In *Cracking The Walnut: Understanding the Dialectics of Nagarjuna*, Thich Nhat Hanh explains how in the four conditions out of which a phenomenon arises (seed condition, continuity condition, object of cognition as condition, supportive condition) we can not find the self-nature of the phenomenon itself. The text which he is explaining, The Verses on the Middle Way by Nagarjuna, conclude this about the matter: > 3. The self-nature of phenomena \ is not found in the conditions. \ Since there is no self-nature, \ how could there be an other-nature? To illustrate this point Thich Nhat Hanh uses the example of fire. > For example, we may look for the self-nature of a flame in a box of matches. In the box are matches made of wood and sulfur. Outside the box is oxygen. When we search inside the wood, sulfur, and oxygen can we find the self-nature of the flame? Whether the match has already been lit or not, we cannot find this self-nature. What we call the self-nature of something cannot be found in its conditions at all. My question is, how can Nagarjuna make the leap that because self-nature is not found in the causes or grounds out of which a phenomenon arises that therefore said phenomenon does not possess self-nature? For instance, if we at first assume that objects possess a separate self-nature and we take the example of ice instead of fire, we see that the conditions out of which ice arises (freezing temperatures, water, air pressure) do seem to possess something resembling the self-nature of their product. This is why I am confused when Thich Nhat Hanh uses the example of fire to illustrate the point -- surely there are other phenomena, like ice, which don't fit the rule?

In the trisvabhava theory, is the consummate nature inflected by past present and future conditions? Or is it always the same and independent of causal conditions?

By far the most popular school of Hindu philosophy, which almost all Hindus nowadays belong to, is the Vedanta school, which is based on an ancient Hindu work called the Brahma Sutras or Vedanta Sutras. The Brahma Sutras consist of a series of aphorisms which summarize and systematize the philosophical teachings of a set of Hindu scriptures called the Upanishads. They also spend some time defending the philosophy of the Upanishads against rival schools of Indian philosophy. In particular, here is what they say concerning Buddhism: > Topic-4: Refutation of Buddhist Realists > > 18. Even if the integration be supposed to arise from either of the causes, that will not be achieved. > 19. If it be argued that a combination becomes possible since (nescience and the rest) can be the causes of one another (in a > successive series), then we say, no, (for nescience etc.,) can each > merely be the cause of origin of another just succeeding. > 20. And because the earlier is negated when the later emerges, (therefore nescience and the rest cannot each be the cause of the next > in the series). > 21. (If it be contended that the effect arises) even when there is no cause, then your assertion (of causation) will be stultified; else (if > you contend that the entity of the earlier moment continues till the > entity of the later moment emerges), the cause and effect will exist > simultaneously. > 22. Neither pratisamkhya-nirodha (artificial annihilation) nor an apratisamkhya-nirodha (natural annihilation) is possible, for there > can be no cessation (either of the current or of the individuals > forming the current). > 23. And (the Buddhist view is untenable) owing to defect arising from either point of view. > 24. And (non-existence cannot be asserted) in the case of Akasa on account of the absence of (its) dissimilarity (with destruction). > 25. And (a permanent soul has to be admitted) because of the fact of remembrance (ie., memory). > 26. Something does not come out of nothing, for this does not accord with experience. > 27. And (if something can come out of nothing, then) on the same ground, success should come even to the indifferent people. > > Topic-5: Buddhist Idealism Refuted > > 28. (External objects are) not non-existent, for they are perceived. > 29. And because of the difference of nature (the waking state is) not (false) like dream etc. > 30. (Tendencies) can have no existence since (according to you) external things are not perceived. > 31. And (the ego-consciousness cannot be the abode), for it is momentary. > 32. Besides (this view stands condemned), it being untenable from every point of view. My question is, have any Buddhist thinkers responded to this critique of Buddhism? Note that I don't want answerers to try responding to the critique themselves (which might lead to too much speculation and arguments). I'm just interested in whether any published works have responded to it. By the way, the aphorisms of the Brahma Sutras are somewhat cryptic, so their meaning and justification are usually understood with the help of commentaries, like this one and this one . Any help would be greatly appreciated. Thank You in Advance. EDIT: Here is a book about the Brahma Sutras' critique of the Vedanta school.

I remember the 1st book I read on Buddhism was about 'dharma' and that this has a few meanings, including, at least 'teaching' and 'element' (I suppose both of these are English glosses). > (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism) The natural order of the universe; > natural law, cosmic order. > (Buddhism) The teachings of the Buddha as a practice to > be promulgated and taught. These are different senses: teaching / reality. Would you say that the teachings explain the elements? By "explain" I mean show how they are caused. ---------- Follow up question (I'm posting enough!) is whether *either* the teachings are about something real, *or* what they are about the elements in the present.

In Buddhism, is the effect ontologically independent of the cause? I'm not asking if the effect makes the cause, which I think would amount to "ontic" dependence; but if the effect can exist without the cause. I can't remember the word for this, but take smoking. It causes cancer, and some people's cancer is caused by smoking: but not all cancers are from smoking. And what has that got to do with 'emptiness', in any Mahayana tradition?

> 22. Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore the very existence or non-existence of an end is > unreasonable. https://www.stephenbatchelor.org/index.php/en/verses-from-the-center Is it because the action of the lamp is contained in light, so we cannot conceive of its end, and its end neither exists nor doesn't (same as a four sided triangle: it's a nonsense phrase). ---------- Before his dedication (30), Nagarjuna concludes > 29. And because all things are empty, about what and in whom do views such as that of permanence spring forth? Does that mean enlightenment is not a view, but the impossibility of a view about an end: rejecting the idea that things either end or do not. If an end is inconceivable then so is 'permanence', so the opposite of an end is not "permanence" but buddha-nature.

I've looked at other responses on Buddhism exchange and googled it too, and I'm still confused about the cause of suffering. Is there one root cause? Multiple causes? Or does Buddhism claim not to know the root cause but only causes later in the chain of causation? Britannica seems to equate craving and attachment and suggest that is what Buddha considered the cause: > "The second truth is the origin (Pali and Sanskrit: samudaya) or cause of suffering, which the Buddha associated with craving or attachment in his first sermon. In other Buddhist texts the causes of suffering are understood as stemming from negative actions (e.g., killing, stealing, and lying) and the negative mental states that motivate negative actions (e.g., desire, hatred, and ignorance)." > > [Four Noble Truths](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Four-Noble-Truths) My initial understanding had been that it was not desire that caused suffering (we all desire things, like if we're cold we desire warmth, and even experienced meditators will feel that way) but becoming attached to a desire or identifying with it. But now I don't know anymore.

Recent exchange here got me thinking. Nagarjuna's karika, 1.3 (Batchelor) > Na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratyayādiṣu vidyate > > Avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate > > The essence of things does not exist in conditions and so on. > >If an own thing does not exist, an other thing does not exist. There is a venerable tradition of different interpretations of Nagarjuna, based on "the two truths". ***Can that phrase be read to mean*** **emptiness does not exist in non-emptiness: if and only if an own thing does not exist in non-emptiness then an other thing does not exist in emptiness** So the first phrase says that emptiness is empty in the sense that the absence of svabhava does not exist in things. After that, that whenever a self caused thing cannot be found, then there is no other empty thing. I don't think it's a normal interpretation? ---------- For the purposes of my philosophical question elsewhere (a neat argument for karma and rebirth) I have rendered 'empty' to mean 'analytic' and 'non-empty' to mean empirical. > *Definition of analytic. Of or relating to analysis or analytics > especially : separating something into component parts or constituent > elements.* >*Definition of empirical. Based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic.*

What happens to a cause after it has generated an effect? I don't think it can cease to really exist, as it never really existed in the first place. Does the effect somehow - metaphorically - crowd out the cause? Or is the effect sufficient - even necessary - for the cause not to appear? What is a good way of thinking about this?

I'm asking this ontological question as in the context of, e.g., an Aristotelian Prime Unmoved Mover, or some other first cause. My guess is that there isn't, probably based on Dependent Origination or maybe even the Heart Sutra. (I hope I have not misconstrued those.) Thanks

> The conventional Buddhist view of causality is that the present > negative and positive effects we see in our lives are a result of > negative and positive causes that we created in the past. So in order > to attain Buddhahood, which is the goal of Buddhist practice, it would > take lifetimes of painstaking efforts to replace all the negative > causes we’ve made with positive causes, while avoiding making > additional negative causes. Based on this view, the possibility of > attaining Buddhahood seems remote and almost impossible. > > In contrast, Nichiren Buddhism teaches that the law of cause and > effect is simultaneous. https://www.worldtribune.org/2017/11/cause-and-effect/ I side against it, which could even cover my slight antipathy toward Nichiren Buddhism. If the effect depends on past causes, then doesn't the metaphor of a fire going out -- and going nowhere -- when the fuel runs out, only work when a cause can run out of effects, which, for me, hints at svabhava. Does a cause running itself down only occur if it has svabhava? And what arguments are there for and against the law of cause and effect being simultaneous? I have a "theory" that Nichiren Buddhism cannot help us in our "next live"; in deed, that mappo -- and Nichiren Buddhism -- condemns all to the Abrahamic hell, even as zen -- the monastic life -- may still be available. But I won't get into it.

There are philosophical arguments for e.g. 'emptiness', as evidenced by it having sections in philosophy encyclopedias. Whether or not you agree with them, probably depends on your language and pre-philosophical intuitions -- which is arguably the same for any philosophy. What about karma ? > And what he taught is not the version of karma popular in certain circles today, according to which, for instance, an act done out of hatred makes the agent somewhat more disposed to perform similar actions out of similar motives in the future, which in turn makes negative experiences more likely for the agent. What the Buddha teaches is instead the far stricter view that ***each action has its own specific consequence for the agent, the hedonic nature of which is determined in accordance with causal laws and in such a way as to require rebirth as long as action continues***. So if there is a conflict between the doctrine of non-self and the teaching of karma and rebirth, it is not to be resolved by weakening the Buddha’s commitment to the latter. Or again: > He who acts is the agent (kartr); that which is performed (kriyate) is > karma; and ***the agent of karma is the one who experiences the result of > that performed karma***. Without karma, an agent is not established. *The Inner Kālacakratantra*, unknown page. > The law of karma is a fundamental principle of the Buddhist worldview. > In brief, karma refers to the idea that intentional actions have > consequences for the agent, in this life and in future lives; in fact, > it is karma that leads to rebirth. Buddhists understand the law of > karma as another manifestation of dependent arising > (paṭicca-samuppāda), the law of cause and effect, whereby everything > that exists arises due to specific conditions. In this sense, the law > of karma is a sort of natural law, so that actions are naturally > followed by consequences, not as the result of divine judgement. But > they will follow: the Buddha emphasised that actions lead inevitably > to appropriate consequences... The inevitability of karmic > consequences is a large part of the way that traditional Buddhism has > presented its ethical teachings. Evil actions, like killing, stealing, > ***lying and so on, are bad karmas and will lead to rebirth in an > unpleasant human situation or in hell.*** Just trying to explain what the mainstream and traditional interpretation of karma is. I think the conventional argument is from authority and the authority of memories of past lives. These I don't find convincing. Can it be inferred from any other Buddhist doctrine, such as emptiness? ---------- I was looking at the wild fox koan here, and this part struck me: > Those who say "one does not fall into cause and effect" deny > causation, thereby falling into the lower realms. Those who say "one > cannot ignore cause and effect" clearly identify with cause and > effect. When people hear about identifying with cause and effect, they > are freed from the lower realms. Do not doubt this. I think it seems to be saying that -- according to (the philosophy of) emptiness -- there is no escaping cause and effect because any cause is its effect. But if we think about it, we don't --- or tend not to -- experience *cause as effect*. If we are going to, that's that, then the effect is somehow put off to another time: **karma**.

Is continuity just causation? When a fire is caused by a spark, is that the same kind of continuity as there is in the dependent origination of the skandhas, just with different causes and effects?

Does a cause depend on its effect? If so then it seems especially difficult to think about nothingness being made or created. This is almost the exact opposite of a question I have asked recently (I'm locked out and looking into that), but not quite. It's usually said that the cause does depend on the cause, in some way > Nāgārjuna argues that cause and effect cannot be substantially > distinct. This is because the effect depends existentially on the > cause (if the cause did not exist the effect would not exist) and > cause depends at least notionally on the effect (if there was no > effect the cause would not be called “cause”). The kind of > independence demanded by substantial existence, by existence by > svabhāva, is simply not available for things which are cause and > effect. But what this notional dependence means I'm not totally sure. I'm not asking about nothingness, and am not saying that sunyata is nothingness! That could only be the case if the absolute truth is that nothing exists.

In this TEDx Talk Youtube video at timestamp 12m 36s, Dr. Daniel Amen told the story of a nine year old boy named Andrew, who attacked a girl on a field for no particular reason and he had other behavioral problems. It turns out that he had a cyst in the left temporal lobe of his brain the size of a golf ball. Once it was removed, he returned to being a normal boy with normal behavior. Questions: 1. If his cyst was caused by past kamma, and if his bad behavior is caused by the presence of the cyst, then this implies that his present behavior is caused by his past kamma and he has no control of it. Is that true? 2. If his bad behavior was caused by the presence of the cyst, then would Andrew be creating bad kamma (by attacking the girl) due to bad intention, or would he not be creating bad kamma (by attacking the girl), because it was due to the cyst and not due to his own intention? 3. What did the Buddha teach about the physical body (including brain) and its ailments or conditions, affecting the mind and kamma? 4. How do we avoid bad kamma, due to mind-influencing effects caused by physical conditioning? 5. How could Buddhist teachings help a person like Andrew (before his cyst was removed)?

Has anyone read Nagarjuna as claiming only that an effect can never be conceived of as its cause? I'm asking because it would neatly fit my own views on how to understand science, as well as I think rendering annihilation a conceptual impossibilty (for reasons other than that thesis assuming a person).

When we ask someone "why do you do that?", we are asking for her/his reasons. It someone asks me "why do you play tennis?" and I say "I like to stay fit and I like to have fun. Tennis is good exercise and good fun, therefore I play tennis", I am giving my reasons. (It doesn't matter if having fun actually is a form of suffering. My reasons are still my reasons.) In light of Buddhist philosophy, would it be right to say that my reasons are the *causes* of my behavior? Is there any general agreement across tenet systems? Or is it one answer for Vaibhashika, one for Sautrantika, one for Chittamatra and one for Madhyamika?

I just reread Bachelor's translation of MMK . It struck me that the argument against causation was that: A cause has no essence in addition to what it is, else it would not be the final cause. But it must have an essence if it is to be active for more than a moment. So everything is radically impermanent: and nothing exists long enough to be born and then cease. And so everything that is born and ceases is empty, it is not a final cause. Any conditioned entity is then a mere conventional designation, something which can be identified in a better way (and on forever) and so is always incorrectly identified. ---------- But I was reading about Sautrantika-Yogacara, and the idea that "existents" which aren't unique particulars aren't causally real. This to me seems wrong, I think we can eliminate the unique particulars from a theory and be left with something which is grounded in the particulars' causal properties. This is what some scientific realists do. ---------- My question Assuming it true that there can be causation without causes, then is there any way to argue that the sentences of science, with their unique particulars eliminated, are not conceptually constructed? Perhaps because only those particulars are as such, and so empty; and our ideas about the rest of the world can be grounded in them, without that structure being thereby empty.

This philosophical treatment of Nagarjuna by Westerhoff talks about how a cause depends on its effect. I think that this point is a stumbling block for me but in my philosophical interpretations of Buddhism *and* of life and death per se. He says: > There are three different ways in which we can make sense of > Nāgārjuna's assertion that the cause depends existentially on the > effect. And then proceeds to argue about them (which I cannot make complete sense of). Is the idea that a conditioned cause must be conditioned by its effect, in the sense of having it as a part?

I came to know His Holiness Dalai Lama serves his guests meat at his residency.... Is it dharma to ask your cook to kill an animal to serve your guest or further is it not your dharma to ask your cook to not kill an animal?.. So as to avoid confusion.. My main question is how will inactions contribute to our karma as much as our actions?.. Like here for eg. Our inaction of not stopping an animal being killed...