Me and a friend have been debating this topic and I'm a little stumped I must say. My friend believes in Hard Determinism where desires control us and our desires come from what he calls "life path". I tried refuting this by saying free will and desires are distinct but he simply brought up that our strongest desires determine our free will. So if you use your free will to go against your strongest desire, then you are still using a stronger desire to over come another stronger desire if that makes sense. So after doing some research I stumbled upon libertarianism and it seems like that is the view point I gave to him about free will and desires being distinct. But I'm not sure if libertarianism is the Biblical explanation. So how does God explain free will and desires being distinct? Can we really choose to not follow our stronger desire without a stronger desire causing us to do so? If so, then why would we choose to do something we do not want to do unless the desire to do that thing is stronger than the desire to not do it?

The relationship between God's foreknowledge (or omniscience) and the free will of humans seems to be a complicated topic where multiple positions exist. Regardless of my position (which you can read about here: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/101932/how-do-non-open-theists-reason-a-basis-for-free-will and https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/101985/how-would-an-open-theist-explain-that-gods-exhaustive-foreknowledge-would-lead) I think it would be helpful to have an overview of all the various positions that arose (including Open Theism). The main questions I have for each position would be: - How do they imagine God's foreknowledge works? - Is God's foreknowledge exhaustive or limited? - What are the biggest biblical arguments they put forward? - Do humans have "free will" and if so, how does it work? - Do they avoid Fatalism/Predeterminism? If so how?

As an example of human behaviour: "and he ate" Genesis 3:6. ESV. A. Adam acted out of freewill. B. Adam's action was determined by God positively withholding from Adam the grace to obey Him and refrain from eating. God did this because He wanted to make the point that grace to obey would come through the 2nd Adam, and therefore God withheld it from the 1st Adam. 1st and 2nd Adam are mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15:45-47. >"And from his fullness we have all received, grace upon grace." John 1:16 ESV

So in the comments of this answer: [How do non-Open-Theists reason a basis for "Free will"?](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/101939/46521) The question: > "Why must it be that a choice that is known by God in advance is not > your own? [...]" – Dark Malthorp was raised. My position in general is that through God's exhaustive foreknowledge, the possible options one can choose will be reduced to one. To my knowledge (correct me if I am wrong with this assumption) this position corresponds with the position of Open-Theism. Therefore, I was wondering if there is an Open-Theist argumentation or explanation that can demonstrate this correlation between omniscience and determinism more precisely and concisely than my attempt in the comments. *God's foreknowledge*: God's knowledge of the future. It can logically be viewed as exhaustive (God knows absolutely everything, which is how I would define omniscience in regards to future), limited (God knows something/a lot but not everything), or non-existent (God knows nothing about the future. *predetermination*: This is the view that every action/decision of humans is already determined, meaning unchangeable regardless of the "illusion" or choice. This could also result in Fatalism . *accountability*: Is the possibility that humans can be justifiably punished for their actions.

The underlying issue/debate that I am having is the reconciliation of God's omniscience (the foreknowledge part in particular) with free will (or lack of it, resulting in Fatalism). In short: If God knows **everything**, including every future action I take before I was even born, how can I take responsibility for sin if I can't prove God wrong? For example: @telion's unborn daughter will lie on 12.12.2050 (I ask this on 02.06.2024 without even having a girlfriend). => If that future sin is known then it follows (at least for me) that this sin is predetermined. => This contradicts the idea of human responsibility for their sins and the free will God provides. It also means that God is responsible for all human sin, which is probably the wrong conclusion. One way to resolve this is to "redefine" the definition of God's omniscience or free will. This is why this question is a follow-up of this one: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/101929/what-is-the-biblical-concept-idea-meaning-of-gods-omniscience My personal solution would be to say that God has knowledge of the future but this knowledge is limited in such a way, that human free will is possible. I recently came to know that this position actually has a name which is Open Theism . In the question https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/83747/which-verses-in-the-bible-say-that-god-is-omniscient the [accepted answer](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/83748/10672) features a defense against Open Theism that includes a lot of scripture, which comes to the conclusion that God has "exhaustive knowledge of the future". However, I either don't understand the actual solution that is provided to the problem of predetermination provided by this defense, or I am simply unconvinced. I think the reason for that is the definition of "free will" or as John Frame puts it: "uncaused actions". I don't think actions are uncaused but there is still a freedom of decision. Meaning if I have 2 options to choose from, then the "probability" of which one I will pick doesn't have to be 50/50. Let's say I have to decide which subject I should get a college degree in: Based on my interests, upbringing, and life goals, specific options are more likely than others so regardless of what I choose, the decision is not free of influence. Influence is not the same thing as predetermination, as I can choose to disregard a specific influence. **So how do I imagine the perspective of God on the future and free will?** I think it is similar to the perspective of the developer of the Game Detroit: Become Human . (To get a better feel for the concept behind the game, see [this video]( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3cLDDwLeJA); at 16.48 the player has to decide between lying or telling the truth.) In this game, the player plays through a story and is provided with various decisions that can greatly impact the overall storyline of the game. In this case, the developer knows and provides all possible options. So he is not particularly surprised by a specific event. The player in this case has limited free will, meaning he cannot decide to simply become a shopkeeper e.g., as that is not an option in the game. But the decisions provided to the player are free. I also think that based on God's almightiness, "forgetting" or "choosing to not know" which options people finally decide, should be in the realm of possibility. The competing view/analogy is that of a movie, where the viewer is "beyond time" from the perspectives of the characters in the movie (as I can fast forward, go back, or replay the movie). In this case, though, I argue that the characters in the movie, don't have actual free will, or at least the "free will" in that case is illusionary. So if I as a movie creator make a story where a person commits a sin, then I can hardly blame the character for it. So to summarize the question(s): - How do non-Open Theists argue for human free will? - How do non-Open Theists argue against predeterminism? - How do non-Open Theists finally conclude that humans are responsible for their sins?

What was God’s role in the Fall (if He had one)? I’m learning about the Calvinist (or perhaps hyper-Calvinist) view of Pre-determinism, and respectfully, it causes me great concern. Perhaps I’m concerned because I misunderstand Pre-determinism altogether. However, if I understand it correctly (which I probably don’t; hence why I’m asking), wouldn’t the Pre-determinist’s natural conclusion of God’s involvement in the Fall be that, because God has willed all events to happen He Himself is responsible for their occurrence? Would the line of reasoning be something like this: 1. Results of events have been determined (or willed) from eternity past. 2. The rebellion (or fall) of spiritual and physical beings were events. 3. Therefore, God determined (or worse, willed) the rebellion of spiritual and physical beings.

- Did the Early Church (ante-Nicene period) believe in libertarian free will? - Did the Early Church (ante-Nicene period) believe in determinism? - Did the Early Church (ante-Nicene period) believe that salvation requires a synergistic cooperation between a free human being and God's grace, and that a person can freely choose to resist God's grace and lose their salvation? ____ Related: - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/65806/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/80167/50422

I'm referring to this article: [What Is Free Will?](https://www.ligonier.org/learn/series/chosen-by-god/what-is-free-will) , which is a transcript of a sermon by Reformed Theologian [R.C. Sproul](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R._C._Sproul) (a video recording of the sermon is available in the same article). I highly recommend reading the article (or watching the video) before posting an answer. The article contains the following sections: - Spontaneous Choice - No Moral Significance - A Rational Impossibility - The Mind Choosing - The Strongest Desire - Your Money or Your Life - “What I Want, I Do Not Do” - Free and Determined - Sinners Want to Sin - In Bondage to Sin Notice that Sproul doesn't exactly use the term "[libertarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics)) free will", but he argues against what he calls "Spontaneous Choice", which for all practical purposes appears to be equivalent to the libertarian understanding of free will. **Question**: How do Christians who believe in libertarian free will respond to R.C. Sproul's critique in the article "What Is Free Will?"? _____ **Related questions** - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/89782/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/48979/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/54588/50422 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/83687/50422 _____ **Appendix - Quotes from the article** Below relevant quotes from the article (emphasis mine): > **If God predestines people to salvation, then what about free will? Doesn't the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination override human free will? What about choice?** Considering the doctrine of divine election in this message, Dr. Sproul discusses some of the fundamentally wrong assumptions people have when they think of free will. > I want to direct our attention to an examination of what we mean by the words free will. What does it mean to have a free will? **What does it mean to be a free moral agent, a volitional creature under the sovereignty of God?** > > First of all, let me say that there are different views of what free will comprises that are bandied about in our culture. I think it’s important that we recognize these various views. > ### Spontaneous Choice > The first view is what I’m going to call the “humanist” view of free will, which I would say is the most widely prevalent view of human freedom that we find in our culture. I’m sad to say that, in my opinion, it’s the most widely held view within the church as well as outside the church. > > **In this scheme, free will is defined as our ability to make choices spontaneously**. **That is, the choices we make are in no wise conditioned or determined by any prior prejudice, inclination, or disposition. Let me say that again: this view says that we make our choices spontaneously**. Nothing previous to the choice determines the choice—no prejudice, prior disposition, or prior inclination—**the choice comes literally on its own as a spontaneous action by the person**. > > **I see at the outset two serious problems that we face as Christians with this definition of free will. The first is a theological, moral problem and the second is a rational problem**. I should really say that there are three problems because the whole lecture will focus on the third one, but, at the outset, we immediately see two problems. > ### No Moral Significance > The first is, as I said, a theological, moral problem. **If our choices are made purely spontaneously, without any prior inclination or disposition, then in a sense we’re saying that there is no reason for the choice. There is no motive for the choice; it just happens spontaneously.** > > **If that is the way our choices operate, then we immediately face this problem: how could such an action have any moral significance at all? This is because one of the things the Bible is concerned about in the choices we make is not only what we choose, but also what our intention is in the making of that choice.** > > We recall, for example, the story of Joseph being sold into slavery by his brothers. When he has this reunion with his brothers many years later, and they repent of that former sin, what does Joseph say to his brothers? When he accepts them and forgives them, he says, “You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good” (Gen. 50:20). God made a choice in the matter. God had chosen, at least, to allow this to happen and to befall Joseph. His brothers made a choice about what to do with Joseph. Their inclination in the making of that choice was wicked. God also made a choice in allowing it to take place, but God’s intention in this activity was altogether righteous and holy. > > So God, in considering a good deed, not only examines the outward deed itself (the action), but He also considers the inner motivation (the intent behind the deed). But if there are no inner motivations, if there is no real intentionality (to use the philosophical term), then how could the action be of any moral significance? It just happens. > ### A Rational Impossibility > **Even deeper than that problem, the humanist view immediately faces the question of whether or not such a choice could actually be made. That is, the question is not simply whether it would be moral if it were made, but whether a creature without any prior disposition, inclination, bent, or reason could even make a choice**. > > Let’s look at this by way of a couple of examples. What is attractive about the idea that I have no prior inclination or disposition is that my will would be neutral. It is inclined neither to the left nor to the right. It is neither inclined toward righteousness nor toward evil but is simply neutral. There is no previous bent or inclination to it. > > I think of the story of Alice in Wonderland when Alice, in her travels, comes to the fork in the road, and she can’t decide whether to take the left fork or the right fork. She looks up, and there is the Cheshire Cat in the tree, grinning at her. She asks of the Cheshire Cat, “Which road should I take?” And the Cheshire Cat replies by saying: “That depends. Where are you going?” Alice says, “I don’t know.” Then what does he say? “Then I guess it doesn’t matter.” > > If you have no intent, no plan, no desire to get anywhere, what difference does it make whether you take the left or the right? In that situation, we look at it and think, “Alice now has two choices: she can go to the left, or she can go to the right.” But really she has four choices: she can go to the left, she can go to the right, she can turn and go back where she came from, or she can stand there and do nothing until she perishes from her inactivity, which is also a choice. > > So, she has four choices, and the question we’re going to ask is: Why would she make any of those four choices? If she has no reason or inclination behind the choice, if her will is utterly neutral, what would happen to her? If there is no reason to prefer the left to the right, nor to prefer standing there to going back, what choice would she make? She wouldn’t make a choice. She would be paralyzed. > > **The problem we have with the humanist notion of freedom is the old problem of the rabbit out of the hat, but without a hat and without a magician. It is something coming out of nothing, an effect without a cause. A spontaneous choice, in other words, is a rational impossibility. It would have to be an effect without a cause**. > > **I would add that, from a biblical perspective, man in his fallenness is not seen as being in a state of neutrality with respect to the things of God. He does have a prejudice. He does have a bias. He does have an inclination, and his inclination is toward wickedness and away from the things of God**. I just say that in passing as we look at various Christian views of the freedom of the will.

From the Wikipedia article on [Determinism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism) : > **Determinism is the philosophical view that all events are determined completely by previously existing causes**. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have sprung from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. The opposite of determinism is some kind of indeterminism (otherwise called nondeterminism) or randomness. Determinism is often contrasted with free will, although some philosophers claim that the two are compatible. > > **Determinism often is taken to mean *causal determinism*, which in physics is known as cause-and-effect. It is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states**. This meaning can be distinguished from other varieties of determinism mentioned below. And from the Wikipedia article on [Causality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Volition) about the topic of volition: > **The deterministic world-view holds that the history of the universe can be exhaustively represented as a progression of events following one after as cause and effect**. The [incompatibilist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incompatibilism) version of this holds that there is no such thing as "[free will](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will) ". [Compatibilism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism) , on the other hand, holds that determinism is compatible with, or even necessary for, free will. If we define the *volitional state* of a person as all the contents of their consciousness, their thoughts, emotions, desires, intentions, plans, decisions, tendencies, habits, etc., at a specific point in time, would Reformed Calvinists then say that all *volitional states* of a person are *causally determined* by prior causes in time? More formally, if we define - V(*p*,*t*) as the volitional state of person *p* at time *t*, - U(*t*) as the state of the universe at time *t*, and - *t1* and *t2* as any two different points in time such that *t1* 2*, would Reformed Calvinists agree that V(*p*, *t2*) is causally determined by U(*t1*) for each person *p* in the universe?

A.W Pink in "The sovereignty of God" says in the introduction- "Two things are beyond dispute: God is sovereign, man is responsible". That compatibilist point of view is compared to Libertarian thinking in Scott Christensen's book "What about Free Will?" page 238. Is there a book which challenges both compatibilist and libertarian thinking by putting forward a third possibility, namely hard determinism? Hard determinism- all human choices are necessarily determined by prior conditions, which in this Christian context would include God's sovereignty. Libertarianism- Freedom of choice is the ability to choose contrary to any prior factors that influence the choice including one's motives, desires and even God Himself. Compatibilism-God determines human choices, yet every person freely makes their own choices.

Usually free-will is assumed by most faith traditions as a prerequisite for moral responsibility in order to justify eternal punishment. The argument goes as "you are truly responsible for your immoral deeds because you were perfectly capable of acting morally, but chose not to, and therefore you are guilty and deserve punishment". In other words, there is an assumption of a self capable of having chosen otherwise. But this definition sounds kind of handwavy to me. What do they really mean by "capable of having chosen otherwise"? Does this mean that if we *somehow* go back in time and press the *"univere's play button"* again, a different decision would have come out of the same self? But how would that be different from randomness? I would appreciate a **formal** (hopefully, **mathematical** if you can) definition of free-will that **clearly** differentiates it from **determinism**, **randomness** and any kind of **determinism-randomness hybrid**. Furthermore, I would love to read a logical discussion of how the formal definition provided would support the existence of **true** moral responsibility. Let me explain why. If the only options available were *determinism*, *randomness* and *determinism-randomness hybrid*, I cannot see any hope for **true** moral responsibility: 1. **Determinism**: your actions, either moral or immoral, are just the ripple effect of past events, you cannot help but do what the laws of Physics make you do, you had no choice, it's not your fault, therefore there is no true moral responsibility on your part. 2. **Randomness**: your actions are random, chaotic, there is no control, you are lucky/unlucky that you behave morally/immorally by random chance (e.g. because of weird quantum randomness in the brain, for example). In other words, it's just a matter of luck, a matter of winning the morality lottery. If you behave immorally, it's not really your fault, it's just your bad luck. Therefore there is no true moral responsibility on your part either. 3. **Determinism-Randomness Hybrid**: your actions are the result of a combination of deterministic rules applied to past events combined with random quantum noise or something along those lines. Depending on how strong are the causal ripple effects from past events and how strong are the random noises altering them, you end up acting either morally or immorally. In part you are unlucky, in part you have no choice. Anyway, it's not your fault. Therefore there is no true moral responsibility on your part either. So, *somehow*, **free-will** is supposed to have a mysterious **formal definition** that distinguishes it from *determinism*, *randomness* and *determinism-randomness hybrid* that allows for **true moral responsibility** in a way that these other concepts can't. I would really appreciate such a formal definition.

I read this quote from John Calvin on [some website](http://www.reformationtheology.com/2007/08/compatibilistic_determinism.php) : >"...we allow that **man has choice and that it is self-determined, so that if he does anything evil, it should be imputed to him and to his own voluntary choosing**. We do away with coercion and force, because this contradicts the nature of the will and cannot coexist with it. **We deny that choice is free**, because through man's innate wickedness it is of necessity driven to what is evil and cannot seek anything but evil. And from this it is possible to deduce what a great difference there is between necessity and coercion. For we do not say that man is dragged unwillingly into sinning, but that because his will is corrupt he is held captive under the yoke of sin and therefore of necessity will in an evil way. For where there is bondage, there is necessity. But it makes a great difference whether the bondage is voluntary or coerced. We locate the necessity to sin precisely in corruption of the will, from which follows that it is self-determined. John Calvin from Bondage and Liberation of the Will, pg. 69-70 I believe in determinism, and I have no problem with the idea that humans *need* to be chastised for bad behavior. For example, a child steals a candy bar. The mother catches the child, makes them return the candy and apologize, and then issues whatever *corrective* chastisement to *cause* the child to think twice next time they want to steal. I also have no problem with the fact that God appointed for this to happen, so that the child's will was not free. The child stealing and then getting chastised is a good lesson to both the child and others about the consequences of sin, and this lesson will *cause* them to behave appropriately (as well as continue the chain of determinism towards God's ultimate goal). Had the child never stolen, then the chastisement would have never occurred, and nobody would have learned any prudence. What I don't understand is why the child *deserves* to be *punished*, namely in an eternal hell with flesh burning (or whatever other ideas are associated with this place.) According to Reformed Theology, why do humans *deserve* to be *punished* forever in hell for their predetermined actions?

Do any existing pastoral counseling programs take into effect how the theological framework concerning the doctrine of free will affects the counselor's therapeutic approach? For instance, an institution that gravitates towards theological determinism (such as Calvinism ) might be more likely to adopt an approach based on radical behaviorism such as CBA (e.g. ACT , which has an underlying worldview of functional contextualism ; or functional analytic psychotherapy), while an institution that leans towards theological indeterminism/libertarianism (such as Pelagianism or Arminianism ) might feel more comfortable with standard CBT approaches. From my experience, most pastoral counseling programs seem to teach some form of CBT without considering how the underlying worldview of the therapeutic approach conflicts (or agrees) with the theological ideologies of the institution and thus might create unintended countertransference . Has anyone dealt with this in scholarly publications or studies? Do any institutions who teach pastoral counseling directly address this issue?

Does Christianity say that the events that happen to us are from God? Is it all free will, or free will and God steps in to veto if he wants, or everything from God. I ask because at the Church I go to it seems like if a street light turns green, it is from God...or if a stranger says something to me, it is a sign from God...