Last year I was walking in the "Camino de Santiago", in Spain, where I met a guy who showed me a symbol engraved in the stone of a bridge. It was a Sun that reflected its rays on the sea. He told me that it was related to Nirvana and the path one has to follow. When I came back from the journey, I tried looking for this symbol on the internet, but didn't find anything about it. The most similar one I found it has been the Unalome symbol. But it seems that all its references are linked to the tatoos, and I didn't find any wikipedia page or Buddhist website talking about it. Back to my question, is the Unalome a Buddhist symbol? Is there a Buddhist symbol similar to the one I have described? I've found the real image, can be find here in google maps photo: https://maps.app.goo.gl/moymLNdJ3LjtrZBt6

In the Attavaggo (Dhammapada, ch. 12) the concept of attā (self) is seen to be employed not merely as a grammatical reflexive but also as a reflexive locus of ethical regulation:- > ***Attānañ-ce piyaṁ jaññā rakkheyya naṁ surakkhitaṁ, tiṇṇam-aññataraṁ yāmaṁ paṭijaggeyya paṇḍito*** > > If one regards oneself as dear one should guard oneself right well, > during one of the three watches of the night the wise one should stay > alert. > > ***Attānam-eva paṭhamaṁ patirūpe nivesaye, athaññam-anusāseyya, na kilisseyya paṇḍito.*** > > First one should establish oneself in what is suitable, then one can > advise another, the wise one should not have any defilement. furthermore, > ***Attā hi attano nātho, ko hi nātho paro siyā?Attanā va sudantena nāthaṁ labhati dullabhaṁ.*** > > For the self is the friend of self, for what other friend would there > be? > > When the self is well-trained, one finds a friend that is hard to > find. > > ***Attanā va kataṁ pāpaṁ, attanā saṅkilissati, attanā akataṁ pāpaṁ, attanā va visujjhati, suddhī asuddhī paccattaṁ, nāñño aññaṁ > visodhaye.*** > > By oneself alone is a wicked deed done, by oneself is one defiled,by > oneself is a wicked deed left undone, by oneself is one purified, > purity and impurity come from oneself, for no one can purify another. (Dhp 12) These verses presuppose that the one who restrains, guards, and disciplines attā at an earlier point is meaningfully the same one who later benefits from that restraint. The ethical logic of delayed gratification, self-restraint, and self-evaluation appears to require a notion of diachronic identity - that the “self” at time t₁ stands in a special relation to the “self” at time t₂. However, the Nikāyas elsewhere explicitly deny personal identity over time in any strong sense, rejecting the view that “the one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result” (e.g., SN 12.46), and refusing to locate any enduring subject across moments of experience. ---------- This raises some difficult interpretive questions:- 1. What is the referent of 'attā' in the Attavaggo? Is it a purely conventional designation for the five aggregates, a pragmatic moral subject, or something else entirely? What kind of continuity does the Attavaggo assume when it appeals to concern for one’s future self? 2. If this continuity is merely causal rather than identical, why is it framed in the language of attā (self) rather than impersonal conditionality? 3. If self-discipline presupposes self-evaluation, which presupposes self-monitoring, which presupposes… ad infinitum, how does the Attavaggo avoid an infinite regress without invoking an enduring subject? I am not asking whether the Buddha affirms a metaphysical self, but whether the Attavaggo’s ethical logic presupposes a residual reflexive agency that is paradoxically necessary for moral efficacy and yet formally incompatible with anattā. Answers grounded in Pāli textual analysis, Nikāya discussions of identity and continuity, or early commentarial attempts to reconcile ethics with non-self are especially welcome.

I have been interested in the Dzogchen practice of Thogal. Would you suggest any sources or websites about this?

I have been practicing Vipassana for quite a while (2 and a half years). Now, I want to also dwell into the teachings of Buddha as presented in Suttas and apply those teaching in my everyday life. I have read a bit about the Majjhima Nikaya and the Samyutta Nikaya but I'm in a dilemma and not sure whether or not other Nikayas are suitable for a beginner. With which Sutta (Nikaya) should I start with?

I've always found the imagery of Vajrapani (a wrathful Bodhisattva) very evocative. I'm reading a little bit about him and how his form is to do with energy and power in service of the Dharma so he is of course a positive figure. But I'm just wondering if anyone knows about the history of this figure and wrathful deities like him. Is he from the Tibetan culture and does he predate Buddhism coming into that country. Also is he a deity that perhaps had negative connotations (a demon perhaps) that Buddhism has co-opted?

In this book about Bodhisattvas it says that traditionally Buddhism can cause longevity in a way that parallels the longevity that is sought after by Taoism. This kind of longevity arises in the same way that the psychic powers do i.e. it is a natural result of practice but it isn't the end point and it isn't something that should be grasped after. This is the first time I have heard of Buddhism in connection with longevity. Has anyone got any further details about this and perhaps some textual references where this is referred to? Please note - I'm not interested in scientific studies or connections to well-being/stress reduction and similar in this question. I want to focus on the texts and traditions rather than more modern studies. Many Thanks

In this Partially Examined Life podcast , the presenters stated that when Buddhism moved into Chinese, it naturally was influenced by the pre-existing Taoist philosophy. This is uncontroversial. However, they went on to make a stronger claim: > it was the influence of Taoism that was responsible for the development of Mahayana. That is quite a claim and obviously the real position is more complex. However, is there any truth in that statement? Was Taoism instrumental in the development of Mahayana Buddhism?

In the Tevijja Sutta (DN 13 ), the Buddha addresses Brahmin students who are described as being learned in the Vedas and belonging to specific Brahmanical lineages. The sutta explicitly situates its interlocutors within the orthodox Vedic tradition, often identified within the Yajurvedic and Sāmavedic recensions:- > Even though brahmins describe different paths—the Adhvaryu brahmins, > the **Taittirīya brahmins, the Chāndogya brahmins**, the Cāndrāyaṇa > brahmins, and the Bahvṛca brahmins—all of them still lead someone who > practices them to the company of Divinity These Brahmins understood as followers of what I suppose were the Taittirīya and Chāndogya Upaniṣadic traditions of the time claim knowledge of the path to union or “company with Brahmā” (brahmasahavyatā). The Buddha responds by redefining the path to Brahmā not through birth, sacrifice, or Vedic recitation, but through the cultivation of the four brahmavihāras. > “So it seems that that mendicant is not encumbered with possessions, > and neither is the Divinity. Would a mendicant who is not encumbered > with possessions join together and converge with the Divinity, who > isn’t encumbered with possessions?” > > “Yes, worthy Gotama.” > > “Good, Vāseṭṭha! **It’s quite possible that a mendicant who is not > encumbered with possessions will, when the body breaks up, after > death, be reborn in the company of Divinity, who isn’t encumbered with > possessions.** Is the Buddha’s teaching of “Brahmasahavyatā” in the Tevijja Sutta intended as a normative soteriological teaching for Buddhists, or is it better understood as a skillful means (upāya) directed specifically at non-Buddhist Brahmins or Followers of Upanishadic traditions, reframing their own theological goal in ethical and meditative terms without endorsing it as final liberation (nibbāna)?

In the Aggivacchasutta (MN 72 ), the Buddha responds to Vacchagotta’s inquiry about the status of a tathāgata after the attainment of cessation by invoking the simile of a fire that has become quenched due to the exhaustion of its fuel:- > “But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you: ‘This fire in front of you > that is quenched: in what direction did it go—east, south, west, or > north?’ How would you answer?” > > “It doesn’t apply, worthy Gotama. The fire depended on grass and logs > as fuel. When that runs out, and no more fuel is added, the fire is > reckoned to have become quenched due to lack of fuel.” > > “In the same way, Vaccha, any form by which a realized one might be > described has been given up, cut off at the root, made like a palm > stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future. A realized one > is freed from reckoning in terms of form. They’re deep, immeasurable, > and hard to fathom, like the ocean. **‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not > reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn > nor not reborn’—none of these apply.** > > Any feeling … perception … choices … consciousness by which a realized > one might be described has been given up, cut off at the root, made > like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future. A > realized one is freed from reckoning in terms of consciousness. > They’re deep, immeasurable, and hard to fathom, like the ocean. > **‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not > reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn nor not reborn’—none of these apply.”** I have questions about how this functions at a technical level within early Buddhist thought. 1. If the aggregates are indeed the sole conditions under which an individual can emerge and be identified, what is the precise significance of the Buddha’s negation of all four alternatives - reborn, not reborn, both, and neither? 2. Is the primary function of this passage to dissolve only to speculative fixation that obstructs liberation, or does it also imply a principled metaphysical account of why post-liberation or even post-mortem identity claims fail at the level of causal analysis? 3. Does the fire simile warrant the conclusion that once causal supports or aggregates are exhausted, questions framed in terms of existence or non-existence become category errors rather than unanswered questions?

Does anyone know of a good summary of the Visuddhimagga? Is *"Loosening the Tangle" A meditator’s guide to the Visuddhimagga by Ian Rose* a good summary?

Why are the three marks (consolidated) not directly included in the Satipatthana Sutta - supposedly the most important of all discourses? Not in the section of principles, but indirectly with regards to the body: > *They meditate observing the body as liable to originate, as liable to vanish, and as liable to both originate and vanish.* Perhaps it is due to the later historical ontological organization of those three messages? Any tangential ideas are welcome.

The previous years of my life feels like a dream. I was happily living, consumed with studies, learning things, watching youtube and stuff, enjoying a lot, mind was busy in various entertaining stuffs. But, I don't know how it started, but all those passions are waning. Its almost as if I've forgotten how to live. Live as in the previous ways of my living. I am now trying to find a way to live as I've lived in the past but can't seem to go back to the old ways. I mean I want to find something fun for my mind as I had in the past but I just cant bring up enough passion. What is happening to me ?

I am asking this in reference to the aircraft that crashed in India. Is there anything like collective karma, like the alayavijnana (Collective Consciousness)? ( I should not say this, but...) Like, sometimes the entire community suffers, like the Jews in the Second World War. Or sometimes there is an earthquake, natural disasters...If the dependent origination is correct, then should there be a reason behind the mass suffering?

Psychedelic substances such as psilocybin or LSD often induce experiences described as "ego death," where the usual sense of self dissolves and a feeling of unity or boundlessness arises. Some interpret these states as glimpses of spiritual truth, potentially similar to Buddhist insights into anattā (non-self) or śūnyatā (emptiness). From a Buddhist perspective, are these chemically induced experiences considered valid insights into the nature of self and reality, or are they fundamentally different from the realizations attained through traditional Buddhist practice? Are there teachings or commentaries that address the nature or value of such experiences?

In the Nikāyas, consciousness is often described as a dependently originated phenomenon. It arises in dependence on conditions such as nāma-rūpa and the sense bases. For instance - > "Just as fire is classified simply by whatever requisite condition in > dependence on which it burns — a fire that burns in dependence on wood > is classified simply as a wood-fire, a fire that burns in dependence > on wood-chips is classified simply as a wood-chip-fire; a fire that > burns in dependence on grass is classified simply as a grass-fire; a > fire that burns in dependence on cow-dung is classified simply as a > cow-dung-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on chaff is classified > simply as a chaff-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on rubbish is > classified simply as a rubbish-fire — in the same way, consciousness > is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which > it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms > is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Consciousness that arises > in dependence on the ear & sounds is classified simply as > ear-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the nose > & aromas is classified simply as nose-consciousness. Consciousness > that arises in dependence on the tongue & flavors is classified simply > as tongue-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on > the body & tactile sensations is classified simply as > body-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the > intellect & ideas is classified simply as intellect-consciousness." ~ MN 38 However, in DN 15 and many other suttas in descriptions of the formless attainments, the Buddha also speaks of a “dimension of the infinitude of consciousness”, which one enters after the dimension of infinite space. > “Having completely surmounted the base of the infinity of space, > (contemplating) ‘Consciousness is infinite,’ one enters and dwells in > the base of the infinity of consciousness. This is the fifth > emancipation. > > “Having completely surmounted the base of the infinity of > consciousness, (contemplating) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > dwells in the base of nothingness. This is the sixth emancipation. Given the standard teaching that consciousness does not exist apart from conditions:- If consciousness is entirely conditioned and dependent, how should we understand this “dimension of the infinitude of consciousness”? what does it mean to speak of a dimension of its infinitude? Does it come under the intellect-consciousness of MN 38 Or is it something different? Who or what is the one who “enters” these dimensions one after another? is it simply the stream of consciousness, or is there an implied experiencer with continuity beyond the aggregates? ---------- I am seeking canonical, commentarial, or scholarly interpretations that reconcile DN 15’s description of the “dimension of the infinitude of consciousness” with the early Buddhist principle of dependent origination. Is this dimension to be understood phenomenologically, as part of meditative experience, or does it suggest a more nuanced conception of consciousness that is distinct from the aggregates?

> 僧問藥山：「平田淺草，麈鹿成群。如何射得麈中麈？」山云：「看箭！」僧放身便倒。山云：「侍者拖出這死漢。」僧便走。山云：「弄泥團漢有什麼限？」 > > A monk asked Yakusan, “On an open plain with shallow grass, elk and deer form a herd. How does one shoot the Elk of Elks?” Yakusan said, “Watch the arrow!” The monk let himself fall. Yakusan said, “Attendants, please drag this dead fellow out.” The monk chose to walk away. Yakusan said, “Fellows who play with mud balls know no bounds.” Master Yakusan pretends to shoot an arrow. The monk in the story lets himself fall. Master Yakusan apparently was not happy with the monk’s response. What should the monk have done instead?

It's obvious what stealing is when engaged-in often. You take the stuff of others while under a certain mental state, that mental state being marked and noticeable by an understanding that something isn't under your possession (but under another's), and physical effort to appropriate it regardless of the other person's wishes. So if someone is happy with you 'stealing' something, is that stealing? In general, no, as this would be a gift. On the other hand, we have situations such as copyright law, or other ideas where the line of 'possession' is inappropriately drawn. So here is the problem. What is the meter by which we can say something is stolen or not? It can't be the sweeping idea, 'this is my property', as that idea can be faked, as in the case of intellectual property. It can be a case where there is appropriate and inappropriate mental possession of items, and stealing only being the violation of the appropriate lines. Is it fully intent? Kamma = Intent, so if you do not engage in the intent of stealing, you will not experience the results. However, what if you are someone who considers smelling the flowers of another individual stealing? Surely that would not be considered stealing, yet to that person smelling the flowers would trigger the intent. Even though that coarse mental intent would arise, as far as I know that is not actual stealing, so the 'non-intent stealing' would not have an object. At which point can you say you are actually stealing, and at which you are not? It is really simple with coarse events but hard with complex contexts. Taking an apple from someone without asking is stealing, but what about abusing sales at a market? - what about when those sales are glitches, unintended, in the system? - what about liberally charging a corporate card? For our modern, daily situations a really subtle understanding of the precepts is required. So where is the subtle line of stealing?

My decrease in creativity does most likely not have anything to do with my feeble meditation attempts, because it is natural to have ups and downs, even when it comes to creativity. But still, meditation deals with ridding oneself of attachments by observing mind states objectively and I think that following through an idea and turning it into a finished piece of work requires quite a lot of attachment and devotion to the project. I suppose my real question is: is it possible to balance being a practicing Buddhist and a creative artist?

> “There is, monks, an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned. If, > monks there were not that unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned, you > could not know an escape here from the born, become, made, and > conditioned. But because there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, > unconditioned, therefore you do know an escape from the born, become, > made, and conditioned.” ~ Ud 8.3 In contemporary discussions—particularly outside of Buddhist contexts, this passage is sometimes interpreted in a theistic or metaphysical sense, as pointing to an eternal, uncreated reality or an absolute ground of being that exists independently and “allows” for liberation.From this perspective, the statement “if there were not that unborn…” is read as implying a foundational ontological ground upon which conditioned phenomena depend. Within a Buddhist doctrinal framework, however, Nibbāna is often said to be neither a self nor a substance, and Buddhism explicitly rejects a creator God and eternal metaphysical essences. - Within early Buddhist doctrine, why is Nibbāna described using terms such as “unborn” and “unconditioned,” rather than simply as the cessation of suffering or defilements? - How should the conditional phrasing “If there were not that unborn…” be understood without reifying Nibbāna into an eternal substance or theistic absolute? - How do traditional Buddhist commentaries address or guard against eternalist or theistic readings of this passage?

Confidence, For a few weeks now, I have lost confidence in almost everything. Like doing even simple stuff. I feel like, I can't. Like, no future. Motivation, For few weeks now, I feel like sleeping or meditating in bed. Like being free from any work or doing any stuff. Why can't I be happy mentally only?. For reference, I did Samantha, Vipssana for the last 4 years, when I have time.