Pramana refers to sources of knowledge in Indian epistemology. The wikipedia article on Pramana states: > Buddhism holds two (perception, inference) are valid means ... to knowledge. This sutta supports Pratyakṣa or perception: > “And what, bhikkhus, is The All? The eye and forms, the ear and > sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and > tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called The > All. > > “If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: ‘Having rejected this all, I > shall make known another all’—that would be a mere empty boast on his > part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, > further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, > bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.” > SN 35.23 Are there examples in the suttas where the Buddha, or his Arahant teacher disciples like Sariputta, used Anumāna or inference? Please provide them. Let's say, when you wake up from sleep and go outside your house to observe the ground to be wet everywhere, but it's currently not raining. So based on this observation, you can infer that it must have very recently rained. Is there any truth of the suttas that is not observed directly by perception but rather inferred from indirect evidence? Another example is evolution. We cannot observe that humans evolved from a common ancestor with chimpanzees. However, we can infer that indirectly from fossil evidence. This is obtaining knowledge from inference. There can be other examples, like how the ancients inferred that Earth must be spherical from the way shadows fell on the ground differently in different cities at the same time.

Does choosing a timer imply that meditation has a fixed goal or endpoint, while choosing a stopwatch suggests that awareness itself sets the boundaries? If time is an illusion we impose on the eternal now, why do we measure it at all in moments of stillness? What might emerge if you meditated without any clock, letting the universe's rhythm guide you instead?

They say perception and inference are valid ways of knowing. Can you explain the diagram:

Anatta is often described as "not-self" which I understand to mean that our identities are illusions. But it's also described as "soullessness" which I think implies that there is no mind other than the brain itself. But many Buddhists believe in rebirth. If there is no soul, how can there be rebirth?

It seems while cetanā concerns having a goal, vāyāma is what carries this goal out. My understanding is neither vāyāma nor cetanā *should* involve upādāna; however, vāyāma is outside of and cultivates the ālaya. If any of this is wrong feedback would be welcome, but my question is does sati require vāyāma, or can it be the result of bountiful ālaya? Does sammā-vāyāma become less significant with cultivation?

[Sense consciousness and pure consciousness | Ajahn Sumedho | 21.10.2020](https://youtu.be/lNZV6z0UO3g?si=4jzUizukuHSJpp0m) My understanding of Sense Consciousness becomes clearer after listening to this Dhamma talk by Ajahn Sumedho. As a meditator this is very helpful. Just pure awareness without judgment and grasping. I would like to hear comments from other meditators.

What would the Buddha teach about how to respond if a dog starts hanging around your meditation hut (or wherever), initially seems friendly, but later—without warning—gets into aggressive moods and bites you severely enough that you need stitches?

Both Theravāda and Mahāyāna accept a core early Buddhist canon, yet each tradition also relies on additional bodies of literature Theravāda on the commentaries (Aṭṭhakathā, Ṭīkā, and post-canonical works such as the Visuddhimagga) and Mahāyāna on sūtras not preserved in Pāli and often considered “later” by modern scholarship. On what doctrinal or hermeneutical grounds does each tradition justify the authority of its later textual strata? Are there explicit criteria within each tradition for discerning which later works are authoritative, semi-authoritative, or merely scholastic? How do traditional scholars within each school respond to the charge that the later texts introduce ideas not present in the early Nikāyas/Āgamas?

Buddhist ethics centrally upholds the precept against taking life, But in modern society there are many professions such as soldiers, military commanders, police officers, and judges whose duties may involve lethal force whether directly (combat, armed enforcement) or indirectly (authorizing executions, issuing orders with foreseeable deadly outcomes). From a Buddhist perspective, how should we understand the karmic implications for individuals in such roles? According to canonical or commentarial sources, how is killing performed under state mandate classified in terms of akusala-kamma? Is it treated identically to private intentional killing, or do texts differentiate between personal motive and institutional role? How does the primacy of cetanā (intention) apply when one participates in lethal actions not out of personal malice but as part of an institutional duty? Furthermore Is there doctrinal room for someone to maintain sincere Buddhist practice while performing duties like the above that may involve lethal force?

I'm interested to know the academic consensus on Cleary's translation of The Blue Cliff Record. I've heard that his translations could be spotty at times, given that, how accurately has he depicted this text? To clarify: I want to know how closely Cleary's translation adheres to the original Blue Cliff Record, not how the Buddhist community regards it in terms of Buddhist practice.

In meditation practice how to recognise a faith follower, dhamma follower and sothapana?when fetter of personality view is broken whether there is a different ofstream of thoughts?

When we study with concentration and our mind gets distracted we bring back to the very subject we study. The same thing we do it in meditation, when mind gets distracted we bring it back to breath . So isn't Studying is also meditation ?

I've been practicing meditation and studying buddhism for years, and I've always been curious about *vipassana*, but I never knew how should I practice it, on what should I focus, etc. So my questions is: what do you recommend for someone who is starting *vipassana* meditation? How do I begin and how should I do it?

In theory, many ways of meditation have been given to stop cravings and aversion. What about practical life? During day to day life, it has often been seen and experienced as well that, "we tend to lean towards comfortablity", whether it be of body or brain. Let's take a basic example: one living in a rented house tend to go for a own-home(whenever possible).... even monks of modern era tend to go for own-kuti/monastery. For this one needs money. Reason being given is, "i feel more freedom inside my own-home instead of rented one". Another eg. : Using technologies, more resources for making life easy-going. Resaon being given as: we have less headaches, more respect, easy-flow of society. Even if i properly give time to analyze, realize, etc. bhlabhla, stay *disconnected* to this modernized life, there is definitely no need for me to ask this question! If one doesn't go for maintaining status, using hi-fi techs, spending money(either for dana purpose or for anything else..), ........ It's more likely to be 99.99% that such person would be physically and mentally **behind** from others. One simple solution came is:: live like a bpl(below poverty line) person but this will definitely decrease morale and enthusiasm of nearby-ones, decreasing their chances of learning dhamma. (If possible, kindly don't include advice for meditation to a freak and too-ignorants) i am more concerned into balancing the life(middle path for householders) such that both nearby ones and me can have less possible crave, more possible dhamma! **Edit::** Maybe, this answer is somewhat talking about balance in last 3 paragraphs. But it is also saying to re-engage in earning money to get approval of others.....getting approval is ok but how would money change someone's behaviour, confusing to me?

It seems that often what one has difficulty with in attempting to hold onto some thing is some other which competes. Can what is effortful in attention be seen as a non-clinging to that which we don't want to attend to? In other words can what is effortful in attention be thought of as an excess of attachment? As if we were something sticky; is what is effortful in rightful adhering (to what is attended to) to be a matter of nonattachment? edit: To put it in Buddhist language is the vāyāma of sati anupādāna.

Four Parts of the Mind 1. Vinnyana or Consciousness – 6 Vinnyanas. These include the consciousness that arises from the Eye, Ear, Tongue, Nose, Mind and Body. 2. Sanya or Perception – Function of this part of the mind is to recognize and evaluate. 3. Vedhana or Sensation – Function is to realize the sensation. 4. Sankhara or Reaction – Function is to react, to give fruit to the sensation. This is the volition of the mind. The 3 types of Sankharas include a) like line drawn on water b) like line drawn on sand on beach c) like line drawn on rock, deep line. My question which part of mind observes 3.Vedana/Sensation in VIPASSANA ? Is it 1.Vinnyana ? And how come one part of **mind**(the first part) is again **mind**?

Given that using the internet and its services, such as social networks and brokers, involves signing contracts, terms of service, policies, and so on, is it possible to use them without breaking the fourth precept? Indeed, most contracts are assumed to have been read and understood before signing. However, reading and understanding what is read can take dozens of hours in each case and requires considerable intellectual effort, even legal knowledge. Furthermore, these contracts often contain clauses that are difficult to comply with or even logically impossible. With the proliferation of these contracts, it becomes almost unmanageable unless one is willing to dedicate an excessive amount of time to them. So, how can we use these services without breaking the fourth precept?

In Buddhist philosophy, particularly in traditions like the Madhyamaka, the catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) operates as a dialectical tool that rejects the four extremes of affirmation and negation (“is,” “is not,” “both,” “neither”) to demonstrate the emptiness (śūnyatā) of any inherent essence (svabhāva). But conversely, Advaita Vedānta employs a similar deconstructionist method, the neti neti (“not this, not this”) utilising it as an epistemic negation process in order to systematically exclude all contingent identifications such as body, senses, mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), and ego (ahaṅkāra) — to arrive at Ātman, the absolute self conceived as pure awareness, distinct from all phenomenal processes. From a Buddhist philosophical standpoint, can the catuṣkoṭi be coherently applied to the Vedāntic conception of Ātman—understood as pure awareness beyond mind,ego and intellect? Would such an analysis deconstruct this posited ultimate subject , or does the Vedāntic notion of Ātman represent a category that eludes Madhyamaka negation?

In the Dīgha Nikāya 15 (DN 15), the Mahānidāna Sutta, the Buddha outlines a a complex stratification of "seven stations of consciousness" and "two dimensions" > “Ānanda, there are these seven stations of consciousness and two > dimensions. Which seven? > > “There are **beings with multiplicity of body and multiplicity of > perception,4 such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the > lower realms. This is the first station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with multiplicity of body and singularity of > perception, such as the Devas of Brahmā’s Retinue generated by the > first (jhāna) and (some) beings in the four realms of deprivation.5 > This is the second station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with singularity of body and multiplicity of > perception, such as the Radiant Devas. This is the third station of > consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with singularity of body and singularity of > perception, such as the Beautiful Black Devas. This is the fourth > station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings who, with the complete transcending of perceptions > of (physical) form, with the disappearance of perceptions of > resistance, and not heeding perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) > ‘Infinite space,’ arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of space. > This is the fifth station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension > of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ > arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** **This is > the sixth station of consciousness.** > > “There are beings who, **with the complete transcending of the dimension > of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ > arrive at the dimension of nothingness. This is the seventh station of > consciousness.** > > **“The dimension of non-percipient beings and, second, the dimension of > neither perception nor non-perception. [These are the two dimensions.]** ~ DN 15 Is the Buddha here describing subjective, internal states of consciousness that can be directly known in meditation, or externally existing cosmological realms that other beings inhabit? This ambiguity is especially pronounced in the case of the “dimension of infinite consciousness.” Is this to be understood as a temporary mental perception - an internal expansion of awareness beyond form - or does it point to a more ontological reality in which consciousness itself is experienced as boundless? If so, what does this imply about the nature of consciousness: is it something objectively infinite by nature, or is any perception of “infinite consciousness” merely a constructed meditative perception, still within the conditioned world, and thus ultimately impermanent?

I have constant chronic pain. Would really like to be rid of it. Is this considered a negative desire in Buddhism? I remember in the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, the Buddha stated that the second Noble Truth is "craving for sensual pleasure, craving for becoming, craving for non-becoming." I guess I interpreted the craving for non-becoming to apply to my desire for my pain to be gone.