I've just started learning Buddhism, and currently investigating 6 realms of rebirth. What confuses me is that it seems different sources give inconsistent ordering of the realms. For example, in the book [Buddhism: A Very Short Introduction](https://www.amazon.com/Buddhism-Very-Short-Introduction-Introductions-ebook/dp/B00BHXVWSS#:~:text=Buddhism%3A%20A%20Very%20Short%20Introduction%20introduces%20the%20reader%20to%20the,of%20Buddhism%20in%20daily%20life.&text=By%20considering%20how%20Buddhist%20thought,faced%20from%20a%20Buddhist%20perspective.) the 6 realms of rebirth is ordered (from highest to lowest) as follows: 1. Gods 2. Humans 3. Titans 4. Ghosts 5. Animals 6. Hell However, in wikipedia article of [Saṃsāra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%E1%B9%83s%C4%81ra_(Buddhism)#Realms_of_rebirth) it presents the following order: 1. Gods 2. Human 3. Demi-god 4. Animal 5. Hungry ghost 6. Hell I also checked wikipedia for [六道](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%85%AD%E9%81%93#%E4%B8%89%E5%96%84%E9%81%93) and some other Chinese online articles (since I can read Chinese). It seems they prefer to order demi-god realm above human realm. So in summary, there seems to be inconsistency of relative ordering of two pairs of realms among various sources, namely the relative ordering between human realm and demi-god realm, and between animal realm and ghost realm. I'm wondering which is right? Is there a definitive ordering? Maybe different branches of Buddhism define them differently?

Buddhist accounts frequently assert that phenomena (dharmas) are empty of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva, asvabhāva), and that their arising, functioning, and cessation occur solely through dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). However, causal efficacy seems to require at least minimal stability of a phenomenon’s defining features. This raises some questions. 1. If dharmas have no intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva), how can they still perform functions ? Doesn't causal power require at least some stable feature, and if not, what does “causal efficacy” actually mean for empty dharmas? 2. Dharmas are described as momentary and empty. How do empty, momentary events form a causal continuum (saṃtāna) without presupposing some underlying stability?

I hope this finds you well and happy. Over the last 25 years I have been trying to apply the instructions from the Buddha on how to study his teaching to keep it pure, found in the Pali Early Buddhist Texts. In my documents linked below, I try to resolve glaring inconsistencies in the Pali text, from the perspective that the Buddha is the unexcelled teacher and does not need help from disciples to teach. You will need a google account to view them: My comparison of up to 54 possible variations in the gradual Path (the Fourth Noble Truth) found in the Pali Texts: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1acDIhERcjDfGYof2v45tqdXOipIh09_OYUfHwXWpVTY/edit?usp=sharing My theory of early and late Buddhist Teachings (covering all Four Noble Truths): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1CE8ycGuHdOBI96wzOiZt2Da1QWHclb2BCR-b1BwZEGs/edit?usp=sharing I'd be interested to hear of other similar work, because I'd like to associate and discuss with people who show at least the easiest to recognise Fruit of Stream Entry, taking the Buddha as their only teacher. That is, I'm seeking the Noble Community. Bhikkhu Sujato et al's 2014 study: Authenticity of the Early Buddhist Texts https://ocbs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/authenticity.pdf only wants to present the case, there is NO evidence of **major** doctrinal change in the EBTs. I'm not interested in people preaching or 'soap boxing' to me, the standard interpretations of doctrines, which I would call dogma. I was a Theravada monk for 20 years. So I am very familiar with them. This pushing of dogma is usually done in the style: 'this is the truth style'/'the Buddha taught this' etc. I'm interested in authentic discussion where people apply the training for his disciples ascribed to the Buddha of 'do not say this is the truth' but rather 'I believe this is the truth', called 'safeguarding the truth' MN 95 and is expressing one's view as one's view, as it really is. I understand this to be an insight practice and found it eradicates arrogance. The difference might better be understood by the difference in: 'the world is flat' - pushed by some organisations and 'I believe the world is flat' - someone expressing their belief realistically. I appreciate facts such as, the Noble Eightfold Path appears x times in the EBTs, but not quoting scripture to push the standard view, as my research shows there are likely many corrupted ideas in the EBTs. For me, agreement with the large body of consistent words of the Buddha, is a higher standard than the number of times an idea occurs. best wishes Joe

As the title says, I am looking for sources from EBT or Theravada, from the actual words of the Buddha about the process of death. Including advice on what one should do when death is close. Assuming the person knows death is arriving imminently. (if that is a correct term)

Was dependent-origination (Pratityasamutpada) revealed to Buddha with enlightenment? If not, when? AI says: > First Sermon: The first formal teaching of this doctrine occurred > during the Buddha's first sermon at Sarnath, shortly after his > enlightenment. This sermon is known as the Dhammacakkappavattana > Sutta, **where he introduced the Four Noble Truths and the concept of > dependent origination**. Okay, but there is only a brief reference to anything resembling dependent-arising in sn56.11 . > Bhikkhus, for however long the wisdom that sees in accordance with > reality - having three modes and twelve aspects - regarding these four > noble truths was not well purified in us,..- And what exactly "the three rounds, twelve aspects" means is still unclear. Does it refer to the Four Noble Truths? > The Buddha turned three times the Dharma wheel of the Four Noble > Truths. During the first turning for indication, the Buddha revealed, > “This is suffering; this is accumulation of afflictions; this is > cessation of suffering; this is the path.” During the second turning > for persuasion, He advised, “This is the suffering you should know; > this is the accumulation of afflictions you should destroy; this is > the cessation of suffering you should achieve; this is the path you > should take.” During the third turning for confirmation, He testified, > “This is the suffering I have known; this is the accumulation of > afflictions I have destroyed; this is the cessation of suffering I > have achieved; this is the path I have completed.” It's summary : > It is the path of understanding and practice, whereby the truth can > become known (sacca-ñāṇa), its function understood (kicca-ñāṇa), so > that its accomplishment may be realized (kata-ñāṇa). Another theory: > The three rounds refer to the three watches of night described in >Mahāsaccakasutta, and the twelve aspects are indeed the twelve links of > Pratityasamutpada.. Was DO developed logically, with effort, or was it a spontaneous arising of his enlightenment?

Please share methods to increase mindfulness. \ Mindfulness means simply an awareness of the objects and sense data that are present. So, for example, it is Tuesday, 1pm. What I have tried so far is to list things and sights that are nearby: - Is it light or dark? - Am I tired or not tired? - Am I walking or sitting? Is it simply raw observation, independent of cast or creed, simply seeing as it is? Thanks sukhi hontu

I'm reading Rob Burbea's book Seeing That Frees. The book is about ways of working with emptiness. In the book, he says that things lack inherent existence. I'm fairly sure this isn't the same as not being real. Is that right? Can things be real and lack inherent existence? I appreciate the real answer will be to meditate on this, but I find exploring such issues more intellectually to be helpful too.

I've been meditating for 1 hour, and I'm planning to extend it to 90 minutes. Will there be any significant change in my experience? Has anyone had a real experience with this? SHOULD I INCREASE TO 90 MINS? Follow up: Why does everyone say to do twice a day instead of once a day? In the [Vipassana 10 day retreat](https://www.dhamma.org/) , they said to not go beyond 60 mins as it will lead to different state. That's why I ask. Why is it getting more and more difficult as I am increasing the duration?

I was reading about Narcissistic Personality Disorder and related conditions like Borderline Personality Disorder . Some qualities seemed in direct opposition to what I've read in books by Thich Nhat Hanh. I was wondering if there were descriptions of Modern Psychological Narcissism in Buddhist works (as opposed to vanity in the Greek myth)? Is it closely tied to notions of Ego? For example, we are encouraged to cultivate Equanimity in Buddhism. BPD has erratic and extreme emotional shifts. Its sufferers have extremely dichotomous, dualistic thinking. Some notion of objectivity is encouraged in Buddhism, a realization that one is observing a phenomenon, and one may have thoughts, judgments, etc about the phenomenon, but this isn't really the thing being observed. People with NPD and the like may be considered extremely subjective, unmindful that they are having opinions and so failing to distinguish between the observation and the judgments. Envy is extremely common among narcissists. On the path to liberation, envy is one of the first emotions to disappear. Are there teachings of Buddhism that could be especially helpful for such people?

Is it a good idea to expose yourself to situations that trigger fear and anxiety and use meditation to get through it, or is the desire to overcome fear and anxiety "bad" because it's technically a desire? (And fear and anxiety are only temporary states anyway and should be recognized for being just that.) Would it even be possible to meditate through a triggering situation since one wouldn't be calm enough to see clearly in such a situation? To put it more simply: could meditation be used as a substitute for CBT? If not, does Buddhism encourage or discourage CBT?

> 'Pain is inevitable. Suffering is optional.' I'm not sure I like the adjective 'optional' because I think it's insensitive to tell someone who's been injured that their suffering is some switch to easily flip (I don't have an issue with the nouns). I think 'not' is better than 'optional'. Anyhoo, many Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT) texts seem to distinguish pain and suffering in other ways such as: - Psychology Today: The Dialectic of Pain: Synthesizing Acceptance and Change > Pain in life is inevitable, but suffering and misery are not. These can result from the way we respond to pain. The more we fight against it, the more likely we are to experience negative emotions, such as anger, hopelessness, and despair, and the harder it becomes to identify changes that can help. Like those Chinese finger-trap toys, the more forcefully we tug to release our index fingers, the more tightly ensnared they become. Calming down and taking stock of the situation opens the means to escape. - Wikipedia: Marsha M. Linehan (this quote has no source as of this writing) > Marsha M. Linehan (born May 5, 1943) is an American psychologist and author. She is the creator of dialectical behavior therapy (DBT), a type of psychotherapy that combines behavioral science with Buddhist concepts like acceptance and mindfulness. - And so on.

I know this can be subjective to each individual, so I am only looking for a general idea rather than a definitive answer. Is it once one is at anagami stage? Or does the gross desire leave before, at certain stages of practice? Like jhana stages as an example? I remember Yutadhammo specifically stating in a video that the desire for sex is actually a relatively easy desire to be free from. Gross desire and more stronger, ingrained desires are much harder to rid oneself of. Though I expect that was also a individual experience.

Thoughts about mine and that things should be this way, about children, husband, and relatives - these are all personality view. That is developed in our own mind. So we inflicted our own wounds. So we were in our own prison. So when this thinking stops, personality view has been destroyed. Hasn't it?

The Buddha knows everything in this universe via his mind alone. Can I do the same? I want to know what is inside a black hole.

How is the connection between *bhava* (as *kamma-bhava* and *upapatti-bhava*) and *jāti* as links in the twelve link formula of dependant arising to be understood?

It seems certain Buddhist groups have come to believe in something they call the "luminous mind " or the "primordial consciousness"; in essence, a mind that is lasting, stable, and assumedly pleasant. From a Theravada point of view, this is terribly problematic; if this mind is able to know multiple consecutive objects, then it is indistinguishable from multiple cittas arising and ceasing, and thus not lasting at all. The idea that there is something lasting from moment to moment sounds very much like the concept of a soul. How does it differ? Or is the point that these Buddhists do believe in a soul?

Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 CE) was one of the foremost philosophers of Kashmir Śaivism , whose magnum opus Tantrāloka is widely regarded as the most comprehensive exposition of non‑dual Śaiva tantric thought. In the chapter of Tantrāloka dealing with causality , Abhinavagupta and the commentator Jayaratha mount a sustained critique of Buddhist theories of causality and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), which they present as inadequate to account for real causal efficiency outside a unified conscious agent. Below are verbatim formulations from the Tantrāloka alongside an academic paper (based on Tantrāloka and Jayaratha’s commentary) mentioning Abhinavagupta’s key objections to the Buddhist theories of causality . ***Important disclaimer:-*** The paper contains a large volume of tightly argued material, textual citations, and sub-arguments. For the sake of clarity and length, I am summarising the main objections rather than citing every verse or passage. Any readers attempting to answer should ideally consult from Page 12 onwards of the said paper alongside the other provided citations alongside the text of Tantraloka from 9.10 to 9.37 for a thorough and accurate understanding of the opponent's objections. ---------- 1:- Causality and succession ---------------------------------------------- Abhinavagupta asserts that Buddhist theory causality is only succession of discrete events with no substantial connection, and therefore cannot explain real causal relations. Especially between phenomena independent of one another The direct Excerpt from the tantraloka 9.11-13 Jayaratha, the commentator, gives the example of Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī (the constellations Pleiades and Taurus): if mere succession were enough to establish causation, Kṛttikā would be the cause of Rohiṇī, since the latter always rises after the former. Yet despite this regular sequence, there is no causal relationship between them.The Śaiva critique here seems to be that Buddhist theory relies too heavily on perceptual succession to define causation. 2: True causality requiring an agent and agency: ----------------------------------------------------- Abhinavagupta argues that because Buddhists emphasize momentary entities, they lack a real connection between cause and effect. Abhinavagupta claims that “the relation of cause and effect is really that of agent and agency” and that the ultimate cause is a conscious agent whose will underlies causation. Excerpt from Tantraloka 9.14-18 Further Jayaratha asks that surely succession and simultaneity are not character- istics in the nature of the things themselves; they are attributes of perception. But it is consciousness which establishes the succession and non-succession when it per- ceives that a cloth is after a pot. The things themselves are not endowed with succession or non-succession as something super added to their natures. So the Buddhists cannot avoid the fact that they are superimposing contradictory attributes upon a single entity even though they are trying to get away by introducing succession (TĀV 9.18). 3: Multiple causes and unity of effects ---------- The concept of complex causality (Sāmagrī ) is used by both Naiyāyikas and Buddhists in their discussions about causality. Abhinavagupta accepts the Buddhist notion of causal totality but maintains that Śiva, as consciousness, is the ultimate agent. While a pot is said to arise from an aggregate of causes (TĀ 9.30ab), this aggregate must form a unity. Without such unity, diverse causes would produce multiple effects. Jayaratha clarifies how This unity has to be grounded in a single, all-pervasive agent of cognition, which alone makes a single effect possible. Excerpt from Tantraloka 9.29-37 ---------- Questions based on the above - ========= 1. How does Buddhist dependent origination avoid collapsing causality into simple succession with no real dependence? How would Buddhists justify dependent origination so that true causal relations are distinguished from mere chronological succession? 2. How do Buddhists account for singular effects arising from multiple interdependent conditions without a unified causal agent or totality? 3. How would Buddhists respond to the claim that causal succession and simultaneity are merely perceptual constructs rather than objective causal relations? 4. How do Buddhist theories of dependent origination articulate “necessity” such that effects follow causes for reasons beyond mere adjacency? 5. How would a Buddhist articulate the concept of momentariness and dependent origination without collapsing into either metaphysical nihilism or affirmation of a first, self‑existent cause? What logic would show that conditionality implies neither absolute self nor random succession? 6. Specifically address whether the criticism shows a misunderstanding of pratītyasamutpāda or momentariness, and why. ----------

The Buddhist doctrinal term svasaṃvedana (literally “self-awareness” or reflexive awareness) plays a central role in classical Indian epistemology and Yogācāra theory of mind as defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. On their view, every act of intentional consciousness is non-conceptually self-aware in addition to being aware of its object, serving as the basis for memory, inference, and perceptual continuity. This reflexivity is often analogized to a lamp that illuminates both objects and itself. However, later Madhyamaka expositors, especially in the Gelug Prāsaṅgika tradition, critique or deny svasaṃvedana even at the conventional level, arguing that positing intrinsic reflexive awareness undermines the two truths and reifies mind. Other Madhyamaka authors, like Śāntarakṣita and Ju Mipham, articulate a more nuanced position where reflexive awareness may be accepted conventionally but denied ultimately. Is there a consistent way within Buddhist epistemology to reconcile Dharmakīrti’s reflexive awareness with Madhyamaka critiques without collapsing into either realism about mind or nihilism about experience? In other words, can svasaṃvedana be framed in a two-truths schema that satisfies both pramāṇa and madhyamaka concerns, and if so, how?

I've been struggling with this one for quite a while now. The fourth foundation of mindfulness is called 'dhammānupassana' - vision in regards to the dhammas. The old translation I was given when I started meditating was "mind objects", which I'm pretty sure is not at all correct in this context, since it doesn't get at the distinction between the fourth set and the first three. The phrase "mind object" is a translation of "dhammarammana". According to Nina Van Gorkom, >Dhammarammana comprises all objects which are not included in the first five classes. These can be experienced only through the mind-door. >http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-16.htm So, "mind object" is a specific subset of reality in a specific context. The first five indriya and the first three elements that comprise rupakkhandha are not a part of this subset, and yet they appear in the section on dhammanupassana. The commentary says relating the the fourth satipatthana, >and now in order to speak of even the laying hold of the aggregates of perception and formations, he said "And, how, o bhikkhus," and so forth." So the emphasis is supposed to be on these two aggregates (even though the five aggregates themselves are under this heading). In Thai, the meaning is given as "that which holds (dhareti) the meditator from falling into evil", which is a definition of the truths (dhammas) taught by the Buddha. That seems appropriate, but it is still curious that there are only a limited number of subsets of the Buddha's teaching in the satipaṭṭhāna sutta, certainly not all of the Buddha's teaching. Does anyone have a proper explanation as to why the fourth set is called "dhammas"?

Why are the three marks (consolidated) not directly included in the Satipatthana Sutta - supposedly the most important of all discourses? Not in the section of principles, but indirectly with regards to the body: > *They meditate observing the body as liable to originate, as liable to vanish, and as liable to both originate and vanish.* Perhaps it is due to the later historical ontological organization of those three messages? Any tangential ideas are welcome.