If my neighbor is real loud, I focus on the noises. It's a sort of involuntary focus. I would like to be able to detach myself from this focus. Until now, I thought focus is part of the 'perception' aggregate, but that doesn't seem correct. Is this sort of focus even part of any aggregate?

I read this: 'Nama-rupa' is simply the aggregates: > And what, bhikkhus, is name-and-form? Feeling, perception, volition, > contact, attention: this is called name. The four great elements and > the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form. > Thus this name and this form are together called name-and-form. > > SN 12.2 Why is attention not one the aggregates?

The common sense-objects are light, sound, smells, tastes, touch, and ideas. The origin must be form. What is form? > The four great elements and the form derived from the four great > elements: this is called form. Thus we assume the sense-objects are derivatives of the four great elements, but what is more? Given the often anomalous classification of intellect as mind or consciousness, I even wonder if its counterpart, idea, is form at all. Is there further elucidation on the matter, like that of the Sankhya school?

If consciousness/awareness as the 5th skandha is impermanent (?), shouldn't it cease to exist when entering Paranirvana? But in SN 22.53 the Buddha says: > "If a monk abandons passion for the property of consciousness, then > owing to the abandonment of passion, the support is cut off, and there > is no landing of consciousness. Consciousness, thus not having landed, > not increasing, not concocting, is released. Owing to its release, it > is steady. Owing to its steadiness, it is contented. Owing to its > contentment, it is not agitated. Not agitated, he (the monk) is > totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the > holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this > world.'" Here cuddlyable3 answers with a quote which says that: > - Damien Keown states: Nirvana [...] involves a radically transformed state of consciousness which is free of the obsession with ‘me and > mine’ > - when a person attains nirvana, they are liberated from ordinary rebirth. When such a person dies, their physical body disintegrates > and their consciousness is said to be completely liberated. They are > not reborn in the ordinary sense. Their consciousness does not take > rebirth into a physical form > - terms like ‘born’ or ‘not born’ do not apply in the case of an Arahant, because those things—matter, sensation, perception, mental > activities, consciousness—with which the terms like ‘born’ and ‘not > born’ are associated, are completely destroyed and uprooted, never to > rise again after his death Doesn't the last point contradict with the others? For me it makes much sense that consciousness is that which gets enlightened and that Nirvana is the state of free, liberated consciousness. I mean if everything what I am, even consciousness, which I think I ultimately am, vanishes, why should I pursue enlightenment then? Thank you.

Wondering if anyone knows the sutta where the Buddha talks about the aggregates and multiple selves. As in there is a changing group of khandas, and in one moment there is a self, (which could be called a self though it is fleeting) and another moment another self. (But its so fleeting it can hardly be called a Higher Self or Soul ect, as its only momentary). Its been about 6 years since I read the sutta, but I did find it, I am not explaining very well. It is quite short and direct. This is not talking about just the body as a self, its talking about the fleeting moment of the four or five aggregates (khandas). I know the simile that will likely be quoted but this was a more obscure reference. Some groups use this reference to refer to the "billions of selves". I am sure it exists in one place probably the Connected Discourses. Blessings in the Buddha Dhamma

I have been wondering what the connection between the five aggregates and the four establishments are. Below i give the translations into English that i've found when reading Bhikkhu Bodhi (BB) and Thich Nhat Hanh (TNH) Five aggregates: * Form * Feelings * Perceptions * Volitional formations (BB); Mental Formations (TNH) * Consciousness Four establishments of mindfulness: * Body * Feelings * Mind, States of Mind (BB); Mind, Mental Formations (TNH) * Phenomena (BB); Objects of mind (TNH) **How can i think about the connection between these lists?** More specifically: * Why is "perceptions" not included in the establishments of mindfulness? * What's the difference between "form" and "body"? * Are "Volitional formations (BB); Mental Formations (TNH)" and "Mind, States of Mind (BB); Mind, Mental Formations (TNH)" the same thing? * What's the relation between "Consciousness" and "Phenomena (BB); Objects of mind (TNH)"?

I read [somewhere](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/50955/why-is-there-no-attention-aggregate/51065#51065) that: > Attention is a product of/maintained by volition/intention (which is sankhara aggregate). I am puzzled by this as the following examples illustrate: 1. I am driving back from a party. I maybe drunk but is 100% focused on the road. Despite this, I find myself driving into a road divider. 2. I am really interested in heavenly beings. I tried to read up, research and find any materials on this subject. After years and decades of studying, I still do not find any devas around me. 3. I am studying for an important test tomorrow. I am aware of the test’s importance and trying hard to attend to my study but my mind keeps drifting to the Netflix show on TV. So, what is attention and how does it work?

**Do we feel because we perceive? Or do we perceive because we feel?** As per mahā-vedallasutta(MN43) > Yaṁ vedeti taṁ sañjānāti, yaṁ sañjānāti taṁ vijānāti. > so vedanā -> sañjānāti -> vijānāti But shouldn't this order be in reverse? Because first, we cognise (vijānāti), then recognise (sañjānāti) and then we feel, isn't it so? Goenka also confirms this sequence. vijānāti->sañjānāti->vedeti. Or is there a different between viññanā and vijānāti as well saññā and sañjānāti? Nibbedhikasutta(AN 6.63) says > Phassa is nidānasambhavo for vedanā/saññā/sankhārā. as if vedanā, saññā and sankhārā co-arise. but are they independent of each other? **Note**: (Adding comments of @blue_ego) consider this question as non sequential. When I say first it means second is dependent on first. Take any meditation practice. we just practice to change perception, and feeling changes accordingly. but vice versa is not true.

Based on the River Sutta below, I can definitely understand assuming the self to be the body. So, when the body becomes old, diseased and approaching death, one assumes that "I am" becoming old, diseased and approaching death. If his body dies, he ceases to exist. This makes him suffer. However, I need much better examples for the other four aggregates. For example, if one assumes the self to be perception, it could be like she assumes the beauty of her body to be her self. "I am this beautiful woman". So, if she loses her beauty due to ageing or disease or accident, then she would suffer. Is this assuming self to be perception (about the body) or is this assuming self to be the form? Or both? Or is this mental fabrications? Another case is let's say, there is a priest of a religion that is strongly based on the belief of God. So, this priest assumes his self to be the "God believer and servant of God". He often prays, "Oh God, may I never stray away from believing in you." Then what if one day, he discovers that God actually doesn't exist? So, does this make him suffer because he assumes his self to be his mental fabrication of "God believer and servant of God"? Is this right? Or how about another case of a renowned surgeon who assumes his self to be the "surgeon"? If one day, he gets Parkinson's disease (while he is still young and at the peak of his practice) that causes his hands to not be steady, then he cannot practise surgery anymore. This makes him suffer. This would be assuming the self to be the mental fabrication of "surgeon". Is this right? What about feeling? If a person loves to listen to music, then he assumes his self to be this "music lover", but if one day he loses his sense of hearing due to disease or accident, this causes him to suffer. Is this right? Consciousness may not be be too hard to understand. If one assumes his self to be the being that continuously is aware and senses the world around him, then idea of death and non-rebirth would cause him to suffer, because he thinks this would cause him to stop being aware of his surroundings. Is this right? But then again, assuming self to be mental fabrications can be reframed in this way: If one assumes that "I think, therefore I am ", so if anything could cause him to stop thinking as he does now, like death or coma or brain injury, then he suffers from worrying about that. Is this right? Or, perhaps, all these examples indeed fall into multiple categories simultaneously? Maybe I cannot easily isolate a case of assuming the self to be only one aggregate, and not the other? From the River Sutta (SN 22.93) : > At Savatthi. There the Blessed One said, "Monks, suppose there were a > river, flowing down from the mountains, going far, its current swift, > carrying everything with it, and — holding on to both banks — kasa > grasses, kusa grasses, reeds, birana grasses, & trees were growing. > Then a man swept away by the current would grab hold of the kasa > grasses, but they would tear away, and so from that cause he would > come to disaster. He would grab hold of the kusa grasses... the > reeds... the birana grasses... the trees, but they would tear away, > and so from that cause he would come to disaster. > > "In the same way, there is the case where an uninstructed, > run-of-the-mill person — who has no regard for noble ones, is not > well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for men > of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma — > assumes form (the body) to be the self, or the self as possessing > form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form. That form tears > away from him, and so from that cause he would come to disaster. > *(and the same applies to the other four aggregates - feeling, > perception, mental fabrications and consciousness)* The sutta goes on to say that the five aggregates are inconstant and impermanent, and should be seen with the right discernment: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.' Seeing thus, the noble disciple becomes disenchanted with the five aggregates.

From Ñanavira's Notes on Dhamma: His note on Mano: > Note that just as the eye, as cakkhāyatana or cakkhudhātu, is that yena lokasmim lokasaññī hoti lokamānī ('[that] by which, in the world, one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world') (Salāyatana Samy. xii,3 ), i.e. that thing in the world dependent upon which there is perceiving and conceiving of the world, namely a spherical lump of flesh set in my face; so the mind, as manāyatana or manodhātu, also is that yena lokasmim lokasaññī hoti lokamānī, i.e. that thing in the world dependent upon which there is perceiving and conceiving of the world, namely various ill-defined parts of my body, but principally a mass of grey matter contained in my head (physiological and neurological descriptions are strictly out of place—see PHASSA).[c] This is in agreement with the fact that all five khandhā arise in connexion with each of the six āyatanāni—see NĀMA & PHASSA [a]. For 'perceiving and conceiving' see MAMA [a]. Why does he say "this is in agreement with the fact that all five khandhā arise in connexion with each of the six āyatanāni."?

In Ñanavira's book Notes on Dhamma: > Phassa is included in nāma since nāma, in specifying saññā, necessarily specifies the pair of āyatanāni ('bases') and kind of viññāna involved (e.g. perception of sourness specifies tongue, tastes, and tongue-consciousness), whereas rūpa does not (inertia or behaviour does not specify its mode of appearance, visual, auditory, and so on): nāma, in other words, entails (but does not include) viññāna, whereas rūpa is simply 'discovered' by viññāna. I don't follow his reasoning here... why is it that Phassa is included in nama instead of rupa because nāma 'entails (but does not include) viññāna, whereas rūpa is simply 'discovered' by viññāna.'? Also why is sañña given some kind of precedence in its inclusion within the category ahead of Phassa?

From M43 the Mahavedalla Sutta: > It is said consciousness. Friend, what is consciousness?: It knows, > therefore it is called consciousness. Knows what? Knows this is > pleasant, this is unpleasant and knows this is neither unpleasant nor > pleasant. Knows therefore it is said conscious. Friend, this knowledge > and this consciousness, are they associated or dissociated? Is there a > method to differentiate them and show them apart? What is known is > consciousness and consciousness is knowledge. Therefore these things > are associated and not dissociated and it is not possible to > differentiate them and show them apart. then later: > Friend, this feeling, perception, and this consciousness, are these > associated or dissociated? Is it possible to differenciate them and > show them apart?: Friend, feelings, perceptions and consciousness are > associated and not dissociated and it is not possible to differentiate > them and show them apart: Friend, the felt is perceived, and the > perceived is consciously known Therefore these things are associated > and not dissociated and it is not possible to differenciate them and > show them apart. If these three - consciousness, perception, and feeling - cannot be told apart, how are they conceptualized separately in the first place? It's a contradiction. If they cannot be told apart, why bother listing them as 3 separate aggregates? Why not just say the three arise together?

S 14.7 The Discourse on the Diversity of Perception says this: > Dependent on the mind-object element, there arises the perception of > mind-object; Dependent on the perception of mind-object, there arises > the thought regarding mind-object; Dependent on the thought regarding > mind-object, there arises the desire for mind-object; Dependent on the > desire for mind-object, there arises the passion for mind-object;Dependent on the passion for mind-object, there arises the searching for mind-object. i want to know if clinging to perception aggregate is causing thinking to occur. i am not interested in thinking (sometimes, more than not, interal verbalization). it's unhappy, tiresome, stressful, etc. if so, how am i clinging to perception aggregate? i am not aware of clinging to this...is it an unknown mind- object? can knowledge be a mind-object?

I would like to know if the following premises are well stated and if their content is true. Also, I'd like to know if the conclusion/answer makes sense: 1) In the aggregates, 'sankhara' are kammic formations. 2) Kammic formations are any phenomena that have an underlying intention, and therefore create new kamma. Question: Is intention (cetana) a sankhara? Thanks in advance for your time. Kind regards!

I'm reading the book [What the Buddha Taught](https://www.amazon.com/What-Buddha-Taught-Expanded-Dhammapada/dp/0802130313) . In the section *The Five Aggregates* of *Chapter II: The Four Noble Truths*, when discussing the relationship between the aggregate of consciousness and other four aggregates, the author said: > The Buddha declared in unequivocal terms that consciousness depends on matter, sensation, perception and mental formations, and that it cannot exist independently of them. He says: > > ‘Consciousness may exist having matter as its means (rūpupāyaṃ), matter as its object (rūpārammaṇaṃ), matter as its support (rūpa-patiṭṭhaṃ), and seeking delight it may grow, increase and develop; or consciousness may exist having sensation as its means . . . or perception as its means . . . or mental formations as its means, mental formations as its object, mental formations as its support, and seeking delight it may grow, increase and develop. > >‘Were a man to say: I shall show the coming, the going, the passing away, the arising, the growth, the increase or the development of consciousness apart from matter, sensation, perception and mental formations, he would be speaking of something that does not exist.’ (S III (PTS), p. 58) First of all, can you help me locate the corresponding sutra as quoted by the author? As I googled the quoted text and browsed a part of Saṁyutta Nikāya on the [dhammatalks](https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/index_SN.html) but couldn't find it. I don't have a copy of Pali Text Society's Saṁyutta Nikāya at hand. Now as I understand it (correct me if I were wrong), the consciousness (as in viññāṇa) is like a sort of bare awareness, awareness of the presence of an object. If there were no light and eyes, there wouldn't be eye awareness of the light. So we can say the aggregate of consciousness depends on the matter. The consciousness arises out of the condition that there's a sense and a corresponding sense organ (both of which are matter). But I think sensation, perception and mental formations all happen with the consciousness (bare awareness) as a precondition. Especially for perception (sanna) which is to recognize the object specifically, shouldn't that be based on bare awareness? So my question, does the aggregate of consciousness depend on the aggregates of sensation, perception and mental formations? If so, why?

The Nibbedhika Sutta: Penetrative (translated by Ven. Thanissaro) states the following: >"And what is the result of feeling? One who feels a feeling produces a corresponding state of existence, on the side of merit or demerit. This is called the result of feeling. What does this mean? If a feeling is either pleasant, unpleasant, or neither pleasant nor unpleasant, then isn't additional input required to determine merit or demerit?

This is based on the comments below this answer . From this page , we find the commentary: > nirodha-samāpatti 'attainment of extinction' (S. XIV, 11), also called > saññā-vedayita-nirodha, 'extinction of feeling and perception', is the > temporary suspension of all consciousness and mental activity, > following immediately upon the semi-conscious state called 'sphere of > neither-perception-nor-non-perception' (s. jhāna, 8). And also this commentary : > According to the commentary, "seclusion" here stands for Unbinding. On > emerging from the cessation of perception & feeling, and having had > contact with emptiness/the signless/the undirected, the mind inclines > naturally to a direct experience of Unbinding. On the other hand, the sutta states: > Furthermore, take a mendicant who, going totally beyond the dimension > of neither perception nor non-perception, enters and remains in the > cessation of perception and feeling. And, having seen with wisdom, > their defilements come to an end. To this extent the Buddha spoke of > progressive cessation in a definitive sense.” > AN 9.61 My question is: Does nirodha samapatti aka saññā-vedayita-nirodha refer to a super trance-like state beyond the 8th jhana in which the practitioner becomes completely unconscious without any mental activity (like what the commentary above suggests) with cessation of ALL perception and feeling? Or does nirodha samapatti aka saññā-vedayita-nirodha refer to Nibbana-element with residue aka Unbinding-property with fuel remaining of Iti 44 (please see Ven. Thanissaro's footnotes), where the arahant is fully conscious with mental activity, but has cessation of only the clinging (or tainted) perception and feeling? This is related to the clinging aggregates of SN 22.48 . The quoted passage from AN 9.61 can be interpreted in both these ways. The commentary suggests that after the practitioner comes out of the super trance-like state then he stays with Nibbana-element with residue. But the latter interpretation suggests that beyond the 8 jhanas, there is no super trance-like state. Rather, after experiencing Nibbana, it's directly Nibbana-element with residue in any state with mental activity present. In short, does nirodha samapatti aka saññā-vedayita-nirodha mean cessation of ALL perception and feeling, or cessation of the clinging-aggregates of perception and feeling? **Question: does nirodha samapatti refer to a super trance like state beyond 8th jhana OR does it refer to the state of arahantship (nibbana-element without residue i.e. without the clinging aggregates of perception and feeling)?**

If feeling, perception and consciousness are conjoined or mixed, and it is not possible to separate them or delineate them or disjoin them, then why do we have five different aggregates instead of just three? What is the significance and usefulness in the teaching to have feeling, perception and consciousness clearly distinguished into three different aggregates? Why were they not combined into a single aggregate? From MN 43 (translated by Ven. Thanissaro): > "Feeling, perception, & consciousness are conjoined, friend, not > disjoined. It is not possible, having separated them one from another, > to delineate the difference among them. For what one feels, that one > perceives. What one perceives, that one cognizes. Therefore these > qualities are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is not possible, having > separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among > them." From MN 43 (translated by Ven. Sujato): > “Feeling, perception, and consciousness—these things are mixed, not > separate. And you can never completely dissect them so as to describe > the difference between them. For you perceive what you feel, and you > cognize what you perceive. That’s why these things are mixed, not > separate. And you can never completely dissect them so as to describe > the difference between them.”

In the Khemaka Sutta (https://suttacentral.net/sn22.89/en/sujato) Khemaka is an Anagami and he sees the aggregates as not-self. Based on this I guess the answer to my question is probably stream-entry or anagami, but I'm not sure. This is a quote from that sutta: > “In the same way, reverends, I don’t say ‘I am’ with reference to > form, or apart from form. I don’t say ‘I am’ with reference to feeling > … perception … choices … consciousness, or apart from consciousness. > For when it comes to the five grasping aggregates I’m not rid of the > conceit ‘I am’. But I don’t regard anything as ‘I am this’. > > Although a noble disciple has given up the five lower fetters, they > still have a lingering residue of the conceit ‘I am’, the desire ‘I > am’, and the underlying tendency ‘I am’ which has not been eradicated.

In the Seeds Sutta (SN 22.54) , we find there are five kinds of seeds, which can grow, when they are fertile, undamaged and securely planted on the ground with water to nourish them. Water is delight and lust, or in another translation, relishing and greed. Earth refers to the four stations of consciousness, or in another translation, four standing-spots of consciousness, i.e. form, feeling, perception and volitional formations. But what are the five kinds of seeds? This translation of the sutta says "Consciousness together with its nutriment should be seen as like the five kinds of seeds." What is consciousness together with its nutriment, that forms five kinds of seeds? What five? In other suttas (e.g. MN 148 ), there are six kinds of consciousness - related to the six senses (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind or intellect). But what are the five in this sutta formed by consciousness and its nutriment? And what is the nutriment for consciousness? In another translation, this is fuel.