In Fratelli Tutti Pope Francis wrote, quoting his 2016 World Day of Peace Address that: > Communicators also have a responsibility for education and formation, especially nowadays, when the means of information and communication are so widespread. Their duty is first and foremost to serve the truth, and not particular interests. > > [Fratelli Tutti 114](http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html) By "Communicators" is he talking about journalists? The media in general or is it broader to mean communication platforms such as Facebook and Twitter? I was reading through Fratelli Tutti and that word "Communicators" struck me as odd, the link back to the Holy Father's other declaration showed me he was talking about the media, but given the context of Fratelli Tutti I'm thinking he's talking about something different. So in general, when Pope Francis uses the vague term "Communicators" which may not be so vague in Italian, who is he talking about?

Muslims says Jesus gave a book when he came as prophet and then over time Christians corrupted that book is that true?

> You were anointed as a guardian cherub, for so I ordained you. You were on the Holy Mount of God. (Ezekiel 28:14, NIV) God is an all powerful God, the creator of Heaven and Earth both the visible and the invisible. This raises a number of questions ... Why would an infinite and powerful God need a created cherub to guard the Holy Mountain? What is there in the Holy Mountain that needs to be guarded upon and from whom? Are the created angels seen as maybe the subject and the possible intruder to the Holy Mount? Is there a treasure there that the angels might steal? The question I would like answered is: **why is there a need to guard the Holy Mountain of God as all the angels even combined cannot match the infinite power of God?**

Previously, I inquired on https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/100110/61679 . Now, I would like to shift the focus to Christian responses to the **Evidential Problem of Evil**. For an in-depth exploration of this argument, a comprehensive article is available at [The Evidential Problem of Evil | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/) . I'll provide a short version with the gist of William Rowe's formulation of the argument, followed by a longer version with multiple excerpts from the original article for those seeking deeper insights. ## Short version > 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some > greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. > 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse. > 3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (Rowe 1979: 336) ## Longer version > Evidential arguments from evil seek to show that the presence of evil in the world inductively supports or makes likely the claim that God (or, more precisely, the God of orthodox theism) does not exist. A variety of evidential arguments have been formulated in recent years, but here I will concentrate on one very influential formulation, namely, that provided by William Rowe. **Rowe’s version of the evidential argument has received much attention since its formal inception in 1978, for it is often considered to be the most cogent presentation of the evidential problem of evil**. James Sennett (1993: 220), for example, views Rowe’s argument as “the clearest, most easily understood, and most intuitively appealing of those available.” Terry Christlieb (1992: 47), likewise, thinks of Rowe’s argument as “the strongest sort of evidential argument, the sort that has the best chance of success.” It is important to note, however, that Rowe’s thinking on the evidential problem of evil has developed in significant ways since his earliest writings on the subject, and two (if not three) distinct evidential arguments can be identified in his work. Here I will only discuss that version of Rowe’s argument that received its first full-length formulation in Rowe (1978) and, most famously, in Rowe (1979), and was successively refined in the light of criticisms in Rowe (1986), (1988), (1991), and (1995), before being abandoned in favour of a quite different evidential argument in Rowe (1996). > > **An Outline of Rowe’s Argument** > > In presenting his evidential argument from evil in his justly > celebrated 1979 paper, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of > Atheism”, Rowe thinks it best to focus on a particular kind of evil > that is found in our world in abundance. He therefore selects “intense > human and animal suffering” as this occurs on a daily basis, is in > great plenitude in our world, and is a clear case of evil. More > precisely, it is a case of intrinsic evil: it is bad in and of itself, > even though it sometimes is part of, or leads to, some good state of > affairs (Rowe 1979: 335). Rowe then proceeds to state his argument for > atheism as follows: > > 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some > greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. > 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse. > 3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (Rowe 1979: 336) > > This argument, as Rowe points out, is clearly valid, and so if there > are rational grounds for accepting its premises, to that extent there > are rational grounds for accepting the conclusion, that is to say, > atheism. > **The Factual Premise** > > Criticisms of Rowe’s argument tend to focus on its first premise, sometimes dubbed “the factual premise,” as it purports to state a fact about the world. Briefly put, the fact in question is that there exist instances of intense suffering which are gratuitous or pointless. As indicated above, an instance of suffering is gratuitous, according to Rowe, if an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented it without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. A gratuitous evil, in this sense, is a state of affairs that is not (logically) necessary to the attainment of a greater good or to the prevention of an evil at least as bad. > > **Rowe’s Case in Support of the Factual Premise** > > Rowe builds his case in support of the factual premise by appealing to particular instances of human and animal suffering, such as the following: > > **E1: the case of Bambi** >> “In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering” (Rowe 1979: 337). > > Although this is presented as a hypothetical event, Rowe takes it to be “a familiar sort of tragedy, played not infrequently on the stage of nature” (1988: 119). > > **E2: the case of Sue** >> This is an actual event in which a five-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan was severely beaten, raped and then strangled to death early on New Year’s Day in 1986. The case was introduced by Bruce Russell (1989: 123), whose account of it, drawn from a report in the Detroit Free Press of January 3 1986, runs as follows: >> >> The girl’s mother was living with her boyfriend, another man who was unemployed, her two children, and her 9-month old infant fathered by the boyfriend. On New Year’s Eve all three adults were drinking at a bar near the woman’s home. The boyfriend had been taking drugs and drinking heavily. He was asked to leave the bar at 8:00 p.m. After several reappearances he finally stayed away for good at about 9:30 p.m. The woman and the unemployed man remained at the bar until 2:00 a.m. at which time the woman went home and the man to a party at a neighbor’s home. Perhaps out of jealousy, the boyfriend attacked the woman when she walked into the house. Her brother was there and broke up the fight by hitting the boyfriend who was passed out and slumped over a table when the brother left. Later the boyfriend attacked the woman again, and this time she knocked him unconscious. After checking the children, she went to bed. Later the woman’s 5-year old girl went downstairs to go to the bathroom. The unemployed man returned from the party at 3:45 a.m. and found the 5-year old dead. She had been raped, severely beaten over most of her body and strangled to death by the boyfriend. > > Following Rowe (1988: 120), the case of the fawn will be referred to > as “E1”, and the case of the little girl as “E2”. Further, following > William Alston’s (1991: 32) practice, the fawn will be named “Bambi” > and the little girl “Sue”. > > Rowe (1996: 264) states that, in choosing to focus on E1 and E2, he is > “trying to pose a serious difficulty for the theist by picking a > difficult case of natural evil, E1 (Bambi), and a difficult case of > moral evil, E2 (Sue).” Rowe, then, is attempting to state the > evidential argument in the strongest possible terms. As one > commentator has put it, “if these cases of evil [E1 and E2] are not > evidence against theism, then none are” (Christlieb 1992: 47). > However, Rowe’s almost exclusive preoccupation with these two > instances of suffering must be placed within the context of his belief > (as expressed in, for example, 1979: 337-38) that even if we > discovered that God could not have eliminated E1 and E2 without > thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad > or worse, it would still be unreasonable to believe this of all cases > of horrendous evil occurring daily in our world. E1 and E2 are thus > best viewed as representative of a particular class of evil which > poses a specific problem for theistic belief. This problem is > expressed by Rowe in the following way: > > - (P) No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s > permitting E1 or E2. Therefore, > > - (Q) It is likely that no good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that > being in permitting E1 or E2. > > P states that no good we know of justifies God in permitting E1 and > E2. From this it is inferred that Q is likely to be true, or that > probably there are no goods which justify God in permitting E1 and E2. > Q, of course, corresponds to the factual premise of Rowe’s argument. > Thus, Rowe attempts to establish the truth of the factual premise by > appealing to P. > > > **The Inference from P to Q** > > On what grounds does Rowe think that P is true? Rowe (1988: 120) states that “we have *good reason* to believe that no good state of affairs we know of would justify an omnipotent, omniscient being in permitting either E1 or E2” (emphasis his). The good reason in question consists of the fact that the good states of affairs we know of, when reflecting on them, meet one or both of the following conditions: either an omnipotent being could obtain them without having to permit E1 or E2, or obtaining them would not morally justify that being in permitting E1 or E2 (Rowe 1988: 121, 123; 1991: 72). > > This brings us, finally, to Rowe’s inference from P to Q. This is, of course, **an inductive inference**. Rowe does not claim to know or be able to prove that cases of intense suffering such as the fawn’s are indeed pointless. For as he acknowledges, it is quite possible that there is some familiar good outweighing the fawn’s suffering and which is connected to that suffering in a way unbeknown to us. Or there may be goods we are not aware of, to which the fawn’s suffering is intimately connected. **But although we do not know or cannot establish the truth of Q, we do possess rational grounds for accepting Q, and these grounds consist of the considerations adumbrated in P. Thus, the truth of P is taken to provide strong evidence for the truth of Q** (Rowe 1979: 337).

Did John Wycliffe affirm baptismal regeneration as a general rule of faith? Or did he hold a more symbolic view of baptism?

>If you cannot afford two doves or two pigeons, you shall bring **two pounds of flour** as a sin offering. You shall not put any olive oil or any incense on it, because it is a sin offering, not a grain offering. You shall bring it to the priest, who will take a handful of it as a token that it has all been offered to the Lord, and he will burn it on the altar as a food offering. **It is an offering to take away sin.** In this way the priest shall offer the sacrifice for your sin, ***and you will be forgiven***. The rest of the flour belongs to the priest, just as in the case of a grain offering. — Leviticus 5:11‭–‬13 GNT If flour can be accepted, why did Jesus have to die for the wicked?

We read in Mtt 17:1-3 (NKJV): > Now after six days Jesus took Peter, James, and John his brother, led them up on a high mountain by themselves; and He was transfigured before them. His face shone like the sun, and His clothes became as white as the light. And behold, Moses and Elijah appeared to them, talking with Him. It is implied that God the Father ordained Moses and Elijah to be part of the Transfiguration, with a special purpose. Moses had been dead and buried while Elijah was thought to be alive( Mtt 27:49). The former was associated with Law while the latter was considered as one of the greatest prophets. My question is : Whom and/or what did Moses and Elijah represent in the Transfiguration ?

*Note*: For context, please see my recently asked question [*Can Reformed Epistemology be considered a special variant of mysticism?*](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/109913/66156) on Philosophy Stack Exchange. It includes many useful references and extensive quotes. --- In essence, [Reformed Epistemology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reformed_epistemology) , primarily expounded by Alvin Plantinga, posits that humans can experientially know God in a *properly basic* manner, through some sort of built-in spiritual sense or [*sensus divinitatis*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensus_divinitatis) , akin to how we form basic beliefs about the external world through the conventional five physical senses: touch, smell, taste, hearing, and sight. William Lane Craig, building on Plantinga's work, further specifies that this direct experiential knowledge of God occurs in Christians through the *inner witness of the Holy Spirit*. In a clarifying [3-minute video clip](https://youtu.be/cC3q3qYIhdI) , Craig elaborates on and defends this notion in a debate with an atheist. (I recommend watching the video.) Interestingly, the experiential nature of knowing God proposed by Reformed Epistemology bears resemblance to the knowledge-granting aspect of mystical experiences as described in [mysticism](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/) . I'll quote a few paragraphs from that article to clarify what I'm talking about: > Under the influence of William James’ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, philosophical interest in mysticism has heavily focused on **distinctive, allegedly knowledge-granting “mystical experiences.”** Philosophers have dealt with such topics as the classification of mystical experiences, their nature, to what extent mystical experiences are conditioned by a mystic’s language and culture, and whether mystical experiences furnish evidence for the truth of mystical claims. > A more inclusive definition of “mystical experience” is: > >> A purportedly nonsensory awareness or a nonstructured sensory experience granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of ordinary sense-perception structured by mental conceptions, somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection. “Experience,” “consciousness,” and “awareness” are notoriously difficult to define and will be left unanalyzed here, but the other key terms in the definition can be understood as follows: > > 1. “Purportedly” allows the definition to be accepted without necessarily accepting that mystics ever really do experience realities or states of affairs in the way they described. > > 2. “Nonsenory awareness” includes content of a kind not appropriate to sense-perception, somatosensory modalities (including the means for sensing pain and body temperature, and internally sensing body, limb, organ, and visceral positions and states), or standard introspection. **Some mystics have referred to a distinct “spiritual” means of knowing appropriate only to a non-physical realm** (nous, intellectus, buddhi). A super sense-perceptual mode of experience may accompany sense-perception as in the cases of “nature mysticism” or “cosmic consciousness” (Bucke 1901), as when, for example, a person has an awareness of God while watching a setting sun. > > 3. “Nonstructured sensory experience” consists of phenomenological sensory content but lacks the conceptualization normally structuring sense-perception. > > 4. “Acquaintance” of realities in mystical experiences means the subject is putatively aware of one or more realities in a way that overcomes the normal subject/object duality: the “acquaintance” is “knowledge by participation” or “knowledge by identity” (Forman 1990, Introduction). Mystical experiences are allegedly “direct,” “unmediated” insights in that sense. > > 5. “States of affairs” include the impermanence of all reality and that God is the ground of the self. “Acquaintance” of states of affairs comes in two forms. In one, a subject is aware of either (one or more) realities on which (one or more) states of affairs supervene. **An example would be an awareness of God (a reality) affording an awareness of one’s utter dependence on God (a state of affairs)**. In its second form, acquaintance of states of affairs involves an insight directly, without supervening on acquaintance, of any reality. An example is coming to “see” the impermanence of all that exists in the phenomenal world. > > Hereafter “mystical experience” will be used in the broader sense, unless otherwise noted, not merely for unitive experiences. Correspondingly, the term “mysticism” will refer to practices, discourse, texts, institutions, and traditions associated with these experiences. The definition excludes paranormal experiences such as visions, voices, out-of-body experiences, and powers such as telepathy. All of these are “dualistic” acquaintance of subjects with objects or qualities of a kind accessible to the senses or to ordinary introspection. In the more specific context of Christianity, it's pertinent to quote the introductory paragraph of the article [Christian mysticism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_mysticism) : > Christian mysticism is the tradition of mystical practices and mystical theology within Christianity which **"concerns the preparation [of the person] for, the consciousness of, and the effect of [...] a direct and transformative presence of God" or Divine love**. Until the sixth century the practice of what is now called mysticism was referred to by the term contemplatio, c.q. theoria, from contemplatio (Latin; Greek θεωρία, theoria), **"looking at", "gazing at", "being aware of" God or the Divine**. Christianity took up the use of both the Greek (theoria) and Latin (contemplatio, contemplation) terminology to describe various forms of prayer **and the process of coming to know God**. Thus, my question for Christians who sympathize with Reformed Epistemology: Do they see any overlap between Reformed Epistemology and Mysticism? Could the former be viewed as a special variant of the latter? Are they completely different views? Is the experience of God through the *sensus divinitatis* a special kind of mystical experience? Does the *sensus divinitatis* play any role whatsoever in mystical experiences in general?

In the ancient church there were two categories in the New Testament canon, the ὁμολεγούμενα (ho-mo-leh-GOO-meh-na; homolegoumena) which designated the books that were fully accepted, and the ἀντιλεγόμενα (ann-tee-leh-GOm-meh-nah; antilegomena) which means "spoken against" and designated those books that were not accepted by everyone but were disputed. The antilegomena are the Epistle to the Hebrews, James, Jude, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, and the Revelation of John. The importance of this distinction was that doctrine was to be founded only on the homolegoumena while the antilegomena were only to be used to support such doctrine. I know that many Lutherans maintain this distinction, but I'm wondering if anyone else does.

According to LDS doctrine, why are we created as spirits before we can receive a body? On earth, all creatures are born with the same bodies as their parents. In the preexistence, why are the children of God born/created out of different matter (spirits) than our heavenly parents? Our Father in Heaven is a physical being. If we are literal offspring of our Father in Heaven, then why aren't we born in the pre-earth life with a physical body, the same as our Father in Heaven?

I've encountered discussions, such as the one linked [here](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/107665/66156) , where certain Christians assert that atheists inherently acknowledge God's existence, often relying on certain interpretations of Romans 1:18-25. I'm keen to explore this interpretation further, examining its prevalence among Christians and investigating alternative exegeses that might support divergent perspectives. Are there theological or philosophical arguments within Christianity that present nuanced readings of Romans chapter 1, challenging the blanket assertion that all atheists, deep down, possess an inherent awareness of God's existence? --- The following are quotes from different sources presenting the viewpoint I'm calling into question: >*Believe No One Who Calls Himself an Atheist* > > **If what Paul says in Romans 1 is true, there is ultimately no such thing as an atheist**. Anyone who calls himself one is wrong on at least three fronts. > > First, someone who claims to be an atheist is suppressing the truth he knows. According to Romans 1, “What can be known about God is plain to them” (v. 19), and their denial is an expression of the fact that they are among those “men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth” (v. 18). Therefore, whatever they believe about themselves, the God who made them says otherwise, and we must believe God rather than man. [...] > > (Source: [Why There’s No Such Thing as an Atheist](https://www.crossway.org/articles/why-theres-no-such-thing-as-an-atheist/)) > Many people who say they are atheists will say those who believe in God are stupid, or foolish. Ironically, Scripture says they are the fools. Professing to be wise they became fools. They exchanged the truth of God for a lie. Their foolish hearts were darkened. Indeed, Psalm 14:1 says, “The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.”” > > **So, when you speak to someone who says he’s an atheist, he is 1) lying, and 2) a fool. He is like a person who says he doesn’t believe in gravity. He sees how it works, he experiences its effects, but denies it exists. Truly, such a person is a fool.** > > How do we as Christians answer the atheist? **I have come to the conclusion that we simply tell them that they really do believe that God exists, because the Bible says they do**. **Even though they may deny it, they know in their heart that they do believe it**. In other words, there really are no atheists. We tell them that they are suppressing this truth in unrighteousness, just as Scripture says. They may call you names, mock you, and hate you, all because you are telling them the truth. Most importantly, we give them the gospel. We should never think we are better, because God tells us “Such were some of you; but you were washed, but you were sanctified, but you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God.” (1 Corinthians 6:11) May the Lord grant the atheists we meet the same grace He has given us. > > (Source: [There Are No Atheists](https://versebyverseministry.org/bible-answers/there-are-no-atheists)) > *There really are no atheists defense* > > **This is the argument that all true atheists are at heart lying so that they may live in a way that is contrary to God's commands (as seen in particular interpretations of Romans 1:18-25)**. Critics note that there are atheists who are not lying and are not using their atheism as an escape to sin. Proponents note, however, that they could just as easily still be lying, perhaps not to others anymore but themselves (i.e. loving the wrong woman argument). Some have claimed this argument, however, fails to account for Stephen Maitzen's point on the demographics of theism. If all atheists are liars, why are people in some societies so much more likely to lie than in others? Finally, some have also claimed this argument fails to account for Jason Marsh's point on natural nonbelief in early humans. Since there was quite plausibly such a thing as natural nonbelief in early humans, then it does not make much sense to say that said nonbelief is self-deceptive. That is because natural nonbelief entails nonresistant nonbelief. > > (Source: [Argument from nonbelief#There_really_are_no_atheists_defense - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_nonbelief#There_really_are_no_atheists_defense))

I have been studying the Trinity recently, and most of my studies have been from St. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologiae*, and he would agree that the persons are the divine Essence. One thing that confuses me is that Aquinas says the divine relations are the divine essence in the sense that we can use the terms "person" and "essence" interchangeably. [*Summa Theologicae*, Q. 28](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm#article3) , but, if the relations (the subsistent persons) are the divine essence, how does one get out of the idea that the "essence of God is begotten" or "spirated"? Even though Aquinas rejected this view, that the essence of God can be begotten, it just seems a bit confusing to say "Jesus (as the divine relation 'filiation') is the divine essence of God, but at the same time, the essence of God isn't begotten?" this seems to be violating the classical laws of logic that x=x.

As I read the gospels and the other NT books, both Jesus and the authors all seem to take the OT as entirely historically accurate, especially the events of Genesis and Exodus. Additionally, this assumption of the literal accuracy of the OT appears to not just be a side note, but form the core of many of their theological arguments. Is this a correct impression of Jesus and the NT authors? I found one question that seems to support this interpretation of Jesus' perspective, at least to a degree.

In the Old and the New Testament "peace be with you" was a common greeting among Jesus Christ and the prophets (Genesis 43:23, Judges 19:20, Luke 24:36, John 20:19) but was "peace be with you" a common greeting among the Early Church Fathers? **Genesis 43:23**: > And he said, Peace be to you, fear not: your God, and the God of your > father, hath given you treasure in your sacks: I had your money. And > he brought Simeon out unto them **Judges 19:20**: > And the old man said, Peace be with thee; howsoever let all thy wants > lie upon me; only lodge not in the street. **Luke 24:36**: > And as they thus spake, Jesus himself stood in the midst of them, and > saith unto them, Peace be unto you. **John 20:19**: > Then the same day at evening, being the first day of the week, when > the doors were shut where the disciples were assembled for fear of the > Jews, came Jesus and stood in the midst, and saith unto them, Peace be > unto you.

Thomists believe that there is no real distinction between perfections of God as God is pure act. My understanding is that they reject real distinctions between perfections because that leads to act and potency composition, but why would that be the case?

A renowned Christian who believes in evolution is [Francis Collins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Collins) : > Collins also has written books on science, medicine, and religion, including the New York Times bestseller, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. After leaving the directorship of NHGRI and before becoming director of the NIH, he founded and served as president of The BioLogos Foundation, which promotes discourse on the relationship between science and religion and **advocates the perspective that belief in Christianity can be reconciled with acceptance of evolution and science, especially through the idea that the Creator brought about his plan through the processes of evolution**. In 2009, Pope Benedict XVI appointed Collins to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. In fact, Francis Collins is a well-known advocate of the concept of [Theistic Evolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theistic_evolution) : > Francis Collins describes theistic evolution as the position that > "evolution is real, but that it was set in motion by God", and > characterizes it as accepting "that evolution occurred as biologists > describe it, but under the direction of God". He lists six general > premises on which different versions of theistic evolution typically > rest. They include: > > 1. The prevailing cosmological model, with the universe coming into being about 13.8 billion years ago; > 2. The fine-tuned universe; > 3. Evolution and natural selection; > 4. No special supernatural intervention is involved once evolution got under way; > 5. Humans are a result of these evolutionary processes; and > 6. Despite all these, humans are unique. The concern for the Moral Law (the knowledge of right and wrong) and the continuous search for God > among all human cultures defy evolutionary explanations and point to > our spiritual nature. However, evolution via natural selection is a process that is inherently plagued with suffering. This suffering emerges from the relentless competition for resources, mates, and survival in an environment where only the fittest prevail. Organisms endure hardships such as hunger, disease, predation, natural disasters, mass extinctions, and territorial disputes as they strive to pass on their genes to the next generation. While natural selection drives adaptation and diversity, it does so through a mechanism that often entails pain and struggle. The evolutionary arms race perpetuates a cycle of suffering as organisms continually evolve to outcompete one another, leading to ever more sophisticated strategies for survival, but also escalating levels of conflict and suffering. I find it quite challenging to harmonize the picture of evolution with what the Bible reveals about God's ideal and desire for animals: Romans 8:19-22 ESV > 19 **For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God**. 20 For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of him who subjected it, **in hope** 21 **that the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to corruption and obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God**. 22 **For we know that the whole creation has been groaning together in the pains of childbirth until now**. Revelation 21:1-4 ESV > Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and the sea was no more. 2 And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. 3 And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, “Behold, the dwelling place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and they will be his people, and God himself will be with them as their God. 4 **He will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain anymore, for the former things have passed away**.” Isaiah 11:6-9 ESV > 6 The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, > and the leopard shall lie down with the young goat, and the calf and the lion and the fattened calf together; > and a little child shall lead them. 7 The cow and the bear shall graze; > their young shall lie down together; > and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. 8 The nursing child shall play over the hole of the cobra, > and the weaned child shall put his hand on the adder's den. 9 **They shall not hurt or destroy** > **in all my holy mountain;** > **for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord** > **as the waters cover the sea.** Isaiah 65:25 ESV > **The wolf and the lamb shall graze together**; **the lion shall eat straw like the ox**, **and dust shall be the serpent's food.** **They shall not hurt or destroy** **in all my holy mountain**,” says the Lord. How can the tremendous amount of suffering inherent in evolution be reconciled with the concept of a loving God from a Christian evolutionary standpoint? --- *Note*: I came up with this question while reflecting on recent discussions on the problem of evil: - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/100110/61679 - https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/100129/61679

Questions specifically on The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) faith on contraception: 1. Does LDS church allow contraception? 2. What forms do they allow? 3. What are their arguments for allowing (or not allowing) contraception? On question #2 I would like to know the LDS take on what the Bible describes Onan as doing in Genesis 38:8,9 . Is that allowed or not and why? Genesis 38:8,9: > Then Judah said to Onan, “Sleep with your brother’s wife and fulfill > your duty to her as a brother-in-law to raise up offspring for your > brother.” 9 But Onan knew that the child would not be his; so whenever > he slept with his brother’s wife, **he spilled his semen on the > ground** to keep from providing offspring for his brother.

In session 24 of the Council of Trent, Canon IV, the Church teaches that "If any one saith, that the Church could not establish impediments dissolving marriage; or that she has erred in establishing them; let him be anathema." Is this declaration held by the Church to mean indefectability in all canonical proceedings of annulments granted or witheld by the Church? Or has it asserted rather that the Church in the principle of the matter **can** hold impediments to annullment of marriages but may err in any given case? That is to say that the Church can be mistaken on the grounds for annullment in any particular case, but the parties are bound to follow the decision of the Church? This would be a religious analogue to the understanding that secular courts may err in the findings of a guilty or non-guilty verdict. How has the Church shown the meaning of this canon? > **Doctrine on the Sacrament of Matrimony** > > **Doctrine and Canons** > > Being the eighth under the Sovereign Pontiff, Pius IV., celebrated on the eleventh day of November, MDLXIII. > The first parent of the human race, under the influence of the divine Spirit, pronounced the bond of matrimony perpetual and indissoluble, when he said; This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. But, that by this bond two only are united and joined together, our Lord taught more plainly, when rehearsing those last words as having been uttered by God, He said, therefore now they are not two, but one flesh; and straightway confirmed the firmness of that tie, proclaimed so long before by Adam, by these words; What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. But, the grace which might perfect that natural love, and confirm that indissoluble union, and sanctify the married, Christ Himself, the institutor and perfecter of the venerable sacraments, merited for us by His passion; as the Apostle Paul intimates, saying: Husbands love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered himself up for it; adding shortly after, This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church. > > Whereas therefore matrimony, in the evangelical law, excels in grace, through Christ, the ancient marriages; with reason have our holy Fathers, the Councils, and the tradition of the universal Church, always taught, that it is to be numbered amongst the sacraments of the new law; against which, impious men of this age raging, have not only had false notions touching this venerable sacrament, but, introducing according to their wont, under the pretext of the Gospel, a carnal liberty, they have by word and writing asserted, not without great injury to the faithful of Christ, many things alien from the sentiment of the Catholic Church, and from the usage approved of since the times of the apostles; the holy and universal Synod wishing to meet the rashness of these men, has thought it proper, lest their pernicious contagion may draw more after it, that the more remarkable heresies and errors of the above-named schismatics be exterminated, by decreeing against the said heretics and their errors the following anathemas. > > **On the Sacrament of Matrimony**. > > - **Canon I**. If any one saith, that matrimony is not truly and properly > one of the seven sacraments of the evangelic law, (a sacrament) > instituted by Christ the Lord; but that it has been invented by men > in the Church; and that it does not confer grace; let him be > anathema. > - **Canon II**. If any one saith, that it is lawful for Christians to have > several wives at the same time, and that this is not prohibited by > any divine law; let him be anathema. > - **Canon III**. If any one saith, that those degrees only of consanguinity > and affinity, which are set down in Leviticus, can hinder > matrimony from being contracted, and dissolve it when contracted; and > that the Church cannot dispense in some of those degrees, or > establish that others may hinder and dissolve it ; let him be > anathema. > - **Canon IV. If any one saith, that the Church could not establish > impediments dissolving marriage; or that she has erred in > establishing them; let him be anathema.** > - **Canon V**. *If any one saith, that on account of heresy, or irksome > cohabitation, or the affected absence of one of the parties, the bond > of matrimony may be dissolved; let him be anathema.* > - CANON VI. If any one saith, that matrimony contracted, but not > consummated, is not dissolved by the solemn profession of religion by > one of the married parties; let him be anathema. > - **Canon VII**. If any one saith, that the Church has erred, in that she hath taught, and >doth teach, in accordance with the evangelical and apostolical doctrine, that the bond of >matrimony cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of one of the married parties; >and that both, or even the innocent one who gave not occasion to the adultery, cannot >contract another marriage, during the life-time of the other; and, that he is guilty of >adultery, who, having put away the adulteress, shall take another wife, as also she, who, >having put away the adulterer, shall take another husband; let him be anathema. > - **Canon VIII**. If any one saith, that the Church errs, in that she > declares that, for many causes, a separation may take place between > husband and wife, in regard of bed, or in regard of cohabitation, for > a determinate or for an indeterminate period; let him be anathema. > - **Canon IX**. If any one saith, that clerics constituted in sacred orders, > or Regulars, who have solemnly professed chastity, are able to > contract marriage, and that being contracted it is > valid,notwithstanding the ecclesiastical law, or vow; and that the > contrary is no thing else than to condemn marriage; and, that all who > do not feel that they have the gift of chastity, even though they > have made a vow thereof, may contract marriage; let him be anathema: > seeing that God refuses not that gift to those who ask for it > rightly, neither does He suffer us to be tempted above that which we > are able. > - **Canon X**. If any one saith, that the marriage state is to be placed above the state of >virginity, or of celibacy, and that it is not better and more blessed to remain in >virginity, or in celibacy, than to be united in matrimony; let him be anathema. > - **Canon XI**. If any one saith, that the prohibition of the solemnization > of marriages at certain times of the year, is a tyrannical > superstition, derived from the superstition of the heathen; or, > condemn the benedictions and other ceremonies which the Church > makes use of therein; let him be anathema. > - **Canon XII**. If any one saith, that matrimonial causes do not belong to > ecclesiastical judges; let him be anathema.

What is the Christian perspective on animal sentience and their capacity for conscious experience of pain and suffering? Do Christians affirm the consciousness of animals and their ability to suffer? What is an overview of Christian viewpoints on this matter? I'm especially interested in exploring the rationale, evidence, biblical foundations, and arguments put forth to support each viewpoint. *Context*: this inquiry holds significance in the context of grappling with the problem of natural evil, animal suffering, and theistic evolution. It is asked as a follow-up to my previous question https://christianity.stackexchange.com/q/100208/61679 --- **Appendix** Evidence that the topic is relevant (and possibly controversial) among Christians: > Recently, some theists have attempted to deal with that part of the problem of evil generated by horrendous animal suffering found in nature - including hundreds of millions of years of animal suffering before we humans even showed up - by saying that animals aren't aware that they are in pain. They maintain this is what "science" has shown. That helps bring the problem of suffering down to size! > > **Indeed, that animals aren't aware that they are in pain is a remarkable "recent scientific discovery", said Christian apologist William Lane Craig in [his debate with me](https://youtu.be/w7FhphWDokA)** , for example. **Craig claimed that all animals other than higher primates lack a pre-frontal cortex, and thus are unaware that they are in pain** (see Craig speaking in the video below from about 2 mins 30 secs - P.S. he says e.g. cats have a level of pain awareness, but he maintains science has shown that cats are unaware that they are in pain, which, he says, will be a great comfort to animal lovers like himself). > > (source: [William Lane Craig: "Animals aren't aware that they're in pain"](https://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2012/10/william-lane-craig-animals-arent-aware.html)) > **A second (though unpopular) response to this problem is to deny that animal pain and suffering is real or morally relevant**. Most will react to this response with incredulity: “Isn’t it just obvious that some animals experience pain and suffering?” The answer to that question is yes and no. **We do think it an item of common sense that animals experience pain and suffering. But the scientific evidence for this is not as strong as you might think**. Of course, scientists all acknowledge that many animals display behaviors that make it look like they are in pain. But that is not good enough. To see why, consider the phenomenon of “blindsight.” Patients with blindsight claim to be blind, and yet are at the same time able to point to objects and, in some cases, catch balls--something they could only do if they could in fact see. So are they blind or not? Well, it depends on what you mean by “sight.” They can see in the sense that they can use visual information to regulate their behavior. But they are not consciously aware of the fact that they can do this. > > (source: [#113 Animal Suffering | Reasonable Faith](https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/animal-suffering))

Jesus said that it was easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to go to heaven. Why would this be? Does this mean that it will be hard for e.g. Warren Buffett to go to heaven? Can a rich man go to heaven only by giving away all of his goods to the poor, as Jesus advised one young rich man? And could this be why Warren Buffett set up a charitable foundation? Mark 10:23-27 ESV > And Jesus looked around and said to his disciples, “How difficult it will be for those who have wealth to enter the kingdom of God!” 24 And the disciples were amazed at his words. But Jesus said to them again, “Children, how difficult it is to enter the kingdom of God! 25 It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God.” 26 And they were exceedingly astonished, and said to him, “Then who can be saved?” 27 Jesus looked at them and said, “With man it is impossible, but not with God. For all things are possible with God.”