For theism to be simple, it must follow from some basic property. Christian theism posits an unlimited agent at the core of reality and likewise a perfect being that has no proper parts as per divine simplicity. Christians posit that this is perfect. Thus, Christian theism posits fundamentally either a maximal agent or perfection itself as the core of reality. You’d think that one could deduce a priori what follows from pure perfection of a maximal agent. But the trinity is obviously not derivable a priori from perfection. If you knew that the fundamental thing was perfection itself, you would obviously not expect it to have three coequal and coeternal persons. Maybe one person, maybe infinite, but definitely not three.

In the Athanasian Creed, the three Persons are one God, and the ‘one God’ is the Trinity. The question is, how are the three Persons one God? If Father = Son = Spirit, that would be Modalism, where the Father, Son, and Spirit are three names for the same one Entity. So, I want to assume that Father, Son, and Spirit are not simply three names for the same Entity, but that there are differences between them. The Creed also says that the three Persons differ. For example, the Father begat the Son. So, while the Father has a Son, the Son does not have a Son. Such differences exclude Modalism. The following suggest that the Son and Spirit are part of the Father: - Firstly. the Creed says they are one undivided substance. (“nor dividing the Substance"). It also says that the Father is the Source and Origin of the Son and the Spirit. The ‘undivided substance’, therefore, is the substance of the Father. With the Son begotten and the Spirit proceeding, that Substance remains undivided. This means that the Son and Spirit are part of the Father’s Substance; the Son is part of the Father. - Secondly, that is also what Athanasius taught: > - “In the Father we have the Son: this is a summary of Athanasius’ theology.” (Hanson, p. 426) > - “The Son is in the Father ontologically.” (Hanson, p. 428) > - “Athanasius’ increasing clarity in treating the Son as intrinsic to the Father’s being” (Ayres, p. 113) > - “Athanasius’ argument speaks not of two realities engaged in a common activity, but develops his most basic sense that the Son is > intrinsic to the Father’s being.” (Ayres, p. 114) (Read More ) If the Athanasian Creed is supposed to reflect Athanasius’ theology, which I suspect it does, it would be fair to conclude that the Son and Spirit are part of the Father. - Thirdly, Athanasius was the norm of Western pro-Nicene theology and that theology relied heavily on Tertullian, who also said that the Son is part of the Father. > “The Father is the entire substance, but the Son is a derivation and > portion of the whole.” (In Against Praxeas 9, Tertullian)

Thomists believe that there is no real distinction between perfections of God as God is pure act. My understanding is that they reject real distinctions between perfections because that leads to act and potency composition, but why would that be the case?

Lately I've read some discussions that says the word "echad" ("one" in English) in the Shema refers to a unity more than an absolute singularity. (Here's one example of those explanations) and would then compare it to husbands and wifes becoming one flesh, among other things. Some even would use the terms "absolute unity" in comparison to "compound unity" These are done, based on my understanding, to support the Trinity via the Old Testament. >Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God is **one LORD**: And thou shalt love the LORD thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might. [Deuteronomy 6: 4 and 5 KJV] However, in light of what we know of Divine Simplicity, this doesn't quite make much sense to me, and would seem contradicting: God is not a union of separate individuals (like the husband or wife is, or a nation, etc), nor can He be said to be "compound" because He is not composed of parts. With these in mind, I wonder how the concepts of Divine Simplicity and Echad as "compound unity" relate to each other - can they be reconciled at all? Or should Deut 6:4 be even used to support the Trinity in the first place? What do I miss?

One of the motivations behind the *doctrine of divine simplicity* (DDS) is that if God was composed of parts, God would depend upon those parts to exist and hence there would be something more fundamental than the godhead to account for what God is. In order for God to be most absolute, God must be completely simple, lacking any and all composition. Some philosophers have suggested that God himself could be the cause of his own complexity, and hence God's aseity would not be threatened. Classical theistic philosophers in response argue that the idea that God giving rise to his own complexity is incoherent and would require for God to be prior to himself, which is absurd. In response to the classical theistic objection, philosophers have suggested that God could be the *grounds* of his own complexity rather than the cause. Philosopher Matthew Baddorf writes: > [I]t is far from obvious that the only kind of thing that could > satisfactorily explain compresence is an outside sufficient cause. ... > **[The neo-classical theistic] God’s tropes are dependent upon God**. This > suggests another explanation for their compresence: they are > compresent because they are each grounded in God. **This is not a causal > explanation, but it is plausible to think that it is an explanation > nonetheless**. ... This conclusion can also be supported by more general > argument. **It is plausible that tropes are individuated by their > bearers and so cannot exist without them. Or, similarly, it is > plausible to think that tropes cannot exist without their bearers > since they are merely ways their bearers are.** (Baddorf, “Divine Simplicity”, 408–409) Rather than God depending upon his parts, his parts depend on him. > For all x, if x is a proper part of God or x is a property of God, > then x depends on God for its existence. (Fowler, “Simplicity”, 122) Is this position coherent? Further reading on this issue would be appreciated. Thanks!

I am a Christian wrestling with some doubts lately, and this is one of the most difficult questions I have. I have seen related questions like "Why does God desire glorification?" and "Does God need us?" but I'm not concerned with the why. The commonly given answers to these types of questions are usually some sort of denial of need on God's behalf, and that he "wants" something. He created because he wanted to be glorified, to love us, for his pleasure, etc. I cannot reconcile that a good, perfect, self-sufficient being would have want or desire. Desires imply something lacking, that when obtained, would add something. If I do not need something but want it, it still indicates there is lack, just not necessary lack. If there is something lacking, then there is not perfection. Is there a Christian Doctrine that satisfies this quandary?

The *Summa Theologica* contains the following quote when considering "Whether God is composed of matter and form?": > Objection 2. Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form. Aquinas rejects this view by saying that the team's description of God's emotions are anthropomorphic (it's referred to as anger because it has a similar effect to anger, for example). However, I do notice that he did not argue that something which has emotions is not necessarily composite, which suggests that he may not disagree with that statement. I'm somewhat baffled by it, though; why are emotions only characteristic of composite entities?

Though apparent, the framework of the Triune Godhead appears logically incoherent in juxtaposition to the Absolute Divine Simplicity model. Looking through the works of Thomas Aquinas, who is the most crucial figure in the development of this model, has led to me to presuppose this conception. A basic notion of this model is that God is not composite, and God is identical to his divine essence or properties. Thus from this arises another basic notion: There cannot be any real distinction or divisions in God, for the simple reason that the absolute oneness of simplicity would crumble under these distinctions. Now setting the Trinity into this framework, I see no coherence. The hypostasis are necessarily and relationally distinct in respective to their personhood. The Father is relationally distinct from The Son in respective to His Fatherhood. This essential distinction between the hypostasis cannot be compatible with a model that disallows any real distinction in God. Although relations are conceptual and uphold a apprehensive framework, because relations are by essence, abstract. What would this mean for the Triune Godhead, if the relational distinction is purely conceptual? Wouldn't this entail that the hypostasis are not relationally distinct in reality? And if so, then doesn't the Trinitarian conception of God plunders into a crisis, as there is there no "real" framework for this distinction? Another issue is the divine and personal properties of paternity, filiation and procession. Recall earlier that a basic principle of Absolute Divine Simplicity is God being identical to his divine essence. Though in a Trinitarian context, the divine properties of paternity, filiation and procession seem to hinder this. These properties are unique to each hypostasis and is not shared nor communicated. The Father upholds the property of paternity, the Son, the property of filiation and the Holy Spirit the property of procession. A quote from Charles Hodge reads, "Paternity, therefore, is the distinguishing property of the Father; filiation of the Son; and procession of the Spirit” (1:461)" This falls under ignorance in context of Absolute Divine Simplicity. If God is identical to his divine essence, then on what basis can the hypostasis possess unique and separate properties? If the hypostasis have an identical essence, then it logically follows that any personal property that is not shared or communicated within the essence is a disruption of that very identity-relation. Even if we were to remove the ADS model, from a purely Trinitarian perspective this seems conflicting, because the doctrine still holds that the hypostasis share the same and one essence. But with the personal properties each hypostasis uniquely possess, this contradicts the very definition of identical essence which in this case, is the same group of properties. Can anyone help me understand or correct me on this? ( I asked in Philosophy and they recommended me here)

> The doctrine of divine simplicity says that God is simple (without > parts). The general idea can be stated in this way: The being of God > is identical to the "attributes" of God. Characteristics such as > omnipresence, goodness, truth, eternity, etc., are identical to God's > being, not qualities that make up that being, nor abstract entities > inhering in God as in a substance; in other words we can say that in > God both essence and existence are one and the same. - wikipedia > Divine simplicity is central to the classical Western concept of God. Simplicity denies any physical or metaphysical composition in the divine being. This means God is the divine nature itself and has no accidents (properties that are not necessary) accruing to his nature. There are no real divisions or distinctions in this nature. Thus, the entirety of God is whatever is attributed to him. - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Simply put Divine Simplicity says that God is **all** of his attributes with no subdivision. God is 100% love, 100% just, 100% merciful, etc. Whatever attributes can rightly be attributed to God, He is all of each of them with no displacement of one by another. Do Biblical Unitarians hold a concept of a divinely simple God? Does it differ in any way from the above? Related: https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/53993/does-divine-simplicity-imply-that-god-is-identical-to-his-attributes https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/5281/what-is-the-biblical-basis-for-divine-simplicity

The consequence of divine simplicity is that God is being subsisting and can only be immutable. If so how does God do anything? Or how did he create?

Divine simplicity is the doctrine that God has no parts/composition. It implies that God is equivalent to his attributes and his attributes are equivalent to each other. So God is love and God is Justice and God's love is the same thing as God's Justice. How does the doctrine of the Trinity mesh with this? There seems to be some distinction within God: three unique hypostases. Perhaps the relations between the hypostases of the Trinity do not constitute "parts" or "composition" but are instead just "distinctions". If so that's a really "semantic" technical answer and I don't get it, some elaboration would be appreciated. Perhaps it has something to do with the doctrine of *interpenetration*, aka *circumincession* aka *perichoresis* aka *co-inherence*. This being the doctrine that "the father fully contains the son and the spirit, the son fully contains the father and the spirit, and the spirit fully contains the father and the son." In this way, if you take any single member of the trinity, you get the entire trinity; it is impossible to separate one hypostasis from the others because whenever you take one hypostasis it always comes with the other two as well. In this way the trinity is inseparable and indivisible, just as the divine simplicity doctrine implies. Nevertheless it still looks sketchy because as mentioned, there is distinction between the hypostases. How is divine simplicity reconciled with the doctrine of the Trinity?

Just to set the stage for this question, Jesus said that the gate is narrow and there are few that find it. As this question has to do with the Calvinist understanding of Election (and the flip side which is Reprobation), I wanted it to be clear that the Elect are few and that, correspondingly, most people are not Elect. > The Lord is not slow to fulfill his promise as some count slowness, but is patient toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance. - 2 Peter 3:9 Here we have the divine desire regarding the eternal destiny of each person expressed as both positive and negative: Negative - God **does not** wish (will, desire) that **any** should perish Positive - Goes **does** wish (will, desire) that **all** reach repentance Calvinism teaches (and I realize that this is condensed) that every person is completely unable to repent, to respond to the gospel in faith, to seek God or approach Him in any way unless God specifically gives that person the ability. Calvinism also teaches that God does give this ability, but only to some. These are called the Elect. The Elect repent and escape death because, and only because, God has given them the ability to do so. Everyone else, the non-elect (or reprobate), not only don't repent and escape death but literally can't because God has withheld the ability to do so from them. Since the Elect are those who have "found" the narrow gate we can easily deduce that God has actively enabled few individuals and prevented most from escaping death and reaching repentance. Setting this Calvinist premise beside the stated desires of God we have: 1) God - I do not desire that any should perish 1a) Calvinism - God actively ensures the death of most 2) God - I desire that all should reach repentance 2a) Calvinism - God actively prevents most from repenting Does Calvinism recognize that it has God working at cross purposes to His stated desire? If so, how is the phenomenon biblically justified?

How do Protestants explain penal substitution being consistent and compatible with divine simplicity given the following discussion? For most of Church history, most Christians have believed that in some sense God is simple i.e. not made up of parts. Stephen R. Holmes writes (39) : > Simplicity is a property of the divine essence. A standard piece of logic in the Greek philosophical tradition, accepted without demur by the Fathers, claims that anything composite must have been composed by an agent; therefore, the claim that God is incomposite is to insist that God was not made by any more basic agent. Then if God is incomposite, God is necessarily simple — the two words are not quite synonyms, but they are certainly mutually entailed. There is no complexity in the divine nature; God is not separable into this bit and that bit. This belief that God is simple, seems important for believing that God is uncreated, or uncaused by anything outside himself – which would offer a legitimate challenge to the idea that he is truly ‘God’. Furthermore, Holmes continues (40): > This matter is coupled with the classical concern to avoid putting God into any class. The logic is once again easily described: if God is one example of a class of things — say, one merciful thing among many other merciful things — then the class as a whole is larger than God, and so something is greater than God. **Similarly, the Christian solution to the Euthyphro dilemma is the doctrine of simplicity. The dilemma, in Christian theological terms, runs as follows. Is God good because we define good to mean what God is (which evacuates the term of any transcendental moral content)? Or is God good because God conforms to some external standard of goodness (which asserts the existence of something greater than God)? By identifying God’s goodness with God’s essence — divine simplicity — we are able to claim that God’s own life is the transcendental standard of goodness, avoiding both unacceptable consequences.** This doctrine of divine simplicity usually includes along with it a doctrine of impassibility i.e. God is unable to be ‘created,’ ‘caused,’ or ‘influenced’ by his emotions, because for them to affect him they must be a separate ‘part’. James E. Dolezal writes about passibility meaning 'caused to be' (24) > Every passion is a caused state of being into which one is moved by the activity of some agent. For this reason, all passions are finite, dependent, time bound, and mutable states of being. Moreover, to experience passion one must possess a principle of receptivity (i.e., passive potency) by which new actuality is received. That is, one must be moveable or changeable. Metaphysically speaking, a passion is an accident that inheres in a substance and modifies the being of that substance in some way. In existential terms, every experience of passion causes the patient to be in some new way. Although it seems okay to say that God can be affected by emotions in his human incarnation (see this question ) penal substitution seems to imply that he is ‘required’ by his wrath to punish humanity for sin. In the most basic sense, penal substitution is: > the idea that Christ’s death is in some way a representative one in which he suffers the judgment/wrath of God on behalf of deserving sinners thereby releasing them from guilt and obtaining forgiveness for them But the way it is typically described by protestants emphasizes God’s anger wrath that cannot be appeased without some sort of blood sacrifice. We say something like: “God cannot abide sin” or his “justice demands to eradicate it”. Tom Wright describes this wrath-bound God as being a hold-over from medieval times: > Christians have spoken, in effect, of the angry God upstairs and the suffering Jesus placating him. Spoken? They’ve painted it: many a mediaeval altarpiece, many a devotional artwork, have sketched exactly that. And of course for some late mediaeval theologians this was the point of the Mass: God was angry, but by performing this propitiatory sacrifice once more, the priest could make it all right. And it was at least in part in reaction against this understanding of the Eucharist that the Reformers rightly insisted that what happened on the cross happened once for all. They did not invent, they merely adapted and relocated, the idea of the propitiation of God’s wrath through the death of Jesus. **This seems to be out of line with belief in God’s simplicity, suggesting that Jesus ‘had’ to die to appease God’s justice, but in so saying, describing justice as a power separate from God himself which ‘affects’ him (contra passibility) and ‘causes’ (contra simplicity) him to demand blood.** Even though wrath does seem to be a real biblical motivator for God’s judgement (Rom. 1:18 and various OT events), it also seems in practice to overly distinguish the ‘loving’ sacrifice of Jesus from the ‘wrath’ of God. That is why Orthodox Abbot Tryphon says : > The major problem with this teaching can be seen in the fact that had Christ died for our sins against God the Father, thus causing a division of God, with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity laid waste, with God pitted against God. This heretical doctrine divides God by implying that Christ isn’t fully God. It also suggests that there is a higher force than God, thus making, God Himself ruled by a “higher force”. In other words, God has no choice but to punish. By this notion, justice forces God to respond to our sin with His wrath, with love becoming secondary. My questions are as follows: **(1.A.) Are there versions of penal substitution which do not include recourse to a lack of emotional self-control – i.e. ‘needing’ to punish someone?** **(1.B.) How do *they* make sense of God’s anger/wrath in scripture?** A discussion regarding simplicity and God's attributes can be found here , although it doesn't address the atonement. **(2.A.) Alternatively, how do advocates of penal substitution communicate Christ’s work without seeming to violate divine simplicity/impassibility?** **(2.B.) Or do these concepts themselves need to be modified in light of penal substitution?** A discussion which gives more precision to the *reasons* for believing in simplicity can be found here .

God created the universe. Therefore He transcends the universe. He is outside the universe. Yet, He has a throne room in heaven: > Revelation 4:2 - Immediately I was in the Spirit; and behold, a throne set in heaven, and One sat on the throne. I told someone that God is outside the universe, but "part" of Him is in it. I was told that violates divine simplicity, since God has no parts. How does one explain God being outside the universe yet on the throne in heaven without violating divine simplicity? Or is the premise wrong somehow?

Scope: Philosophy of orthodox Trinitarianism. Off the top of my head, the Bible says that God is love, God is light, God is truth, God is wisdom, and God is Spirit. Is it a more general conclusion of divine simplicity that God's essence is identical to his attributes? I vaguely remember encountering this argument but cannot remember the source.

Let's assume that God is omnipotent in the sense that he can do anything which is logically possible (so that he cannot create square circles because a square circle is a contradiction). Now it is thought that God cannot do things like make himself cease to exist, or to become contingent. How does this square with the idea that (at least some part of) God became a man. By entering into time and assuming a bodily form, is that not the meaning of becoming contingent? I can anticipate the answer that Jesus has two natures, the human one that is contingent (and does not exist anymore) and one that is divine (which was never contingent), but this seems to me to just split Jesus into a divine part (which was never contingent) and the ordinary human part, so that the Jesus that walked on Earth was an ordinary human, and hence no need fore the idea of the trinity. Any way to resolve this dilemma? Edit: Perhaps to restate: Do we have to accept that God - in his omnipotence, must be able to create the logically impossible, in order to believe in something like the trinity?

Wikipedia defines divine simplicity this way: > In theology, the doctrine of divine simplicity says that God is > without **parts**. *Euthyphro, God's Nature, and the Question of Divine Attributes*, which discuss Divine Simplicity and the philosophies used to describe how God is "simple," provides a better definition in part 1 : > When we speak of God’s simplicity then, in the most elementary sense, > we are speaking of his not having parts, of his non-compositeness. “We > use the term,” Berkhof explains, “to describe the state or quality of > being simple, the condition of being free from division into parts, > and therefore from compositeness” Here's part 2 and part 3 . Personally, I think divine simplicity is coherent. But I couldn't find any scriptural support for this doctrine. What is the Biblical basis?