Is the *esse* that perfected the humanity of the Word, common to all three Persons of the Blessed Trinity or to only the Word? I ask because the divine *esse* is identical to the divine nature. And the term "divine nature" could be understood in two senses. In one sense, it refers to all three Persons of the Blessed Trinity. In another sense, it refers to a particular Person of the Blessed Trinity, which is in this case the Word. Or is it the case that it's both depending on which sense is used?

What cannot licitly be bought and sold, according to Thomist Catholic moral theologians? (I know buying/selling relics is forbidden.)

St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II-II q. 78 a. 1 co., says that usury is to sell the use of a consumable good separately from the consumable good itself: >To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident, we must observe that there are certain **things the use of which consists in their consumption**: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. On like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury. > >On the other hand, there are **things the use of which does n̲o̲t̲ consist in their consumption**: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a house. But that explanation makes no sense to me. Just because the use of wine consists in its destruction, I do not see how this implies that the sale of the use of wine also implies the sale of the property itself. I see no significant difference between using a house as a dwelling and using wine for drinking. If the sale of the use of the house can be separated from the sale of the property itself, then the sale of the use of the wine can also be separated from the sale of the property itself.

This is a bit of a weird one. **Is it possible for a priest to bless data/a computer program?** I ask because I'm considering writing a simple app for use by the faithful, and I like the idea of the app itself being blessed. It becomes even weirder when you think about downloads; **are the copies blessed?** I'd be especially interested if anyone can provide a Thomistic framework for this. Either way, this seems a like a fun intellectual exercise, and I'm curious what people think. Thanks!

One of the motivations behind the *doctrine of divine simplicity* (DDS) is that if God was composed of parts, God would depend upon those parts to exist and hence there would be something more fundamental than the godhead to account for what God is. In order for God to be most absolute, God must be completely simple, lacking any and all composition. Some philosophers have suggested that God himself could be the cause of his own complexity, and hence God's aseity would not be threatened. Classical theistic philosophers in response argue that the idea that God giving rise to his own complexity is incoherent and would require for God to be prior to himself, which is absurd. In response to the classical theistic objection, philosophers have suggested that God could be the *grounds* of his own complexity rather than the cause. Philosopher Matthew Baddorf writes: > [I]t is far from obvious that the only kind of thing that could > satisfactorily explain compresence is an outside sufficient cause. ... > **[The neo-classical theistic] God’s tropes are dependent upon God**. This > suggests another explanation for their compresence: they are > compresent because they are each grounded in God. **This is not a causal > explanation, but it is plausible to think that it is an explanation > nonetheless**. ... This conclusion can also be supported by more general > argument. **It is plausible that tropes are individuated by their > bearers and so cannot exist without them. Or, similarly, it is > plausible to think that tropes cannot exist without their bearers > since they are merely ways their bearers are.** (Baddorf, “Divine Simplicity”, 408–409) Rather than God depending upon his parts, his parts depend on him. > For all x, if x is a proper part of God or x is a property of God, > then x depends on God for its existence. (Fowler, “Simplicity”, 122) Is this position coherent? Further reading on this issue would be appreciated. Thanks!

**NOTE: This question is aimed at those who hold a particular view of the Trinity. If you do not hold the view I am referring to, then this question is not directed torwards you** Thomists and other Trinitarians hold that each person of the Trinity is identical to the divine essence, and that there is only a virtual or mind dependent distinction between the persons and the essence. But if each person is the divine essence, wouldn't that mean the persons are identical to each other? How then can we say the hypostases are distinct?

A chat yesterday informed me that Aquinas' [argument from causation](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wefohtJBnN8) was "too Newtonian" to work for modern atheists and only works in our friendly neighborhood eminently perceivable dimension. So, my question is, have any Christian philosophers been working on moving these particular goalposts into quantum space? And not just in a "well who created the multi-verse" way or an abject denial.

During this morning's _This Man is You_ video, Dr. Peter Kreeft use an analogy of a freight car to explain St. Thomas's argument from causation (one of the famous five proofs). He said that when you come to a train tracks and see a freight car moving, you know that the one in front of it is pulling it and the one in front of that is pulling it, etc. until you come to the engine which is pulling all of them; and this is like God creating the universe. Now, since this is a men's group, we naturally got to talking about trains and one of the fellows mentioned that it's common to have engines in the middle out west and also common to have them at the rear. And I got to thinking, is God the prime mover puller or pusher? Does that make a difference? And, just to frame this as a question that I think is on topic and not purely philosophical does the Thomistic principle of God as the First Cause also work if you think of God as the Final Cause - does it make any difference; could God also be _all_ the causes?

**Doesn't God giving orders to demons contradict the principle of double effect ?** 1 Kings 22:19-23, 1 Samuel 16:14 and Judges 9:23 clearly seem to say that God gave orders to demons. Thomas Aquinas also said that God sometimes sends demons to punish people and that demons always punish with evil intentions (they punish out of hatred and envy of humanity, not out of justice, so demons always sin when they punish someone). > The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. > According to the principle of double effect, sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end. > — [Doctrine of Double Effect (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect) The principle of double effect says that "the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed". Doesn't God doing justice against mankind through the sins of demons violate the principle of double effect?

I was wondering if someone could give me some of the key differences between Thomism and Molinism. That includes things like grace, foreknowledge, and any other aspect that they may disagree on.