> In short, open theism posits that since God and humans are free, > God's knowledge is dynamic and God's providence flexible. Whereas > several versions of traditional theism picture God's knowledge of the > future as a singular, fixed trajectory, open theism sees it as a > plurality of branching possibilities, with some possibilities becoming > settled as time moves forward. Thus, the future, as well as God's > knowledge of it, is open. Open Theism states that, while God knows everything that can be known, the future free-will choices made by individual persons do not fall in the knowable category. In Isaiah 46 we find the following: > Remember the former things of old: for I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me, Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure: (vs. 9-10) There are no explicit or implicit limitations on God's foreknowledge contained in this passage: He declares (and therefore must know in advance) the end from the beginning. Open Theism declares that human, free-will choices are unknowable in advance by God. However it appears that, since the inception of any future circumstance is laden with, and even produced by, a myriad of human choices, declaring from ancient times the things that are not yet done would necessitate intimate knowledge of future human choices. On what basis does Open Theism limit God's possible foreknowledge? Of interest is this peer-reviewed article from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (entitled Foreknowledge and Free Will) arguing against the assumption that perfect foreknowledge eradicates free will.

Open theism posits that God possesses comprehensive knowledge of every possible future but is unaware of which particular future will be actualized due to human free will. Wouldn't this result in the same thing as Molinism? If God has exhaustive knowledge of every potential future, He knows precisely how each individual would act in any given situation. Thus, God would be aware of whether a person will ultimately be good or bad from the moment of their birth. Isn't this analogous to Molinism's concept of "middle knowledge"? One could argue that God's awareness of possibilities is so vast that He comprehends every conceivable outcome for an individual, not just every choice they might make. For instance, there exists a potential world where I become a terrorist, and another where I become a priest. God understands all these possibilities in perfect detail but is unaware of which one will unfold because it depends on my exercise of free will. However, wouldn't this contradict the Christian concept of the soul? This perspective seems to suggest that there is no inherent soul, and that a person's character is entirely contingent on circumstances. For example, if I had been born to strict Muslim parents, I might have become an extremist Muslim. If I'm not misunderstanding open theism, it appears to imply that a person's characteristics are solely determined by the random chance of their upbringing.

I've been studying the topic of Open Theism in comparison to other perspectives on God's sovereignty, omniscience, and man's free will. As I understand it, on a scale spanning from full on deterministic fatalism to fully libertarian freedom, Hyper-Calvinism is on one extreme end and Pelagianism is on the other extreme. Since Calvinism allows for a form of free will, it is obviously not deterministic fatalism, but it's obviously close by. Also, as I understand it, Augustinianism is very similar to Calvinism (or, rather, vice versa since the former came first chronologically), and Semi-Pelagianism is approximately halfway between Augustinianism and Pelagianism. My question, therefore, is two-fold: 1. Does the above scale provide an accurate structure from which to understand the perspectives listed above? 2. Where does Arminianism, Molinism, and Open Theism fall in comparison to the things listed above? In particular I've heard people effectively say that Arminianism is halfway between Calvinism and Semi-Pelagianism. Is that true, or is it closer to one than the other? I've also heard people describe Molinism as a variant of Arminianism. If true does it shift it towards Calvinism or away from it? Finally, it seems like Open Theism and Pelagianism are similar in that they exclusively focus in on either the nature of God or nature of man in ways fundamentally contrary to Scripture, and make vague statements on the nature of man or God. Ultimately, I'm trying to get a big-picture overview of all these things and how they relate to one another, so if part of all of my understanding above is way off base, I'd appreciate an explanation of where I went off the rails, and how you would explain the relationship between all these things.

So in the comments of this answer: [How do non-Open-Theists reason a basis for "Free will"?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/101939/46521) The question: > "Why must it be that a choice that is known by God in advance is not > your own? [...]" – Dark Malthorp was raised. My position in general is that through God's exhaustive foreknowledge, the possible options one can choose will be reduced to one. To my knowledge (correct me if I am wrong with this assumption) this position corresponds with the position of Open-Theism. Therefore, I was wondering if there is an Open-Theist argumentation or explanation that can demonstrate this correlation between omniscience and determinism more precisely and concisely than my attempt in the comments. *God's foreknowledge*: God's knowledge of the future. It can logically be viewed as exhaustive (God knows absolutely everything, which is how I would define omniscience in regards to future), limited (God knows something/a lot but not everything), or non-existent (God knows nothing about the future. *predetermination*: This is the view that every action/decision of humans is already determined, meaning unchangeable regardless of the "illusion" or choice. This could also result in Fatalism . *accountability*: Is the possibility that humans can be justifiably punished for their actions.

The underlying issue/debate that I am having is the reconciliation of God's omniscience (the foreknowledge part in particular) with free will (or lack of it, resulting in Fatalism). In short: If God knows **everything**, including every future action I take before I was even born, how can I take responsibility for sin if I can't prove God wrong? For example: @telion's unborn daughter will lie on 12.12.2050 (I ask this on 02.06.2024 without even having a girlfriend). => If that future sin is known then it follows (at least for me) that this sin is predetermined. => This contradicts the idea of human responsibility for their sins and the free will God provides. It also means that God is responsible for all human sin, which is probably the wrong conclusion. One way to resolve this is to "redefine" the definition of God's omniscience or free will. This is why this question is a follow-up of this one: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/101929/what-is-the-biblical-concept-idea-meaning-of-gods-omniscience My personal solution would be to say that God has knowledge of the future but this knowledge is limited in such a way, that human free will is possible. I recently came to know that this position actually has a name which is Open Theism . In the question https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/83747/which-verses-in-the-bible-say-that-god-is-omniscient the [accepted answer](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/83748/10672) features a defense against Open Theism that includes a lot of scripture, which comes to the conclusion that God has "exhaustive knowledge of the future". However, I either don't understand the actual solution that is provided to the problem of predetermination provided by this defense, or I am simply unconvinced. I think the reason for that is the definition of "free will" or as John Frame puts it: "uncaused actions". I don't think actions are uncaused but there is still a freedom of decision. Meaning if I have 2 options to choose from, then the "probability" of which one I will pick doesn't have to be 50/50. Let's say I have to decide which subject I should get a college degree in: Based on my interests, upbringing, and life goals, specific options are more likely than others so regardless of what I choose, the decision is not free of influence. Influence is not the same thing as predetermination, as I can choose to disregard a specific influence. **So how do I imagine the perspective of God on the future and free will?** I think it is similar to the perspective of the developer of the Game Detroit: Become Human . (To get a better feel for the concept behind the game, see [this video]( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3cLDDwLeJA); at 16.48 the player has to decide between lying or telling the truth.) In this game, the player plays through a story and is provided with various decisions that can greatly impact the overall storyline of the game. In this case, the developer knows and provides all possible options. So he is not particularly surprised by a specific event. The player in this case has limited free will, meaning he cannot decide to simply become a shopkeeper e.g., as that is not an option in the game. But the decisions provided to the player are free. I also think that based on God's almightiness, "forgetting" or "choosing to not know" which options people finally decide, should be in the realm of possibility. The competing view/analogy is that of a movie, where the viewer is "beyond time" from the perspectives of the characters in the movie (as I can fast forward, go back, or replay the movie). In this case, though, I argue that the characters in the movie, don't have actual free will, or at least the "free will" in that case is illusionary. So if I as a movie creator make a story where a person commits a sin, then I can hardly blame the character for it. So to summarize the question(s): - How do non-Open Theists argue for human free will? - How do non-Open Theists argue against predeterminism? - How do non-Open Theists finally conclude that humans are responsible for their sins?

>“for whenever our heart condemns us, God is greater than our heart, and he knows everything.” 1 John‬ ‭3:20‬ ‭ESV‬‬ Considering that God knows everything, that means he would know the future. How do open theists respond to this?

**Libertarian free will** is the position that a person’s choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. Libertarians generally argue that we cannot be held responsible for our own choices unless we were entirely able to have made a contrary choice instead.1 I’ve included both Arminians and open theists in the question because my understanding is they would generally agree on their views and would both self-identify as holding the libertarian free will position.2 Please no philosophical or logical arguments or opinions. The question here is what case can be made for this view from the Bible. Answers are welcome from determinists and compatibilists as long as you think you can faithfully represent the libertarian position (always cite your sources if applicable!). ---- 1 This is not to be confused with the political view known as libertarianism. Political libertarianism and libertarian free will, sometimes called metaphysical libertarianism, are completely unrelated. For a fuller definition see *[Theopedia › Libertarian free will](http://www.theopedia.com/libertarian-free-will)* .
2 For an Arminian defending libertarian free well and self-identifying as libertarian, see *[Society of Evangelical Arminians › Libertarian free will](http://evangelicalarminians.org/libertarian-free-will/)* . For an open theist, see *[ReKnew.org › Is Free Will compatible with Predestination?](http://reknew.org/2007/12/is-free-will-compatible-with-predestination/)* .

These questions pretty clearly show that God knows the future: > For I know the plans I have for you, declares the Lord, plans for welfare and not for evil, to give you a future and a hope. > > [Jeremiah 29:11, ESV](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Jeremiah+29%3A11&version=ESV) > When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth, for he will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. > > [John 16:13, ESV](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+16%3A13&version=ESV) Open theism "is the Christian doctrine that the future is not settled but open because God is alive, eternally free, and inexhaustibly creative." So how do open theists respond to these verses?

[Open theism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_theism) , in a nutshell, asserts that the future free choices of agents endowed with free will are unknowable, and therefore that God, though omniscient, is not capable of knowing in advance what we will freely choose in any particular future situation because future free choices are unknowable things, as I just said. What is the biblical basis for Open Theism?

Ronald Nash challenges [open theism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_theism) in his book, *Life's Ultimate Questions*, in particular on the point of God's foreknowledge during the crucifixion of Jesus. Since God's knowledge of the future is "open" or "dynamic," according to open theism, he is not omniscient in the classical sense. Nash argues: > Think back to this God's conundrum at the time his Son was dying on the cross. At that moment, the finite God of open theism had no way of knowing if even one human being would accept his Son as Savior. This poor impotent deity faced the possibility that the suffering of his Son upon the cross would bring about the salvation of no one. (323) Nash seems to be ignoring the case of OT saints (whom presumably God knew would be saved through the death of Christ). But otherwise, is he right? Is he fairly representing the view of open theism? Do its adherents generally admit that God didn't know if Christ's death would result in a church, or indeed a single post-resurrection believer? If he didn't know, did he have any purpose for sending Jesus to earth other than saving OT saints? If there is disagreement on this among the various types of open theists, I'd like an overview of their positions.

How do followers of [open theology (open theism)](https://www.iep.utm.edu/o-theism/)1 interpret 1 Peter 1:2 (KJV), in particular the emphasized part? > Elect **according to the foreknowledge of God the Father**, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ: Grace unto you, and peace, be multiplied. In what sense was God's plan carried out according to his foreknowledge, in open theology? Note that it is *foreknowledge* that is in focus of my question. According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_theism#Varieties_of_open_theists) there are four branches of open theism: > - Voluntary Nescience: The future is alethically settled but nevertheless epistemically open for God because he has voluntarily chosen not to know truths about future contingents ... - Involuntary Nescience: The future is alethically settled but nevertheless epistemically open for God because truths about future contingents are in principle unknowable ... - Non-Bivalentist Omniscience: The future is alethically open and therefore epistemically open for God because propositions about future contingents are neither true nor false ... - Bivalentist Omniscience: The future is alethically open and therefore epistemically open for God because propositions asserting of future contingents that they 'will' obtain or that they 'will not' obtain are both false. Instead, what is true is that they 'might and might not' obtain ... So followers of either Nescience branch believes that while there *is* a definite future, God does not know it (either voluntarily or involuntarily). On the other hand, followers of either Omniscience branch believes that the future is not (fully) settled, but that God has perfect knowledge as far as it makes sense to talk about it. Optimally, an answer would deal separately with each branch, or provide an answer that all branches support. 1 *Open Theism is the thesis that, because God loves us and desires that we freely choose to reciprocate His love, He has made His knowledge of, and plans for, the future conditional upon our actions. Though omniscient, God does not know what we will freely do in the future. (quoted from linked reference)*

Most translations say that "Now I know that you fear God" and I refers to the angel in the previous verse. But Open Theists say that God is learning, that "I" refers to God, but I don't see that in the translations. Is there any evidence of this belief, that "I" refers to God, in the text?

John Piper has said that [open theism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_theism) (i.e. the notion that God himself changes over time and can choose to be ignorant of His own future if He so chooses) "is an attack, however unwittingly, on the cross and on the work of the Spirit as our only hope of persevering faith and salvation." What is the basis for this assertion?