On what basis does Open Theism introduce limitations to Isaiah 49:9-10?

> In short, open theism posits that since God and humans are free, > God's knowledge is dynamic and God's providence flexible. Whereas > several versions of traditional theism picture God's knowledge of the > future as a singular, fixed trajectory, open theism sees it as a > plurality of branching possibilities, with some possibilities becoming > settled as time moves forward. Thus, the future, as well as God's > knowledge of it, is open. Open Theism states that, while God knows everything that can be known, the future free-will choices made by individual persons do not fall in the knowable category. In Isaiah 46 we find the following: > Remember the former things of old: for I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me, Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure: (vs. 9-10) There are no explicit or implicit limitations on God's foreknowledge contained in this passage: He declares (and therefore must know in advance) the end from the beginning. Open Theism declares that human, free-will choices are unknowable in advance by God. However it appears that, since the inception of any future circumstance is laden with, and even produced by, a myriad of human choices, declaring from ancient times the things that are not yet done would necessitate intimate knowledge of future human choices. On what basis does Open Theism limit God's possible foreknowledge? Of interest is this peer-reviewed article from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (entitled Foreknowledge and Free Will) arguing against the assumption that perfect foreknowledge eradicates free will.