Across Buddhist traditions, liberation (nirvāṇa/nibbāna) is presented as the cessation of suffering through insight into the nature of reality. However, there appears to be substantial disagreement both within the tradition and in modern scholarship over whether this requires substantive ontological commitments. In the early discourses of the Pāli Canon, the Buddha famously refuses to answer speculative metaphysical questions (e.g., the “undeclared questions” in the Cūḷamālukya Sutta), framing the Dhamma as therapeutically oriented toward the cessation of dukkha. This has led some interpreters to read early Buddhism as anti-metaphysical or methodologically quietist. Yet the path itself seems to require insight into doctrines such as dependent origination paṭiccasamuppāda,anattā, and anicca. These appear to function not merely as pragmatic heuristics but as claims about how things actually are. Later traditions intensify this tension:- - The Abhidharma systems of schools such as the Sarvāstivāda develop highly detailed ontologies of dharmas, seemingly grounding liberation in precise metaphysical analysis. - In contrast, Madhyamaka, especially as articulated by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, appears to deconstruct all ontological positions including those that might underwrite soteriology itself while maintaining that such deconstruction is indispensable for liberation. This raises a structural problem: If liberation requires “seeing things as they are” (yathābhūta-ñāṇadassana), does this not presuppose some metaphysical or ontological account of what ultimately exists or how phenomena are structured? Can a “metaphysics-free” Buddhism be coherent, or does the very logic of liberation require at least minimal ontological commitments?

Buddhist accounts frequently assert that phenomena (dharmas) are empty of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva, asvabhāva), and that their arising, functioning, and cessation occur solely through dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). However, causal efficacy seems to require at least minimal stability of a phenomenon’s defining features. This raises some questions. 1. If dharmas have no intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva), how can they still perform functions ? Doesn't causal power require at least some stable feature, and if not, what does “causal efficacy” actually mean for empty dharmas? 2. Dharmas are described as momentary and empty. How do empty, momentary events form a causal continuum (saṃtāna) without presupposing some underlying stability?

Are there good apologetic resources (books, audios, sites, etc.) that give the buddhist answer to advaita vedanta and/or hinduism in general? To the substantial model of the atman-brahman or purusha/prakriti of Patanjali yoga. I understand that in the West, Whitehead's criticisms were quite close.

I know a lot of the Kyoto school were / have been defined as being as panentheists: but were there any **pantheist** Buddhists? And, has any comparative religion scholar defined it as pantheism?

I just get started three days ago. When meditating, I felt hard to breathe and even the lack of oxygen to the brain. I felt my bell and chess were stiff and this intervene me in getting enough oxygen. My posture is right (I so sure about that). How do I overcome it? Should I keep going or find some changes?

Can we intend and generate karma for something that we believe is impossible? Suppose I am playing a video game and imagine that I am killing actual people on a battlefield, but believe this is not the case. Do I generate the karma of killing? What if someone has hooked it up to an AI on a battlefield or I suspect that they have. Do I generate the karma of killing in either of those cases? This is similar to this question, but I really wanted a authoritative answer, especially of this version. I suspect that it can generate unwholesome attitudes for a while. Is that the same as generating bad karma?

Is this Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN 5.230)sutta true? Is it translated to English from the Pali correctly? >AN 5.230 Numbered Discourses 5.230 >23. Long Wandering Black Snakes (2nd) “Mendicants, there are these five drawbacks of a black snake. What five? It’s irritable, acrimonious, venomous, fork-tongued, and treacherous. These are the five dangers of a black snake. >In the same way there are five drawbacks of a lady. What five? She’s irritable, acrimonious, venomous, fork-tongued, and treacherous. This is a lady’s venom: usually she’s very lustful. This is a lady’s forked tongue: usually she speaks divisively. This is a lady’s treachery: usually she’s an adulteress. These are the five drawbacks of a lady.” https://suttacentral.net/an5.230/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none¬es=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin Ajahn Sujato says it's just wrong, but I wonder if its mistranslated. Are there any other suttas where the Buddha appears to believe things that seem to be born of kilesa. Do any Buddhists believe this sutta? How old is this sutta? I am thinking that that it must be a bad teaching that maybe some monk with too much kilesa slipped in there? >Ajahn Sujato: "And no, I don’t think this was really spoken by the Buddha. Deal with it. What I’m interested in is to subject this text to the same elementary standard that the Buddha himself insisted on, and that we would apply to any other truth claims: does it stack up against the evidence? I assume it doesn’t, but I’d like to see the proof. Does anyone know of any objective, empirically based psychological studies that statistically examine possible gender differences between men and women in these traits?"... https://sujato.wordpress.com/2010/12/05/is-this-sutta-true/ Unless I am just too unenlightened to understand, that sutta doesn't sound like the Buddha I follow. Is it in the context of meditation against sensual desire? Does this damage the reputation of the Buddha? Does the Buddha have to be completely perfect within our unenlightened understanding? That sutta seems impossible though. The Buddha did ordain Bhikkhunis so I was thinking this sutta must be a fraud, right?

In these video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWcgvxlyrkw how come one part of mind(the first part) is again mind?

Is it true that the Buddha will never be a woman? If so, why is this? To be specific, I am particularly asking whether or not the Buddha itself can be female. I am *not* asking whether a woman can become a Buddha in her future life.

One of the 10 wrong views is the view that there are no spontaneously reborn beings. The preceding 2 wrong views in the sequence of 10 are "there is no mother" and "there is no father". 1. Now beings born on earth mostly see beings coming to existence due to a mother and father. Most will never see a "spontaneously reborn being". So how does one form the view that there ARE spontaneously reborn beings when one has never seen such beings? Or is it adequate to simply not reject the possibility of the existence of such beings, but not form the view that there are such beings? 2. Also, if one has the view that there is a mother and father, how does one reconcile these 2 views with the view that there are spontaneously reborn beings, which we are also told are born without a mother and father? Further, say if all the beings we encounter were born spontaneously, how can we form the view that there is a mother and father? Or do the words mother and father mean something other than the biological parents or the first pair of primary carers, e.g. DP verse 294? 3. Why is this view included in the 10 wrong views? The other 9 views does provide a framework for beings to avoid evil and do good. Rejecting this wrong view and accepting its opposing view that there indeed ARE spontaneously reborn beings requires a stretch of the imagination for many. What is the moral purpose? Once again these questions are asked only for academic interest.

In contemporary scholarship on Buddhist philosophy, nonduality is an important theme, but its ontological and epistemological status varies greatly across traditions. For example: Madhyamaka critiques any intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and affirms nonduality as a de-reification of both subject and object. Yogācāra is often interpreted as asserting mind-only (cittamātra), but classical Yogācāra philosophers also defend a two-truths framework to avoid ontological commitments. Zen emphasizes direct nondual experience, yet it operates outside detailed philosophical articulation. Question: How do these various Buddhist approaches such as classical Mahāyāna/Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, Zen, etc conceptualize nonduality such that: It does not collapse into a metaphysical foundation or eternal ground (i.e., avoids eternalism / ground-substantiation), It preserves Buddhist soteriology (dependence, emptiness, two truths), And it remains philosophically coherent within each school’s own ontological and epistemic frameworks? In other words: What are the distinct mechanisms or philosophical moves each tradition uses to articulate nonduality without turning it into a reified ultimate reality? Please support answers with primary sources or credible secondary scholarship where possible.

I know this can be subjective to each individual, so I am only looking for a general idea rather than a definitive answer. Is it once one is at anagami stage? Or does the gross desire leave before, at certain stages of practice? Like jhana stages as an example? I remember Yutadhammo specifically stating in a video that the desire for sex is actually a relatively easy desire to be free from. Gross desire and more stronger, ingrained desires are much harder to rid oneself of. Though I expect that was also a individual experience.

I can devote 7 hours total to meditation + sleep per day. Should I do 5 hours of sleep and 2 hours of mediation (1 hour twice) **or** 6 hours of sleep and 1 hour of meditation? Please explain your reasons why. Will 2 hours of meditation increase my productivity? Please explain from your own experience, not any bookish knowledge Will meditating twice give me **twice** as much benefit as meditating once?

I have been researching the distinction between Samatha-Vipassana (Tranquility-Insight) and Sukkha-Vipassana (Dry Insight), and I am encountering textual references that suggest serious soteriological and psychological risks when the "dry" approach is uncoupled from its ethical and emotional foundations. Specifically, I am looking for Sutta or Commentary references that address the following three doctrinal pitfalls, particularly for practitioners who may be isolated from a Sangha: - The Misunderstanding of Desire (Chanda vs. Tanha): The Brahmana Sutta (SN 51.15) establishes that Chanda (desire/zeal) is necessary to complete the path ("desire to end desire"). Is there a recognized danger of a practitioner confusing Chanda with Tanha (craving), leading to a state of "spiritual apathy" where they suppress the very volition needed to emerge from suffering? How does the Abhidhamma distinguish the function of Chanda in the Iddhipadas from the craving to be abandoned? - The Near Enemy of Equanimity (Indifference): The Visuddhimagga (Chapter IX & XX) identifies "Indifference" (aññāṇupekkhā or gehasita-upekkha) as the "near enemy" of Upekkha (Equanimity). Doctrinally, how does one distinguish between a noble "letting go" and a pathological "dissociation" or depression, particularly if the practitioner is experiencing "dry" insight without the counterbalancing factors of Piti (Rapture) or Pasada (Faith)? Are there suttas that warn against adukkhamasukha (neutral feeling) being mistaken for wisdom? - The "Salt Crystal" Dynamic and Mitigation of Kamma: The Kimatthiya Sutta (AN 11.1) links Sila (virtue) causally to Non-remorse and eventually Samadhi. Furthermore, the Lonaphala Sutta (AN 3.101) suggests that a "developed mind" (large body of water) mitigates the "salt" of kamma. If a practitioner skips the cultivation of "wet" virtues (generosity, community, active merit-making) and dives straight into "dry" observation, does the canon predict a specific type of "meditation sickness" or mental rigidity? Does the Sivaka Sutta (SN 36.21) offer a corrective to the view that all physical/mental distress during practice is "karmic purification" that must be passively endured? I am interested in whether the texts treat "Dryness" not just as a technique (no Jhana), but as a potentially dangerous deficiency in the Seven Factors of Enlightenment (specifically the lack of Piti-sambojjhanga), and if such a deficiency is linked to "Wrong Deliverance" or Niyati-ditthi (fatalism).

This question was inspired by [an earlier one](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/51807/do-any-sub-sects-of-buddhism-have-the-concept-of-eternal-hell) . In [DN27](https://suttacentral.net/dn27/en/sujato#10.2) , it was mentioned: > As the cosmos contracts, sentient beings are mostly headed for the realm of streaming radiance. I recalled hearing a Dharma talk ages ago that as a great aeon ends, all the lower realms are emptied (perhaps, destroyed?) and beings are reborn into the higher realms. This appeared to be what the above sutra is alluding to. Correct me if I am wrong. Does this mean that all the hell beings (even those in the lowest hell) will also be promoted to the higher realm? What happens to their bad karma, is it suspended? Or is the contraction of the universe halted until these beings had expired their bad karma?

When we study with concentration and our mind gets distracted, we bring it back to the very subject we study. The same thing we do in meditation; when our mind gets distracted we bring it back to breath. So isn't studying also meditation?

*Sorry; part of this question is described in Chinese, as I cannot find their Pali or Sanskrit script; even if I can, I can't read them.* The Saddharmapundarika Sutra (法华经) quoted Buddha (Sakyamuni himself) once said about "Saddharma Vipralopa (末法)", the Ending Era in which Buddhism would become unpopular and weak (转复微末，谓末法时). Later commentary scripts claimed Buddha said "there is 500 years of correct Buddism, 1000 years of similar Buddhism and 3000 years of Ending Buddhism after my nirvana" (然佛所说，我灭度后，正法五百年，像法一千年，末法三千年). This saying is believed to be real but also there are different interpretation. Some source said Samyuktagama (杂阿含经) mentioned Ending Era (Saddharma Vipralopa) much earlier, but I didn't find. Based on the idea that Buddha said "500+1000 years after his nirvana, it is the Ending Era", the Mahayana Jingtu faction (净土宗) and 净土-influenced Tiantai faction (天台宗) thus believe we are now in the Ending Era of Buddhism, and developed a full system of getting liberated in this current era. These are, however, not accepted by Zen faction (禅宗), another major Mahayana faction in China. Zen believe the Ending Era is real but it is not that bad and the timetable is not referring to real time. > 末世众生愚痴钝根，不解如来三大阿僧祇秘密之说，遂言成佛尘劫未期，岂不疑误行人退菩提道。 I want to know, are these 3 creeds (below) also accepted in other factions of Buddhism, especially different factions of Theravada out of Sinosphere? Or, are these thoughts denied or left intentionally not to discuss? 1. There is an Ending Era of Buddhism after Buddha's nirvana. 2. The Ending Era is very bad, Buddhism becomes unpopular and wrong, and people are too stupid to get nirvana by themselves. 3. We are currently in this Ending Era. --------------- I think maybe some faction may deny the idea of Ending Era; for example, another translated book named "Ekottara Āgama (增壹阿含经)" said the Buddhism after Buddha will last forever and gain billions of believers. > 佛告阿难曰。我灭度之后。法当久存......东方弟子无数亿千。南方弟子无数亿千。是故。阿难。当建此意。我释迦文佛寿命极长。所以然者。肉身虽取灭度。法身存在。此是其义。当念奉行。 Maybe some of them is fake, wrong, or intepreted mistakenly. I don't know, and don't want to discuss which is correct and which is wrong, they are all ancient and said to be translated from India. My question is only, is there any other faction believe "it's the Ending Era now, the End is nigh!".

In Hindu cosmology, time is divided into four Yugas (Satya, Treta, Dvapara, Kali), with Satya Yuga, the first epoch described as a kind of utopian golden age and Kali Yuga as an age of decline and moral degradation—the one we are said to be living in now. My question is: - Does Buddhism have a similar concept of cyclical ages, especially a notion of a "golden age" vs. an "age of decline"? - If so, how is this described in Buddhist texts?

When you meditate with ADHD, the difficulty level of life drops a lot. If you then practice the noble eightfold path in order to come closer to nibbana, you're sort of doing that on a wheelchair. If you stop meditating, ADHD will come back full force, and you still have 0 experience of being on the noble eightfold path on that difficulty level. Could meditating be a hindrance toward enlightenment, for that reason? Aren't you making it too easy for yourself?

(Not sure if i should break this down into two questions. Let me know if that's better.) 1. Is Gautama Buddha the originator of the idea of skandhas? 2. The suttas provides multiple accounts of the skandhas characteristics, and their foundational role in dukkha (For instance SN 22.86 ). But does the suttas provide a rationale for the taxonomy into these five particular skandhas? (To clarify, i'm not asking what the skandhas are, or how they function). In other words: *why* rupa, vedana, sanna, sankharas and vinnana? Are the reasons detailed in any sutta? Or should this question be deemed acinteyya?