Is this a grave mistake in DN22 translation? It appears both Ven. Thanissaro and Bhante Sujato have made a grave translation error [in DN22](https://suttacentral.net/dn22/en/sujato?layout=linebyline#1.7) . > “Mendicants, the four kinds of mindfulness meditation are the path to convergence. They are in order to purify sentient beings, to get past sorrow and crying, to make an end of pain and sadness, to end the cycle of suffering, and to realize extinguishment. > > “Ekāyano ayaṃ, bhikkhave, maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā, sokaparidevānaṃ samatikkamāya dukkhadomanassānaṃ atthaṅgamāya ñāyassa adhigamāya nibbānassa sacchikiriyāya, yadidaṃ cattāro satipaṭṭhānā. Ven. Vijithananda explain this in a different way. "Attangamaya" means not "make to and end of pain and sadness" but taking them as not I, me, or mine.

If there is no self in mental formations and volition, then who carries out mindfulness? I try to see that there is no self in things. Is it not therefore that I am? 'Being mindful you'll see that even the ambition to be mindful has no self' - who sees that?

I understand that the ego is the root of all suffering — I’ve witnessed it in my own life many times, and I truly believe it. Over the years, I’ve worked hard on dissolving my ego, and today I feel much happier and more at peace. I can face the nuances of life with calm and clarity. However, I’ve reached a point where I feel so calm that I fear I’m not using my potential to do enough good in the world. I have unique capabilities, strengths, and talents that I feel could be put to better use. **How can I express and use the gift of being myself in a powerful and meaningful way — to do good — without letting the ego take the spotlight again?**

Prajñākaragupta (ca. 8th–9th century) was a Buddhist philosopher of the epistemological school and the author of the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, an extensive commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. In his epistemic interpretations, the wisdom of non‑duality (advaya‑jñāna) is presented as “the ultimate means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).” To quote from here :- > **At the core of Prajñākaragupta’s thought is the wisdom of non-duality > (advaya-jñana) which is the ultimate means of valid cognition > (pramāṇa).** Dharmakīrti had further defined "pramāṇa" as that which > illuminates unknown objects (ajñātārthaprakāśo vā) and as that which > is a "knowledge without deception" (avisaṃvādi jñānam). > **Prajñākaragupta states that "unknown objects" ultimately refers to the > ultimate object (paramārtha) which is a non-dual form (advaitarūpatā) > (PVA 79,15-17). This non-dual perception (advaita-dṛṣṭi) is what > ultimately leads to the end of suffering.** Prajñākaragupta identifies > it with what Dharmakīrti calls the insight (yukti) that leads to the > end of suffering (Pramāṇavārttika chapter II v. 139). Previous > commentators had mainly aligned this with not-self. Prajñākaragupta > agrees, but also gives an alternative explanation: "yukti is union > (yoga), which means that all phenomena are interconnected beyond all > differences, that is, non-duality (advaita)" (PVA 116,16-19). **For > Prajñākaragupta, all other forms of Buddhist epistemology which do not > discuss non-duality are ways to gradually lead a person to higher and > subtler levels of wisdom, culminating in the nondual cognition** > (advaitāvabodha). ---------- Questions for Discussion:- 1. Does Prajñākaragupta’s non‑dual reading implicitly reify a kind of absolute awareness or self‑like substratum that diverges from the Buddha’s teaching of anatta? Given that Prajñākaragupta uses advaitarūpatā to characterize the ultimate object of cognition and posits an ultimate lack of distinction between knower and known, is this formulation closer to a form of non‑dual eternalism rather than strict Buddhist no‑self? 2. Can his interpretation genuinely be reconciled with the early Buddhist elimination of a permanent self? ----------

So far as I understand the terminology, there are two levels of knowledge: 1. "conceptual knowledge" like "man" and "woman" 2. "ultimate reality" like the five khandas The importance of understanding Anatta or Anatman (egolessness) as the "ultimate reality" is explained in Access to Insight article on Egolessness: - [The Three Basic Facts of Existence III. Egolessness (Anatta)](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/various/wheel202.html) Anatta contemplation is about a clear understanding of egolessness. Does this insight come from Dhammanupassana (contemplation on the teachings of the Buddha)? As an example of this question, how do these two fit together: - “There is no doer, but only the doing” - The yogi should just note “seeing, seeing”.

Psychedelic substances such as psilocybin or LSD often induce experiences described as "ego death," where the usual sense of self dissolves and a feeling of unity or boundlessness arises. Some interpret these states as glimpses of spiritual truth, potentially similar to Buddhist insights into anattā (non-self) or śūnyatā (emptiness). From a Buddhist perspective, are these chemically induced experiences considered valid insights into the nature of self and reality, or are they fundamentally different from the realizations attained through traditional Buddhist practice? Are there teachings or commentaries that address the nature or value of such experiences?

In the early Buddhist discourses, anattā is primarily taught through an analysis of the five aggregates, showing that none of them can coherently be identified as a self. At the same time, the Buddha repeatedly declines to affirm either the existence or the non-existence of a self when questioned directly. This combination of analytic negation and doctrinal restraint raises a fundamental interpretive question about the status of the teaching. Should anattā be understood only as a soteriological method aimed at dismantling identity-view and attachment, without committing to a determinate ontological claim about reality? Or does it presuppose a view about the nature of reality that is deliberately left implicit in the early texts? How should the Buddha’s refusal to answer metaphysical questions about the self be understood: as a principled suspension of ontology, or as a pedagogical strategy shaped by the goals of the path? Furthermore, Do developments in the Theravada and Madhyamaka traditions represent faithful philosophical articulations of the early teaching, or do they mark a shift in explanatory aims and conceptual framework?

Anatta is often described as "not-self" which I understand to mean that our identities are illusions. But it's also described as "soullessness" which I think implies that there is no mind other than the brain itself. But many Buddhists believe in rebirth. If there is no soul, how can there be rebirth?

In my quest to develop virtue, sometimes, I get distracted and entangled in thoughts. When I am in thoughts, virtuous conduct is halted. The reason why I get entangled in thoughts, is usually because of attachment. For example, attachment to what someone thinks about me. My head starts ruminating and I am not being mindful or diligent or metta in the present moment. One way to phrase this came to mind, inspired by a sutta describing enlightenment. To paraphrase the relevant part of the sutta: > Picking up the aggregates is a burden, laying them down is blissful Inspired by this, **when I become distracted, I think of it like this:** > **Instead of having practiced the eightfold path, I picked up the aggregates** **Since I still don't grasp enlightenment or anatta, I am unsure if this is a helpful application of that phrase.** What do you think?

**Today I momentarily fell back to identifying with old thinking patterns, and as a result, old habits and sluggishness emerged.** It caused some trouble, mainly that I delayed departure to a casual meeting with my parents. I called and said as an explanation that I don't feel so good today, and the way I said it left open interpretation that I may call things off entirely. **But then, I remembered the virtue of diligence amongst others, and turned things around.** While I told my parents that "I didn't feel so good", to myself, now, **I think of it as me having "forgotten who I am, for a moment".** This was a phrase that came to me when I was being diligent and discarding of wrong thought again. **But since I still don't grasp anatta, I am unsure if this is a helpful phrase.** What do you think?

In Yogācāra, the ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) is described as containing karmic seeds and functioning as the basis for the arising of the six manifest consciousnesses. However, since the ālaya-vijñāna persists from moment to moment and across lifetimes, it can appear to be an underlying metaphysical substrate. If all schools of Buddhism maintain the doctrine of anātman (non-self), then how is the ālaya-vijñāna not being reified into some kind of enduring essence? Is ālaya-vijñāna considered merely a provisional explanatory model that is ultimately eliminated or transformed upon awakening?

Should I see right practice as not self? The same question is phrased three times over, in different ways, below. As context, I am a householder that seeks to eliminate suffering. **Question from Buddhist point of view** I want to let go of everything but right practice. This allows me to see many things as not self, unphased. For example, feeling tired or aroused or discontent. These things are not part of right practice, so I am able to see them as not self and let them pass by. It then feels like a wave has passed by me, and fully knowing that the wave was not self, and fully footed in overcoming craving, I feel no need to look back at the wave. However, when thoughts of diligence come up, and of right speech, I am hesitant to see them as not self. I am afraid that if I see them as something that will just pass, something to be impassionate about, that I will then deviate from the right path. The concept of right path too, is something I am hesitant to see as not self. How to proceed? **Question with Christian example** In Christianity, there is the concept of the new man and the old man. Practitioners are said to never be able to hope to shake off the old man in them (until Jesus returns). Practitioners are told to strive continuously to *be* the new man. Is the Buddhist answer to let go of the new man too? **Question with concrete example** I have a thought about turning on the TV. The matters in that thought are not about giving up craving, not about mindfulness, not about being metta, so I give up the thought and don't look back at it. Then I have a thought about doing well at a new job. Usually I have doubtful thoughts about the new job. The thought of working hard at the job I see as related to diligence. I do not give up the thought and entertain it. Whereas the TV watcher is clearly not self - something that has arisen from a place that is not self - the thought of working hard at the job now feels like self. I am about the thought, the thought is about me. There is a self and the self is concerned with the thought. I don't feel it's possible to overcome the sense of self without giving up the thought, and giving up the thought I don't feel is possible without the giving up of diligence. If someone suggested that you could have not-self AND thought entertainment, I think I would brush that off as them not speaking from experience. Should I give up right diligence / right livelihood?

Buddha has taught that Sabbe Dhamma Anatta. I agree, however being an ignorant fellow, I believe I am body, I am eyes, I am intelligence, I am consciousness, my wife is mine, my son is mine. What do you find as you, yours, or yourself, honestly? (This question attempts to find out depths of our ignorance)

Dependent origination is interpreted by users of this platform to mean that craving and grasping can give rise to a sense of self. It's also advised on this platform to reflect on not-self of various things like mind and body. Not-self is described elsewhere as "not in control of", although people caution against conceptualizing not-self. I take this to mean that whenever I feel I "am", that "I" is an illusion built on a layer of craving and grasping. So, whenever I feel I "am", I reflect on an inability of me as an illusion to change anything - to move a body part, to breathe in a different way, to change thoughts, to prevent something, etc. Is this a wrong view?

In my current considerations, there are two options regarding self view and suffering, and I am not sure which one applies. Would appreciate any advice. Option 1: there is a true self that can be deluded into identifying with the aggregates. While there is a lot of talk about how there is no self at all, Zen Buddhism to my understanding teaches that there is a "big I" and "small I", and that the big I should be revealed. The big I in option 1 could have the property "asleep" or "misidentifying". Option 2: it's the aggregates themselves holding self-view which causes suffering *within the aggregates*, and through the Dhamma it is our aggregates that learn to stop holding self view. There is no separate self beyond the aggregates at all, not even realized after awakening nor in a conceptual manner. Which one is correct? Possibly neither of them?

The doctrine of anattā denies any soul or self, yet the suttas mention beings like petas, yakkhas which are supposed to be Ghosts and spirits. If there is no soul, what is said to persist as a ghost or spirit?

Is there an ultimate self according to zen masters such as Dogen? I think that in the scholastic tradition of the mahayana, that is not the standard interpretation of the sutras etc.. I guess I mean what I am all along, rather than something "fixed". The snake was merely a rope all along, rather than nothing whatsoever or nothing more than the illusion of a snake/myself.

Given what I assume was the predominant view of the time, I would not be surprised if there are many Suttas that deal explicitly with resurrection (as opposed to rebirth which seems to be a more recent word used to delineate the concept), but I am interested in finding out in which sutras did Buddha Shakyamuni deal explicitly with annihilationism (ucchedavāda) which, as I understand it, is the position of the dissolution of the self after death (of which materialism would be a subset). I am aware of the following Suttas: - Brahmajāla-sutta -- which covers a large array of positions of wrong arguments against annhilationism, but doesn't seem to go into too much detail on how it is a wrong view. - Alagaddūpama-sutta -- in which The Buddha instructs on how to defend his position from being confused with annihilationism. - Pālileyya-sutta -- not sure exactly how to interpret this, but it seems to be about assuaging the fear of annihilation. - Achela Kassapa-sutta -- where the Buddha states the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism. - Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta -- where The Buddha separates his view from all conventional views. - Kalama Sutta -- where The Buddha explains the benefits of the path even if there is nothing after death. Are there any glaring misconceptions here? Are there any other Suttas dealing with this topic?

In *Cracking The Walnut: Understanding the Dialectics of Nagarjuna*, Thich Nhat Hanh explains how in the four conditions out of which a phenomenon arises (seed condition, continuity condition, object of cognition as condition, supportive condition) we can not find the self-nature of the phenomenon itself. The text which he is explaining, The Verses on the Middle Way by Nagarjuna, conclude this about the matter: > 3. The self-nature of phenomena \ is not found in the conditions. \ Since there is no self-nature, \ how could there be an other-nature? To illustrate this point Thich Nhat Hanh uses the example of fire. > For example, we may look for the self-nature of a flame in a box of matches. In the box are matches made of wood and sulfur. Outside the box is oxygen. When we search inside the wood, sulfur, and oxygen can we find the self-nature of the flame? Whether the match has already been lit or not, we cannot find this self-nature. What we call the self-nature of something cannot be found in its conditions at all. My question is, how can Nagarjuna make the leap that because self-nature is not found in the causes or grounds out of which a phenomenon arises that therefore said phenomenon does not possess self-nature? For instance, if we at first assume that objects possess a separate self-nature and we take the example of ice instead of fire, we see that the conditions out of which ice arises (freezing temperatures, water, air pressure) do seem to possess something resembling the self-nature of their product. This is why I am confused when Thich Nhat Hanh uses the example of fire to illustrate the point -- surely there are other phenomena, like ice, which don't fit the rule?

I feel curious about what it actually feels like when someone directly experiences anatta. How do practitioners describe that experience? Is it sudden or gradual? Does it come with a sense of liberation, fear, or something else entirely? I’m especially interested in how this experience is understood or explained within different traditions, like Theravāda or Zen, if there are differences. Please note I'm not looking for just theoretical explanations. I’d really appreciate if there are descriptions from those who lived and felt experience of realizing anatta.