How do Buddhist philosophers address Abhinavagupta’s critique of dependent origination and Buddhist theories of causality?

Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 CE) was one of the foremost philosophers of Kashmir Śaivism , whose magnum opus Tantrāloka is widely regarded as the most comprehensive exposition of non‑dual Śaiva tantric thought. In the chapter of Tantrāloka dealing with causality , Abhinavagupta and the commentator Jayaratha mount a sustained critique of Buddhist theories of causality and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), which they present as inadequate to account for real causal efficiency outside a unified conscious agent. Below are verbatim formulations from the Tantrāloka alongside an academic paper (based on Tantrāloka and Jayaratha’s commentary) mentioning Abhinavagupta’s key objections to the Buddhist theories of causality . ***Important disclaimer:-*** The paper contains a large volume of tightly argued material, textual citations, and sub-arguments. For the sake of clarity and length, I am summarising the main objections rather than citing every verse or passage. Any readers attempting to answer should ideally consult from Page 12 onwards of the said paper alongside the other provided citations alongside the text of Tantraloka from 9.10 to 9.37 for a thorough and accurate understanding of the opponent's objections. ---------- 1:- Causality and succession ---------------------------------------------- Abhinavagupta asserts that Buddhist theory causality is only succession of discrete events with no substantial connection, and therefore cannot explain real causal relations. Especially between phenomena independent of one another The direct Excerpt from the tantraloka 9.11-13 Jayaratha, the commentator, gives the example of Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī (the constellations Pleiades and Taurus): if mere succession were enough to establish causation, Kṛttikā would be the cause of Rohiṇī, since the latter always rises after the former. Yet despite this regular sequence, there is no causal relationship between them.The Śaiva critique here seems to be that Buddhist theory relies too heavily on perceptual succession to define causation. 2: True causality requiring an agent and agency: ----------------------------------------------------- Abhinavagupta argues that because Buddhists emphasize momentary entities, they lack a real connection between cause and effect. Abhinavagupta claims that “the relation of cause and effect is really that of agent and agency” and that the ultimate cause is a conscious agent whose will underlies causation. Excerpt from Tantraloka 9.14-18 Further Jayaratha asks that surely succession and simultaneity are not character- istics in the nature of the things themselves; they are attributes of perception. But it is consciousness which establishes the succession and non-succession when it per- ceives that a cloth is after a pot. The things themselves are not endowed with succession or non-succession as something super added to their natures. So the Buddhists cannot avoid the fact that they are superimposing contradictory attributes upon a single entity even though they are trying to get away by introducing succession (TĀV 9.18). 3: Multiple causes and unity of effects ---------- The concept of complex causality (Sāmagrī ) is used by both Naiyāyikas and Buddhists in their discussions about causality. Abhinavagupta accepts the Buddhist notion of causal totality but maintains that Śiva, as consciousness, is the ultimate agent. While a pot is said to arise from an aggregate of causes (TĀ 9.30ab), this aggregate must form a unity. Without such unity, diverse causes would produce multiple effects. Jayaratha clarifies how This unity has to be grounded in a single, all-pervasive agent of cognition, which alone makes a single effect possible. Excerpt from Tantraloka 9.29-37 ---------- Questions based on the above - ========= 1. How does Buddhist dependent origination avoid collapsing causality into simple succession with no real dependence? How would Buddhists justify dependent origination so that true causal relations are distinguished from mere chronological succession? 2. How do Buddhists account for singular effects arising from multiple interdependent conditions without a unified causal agent or totality? 3. How would Buddhists respond to the claim that causal succession and simultaneity are merely perceptual constructs rather than objective causal relations? 4. How do Buddhist theories of dependent origination articulate “necessity” such that effects follow causes for reasons beyond mere adjacency? 5. How would a Buddhist articulate the concept of momentariness and dependent origination without collapsing into either metaphysical nihilism or affirmation of a first, self‑existent cause? What logic would show that conditionality implies neither absolute self nor random succession? 6. Specifically address whether the criticism shows a misunderstanding of pratītyasamutpāda or momentariness, and why. ----------