Usually Sati is translated as Mindfulness, but according to the Wikipedia entry, Mindfulness is described as follows: >Mindfulness is the psychological process of bringing one's attention to experiences occurring in the present moment, which can be developed through the practice of meditation and other training. The term "mindfulness" is a translation of the Pali term sati, which is a significant element of Buddhist traditions. According to suttacentral's entry, Sati is defined as memory, recognition, consciousness, intentness of mind, wakefulness of mind etc. My question is then, is it a mistake to call Sati Mindfulness, since Minsfulness means awareness. Now Sati is always used with his close companion sampajañña, which in turn makes the attention always directed to moral attitudes etc., whereas "mainstream mindfulness" just observes inner and outer phenomena with an open, curious and beginners mind. Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mindfulness https://suttacentral.net/search?query=sati

Or, what would be the best teaching to spark an interest in someone who knows little or nothing about the teachings of the Buddha?

I often hear this word and I think I have some doubts because in Hinduism Jupiter is called Guru. So maybe I could be misunderstanding. What do lamas mean when they say guru? Could Shree Ganesha be my Guru? Thanks

I learned that the monks of a monastery draw and consecrate or bless sacred images and then resell them. Is all this permitted by the law of dharma? Don't we fall into materialism by commodifying the things of the spirit? I wonder the same thing about other objects, statues, malas, etc...

I have a hypothetical question. Let's say I don't believe in karma, reincarnation, or any deities of any sort. I also saw in some texts and videos that, to achieve higher awareness, I should not define good or bad either. That I should be equanimous towards everything. If there is no distinction between good and evil, where does morality come from then, in the absence of karma? How do I justify my inclination toward doing good to humanity? Is my question nonsensical? Please help me resolve this conflict.

The doctrine of [pratītyasamutpāda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prat%C4%ABtyasamutp%C4%81da) states that: > **all dharmas (phenomena) arise in dependence upon other dharmas**: "if this exists, that exists; if this ceases to exist, that also ceases to exist". **The basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things.** However, on the [Wikipedia page on Nirvana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nirvana_(Buddhism)) , it is stated: > According to Dhammapala, **nibbana is an objective reality** which is the opposite of samsara. **Nibbana has its own nature (sabhava) which is unlike all conditioned phenomena.** From this, I'm curious to know the following inter-related ideas: a) Is all there is to reality these conditioned Dharma and if yes, where does Dhammapala's idea of nibbana fit into this if its a non-conditioned phenomena which an intrinsic essence/nature? b) In the view of Dhammapala, are all conditioned phenomena ultimately dependent on this Absolute and Objective Reality which has an intrinsic nature? Does nibbana originate anything itself or is it merely like a principle? Just as an idea, perhaps the doctrine of the Two Truths is related to this, with nibbana belonging or being identical to the Ultimate Truth.

Everyone born in this world is bound to suffer. Mara tempted Buddha so many times to abandon his quest which he did not. Yet Mara herself never suffered due to her own Karma or due to her belief system. Mara is alive even today. My question is why not Mara, the tempter, suffers or suffered due to her belief system and actions ?

This is more directed to someone who understands Sinhalese. Is there difference between Rahath and Maha rahath? Is it interchangeable? In the texts some places it says rahath and in some places it refers as maha rahath.

A very famous, so famous it may be apocryphal, zen quote says: > Before Enlightenment chop wood carry water, after Enlightenment, chop > wood carry water. What does this mean? Specifically, is the discourse saying that time without effort is wasted time?

How does craving (taṇhā) manifest with respect to neutral feelings? In Dependent Origination (or dependent co-arising, however you'd like to call it), it is said that Craving (taṇhā) follows on the heels of Feeling (vedanā). Feeling, in general, is of 3 main types: pleasant, unpleasant, neutral. I do see how craving/aversion manifests with respect to both pleasant and unpleasant feeling. But how does it relate to neutral feeling? How is it that I either lust after or try to avoid something that is truly neutral?

It is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira:

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word ‘chariot’ is used, So, when the aggregates exist, There is the convention ‘a being.’ SN 5.10

However, in the Yamaka Sutta:

“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.” ... “But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life ...” SN 22.85

Yamaka denies the aggregates taken together as the Tathagata is real and actual. On the other hand, Vajira seems to be affirming that the aggregates taken together is a convention. The words in pali for this phrase of real and actual are *saccato thetato* and for convention the word is *sammuti.* When he performed an analysis - as the Buddha advised Yamaka to do - he tried to find the *saccato thetato* self, but came up empty. Does that mean that Vajira erred in naming 'a being' as a convention? Is this a true contradiction? Why did the Buddha advise Yamaka to try and find a self through analysis? Wasn't this leading Yamaka into a thicket of views? UPDATE: This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question (at least I do now and I'm not totally convinced I didn't have that idea already when I first opened it) so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

It is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira:

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word ‘chariot’ is used, So, when the aggregates exist, There is the convention ‘a being.’ SN 5.10

The pali translated as 'convention' is 'sammuti'. Looking at other places where the word 'sammuti' is used we can find numerous references in the theravada vinaya. Each of these translates the word 'sammuti' from pali to english as 'agreement' and not 'convention.' Is that all the conventional existence of 'a being' is - an agreement? Is 'a fist' an agreement? Is 'a lap' an agreement? Is 'the President of the United States' an agreement? Is 'rebirth' an agreement? It would seem some agreements are skillful and some are not. That is why the Buddha gave the vinaya, right? Do Noble Ones with Right View not understand agreements or somehow give up these agreements or do they just acknowledge that *all of these* are just agreements and not real and actual? It would seem to me that Noble Ones with Right View see that 'mother and father' is just an agreement to the same extent as 'this world' and 'the next world.' Right View does not utterly deny any of these; it simply acknowledges them for what they are and no more: useful agreements. UPDATE: This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

The setup ...

Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena. AN 3.47

Together with ...

Why is that? Transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. For such a long time you have undergone suffering, agony, and disaster, swelling the cemeteries. This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions. SN 15.1

Along with the assumption that "transmigration" or "samsara" is a conditioned phenomena ... Would seem to give rise to a contradiction. On the one hand, the Buddha said quite unambiguously that conditioned phenomena have a beginning, middle and an end, but on the other hand the Buddha said that "transmigration" or "samsara" has no known beginning. Questions:

1. Do you agree this is an apparent contradiction?
2. Do you think this is a real contradiction?
3. If it is apparent but not real, then how would you resolve it?

I would say, "yes, no, and it is complicated" but I'm curious to know how others resolve it. Related but distinct questions. UPDATE: This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

Do doctors earn merit on a regular basis as a result of their good acts of treating and curing illnesses of their patients? Is their profession an excellent one because of their chance to earn merit?

It is well known that many Buddhist philosophers and scholars of various traditions, such as Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti rely on and acknowledge reductio ad absurdum as a method of positing arguments and discussing different forms of knowledge. On the [Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhist_logico-epistemology) regarding Buddhist logico-epistemology, it is stated: > K. N. Jayatilleke sees Buddha's epistemological view as a kind of empiricism which also includes a particular view of causation (dependent origination): "inductive inferences in Buddhism are based on a theory of causation. These inferences are made on the data of perception. What is considered to constitute knowledge are direct inferences made on the basis of such perceptions.": 457  Jayatilleke argues the Buddhas statements in the Nikayas tacitly imply an adherence to some form of correspondence theory, this is most explicit in the Apannaka Sutta (MN 60).*He also notes that Coherentism is also taken as a criterion for truth in the Nikayas, which contains many instances of the Buddha debating opponents by showing how they have contradicted themselves.: 352–353.  He also notes that the Buddha seems to have held that utility and truth go hand in hand, and therefore something which is true is also useful (and vice versa, something false is not useful for ending suffering).: 359  However, on that same page, it is stated: > According to Jayatilleke, **'pure reasoning' or 'a priori' reasoning is rejected by the Buddha as a source of knowledge.: 273  While reason could be useful in deliberation, it could not establish truth on its own.** This is slightly confusing to me because if you are subscribing to some of the views mentioned in the first paragraph (and some other Buddhist concepts more generally), there is no way to defend them in a purely posteriori way. Thus, at least some apriori reasoning is necessary in order to even begin establishing other principles used throughout Buddhist philosophy and worldview which are considered truthful. Reductio ad absurdum is one such way of establishing truth in an apriori way. As such, does Buddha see reductio ad absurdum as valid forms of argumentation and deriving truth, and if not, how does he argue for different concepts without relying on apriori reasoning? **I just want to clarify that in this case, I am saying "reductio ad absurdum" to mean the following:** reductio ad absurdum argument is showing that non-acceptance of some X would result into a complete incoherence and any non-acceptance would simply not be sound and coherent, and hence, it necessarily must be accepted for anything other than its affirmation is not possible. In other words, non-acceptance of some X concept or idea would result in a self-refuting idea logical fallacy. And as noted above, it seems that Buddha subscribed to the notion that contradiction is not acceptable. So I think it would only make sense if Buddha affirmed reductio ad absurdum for there can be situations where anything other than embracing and accepting some idea X would result in complete incoherence, and this is technically done in an apriori and deductive manner but according to Jayatilleke, Buddha rejected apriori argumentation so it doesn't make much sense. I hope that what I wrote is clear. I'm a beginner and interested in learning Buddhist concepts. If something I wrote is incorrect, please let me know and I will change it.

I read the following on the internet: > In MN 44, the four remembrance-establishings (are) > undistractable-lucidity-themes. > > Any topic for satipatthana "mindfulness", can be a topic for samādhi > nimitta, or a subject for jhāna meditation to investigate with > dhamma-vicaya, vitakka and vicāra, upekkha, sati and sampajāno in the > higher jhānas. The nimitta of samādhi can be visual, or conceptual, > and both, just as it can be in guarding the sense doors. > In AN 4.14, samādhi nimitta suggested one develops are the corpse in > various stages. > > Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu uppannaṃ bhaddakaṃ samādhinimittaṃ > anurakkhati aṭṭhikasaññaṃ puḷavakasaññaṃ vinīlakasaññaṃ > vicchiddakasaññaṃ uddhumātakasaññaṃ. It’s when a monk preserves a > meditation subject that’s a fine basis of undistractible-lucidity: the > perception of a skeleton, a worm-infested corpse, a livid corpse, a > split open corpse, or a bloated corpse. Does the term 'samādhi nimitta' in MN 44 above really mean '*undistractable-lucidity-themes*'? If so, why is 'samādhi nimitta' translated as '*basis of undistractible-lucidity*' in AN 4.14 above?

There are three closely related words in Pali , namely, Sankhara, Sasankhara and asankhara. They are mentioned in the following sutta : ============== “Bad, unskillful qualities, mendicants, arise with conditions, not without conditions. “Sasaṅkhārā, bhikkhave, uppajjanti pāpakā akusalā dhammā, no asaṅkhārā. By giving up those conditions, those bad, unskillful qualities do not occur. ”Tesaṁyeva saṅkhārānaṁ pahānā evaṁ te pāpakā akusalā dhammā na hontī”ti. ========== My question is : Is Nibbana an asankhara?

This question arises from [this previous post](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/29818/why-does-one-suffer-because-of-ignorance-if-ignorance-is-unintentional) . The questioner seems perplexed that a person should suffer for not knowing or possessing certain knowledge i.e. simply for being unaware. While there is an active component in desire (us wanting or craving) and aversion (us disliking or hating). However, ignorance is not something we can control or actively avoid. So, my question is there an active component in ignorance i.e. do we intentionally ignore and/or indulge in ignorance? Perhaps, by understanding this process better, we can also answer [this question on how to get rid of it](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/49878/how-to-get-rid-of-ignorance) .

[SN 22.85](https://suttacentral.net/sn22.85/en/bodhi?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false) says: > “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, > perception, volitional formations and consciousness taken together as > the Tathagata?”— > > “No, friend.” > “If, friend Yamaka, they were to ask you: ‘Friend Yamaka, when a > bhikkhu is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, what happens to > him with the breakup of the body, after death?’—being asked thus, what > would you answer?” > > “If they were to ask me this, friend, I would answer thus: ‘Friends, > form is impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering [unsatisfactory]; what is > suffering [unsatisfactory] has ceased and passed away. Feeling … Perception … > Volitional formations … Consciousness is impermanent; what is > impermanent is suffering [unsatisfactory]; what is suffering [unsatisfactory] has ceased and passed > away.’ Being asked thus, friend, I would answer in such a way.” > > “Good, good, friend Yamaka! Are the two excepts above contradictory? What is the precise analysis of SN 22.85 & SN 22.86 here?

Dependent Origination says, given the consciousness, name and form arises. But in SN12.65 it says name-form is condition for consciousness: >When consciousness exists there are name and form. Consciousness is a condition for name and form.’ ‘viññāṇe kho sati nāmarūpaṁ hoti, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpan’ti. > >Then it occurred to me: Tassa mayhaṁ, bhikkhave, etadahosi: > >‘When what exists is there consciousness? What is a condition for consciousness?’ ‘kimhi nu kho sati viññāṇaṁ hoti, kiṁpaccayā viññāṇan’ti? > >Then, through rational application of mind, I comprehended with wisdom: Tassa mayhaṁ, bhikkhave, yoniso manasikārā ahu paññāya abhisamayo: > >‘When name and form exist there’s consciousness. **Name and form are a condition for consciousness.**’ ‘nāmarūpe kho sati viññāṇaṁ hoti, nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇan’ti. My question is : Is there a circular reasoning in dependent origination of name-form and consciousness?