" and "wrath" translate the same Greek and Latin terms, which also refer to the passion or emotion of anger. I take most of my understanding from DeYoung's book, which utilizes Aquinas' taxonomy: Pride is not among the Seven; it is the root of them. So, the basis of all sin is Pride, and at the first stage of specification, Pride manifests as one of the Seven Vices. But, to understand if these Seven Vices actually represent what they're supposed to, we must ask: *specification of what*? They are all sin; they are all forms of Pride, but what differentiates them? If we look at the spectre of fundamental differences in how sin manifests, we are able to logically verify that the seven categories are indeed distinct, comprehensive, and basic. But I have yet to see a very logical explication of this. I begin with a little demo of the kind of thinking I am looking for below: > When Pride blossoms into sin, what is the first "choice" of specification to be made? Well, to ask that, we must ask by what mechanism sin works? All that exists is from God. So, sin must be a corruption of God's work. For us to work as individuals, societies and as a species, we need to have drives. Drives can be placed on a taxonomy of basicness. The most basic drives are those directly given to us by God; less basic drives are simply more specific instantiations of (combinations of) those basic drives. For example, we have the drive to consume sustenance. So, we may have the drive to walk over to a river; that drive is a more specific one, that is simply a specific, less basic, instantiation of the drive to consume sustenance. > > So, it follows that sin must be a corruption of our drives; a disordered effort to fulfill our drives. How could our efforts be disordered? Well, if our efforts to fulfill a drive bring about net wrong, then it is disordered. But how could our effort to fulfill God-given drives bring about net wrongness? If our efforts actually harm our overall fulfillment of our drives, then they bring about net wrongness (AKA, they are "disordered"). Our efforts to fulfill a drive can fail by not actually fulfilling that drive, or by leading to a greater detriment of other drives, or (usually) a little bit of both. In all cases, we are harming our overall fulfillment of our God-given drives. > >So, if this thinking is correct, we may identify the bases of sin by identifying the bases of drives. What is the root drive? Whatever the root drive is, (assuming Aquinas and DeYoung are correct), the corruption of this root drive is Pride. I find the **drive towards self-love** to be a logical contender. Not only does it seem like the basic drive that would give rise to all other drives, that all eventually lead to the attainment of good; it also seems like Pride would be the corruption/disordering of our God-given drive to love ourselves. > > But how to proceed from here? How does this drive/vice get specified at the most fundamental level? It is claimed that the taxonomy of vices has a stem/root made that is Pride, with seven branches (each representing a Capital Vice) sprouting from it, from which all other branches and fruits come from. In logical terms, that means that we start with Pride, and then we ask a single question regarding its specific instantiation. We must find a comprehensive list of distinct answers to this single question. If that list has seven answers that each correspond to a Capital Vice, then we will have shown the taxonomy to be correct. > > It seems obvious the question will be something like "how does one engage in Pride?" Or, equivalently, "how is one's fulfillment for the root drive disordered?" Obviously, that formulation is far too vague. To answer that question in full-detail would not give us seven answers, but thousands! Instead, it must be a much narrower form of this question. So, what is this question? What is the logical structure of the taxonomy of sin? How are the Seven Capital Vices basic, comprehensive, and properly delineated (i.e., all vices are distinct)? And how do they all stem from Pride?

According to Trinitarian theology as held by the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, God is 3 persons/hypostasis in 1 essence/nature/substance and one attribute of God is his immutability ([*c.f.* *Summa Theologica* Ia Q9 A1](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1009.htm)) yet it is also the case that Christ is both true God and true man. This latter doctrine is called the hypostatic union referring to the two natures (divine and human) present in one person (hypostasis). How are these doctrines both held as true?

I've heard that there were two points of Catholic doctrine in Aquinas' Summa Theologica that were later successfully defended to the contrary. One, I think is the Immaculate Conception of Mary (although I don't know where that is in the Summa) and I'm not sure what the other one is. Excluding things that might not exactly measure up to modern science. What are the points of doctrine in the Summa that don't line up with Eternal Law?

I have been studying the Trinity recently, and most of my studies have been from St. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologiae*, and he would agree that the persons are the divine Essence. One thing that confuses me is that Aquinas says the divine relations are the divine essence in the sense that we can use the terms "person" and "essence" interchangeably. [*Summa Theologicae*, Q. 28](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm#article3) , but, if the relations (the subsistent persons) are the divine essence, how does one get out of the idea that the "essence of God is begotten" or "spirated"? Even though Aquinas rejected this view, that the essence of God can be begotten, it just seems a bit confusing to say "Jesus (as the divine relation 'filiation') is the divine essence of God, but at the same time, the essence of God isn't begotten?" this seems to be violating the classical laws of logic that x=x.

In St.Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica, it said >But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal"; whereas **to know "animal" distinctly is know it as "rational" or "irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion**: therefore our intellect knows "animal" before it knows man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal. (Answer of Question 85(3)) >Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly **to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance,"** but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals. (Answer of Question 108(5)) So human being is defined as rational animal(or rational substance), and animal is sensible substance. However, androids with AI have complete rationality too, and they can be sensible with sensors. So is android a kind of mankind? Androids seems also rational substances, thus they are men by the definition. However in common sense they don't have souls, hence mustn't be mankind. That seems a paradox. So **my question**: Are androids have souls? Are androids rational substances? If they are rational substances but don't have souls, are they mankind? Why? Note: 'Android ' in here means a kind of intelligent robot which is similar to ours, not a kind of Google's OS.

I have been reading what St. Thomas has to say on resurrection and how the human body will be changed afterwards. St. Thomas talks about how all people, the damned and the saints alike, will become immortals. He says the soul will communicate its natural immortality to the body. Summa Contra Gentiles, CHAPTER LXXXIX--Of the quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost:   > Now the human body, after the resurrection, will not be transmutable > from form to form, either in the good or in the wicked; because in > both it will be entirely perfected by the soul in respect of its > natural being. Summa Contra Gentiles, CHAPTER LXXXVI--Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies:   > The bodies of all men alike will be organised as befits the soul, so > that the soul shall be an imperishable form giving imperishable being > to the body, because to this effect the power of God will entirely > subject the matter of the human body to the human soul.   Summa Theologiae, (This is from my notes and I forgot where exactly in the Summa this is):   > But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a > certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to > itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and > power to the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual." If this is the case, then why can't the soul keep the body from corruption now so that humans become naturally immortal without the need of any preternatural gift to keep us immortals? I wish to get an answer from a metaphysical and Catholic perspective.

I am currently investigating Catholic/Protestant theological differences. In trying to understand arguments about the immaculate conception of Mary, I began reading St. Thomas Aquinas, when I stumbled across something unusual. In [*Summa Theologica*, Part 3, Question 7, Article 1](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/4027.htm#article1) , Aquinas addresses the issue of Mary's sanctification before birth. Aquinas references St. Augustine, supposedly in a work on Mary's Assumption: >I answer that, Nothing is handed down in the canonical Scriptures concerning the sanctification of the Blessed Mary as to her being sanctified in the womb; indeed, they do not even mention her birth. **But as Augustine, in his tractate on the Assumption of the Virgin, argues with reason, since her body was assumed into heaven, and yet Scripture does not relate this;** so it may be reasonably argued that she was sanctified in the womb. My question is this: **Did St. Augustine write a tractate on the Assumption of Mary?** I am aware that the Assumption is generally considered a late belief (and the earliest explicit quote I could find is from Epiphanius in 350AD, although it is debated). I imagine if a father as prominent as St. Augustine wrote a whole tractate on the belief, that would be a major piece of evidence. Is it perhaps a lost work of his, or maybe a medieval forgery that Aquinas thought was real? Any information would be appreciated.

This post is related to https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/95124/how-should-one-read-the-summa-theologiae In Peter Turner's answer to the question posed in the above link, he states: >The arguments against are listed first, so everything St. Thomas does not think are the objections. Everything else is what he does think is true. >The "On the Contrary" part is not always there, but usually is a summation of the refutations. In light of this, I ask: **(i.) If one is going to quote a thought of St. Thomas (say, in a book)---may one quote from the *Summa* as coming from St. Thomas---that which begins, "On the contrary,"?** For example, in reference to [IIa-IIæ Q32 A5. *Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?*](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3032.htm#article5) , > **On the contrary,** No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for omitting to give alms, as is clear from Matthew 25:41-43. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept. may I quote the above as a thought coming from St. Thomas? Regarding the next paragraph, I'm pretty sure that I may say something like: > St. Thomas says: "As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers, according to 1 John 3:18: 'Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth.' And in order to be a person's well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept...." Finally, regarding "Spiritual Alms", **(ii.) is it safe to assume that the terms "Spiritual Alms" and the more current, "Spiritual Works of Mercy", are synonymous?**

Consider, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas on the topic of Mercy: [Question 30. Mercy](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3030.htm) The **topic** is then broken down into a series of *articles* (questions) - which are further divided into Objections, **"On the Contrary"**, **"I Answer that"**, and **Replies to Objections**. Can someone provide a structural explanation of how one is to read St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*; and in particular, how one is to determine which part of an Article's content reflect St. Thomas' personal thoughts on the matter? (e.g., Does St. Thomas himself always object to the objections? Are his true thoughts only found in "I answer that"? Are his true thoughts reflected in the "replies" to the objections?)

In the *Summa Theologiae,* St. Thomas Aquinas says that "angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear." *Source*: [Ia Q. 51 Art. 2 (Whether angels assume bodies) Obj. 3](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1051.htm) Based on Catholic theology, does this mean angels cannot destroy matter, if they cannot make earth or water disappear?

The following passage occurs in Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* ([Supp 91.3](https://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.XP_Q91_A3.html)) : > A gloss on Isaiah 30:26, "The light of the moon shall be as the light > of the sun," says: "**All things made for man's sake deteriorated at his > fall, and sun and moon diminished in light**." This diminishment is ... What exactly or who exactly is Aquinas quoting from here (the **bold** text)? Does this work still exist? And is there a general way to find out where these "glosses" are coming from?

Are all the articles of St. Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* to be accepted as the truth by every Catholic? Are there any criticisms of the *Summa Theologica* within the Catholic Church?

Aquinas argues that angels achieve their end by a single meritorious act. They either choose God, thereby possessing the Beatific Vision, or the reject him and fails permanently to achieve the end they were created for (Beatific Vision). So, if the demons (fallen angels) have chosen to go against God and since they cannot "change their mind" due to how the angelic nature operates, aren't they already in hell (i.e. lost the Beatific Vision forever) and aren't they already suffering the pangs of hell? But, I found some verses from Scripture that seems to suggest the fallen angels are still awaiting their end (hell) until Final Judgement: > And the angels who did not keep their positions of authority but > abandoned their proper dwelling—these he has kept in darkness, bound > with everlasting chains for judgment on the great Day. (Jude 1:6) > > For if God did not spare the angels when they sinned, but cast them to > pits of nether gloom to be kept until judgment. (2 Peter 2:4) So, are the demons already in hell suffering its pangs? How do we understand the quotations from Scripture? I would appreciate answers that are consistent with the Catholic teaching.

I've been reading the Catechism, and reached the 310th point ; it's about Divine Providence and the scandal of evil. I am having a hard time understanding the following passage: "With infinite power God could always create something better (174 ). But with infinite wisdom and goodness God freely willed to create a world 'in a state of journeying' towards its ultimate perfection." It sounds contradictory to me. It states that God has both infinite power and infinite goodness. It seems, then, that it would only be possible for Him to create "something better", since not creating "something better" while being able to do so would be in disagreement with His infinitely good nature. How does the Catechism avoid this apparent contradiction? It links to the Suma Theologica, but I am not proficient enough in Philosophy to understand it. If possible, I would like an answer that solves this problem *within* the Catechism, i.e. without usage or substitution by other arguments.

## The Anomaly The other day when I was [answering a question](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/89764/10672) using Thomas Aquinas's [Summa Theologica](https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm) (Notre Dame Prof. Alfred J. Freddoso's translation) I came across a new type of "Reply to Objection" in [II-II q.83 a.14](https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%202-2/st2-2-ques83.pdf) called > "**Reply to the argument for the contrary**" The New Advent website version is not consistent. Sometimes, the "On the contrary" is prefixed with another "Objection". For example, in [Article 14](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3083.htm#article14) , the "On the contrary" is labeled > "**Objection 4. On the contrary**" and the reply is titled > "Reply to Objection 4". But sometimes the New Advent website simply adds another "Reply to Objection" with no corresponding "Objection", since the "On the contrary" *itself* is the objection. For example in [I-II q.26 a.3](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2026.htm#article3) ([Notre Dame version here](https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201-2/st1-2-ques26.pdf)) , we have > On the contrary and > Reply to Objection 4 I found other examples in - **I-II q.11 a.2** (Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?): [ND website](https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201-2/st1-2-ques11.pdf) vs. [New Advent](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2011.htm#article2) - **II-II q.136 a.5** (Is patience the same as longanimity): [ND website](https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%202-2/st2-2-ques136.pdf) vs. [New Advent](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3136.htm#article5) Using Google search on the query "Reply to the argument for the contrary" site:www.nd.edu yields [9 results](https://www.google.com/search?q=%22Reply+to+the+argument+for+the+contrary%22+site%3Awww.nd.edu) , but there are maybe more since this search is dependent on how uniform the labeling of the section is in Prof. Alfred J. Freddoso's translation (hosted in the ND website). ## The Question What is the meaning of this rare occurrence? Can we infer that St. Thomas does not have a definitive answer for the question? Or does it point to something else?

Why do theologians and philosophers suppose a connection between God's **Infiniteness or Finiteness** and **Omnipresence,** and Problem of **Evil**? Proponents of God's Finiteness (like William James), suppose that this explains why Evil present in the World. Proponents of God's Infiniteness (like most theologians and philosophers) say: He is Omnipotent, and Omnipresent, so He should be Infinite. Let's examine these rationally: Christian Scholars **usually** allude to God an **Infiniteness**, i.e: space (not matter) is infinite, and God fills the whole space, hence He is Infinite. Also, God is Eternal (infinity in time). Look, for example, **Thomas Aquinas**, on (**Infinity of God**), on **encyclopedia.com.** I searched much more in the Bible to find Verses or passages that hint to Infiniteness of God, especially in **Space and Consciousness**, I couldn't find. To be accurate, there are two passages that hint to God's Omnipresence, i.e: **Psalms 139:7-12, and Hebrews 4:13**. Omnipresent doesn't mean Infinite in Space and Consciousness. All that it may means is that the Omnipresent God Permeates His creation; His creation=the World+the Living Beings. Thus, God is Omnipresent in His Creation. Finite in Space and Consciousness doesn't mean lack of Omnipotence and Presence of Evil. I.e: doesn't justify the Presence of Evil. Those philosophers who looked upon Evil from narrow scope. Evil is required as part of involution that precedes evolution, also, it may be considered as byproduct of **FREEDOM** granted to Human Beings. Of course God is Infinite in Time, i.e: He is Eternal. I.e: He **can't**, and **couldn't** die. In philosophy there are many philosophers who assume God's Finiteness, e.g: **Charles Renouvier** and **William James.** Could you, please, give me Biblical evidences for God (Finiteness) or (Infiniteness) in Space, and Consciousness?

In the ***Summa Theologiae***, St. Thomas argues that all will die and rise again when Jesus returns. But this seems to be in contradiction to St. Paul, who wrote: > "We who are still alive and are left will be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air. And so we will be with the Lord forever." (1 Thessalonians 4:17) This suggests that those still alive when Jesus comes will not suffer any physical death. But, St. Paul also seems to contradict himself when he says: > "What you sow does not come to life unless it dies." (1 Corinthians 15:36) Also, wasn't prophet Elijah taken bodily to heaven? And the Blessed Virgin too? How can we reconcile this problem(s), in the light of what the Church teaches?

The Teaching of Tradition that support the Council of Trent interpretation on death penalty cited the reflections or teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine: > "They will never be beasts, but they can behave like beasts. "And if they behave like beasts, their dignity will suffer loss", while their personhood remains. Therefore we destroy the body, and leave the soul in God's hands, it is an appeal to the Highest Court. There is a difference between the dignity we have being made in God's image and the dignity of our bodies which are NOT made in God's image, and aka Catholic underlines it." – (St. Thomas Aquinas himself and St. Augustine himself quoted from comment of other user) From above teachings, I found a lot of reflections not yet certain or are open for better understanding like: 1. **They will never be beasts, but they can behave like beasts.** (*Is an admission of conditional behavior*). 2. **"And if they behave like beasts, their dignity will suffer loss,” while their personhood remains.** (*The words "will suffer loss" again is not certain and will have difficulty to guarantee that a soul really has lost its dignity in the absence of human faculties as we are commanded not to judge in Matthew7:1*). 3. **Therefore we destroy the body, and leave the soul in God's hands, it is an appeal to the Highest Court.** (*The wordings can be clearly seen "as an appeal a prayer only subject to the Wisdom & Providence of God", so they are recognizing that Tradition does not have a Final Say on ending one's life*). But, the most troubling one is the teaching separating the dignity of man soul to the dignity of the his body. > “There is a difference between the dignity we have being made in God's image and the dignity of our bodies which are **not** made in God's image," This particular phrase on Tradition seems emphasizing the physical body is not made in God's image only the soul. My understanding is the soul animates our body and while it is our soul that will be judge in the end by God,the Church teaches the resurrection of our bodies.So, our judged soul will be reunited to our resurrected bodies. My question, what is the scriptural basis of the teaching that the dignity of the soul is separate from his body? I'm looking for Catholic Church Teaching that will expound and put clarity on the issue of the inherent dignity of man (body & soul), which the Council of Trent said *"will suffer loss"* that is put now to better understanding under Pope Francis *"that man's dignity is not lost even after committing a very serious crimes."*

Upon being referred to the statements of Thomas Aquinas in _Summa Theologia_, I read this: > It is written (Ezekiel 44:2): "This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it; because the Lord the God of Israel hath entered in by it." Expounding these words, Augustine says in a sermon (De Annunt. Dom. iii): "What means this closed gate in the House of the Lord, except that Mary is to be ever inviolate? What does it mean that 'no man shall pass through it,' save that Joseph shall not know her? And what is this--'The Lord alone enters in and goeth out by it'--except that the Holy Ghost shall impregnate her, and that the Lord of angels shall be born of her? And what means this--'it shall be shut for evermore'--but that Mary is a virgin before His Birth, a virgin in His Birth, and a virgin after His Birth?" It seems to me that the context of this passage is about the temple that Ezekiel is to have built than any idea about the future. Indeed, the vision takes Ezekiel to other gates and other parts of the temple. I cannot find any New Testament writer (or subject) who alludes to this text. Why would someone conclude that this passage is about Mary, the Mother of Jesus?

In Summa Theologiae, when talking about "The quality of the world after judgement ", in the 4th article the reply to objection 4 states: > "Reply to Objection 4. This brightness will be in these bodies even as it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat, because these bodies will then be un*alterable*, as the heavenly bodies are now." Here, what does St. Thomas Aquinas mean by *alteration*? In the reply to objection 4, he says *these bodies* will be unalterble. From *these bodies* I understand that he means things on earth, ie; bodies other than heavenly bodies. If things on earth become unalterable after the judgement, how can redeemed man make use of them as St.Thomas Aquinas states in reply to objection 5 of the 3rd article, in the same link I provided above, that: > "...thus man will make use of other creatures..." I think reading the full 4th article in "The quality of the world after judgement " will help a lot in answering the question. I hope my question is understandable:)