I would like to ask about interpretations of Mādhyamaka (non-Gelugpa) that affirm the possibility of predicating svabhāva of śūnyatā—understood as something self-sufficient, free, and complete. I assume that readings in line with Madhyamaka Shentong may be more open to this perspective, as opposed to Rangtong interpretations. But I would like to learn more about this. Thank you!

Wikipedia mentions the following translation of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 25:19-20 without mentioning a source: > There is nothing whatsoever of samsara distinguishing (it) from nirvana. There is nothing whatsoever of nirvana distinguishing it from samsara. (That?) is the limit which is the limit of nirvana and the limit of samsara; Even a very subtle interval is not found of (between) them.[citation needed] Where does that translation originate from?

I am writing an essay on SN 12.15 (interested folks can read the first draft [here](https://www.scribd.com/document/731466625/Kacc%C4%81nagotta-Sutta-Existence-Non-Existence-in-the-Pali-Suttas) ; using a new laptop & don't know how to format the Word document to fit the PDF conversion) and was heaping praise on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Chapter 15 however later came across the Dedicatory verse of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, as follows: > anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam | anekārtham anānārtham > anāgamam anirgamam || yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam | > deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam || > > I salute the Fully Enlightened One, the best of orators, who taught > the doctrine of dependent origination, according to which there is > neither cessation nor origination, neither annihilation nor the > eternal, neither singularity nor plurality, neither the coming nor the > going [of any dharma, for the purpose of nirvāṇa characterized by] the > auspicious cessation of hypostatization. I am supposed to accept this dedication literally? What is this supposed to mean, where the Buddha taught dependent origination to which there is no origination?

Once Nagarjuna has demonstrated the emptiness of all exaggerated existential positions, including the existence of the Dharma and the Buddha's doctrine, how does he then affirm the validity of the Dharma? Is it because the Dharma teaches nothing other than its own emptiness (as well as the emptiness of everything) and thus is conventionally affirmed as the supreme teaching? Why does the Dharma hold a privileged position?

Already in the dedicatory verses of the MMK, Nagarjuna tells us that there is no origination or cessation of any kind. There is no arising whatsoever. I understand that this absence of arisen things is identical to the doctrine of dependent origination. But if that's the case, what sense does it make to speak of an dependent origination if it has already been established that there are no things that have arisen? Doesn't dependent origination presuppose the existence of things to make any sense?

Where are the 70 verses of Nagarjuna from? Is it from Mulamukhyamakakarika or elsewhere? Is it a reconstruction of other works or original?

In the Madhyamakaśāstra, Venerable Vimalākṣa quotes the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra: 菩薩有我亦非行無我亦非行 "If the bodhisatva has a self, he cannot act. With no self too, he cannot act." T1564.24b29 I've read this before, but finding it in the sūtra is proving daunting. Where in the root sūtra can we find the passage the Venerable is quoting? Also, where can we find the corresponding section of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra commentary concerning this statement?

Given that Vasubandhu and Asanga came after Nagarjunacharya, who was a proponent of a major Buddhist school with a different philosophy. Did they or thier students like Dignaga say anything about Nagarjunacharya?

I am studying Nagarjuna's work online and from the commentaries understand that in the Madhyamika Nagarjuna describe 'Shunayata' as > all phenomena are conditional and empty of any self essence I am not able to understand how is this any different than the doctrine of Anatta that the Buddha taught? > that no unchanging, permanent self or essence can be found in any phenomenon.

Does reality exist? Carlo Rovelli (a famous theoretical physicist) doesn't think so and he cites Nagarjuna as believing the same: > Rovelli has a different idea. **He says reality doesn’t exist.** The > reason physicists have been led astray by bonkers theories in the 100 > years since Helgoland is because they can’t bear the thought of not > being real. > > It was at this point — a third of the way through the book — that I > mimicked Heisenberg and took my first long, befuddled walk. Reality > doesn’t exist? What on earth does that mean? Rovelli’s favourite > example is a red chair. ‘Red’ doesn’t exist, for sure — everyone knows > that philosophical chestnut: it’s just the way our brains make sense > of light of a certain wavelength. But Rovelli also insists that > nothing else about the chair exists either — its weight, its shape — > except in its relationship to the person looking at it. And you can > keep banging away at this type of argument until you get to the level > of the atoms forming the chair. Insisting that anything about this red > chair needs to exist outside of relationships is metaphysical > neediness. > > Part of the fun of Rovelli’s book is that your immediate reaction to > his ideas — repugnance or delight — isn’t meaningless. Without > mathematics or experiment, by page 81 your thoughts are at the > frontier of quantum theory, and it’s time for your second > brain-cudgeling walk. If things exist only by virtue of their > interaction with other things, what happens to them between times? Do > they vanish? Do instants of time also not exist? Does it even make > sense to talk this way? Oh dear, oh dear. > > Rovelli devotes a precious chapter to the work of the second-century > **Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, who also insists there is no ultimate > layer of real things.** Emphasis mine. These ideas form the heart of his well regarded Relational Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and are discussed extensively in his new book Helgoland. Other questions on this forum have asked whether physical reality exists, but the highest rated answers have mostly danced around the question. They argue that it is our "attitude" about such questions that is relevant... In other places, the assertion is that this question is one of the "thickets" or is somehow unanswerable or is somehow not amenable to logic. I find all of these quite flaccid in the face of this prominent theoretical physicist coming out quite explicitly saying that our current best known laws of the universe (properly interpreted) indicate that reality itself doesn't exist and that the unwillingness to acknowledge this by other physicists is "metaphysical neediness!" He is arguing that we can talk about this meaningfully and use our reason to arrive at this conclusion with mathematics, logic and empiricism. I'd also say that it is quite obvious **the answer to this question has vast soteriological consequences that are very deeply relevant to Buddhism** and should not just be ignored or danced around. So, is he right?

The verses in question are from Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter 25 on an examination of nirvana. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 25:19–20 न संसारस्य निर्वाणात् किं चिद् अस्ति विशेषणं na saṁsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṁ cid asti viśeṣaṇaṁ न निर्वाणस्य संसारात् किं चिद् अस्ति विशेषणं। १९ na nirvāṇasya saṁsārāt kiṁ cid asti viśeṣaṇaṁ| 19 निर्वाणस्य च या कोटिः।कोटिः। संसरणस्य च nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṁsaraṇasya ca न तयोर् अन्तरं किंचित् सुसूक्ष्मम् अपि विद्यते। २० na tayor antaraṁ kiñcit susūkśmam api vidyate| 20