Buddha says > So you should train like this: ‘I will not tell a lie, even for a > joke.’ Tasmātiha te, rāhula, ‘hassāpi na musā bhaṇissāmī’ti Dhamma as taught by Buddha is not a lie therefore one should not say things which contradict Buddha. However Buddha in [MN 22](https://suttacentral.net/mn22/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=linebyline&reference=none¬es=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin) asks to give up Dhamma. > By understanding the simile of the raft, you will even give up the > teachings, let alone what is against the teachings. > > Kullūpamaṁ vo, bhikkhave, dhammaṁ desitaṁ, ājānantehi dhammāpi vo > pahātabbā pageva adhammā. What is meant by giving up the teachings ? For example- How do you give up the teaching that Sabbbe Dhamma Anatta? or Sabbe Sankhara Anicca? or Sabbe Sankhara Dukkha?

Sabbe Sankhara Anicca means all conditioned phenomena are impermanent. However , I was thinking whether any phenomena can be present everywhere even for a short span of time ? In other words I think , no conditioned phenomena can be ubiquitous because it will give a sense of temporary Self. One ubiquitous phenomena which comes to my mind is the presence of atom. Everything is made up of atoms except dark matter. Another ubiquitous phenomena is gravity. It seems to present everywhere.This is true for everything and everywhere. Is it true that no conditioned phenomena can be ubiquitous? And what will be the Pali or Sanskrit translation for “No conditioned phenomena can be ubiquitous.”? PS : I think Buddha didn’t say anything about it. However your thoughts are welcome. One reason I asked this question was because an ubiquitous phenomena gives at least a sense of temporary Self.

Three translations of Bhikkhu Sujato say: > But Master Gotama, when a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, where > are they reborn? > > Evaṃ vimuttacitto pana, bho gotama, bhikkhu kuhiṃ upapajjatī ti? > > ‘They’re reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha. > > “Upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”. > > Well then, are they not reborn? > > Tena hi, bho gotama, na upapajjatī ti? > > ‘**They’re not reborn**’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha. > > “Na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”. > >MN 72 ___________________________________________ > Seeing this, a learned noble disciple becomes disillusioned with form, > feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness. > > Evaṃ passaṃ, bhikkhave, sutavā ariyasāvako rūpasmimpi nibbindati, > vedanāyapi nibbindati, saññāyapi nibbindati, saṅkhāresupi nibbindati, > viññāṇasmimpi nibbindati. > > Being disillusioned they become dispassionate. Being dispassionate > they’re freed. When freed, they know ‘it is freed’. > > Nibbindaṃ virajjati; virāgā vimuccati. Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ > hoti. > > They understand: ‘**Rebirth is ended**, the spiritual journey has been > completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to > any state of existence.’ > > ‘Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ > itthattāyā’ti pajānātī”ti. > >SN 22.59 ____________________________________________________ > **The sage at peace is not reborn**, does not grow old, and does not die. > They are not shaken, and do not yearn. > > Muni kho pana, bhikkhu, santo na jāyati, na jīyati, na mīyati, na > kuppati, na piheti. > > For they have nothing which would cause them to be reborn. Not being > reborn, how could they grow old? Not growing old, how could they die? > Not dying, how could they be shaken? Not shaking, for what could they > yearn? > > Tañhissa, bhikkhu, natthi yena jāyetha, ajāyamāno kiṃ jīyissati, > ajīyamāno kiṃ mīyissati, amīyamāno kiṃ kuppissati, akuppamāno kissa > pihessati? > >MN 140 Why does MN 72 say "not reborn" does not apply to the freed mind (*vimuttacitto*) but SN 22.59 and MN 140 say "rebirth is ended" and the arahant is "not reborn"?

It is widely understood across all Buddhist traditions that the Buddha often spoke of persons and used words like 'I' and 'person' and 'self' and this is not seen as problematic or contradictory to the doctrine of anatman. Just as it is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira: > “Just as, with an assemblage of parts, > The word ‘chariot’ is used, > So, when the aggregates exist, > There is the convention ‘a being.’ > > SN 5.10 It is also self-evident that the Buddha would associate a proper name with individual beings and use this name conventionally over time to identify specific individuals. This is also not controversial for any Buddhist tradition that I'm aware. However, there were times when "the self" was discussed in such a way that the Buddha would not answer such as the famous case of Vacchagotta. It is widely understood that the Buddha found Vacchagotta's questions or mindset about those questions as problematic. Specifically, he held that Vacchagotta was confused or had some invalid presuppositions about the self that directly violated or contradicted the doctrine of anatman. Vacchagotta held to the notion that the self necessarily was real and actual and the Buddha understood that Vacchagotta was incapable of understanding the truth so he was silent. There are some on this forum who hold that speaking of *the self in this life* - when it is merely for conventional communication - is fine and not in contradiction to anatman, but speaking of *the self in other lives* in the same continuity is strictly forbidden as always contradicting anatman and necessarily presupposing the self to be real and actual. Why insist that all discussions of future or past lives necessarily entails the presupposition of real and actual existence? In short, why is it that real and actual existence is only sometimes the basis for discussions in this life, but always the basis for discussions about past or future lives? Why do some hold so dearly that the Buddha could not be speaking of future lives in the very same conventional manner that the Buddha often used the word "I" to refer to himself in his present life... merely as a means of communicating the truth to worldly beings? Why is it that some believe we can speak faultlessly of persons in this life and identifying them across various points in time in this life, but we are foreclosed of speaking faultlessly of persons in next lives or in past lives? Consider the Yamaka Sutta: > “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, > perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as > the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.” “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do > you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling, > without perception, without volitional formations, without > consciousness?”—“No, friend.” > > “But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and > actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I > understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose > taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of > the body and does not exist after death’?” > > SN 22.85 From this we can draw four conclusions: 1. It is not appropriate to regard the Tathagata as possessing or consisting of the aggregates taken together as real and actual 2. It is not appropriate to regard the Tathagata as not-possessing the aggregates or without them taken together as real and actual 3. The Tathagata is not to be regarded as real and actual 4. This is true both for future lives (the focus of Yamaka's question) as well as the present life If this is so, then it was entirely appropriate to refer to the Tathagata as existing in his present life, but not to do so with the presupposition that the Tathagata was 'real and actual', right? It was faultless to refer to the Tathagata as merely existing conventionally, right? If this is so, then why is it a fault to refer to the Tathagata as merely existing conventionally in a future life? Indeed, Yamaka was rebuked for denying this very thing, right?! With this question I'm interested in the perspective and answers from all the Buddhist traditions. NOTE: Some may see an apparent contradiction between SN 5.10 and SN 22.85 but it is cleared up by understanding the difference between 'convention' and 'real and actual'

Anything which is a result of combination can be called conditional. But is the opposite also true ? That is anything which is conditional must be a result of combination. For example - If there is a feeling then there must be a craving. This is a condition with no combination. However if you look closely feeling alone can not result in craving unless you are aware of the path leading to fulfilment of the feeling again. Therefore feeling with path awareness leads to cravings. Cravings result from combination of feelings and path awareness. Another example would be - If the weather is cloudy , it will rain. Cloud itself can not bring rain unless it reaches a specific density. Therefore cloud and density of cloud are a must for a rain.

Nobody has ever seen a circle. Yet we all say "that is a circle" and nod in agreement. But when we say that the top of a bottle is a circle, we see the bottle top, not really the circle. The recognition of a circle is impermanent. We are taught to recognize a circle in school and are given its name as "circle". Nobody has ever drawn a circle. We can only draw a rough form that is recognized as a "circle" but is actually not a circle. And it's not a circle because circles are made of points with no width, so a drawing of a circle can never be the circle we recognize. So then we ask, "What is a circle?" And in response comes the chorus, "A circle is a form". Except that the Buddha says: > [SN22.55:3.1](https://suttacentral.net/sn22.55/en/sujato#sn22.55:3.1) : They don’t truly understand form—which is impermanent—as impermanent. So if a circle is a form, it must be impermanent. But wait. How can this be? Beyond our deaths and the forgetting of the circle, others will be born who will be taught to recognize a circle as "circulo" or "Kreis" or whatever. And our children and their children will agree that these words define the same form. Is a circle a form and if so, how can we understand what the Buddha means when he says that form is impermanent?

This question concerns the proper understanding of AN 3.47:

“Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena.” AN 3.47

It might have been suggested in other questions that this sutta is referring only to non-composite sankharas. That is, for composite phenomena - like a chariot - that arising, ceasing, and enduring are not evident. Is this correct? Can the arising, enduring and ceasing of a chariot not be known because it is composite or made up of parts? If so, what would be a good example of a non-composite sankhara that this sutta *would* be applicable to? What non-composite conditioned phenomena can rightfully be said to arise, endure and cease? Does anyone have an example?

Nama, as in namarupa, the designation of 'feeling, perception, attention, intention & contact', why do they call these 'Nama'? Some clues or points to keep in mind; * intention (cetana) is kamma * six classes of intention are sankhara * sankhara fabricates the conditioned * contact has 6 sense media as cause * feeling, perception and sankhara are 'aggregates', are conjoined & are conjoined with 'consciousness' aggregate * 4 aggregates have objects * 3 aggregates always accompany consciousness * consciousness arises as one thing and ceases as another * same consciousness doesn't go from one life to another * consciousness is said to be inbetween two ends, 'form' on one end and 'name' on the other end * both 'the eye' and 'the form visible by the eye' are included under 'form [rupa]' * consciousness meeting rupa is a meeting of the three, is 'contact' * feeling is born of contact * feeling is requisite for craving * everything comes into being through attention * with consciousness as condition, name-and-form comes to be * with name-and-form as condition, consciousness comes to be * from sankhara as a requisite condition comes consciousness * sankhara has ignorance for cause * rupa isn't always generated as in arupajhana, formless perception attainment

How or what can you advise, or what might help, anyone who drinks too much, or who may want to stop drinking? Maybe based on experience and not only on Dhamma-theory (but an answer must include at least some Buddhist doctrine or practice or perspective).

There was a question on my mind lately, regarding ego. It is not paradox per se but I find it slightly paradoxical. Because people have such a strong ego, humanity has risen above the animal level. Our ego was main reason that we progressed, our desire to improve etc. If it wasn't for our ego, we would still be in caves, struggling and Buddhism would never exist. Isn't this paradoxical? Ego is the main reason that we came to the point where we are trying to forget our ego?

I asked a question which indirectly asked about Adhamma. However there was no direct refutation of Adhamma. So , I had to ask this question directly: Is there anything called as Adhamma in the Suttas ? In Sanskrit there is a word Adharma as opposite of dharma. > Adharma (Sanskrit: अधर्म) is derived from combining "a" with "dharma", > which literally implies "not-dharma". It means immoral, sinful, wrong, > wicked, unjust, unbalanced, or unnatural. Suppose I say forms are you or yours or yourself . Feelings are you or yours or yourself. Perceptions are you or yours or yourself. Choices are you or yours or yourself. Consciousness is you or yours or yourself. Then can the above observation or teaching be called Dhamma or Adhamma? I am asking this to clarify the meaning of Dhamma.

I've been looking around online for an answer to this question, but have come up empty handed. My understanding of *The Blue Cliff Record* is that it's a collection of famous cases compiled from the history of Zen. But what I'm wondering is how *The Mumonkan* differs from it? (I haven't read this one yet). Is there any overlap in the cases? And what was the purpose of having two different collections of Koans? Is it an entirely new collection? If so, what is the difference in the history of their respective collections?

Adhamma word is used at few places in the Suttas . Adhamma is opposite of Dhamma. If Dhamma means Right then Adhamma means Wrong. There is a characteristic of existence: Sabbe Dhamma Anatta. Can I say “ Sabbe Adhamma Anatta “? Does “ Sabbe Dhamma Anatta “ exclude Adhamma? If not then how do we reconcile?

Sabbe Dhamma Anatta says Form is not me , mine or myself.Feeling is not me , mine or myself .Perception is not me , mine or myself.Choices is not me , mine or myself.Consciousness is not me , mine or myself. Suppose I give one million dollar to somebody then am I doing Adhamma (not Dhamma , not supporting the path of Nibbana)? Because giving money means Money is yours. Feelings resulting from becoming rich is yours. Perception of rich is you , yours and yourself. Choices of luxurious living is yours. Consciousness of richness or luxurious living is yours. By giving money to somebody am I not propagating a wrong notion of Self(which in my opinion is adhamma)? Following is link to definition of Dhamma as an answer to “Is Anatta a phenomenon ? ” To quote : > While the word 'dhamma' is used AN 3.136 is in relation to 'natural > law', it is a 'dhamma' because the wisdom/understanding of anatta as > natural law 'supports' liberation from suffering.

In *Beacon of Certainty* (tr. Pettit), Mipham Rinpoche addresses key questions about how to practice based on Madhyamaka philosophy. The first question has to do with distinguishing absolute negation from implicative negation. - An affirming negative (or “implicative negation”) “expresses the absence of one predicate while implying some other.” (Pettit 109) In short, this is not a good way to conceive how *appearances* are empty of any true and inherent existence: because the implied *object* has to somehow stand apart and have some kind of inherent existence that is immune from further analysis. - A non-affirming negative (or “absolute negation”) “simply excludes something, without implying anything else.” (Pettit 109) This is a much more fruitful stance because it does not hold some kind of appearance as standing separate from emptiness; and therefore it can serve as a conceptual segue to meditative experience of the coalescence of emptiness and appearance. I think this distinction is a very powerful tool in overcoming the tendency to take appearances as concrete realities that somehow have emptiness within them; and to understand how appearance and emptiness coalesce. Is there a similar distinction within Theravadin buddhism? It seems like this would be a useful distinction when exploring the 3 Dharma seals, particularly that of not-self *(sabbe dhammā anattā*). But I've never encountered such an analysis when reading in the Pali Canon or Theravadin commentaries.

Sabbe Dhamma Anatta. It means all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are not-self. Is not-self or Anatta a phenomenon?

We are conditioned beings. Process of conditioning begins at a very early age and continues till we die. My question is : Does the process of conditioning affect the conditioner ?

In this excellent answer giving an in depth explanation of the various uses of sankhata in various suttas, the first usage is explained as 'conditioned things' based upon the famous phrase, "sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā" which is translated in various ways by different translators. Observe:

’All conditioned things are impermanent’ I.B. Horner

’All formations are impermanent’ Bhikkhu Bodhi

’All form is impermanent’ Bhikkhu Bodhi

‘All processes are inconstant’ Thanissaro Bhikkhu

’All conditional things are impermanent’ Suddhāso Bhikkhu

’All conditional things are impermanent’ Ācāriya Buddharakkhita

’That all conditional things are impermanent’ Peter Feldmeier

‘All conditions are impermanent’ Bhikkhu Sujato

‘All conditions are impermanent’ Bhikkhu Ānandajoti

Questions:

1. Are the differences in these translations meaningful?
2. If so, what is the correct translation/meaning?
3. Is it incorrect to translate sankhara in the context of 'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā' as 'a thing' or 'a phenomena?'
4. Is there any other place in the suttas where we can definitely say that sankhara is used to mean 'a thing' or 'a phenomena?'

Surely The Buddha appeared quite emaciated when he realized full enlightenment. Why is an emaciated Buddha rarely represented in art?

I've been to a nice restaurant (pictured below) where the bar was decorated with statues of the Buddha. Given the 5th precept and all; this seemed a bit odd. Would it be correct to surmise that the 5th precept is understood in different ways among Buddhists?