Prajñākaragupta (ca. 8th–9th century) was a Buddhist philosopher of the epistemological school and the author of the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, an extensive commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. In his epistemic interpretations, the wisdom of non‑duality (advaya‑jñāna) is presented as “the ultimate means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).” To quote from here :- > **At the core of Prajñākaragupta’s thought is the wisdom of non-duality > (advaya-jñana) which is the ultimate means of valid cognition > (pramāṇa).** Dharmakīrti had further defined "pramāṇa" as that which > illuminates unknown objects (ajñātārthaprakāśo vā) and as that which > is a "knowledge without deception" (avisaṃvādi jñānam). > **Prajñākaragupta states that "unknown objects" ultimately refers to the > ultimate object (paramārtha) which is a non-dual form (advaitarūpatā) > (PVA 79,15-17). This non-dual perception (advaita-dṛṣṭi) is what > ultimately leads to the end of suffering.** Prajñākaragupta identifies > it with what Dharmakīrti calls the insight (yukti) that leads to the > end of suffering (Pramāṇavārttika chapter II v. 139). Previous > commentators had mainly aligned this with not-self. Prajñākaragupta > agrees, but also gives an alternative explanation: "yukti is union > (yoga), which means that all phenomena are interconnected beyond all > differences, that is, non-duality (advaita)" (PVA 116,16-19). **For > Prajñākaragupta, all other forms of Buddhist epistemology which do not > discuss non-duality are ways to gradually lead a person to higher and > subtler levels of wisdom, culminating in the nondual cognition** > (advaitāvabodha). ---------- Questions for Discussion:- 1. Does Prajñākaragupta’s non‑dual reading implicitly reify a kind of absolute awareness or self‑like substratum that diverges from the Buddha’s teaching of anatta? Given that Prajñākaragupta uses advaitarūpatā to characterize the ultimate object of cognition and posits an ultimate lack of distinction between knower and known, is this formulation closer to a form of non‑dual eternalism rather than strict Buddhist no‑self? 2. Can his interpretation genuinely be reconciled with the early Buddhist elimination of a permanent self? ----------

In Buddhist epistemology, Dharmakīrti develops a sophisticated theory of perception and inference, emphasizing pramāṇa (valid cognition) as the means to apprehend reality. Central to his system is the idea that perception provides direct, non-conceptual access to particulars, while inference allows us to understand universals and causal relations. At the same time In the early Buddhist texts, the Buddha too repeatedly emphasizes “seeing things as they are” (yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti), a form of direct awareness that is often described as immediate and non-conceptual. I am interested in exploring how Dharmakīrti’s framework relates to this epistemological stance of the Buddha. To what extent can Dharmakīrti’s pramāṇic approach be interpreted as a systematic elaboration of the Buddha’s notion of direct cognition? Are there points of convergence or divergence between Dharmakīrti’s epistemic theories and the original suttas?

[This answer on Reddit](https://old.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/12flgq9/what_are_some_arguments_for_reincarnation_from_a/jfgry4f/) gave a basic outline of [Dharmakīrti's argument for rebirth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebirth_(Buddhism)#Metaphysical_arguments) in the form of a syllogism: 1. Matter and consciousness are metaphysically different, their characteristics and nature are different 2. An effect must be of the same nature as its substantial cause 3. Thus consciousness cannot arise from or be produced by matter (1, 2) 4. Conclusion: Therefore, there must have a been a consciousness prior to any person's conception which causes the first moment of consciousness in this life For the sake of the question, let's assume that you accept this line of argumentation. The question then becomes, how did the first mental event arise according to this framework? Of course, there is the idea that many immaterial intellects exist in the transcendent realms some of which stretch beyond iterations of the universe and many eons, but at the same time, for there to be so many creatures on just this planet with consciousness would implicate that billions upon billions, if not more, immaterial entities survived the past iteration(s) and eons and made it to this one, and also never achieved enlightenment during that time, which seems highly implausible. Perhaps the Yogacara idea of the store-house consciousness must be of use here, but it would be difficult to prove, I'm not too sure. If anyone knows more about Dharmakīrti's thinking with regards to this, please share your knowledge.

Did any Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or Vietnamese Buddhists write about Buddhist logic in the tradition of Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti? What were their contributions to logic and epistemology?

I have read here argumentation for the continuity of mind, coming from a Geshe in Tibetan Buddhism. From what I have learnt it is asserted that: * Consciousness could not arise from matter (could not have matter as its ***substantial cause***). * It could not arise from nothing. * It could only arise from another moment of consciousness. Note: the definition of **"substantial cause"** above comes from Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika. Has anyone come across a Buddhist argument why something could not have nothing as its substantial cause? What faulty logical consequences would follow? More specifically, I have in mind a situation when due to a higher being's act/wish, something comes into being. What comes into being is not transformed from another previous entity, but emerges "from nothing" merely due to the higher's act/wish. I would like to understand whether there are logical contradictions that would follow from the asserting this to be possible.

There has been a rich history of debate between Vedantists and Buddhists. One main method the Vedantist uses disprove every other sect which doesn't hold Vedas as true, is to first prove that Vedas are authorless, then say that authorless Vedas have to be 100% true because the defects of lies and incomplete knowledge cannot be there in authorless, and therefore that whatever in Vedas must be 100% true and any sect which goes against the Vedas must be false. These are the two steps 1. Apourusheyatva (Authorlessness) 2. Swayam Pramanya (Default Validity) I have heard that various Buddhist scholars like Dharmakirti etc have tried to refute the claim of authorlessness of Vedas and its validity. Supposedly one such argument is there in first chapter of Pramanavarttika, which I couldn't find. >The first chapter discusses the structure and types of formal inference and the apoha (exclusion) theory of meaning. Dan Arnold writes that apoha is: "the idea that concepts are more precise or determinate (more contentful) just to the extent that they exclude more from their purview; the scope of cat is narrower than that of mammal just insofar as the former additionally excludes from its range all mammals in the world that are not cats." In the latter half of this chapter, Dharmakīrti also mounts an attack on Brahmanism, the authority of the Vedas, Brahmins and their use of mantras, and the system of caste (see Eltschinger 2000). He also discusses the role of scripture, which he sees as fallible and yet important for their discussion of “radically inaccessible things” (atyantaparokṣa) such as karma. Dharmakirti critiques the Brahmins thus: > > "The unquestioned authority of the Vedas; the belief in a world-creator; the quest for purification through ritual bathing; the arrogant division into castes; the practice of mortification to atone for sin— these five are the marks of the crass stupidity of witless men." So -- what were Buddhist arguments against Vedic validity because of its authorlessness? I'm interested in logical syllogism of Dharmakirti and the like -- in response to the authorlessness of Vedas. --- Edit -- My question is specific: Vedantists have given a syllogistic argument to prove that the Vedas are authorless, and many eminent scholars of Buddhism like Dharmakirti etc have tried to refute those syllogistic arguments by logic ... what are those arguments? Please don't answer this question in a general or a philosophical way.

Did Dignaga argue against real relations? I gather that his student, Dharmakirti, did. I'm asking only because I'd disagree, but am skeptical about universals.

> The point is that such moment by moment destruction is spontaneous > (ākasmika) and is the uncaused real nature of things, because it > cannot be an effect of any cause. The effect of such a cause, i.e., > the absence of the entity, would have to be a type of non-being > (abhāva), and non-being is unreal. > > A key underlying principle of the vināśitvānumāna is that negative > facts, such as absences, are not part of the ultimate furniture of the > world, but are just fictional conceptual constructions, as they are > devoid of causal powers. Equally, a fiction lacking causal powers is > not the effect of something else. While it is obviously impossible to > deny that hammers smash pots, the absence (abhāva) of the pot, i.e., > the non-existent pot, is not an effect, just as other non-existent > things (abhāva), like horns of rabbits, are not effects of anything > either. Hammers and the like are thus not actually causes of the pot's > absence but of it turning into potsherds. That idea is perhaps > defensible, in that arguably the mere absence of something—a purely > negative fact—might be less real and less efficacious than the > presence of other things. Nonetheless, the rest of the argument > looks to consist in a number of non-sequiturs going from that > difference in efficacy and reality between absences and presences to > the idea that perishing is somehow the real nature of things, that it > must be intrinsic to them, and that therefore things must perish > spontaneously moment after moment. Let's grant the Buddhist view that > the perishing of x is the real property of changing into a new thing, > and not just x becoming absent. If it is accepted that hammer blows do > change pots into potsherds, then why couldn't someone skeptical about > the Buddhist's arguments just take that as the model of how things > perish when they do? It does not follow from that model of perishing > that a pot could not endure for quite a while. Is it a non sequitur? If there are no absences then is nothing excluded from the causal context of an effect? If so, then couldn't we just conclude that causation is beyond conceptualization, so that any cause (the hammer) of e.g. destruction (the broken pot) is also not the cause, and the effect of destruction must be "the real nature of things", so invariant? Is that a good reconstruction of the argument, or have I misunderstood?

For what reason did Dharmakirti argue that absences are conceptual constructions? I wondered if it was because real absences would have svabhava, would be essences, because they do not change in time? I can't find anything to cite now, but I believe he argued this. I mean everyday absences, such as a cow from a field, rather than anything technical about apoha, which I am not that familiar with.

What is the "mark of cessation"? E.g. from Kihwa's _Commentary on the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment_: > From the standpoint of cultivation and severing, the sequence is from > coarse to subtle: ceasing, changing, abiding, and arising. > If you extinguish the mark of cessation, then you have for the first time attained the level of faith. Is it an abstract entity? If so, how would Dignaga's theory of apoha account for it? If not, I think it would be phenomenal, but I don't know what sort of actual thing it could be. I mean, can it studied empirically, like fire, or like consciousness? Does it matter either way to Buddhist practice or just life in general? --- Here's a copy of the text in question: