What, exactly, is the notion of cause and effect at work in a causal series that includes the citta-santāna? I suppose the obvious answer is the 12 links of dependent origination, but I am confused ***how*** ignorance causes sankhara to arise. **Obviously, speculating where will be reborn is frowned upon, even if suggesting that rebirth may work even with some views (such as mind-brain identity) is not.** ---------- Suppose that it reduces to something physical, so that my *brain state* for my "death thought" must bring about a new brain state somewhere: is it very conceivable, in contemporary physics or biology, that the state of my brain right sufficiently for citta-santana with an existing (or just coming into existence) brain state that is not "my" brain?

from my experience aum-mantra meditation and physical yoga have altered my mental/spiritual state quicker and it's been sustained for longer in between practice sessions than just focusing on my breathing. The former have brought me much stronger states too.

Today I realize that, if something good or bad happens to me, it is caused by Karma. It gave me a huge relief. Because before I would experience aversion when something bad happened to me. But now, I believe that I am 100% responsible for whatever happens to me. But, As I know, not everything is caused by Karma. There are some other reasons such as whether, Dhamma etc. So how can I know the real cause behind something for sure? (Is it Karma or some other cause?) It is said that someone needs to experience the truth to understand the truth. So how can I build a solid understanding of the cause behind things and Karma?

I have read here argumentation for the continuity of mind, coming from a Geshe in Tibetan Buddhism. From what I have learnt it is asserted that: * Consciousness could not arise from matter (could not have matter as its ***substantial cause***). * It could not arise from nothing. * It could only arise from another moment of consciousness. Note: the definition of **"substantial cause"** above comes from Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika. Has anyone come across a Buddhist argument why something could not have nothing as its substantial cause? What faulty logical consequences would follow? More specifically, I have in mind a situation when due to a higher being's act/wish, something comes into being. What comes into being is not transformed from another previous entity, but emerges "from nothing" merely due to the higher's act/wish. I would like to understand whether there are logical contradictions that would follow from the asserting this to be possible.

An important compendium of the ancient Indian philosophical schools - called Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha - was written in India in 14th century CE by Madhvacharya (a non-Buddhist Indian Philosopher) who gives an intriguing account of the debate between ancient Indian materialists (the Charvaka) and the extent Buddhist schools of thought in India at that time. He describes the Charvaka thus: > Chárváka, the crest-gem of the **atheistical school**, the follower of the > doctrine of Bṛihaspati. The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be > eradicated, for **the majority of living beings hold by the current > refrain**— > > While life is yours, live joyously; > None can escape Death's searching eye: > When once this frame of ours they burn, > How shall it e'er again return? > > The mass of men, in accordance with the Śástras of policy and > enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, **and > denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world**, are > found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for > that school is Lokáyata,—a name well accordant with the thing > signified. This characterization would appear quite in accordance with descriptions in sutta of the Charvaka school and its tenets: > "When this was said, Ajita Kesakambalin said to me, 'Great king, there > is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed. There is no > fruit or result of good or bad actions. There is no this world, no > next world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously reborn beings; no > brahmans or contemplatives who, faring rightly and practicing rightly, > proclaim this world and the next after having directly known and > realized it for themselves. A person is a composite of four primary > elements. At death, the earth (in the body) returns to and merges with > the (external) earth-substance. The fire returns to and merges with > the external fire-substance. The liquid returns to and merges with the > external liquid-substance. The wind returns to and merges with the > external wind-substance. The sense-faculties scatter into space. Four > men, with the bier as the fifth, carry the corpse. Its eulogies are > sounded only as far as the charnel ground. The bones turn > pigeon-colored. The offerings end in ashes. Generosity is taught by > idiots. **The words of those who speak of existence after death are > false, empty chatter. With the break-up of the body, the wise and the > foolish alike are annihilated, destroyed. They do not exist after > death.**' ---------- This compendium describes the Buddhist response to the Charvaka school as a direct attack on their understanding of causation vs correlation. Succinctly put, it would appear the Charvaka did not believe in causation, but rather only believed in correlation: > "Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if > inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force; > else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the > thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on > hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do > those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?" > > All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy. > ... > **Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a > proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference**, &c. > > The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the > knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a > former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases > this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the > coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, > drugs, &c. > > From this it follows that fate, &c., do not exist, since these can > only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do > not allow adṛishṭa, the various phenomena of the world become > destitute of any cause. > > But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena > can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. > Thus it has been said— > > The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn; > By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born. > The author of the work then gives the known Buddhist reply at the time in ancient India. This can be succinctly summarized as denial of causation leads to practical absurdities. NOTE: invariable concomitance is a term of art in ancient Indian debate that is described here. > At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid > down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance, > your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is > easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has > accordingly been said— > > "From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as a > determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance—not through the > mere observation of the desired result in similar cases, nor through > the non-observation of it in dissimilar cases." > > On the hypothesis (of the Naiyáyikas) that it is concomitance and > non-concomitance (e.g., A is where B is, A is not where B is not) that > determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance of > the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being > impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and > future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyáyika) rejoin that > uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our > system, we reply: **Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect > may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a > stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be > entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in > practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt > terminates where there is a practical absurdity.**" Which seems in accordance with the ancient Indian Nagarjuna's opening verse of his famous treatise: ---------- Based on this my questions are: 1. Does the non-Buddhist author of this work accurately describe Charvaka views and tenets at the time? 2. Does the non-Buddhist author of this work accurately describe Buddhist replies at the time? 3. Why was it deemed important to the ancient Indian schools (Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike) this debate over causation vs correlation? 4. If you accept the Buddhist view in this debate as superior, then how does it undermine the views and tenets of the Charvaka? 5. Is it true that the Charvaka school was the most popular in ancient India at the time this compendium was written? 6. What do we know of how prevalent was the Charvaka school in the time of the Buddha? 7. If the Charvaka school was very prevalent in the time of the Buddha and granting the supposition that some hold - that the Buddha only taught rebirth as a fictional contrivance to appeal to the people of his time and age - then why did the Buddha also teach rebirth to the people who steadfastly rejected it? (please only answer this if you actually believe this supposition as that's all I'm interested in...)

I'm asking this ontological question as in the context of, e.g., an Aristotelian Prime Unmoved Mover, or some other first cause. My guess is that there isn't, probably based on Dependent Origination or maybe even the Heart Sutra. (I hope I have not misconstrued those.) Thanks

> The conventional Buddhist view of causality is that the present > negative and positive effects we see in our lives are a result of > negative and positive causes that we created in the past. So in order > to attain Buddhahood, which is the goal of Buddhist practice, it would > take lifetimes of painstaking efforts to replace all the negative > causes we’ve made with positive causes, while avoiding making > additional negative causes. Based on this view, the possibility of > attaining Buddhahood seems remote and almost impossible. > > In contrast, Nichiren Buddhism teaches that the law of cause and > effect is simultaneous. https://www.worldtribune.org/2017/11/cause-and-effect/ I side against it, which could even cover my slight antipathy toward Nichiren Buddhism. If the effect depends on past causes, then doesn't the metaphor of a fire going out -- and going nowhere -- when the fuel runs out, only work when a cause can run out of effects, which, for me, hints at svabhava. Does a cause running itself down only occur if it has svabhava? And what arguments are there for and against the law of cause and effect being simultaneous? I have a "theory" that Nichiren Buddhism cannot help us in our "next live"; in deed, that mappo -- and Nichiren Buddhism -- condemns all to the Abrahamic hell, even as zen -- the monastic life -- may still be available. But I won't get into it.

Consider someone is doing something (for instance eating). I can say that he is eating because of hunger, and his hunger is because his body needs energy. So, **every** action have **external** causes **only**. Can I do something by my own (without **external** causes)? I know that I can't do unwholesome things because of anatta. But I can say that I did something because of ignorance, and also that my action has an effect (karma). This post may not be a question. I'm looking for a way to clear my understanding. Kind regards.

How come worrying is a bad karma ? Buddha stated that Having a confident mind gives a good rebirth ( in heaven etc.). Most of the time, I worried about not able to complete a task within the desired time. What would be the karmic effect of this worrying and any other worries ?

Isn't **uncertainty** and **cause and effect** conflict each other ? Did Lord Buddha teach about uncertainty ? (Ven. Ajahn Brahma thero on uncertainty - [Life is a series of unexpected events](https://youtu.be/B30aqzhP5mc) ) **My understanding:** To the Buddha, life is not uncertain. Because Lord Buddha knew his and other people's past karma. He knew almost everything about the universe. So, He had ability to predict the future. But for us, We don't have that knowledge. So, Life is uncertain to us.