Given Buddhism’s long historical development across regions (e.g., Theravāda, Mahāyāna, Vajrayāna), what criteria can practitioners use to determine whether a particular belief or practice is: - grounded in early Buddhist doctrine, - a skillful means/expedient within a legitimate later tradition, or - primarily a cultural superstition layered onto Buddhism which is a deviation from the original teachings?

Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 CE) was one of the foremost philosophers of Kashmir Śaivism , whose magnum opus Tantrāloka is widely regarded as the most comprehensive exposition of non‑dual Śaiva tantric thought. In the chapter of Tantrāloka dealing with causality , Abhinavagupta and the commentator Jayaratha mount a sustained critique of Buddhist theories of causality and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), which they present as inadequate to account for real causal efficiency outside a unified conscious agent. Below are verbatim formulations from the Tantrāloka alongside an academic paper (based on Tantrāloka and Jayaratha’s commentary) mentioning Abhinavagupta’s key objections to the Buddhist theories of causality . ***Important disclaimer:-*** The paper contains a large volume of tightly argued material, textual citations, and sub-arguments. For the sake of clarity and length, I am summarising the main objections rather than citing every verse or passage. Any readers attempting to answer should ideally consult from Page 12 onwards of the said paper alongside the other provided citations alongside the text of Tantraloka from 9.10 to 9.37 for a thorough and accurate understanding of the opponent's objections. ---------- 1:- Causality and succession ---------------------------------------------- Abhinavagupta asserts that Buddhist theory causality is only succession of discrete events with no substantial connection, and therefore cannot explain real causal relations. Especially between phenomena independent of one another The direct Excerpt from the tantraloka 9.11-13 Jayaratha, the commentator, gives the example of Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī (the constellations Pleiades and Taurus): if mere succession were enough to establish causation, Kṛttikā would be the cause of Rohiṇī, since the latter always rises after the former. Yet despite this regular sequence, there is no causal relationship between them.The Śaiva critique here seems to be that Buddhist theory relies too heavily on perceptual succession to define causation. 2: True causality requiring an agent and agency: ----------------------------------------------------- Abhinavagupta argues that because Buddhists emphasize momentary entities, they lack a real connection between cause and effect. Abhinavagupta claims that “the relation of cause and effect is really that of agent and agency” and that the ultimate cause is a conscious agent whose will underlies causation. Excerpt from Tantraloka 9.14-18 Further Jayaratha asks that surely succession and simultaneity are not character- istics in the nature of the things themselves; they are attributes of perception. But it is consciousness which establishes the succession and non-succession when it per- ceives that a cloth is after a pot. The things themselves are not endowed with succession or non-succession as something super added to their natures. So the Buddhists cannot avoid the fact that they are superimposing contradictory attributes upon a single entity even though they are trying to get away by introducing succession (TĀV 9.18). 3: Multiple causes and unity of effects ---------- The concept of complex causality (Sāmagrī ) is used by both Naiyāyikas and Buddhists in their discussions about causality. Abhinavagupta accepts the Buddhist notion of causal totality but maintains that Śiva, as consciousness, is the ultimate agent. While a pot is said to arise from an aggregate of causes (TĀ 9.30ab), this aggregate must form a unity. Without such unity, diverse causes would produce multiple effects. Jayaratha clarifies how This unity has to be grounded in a single, all-pervasive agent of cognition, which alone makes a single effect possible. Excerpt from Tantraloka 9.29-37 ---------- Questions based on the above - ========= 1. How does Buddhist dependent origination avoid collapsing causality into simple succession with no real dependence? How would Buddhists justify dependent origination so that true causal relations are distinguished from mere chronological succession? 2. How do Buddhists account for singular effects arising from multiple interdependent conditions without a unified causal agent or totality? 3. How would Buddhists respond to the claim that causal succession and simultaneity are merely perceptual constructs rather than objective causal relations? 4. How do Buddhist theories of dependent origination articulate “necessity” such that effects follow causes for reasons beyond mere adjacency? 5. How would a Buddhist articulate the concept of momentariness and dependent origination without collapsing into either metaphysical nihilism or affirmation of a first, self‑existent cause? What logic would show that conditionality implies neither absolute self nor random succession? 6. Specifically address whether the criticism shows a misunderstanding of pratītyasamutpāda or momentariness, and why. ----------

I read the following in the internet: > You are right, **punarbhāva** doesn't mean "rebirth"... except in all the > dictionaries, all the Pāli instruction books, all the grammars, all > the traditional literature, and all the modern commentarial > literature. LMAO. – Based on in the above, how did the Buddha have direct knowledge and vision "this is my last rebirth; now there’ll be no more future lives” (ayamantimā jāti, natthi dāni **punabbhavo**’”ti.)? If the question is not clear, some Buddhists assert punabbhavo & jati are mental states, therefore such Buddhists assert such mental states can be directly known to arise & cease, as for example, when SN 12.20 says: "*birth is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation*." But if punabbhavo means rebirth, how did the Buddha directly know this rebirth would end when craving ended? For example, when craving ends in a Buddha, the body keeps breathing, the cells of the body keep replicating, consciousness keeps arising at the six sense bases. Therefore, how did the Buddha directly know craving leads to reincarnation/rebirth? For example, if the hair of the head keeps growing after craving ends, how could the Buddha have been certain rebirth ends when craving ends?

I am a practicing Buddhist following the Thai forest tradition. I have ADHD and take extended-release methylphenidate (an ADHD stimulant every morning). I also meditate in the mornings. My question is whether it is proscribed in the Canon to meditate on ADHD medication. Clearly, these stimulants did not exist in the Buddha's time, but would the advice on something like methylphenidate be the same as the advice for caffeinated tea? I am able to progress further in my meditation when I take the medication before meditating, but is it hampering the progress in the mind to meditate on a mind affected by a stimulant? Please back up your answers with passages from the suttas if possible. Thank you.

When I am very angry or very fearful, my work efficiency work increases and I can concentrate more. But now that I have been practicing Vipassana for a couple of years, my fear and anger has diminished. I am worried whether this will hamper or worsen my work or not. Please guide me

I am from India and I want to convert to Buddhism. However, there are no Buddhist monasteries or temples near my home. Because of this, I am unsure about the proper process to formally convert. Is it necessary to visit a monastery and take initiation from a monk, or is there any way to convert online or virtually? I would really appreciate guidance on the correct and authentic way to become a Buddhist in this situation.

I asked this question on the Philosophy StackExchange, as some belief systems have deep belief that everything is on a spectrum of polarity/opposites: - [What philosophies don't say things boil down to polarities (opposites)?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/118562/what-philosophies-dont-say-things-boil-down-to-polarities-opposites) What does Buddhism say about polarities/opposites? Does everything have an opposite? If so, how? I have several examples in my linked question, of what I think cannot be polarities: > I have thought a little about this and it appears that there are not > just polarities, but at least 3 classes of property values: > > 1. [On-off values](https://gist.github.com/lancejpollard/aa3b2eb6d03c997c6c42c214bf8c6701) > (not opposites, but a single property like "itchy" or "spikey", which > can have "more" or "less" of an intensity. _There is no opposite to > itchy or spikey._ At least the way I look at things. If you say > "non-itchy" as an opposite, what does that even mean? Basically it > boils down to "no value" or "some value", of one property. > 2. [Opposite values](https://gist.github.com/lancejpollard/5cd76ba84a1773fcd9228565baeb3423) . > These are your typical "polarities" like hot/cold, bright/dim, > heavy/light, etc.. Each is a single property with a pair of values on > a spectrum, ranging from one side to the other. > 3. Multidimensional values. These are things like "color", which has at least red/blue/green (rgb, 3 values ranging from 0-255 on modern > computers), or hue/saturation/lightness (hsl). I think most > "properties" belong to this category TBH, but I can't think of many > more. In coding, these are "data models" or "types with attributes".

What are the rules or guidelines on how a Buddhist should engage with others who would like to discuss philosophies, beliefs, ideas, and practices of other religions or belief systems? - Are Buddhists allowed to discuss / engage in the ideas to some degree? Or is it shunned. - How does Buddhism incorporate ideas outside the main canon / system? _(Generally speaking)_ - Are certain topics to be never discussed? This would help me ask better questions to the Buddhism community in general, but also would serve as a gauge as to how to interact. Basically, what is acceptable conversation topics in the end.

In the early strata of the Pāli Canon,in discussions of dependent origination in the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta and the Mahānidāna Sutta, consciousness or viññāṇa is repeatedly characterized as dependently arisen (paṭiccasamuppanna), specific to its object (e.g., cakkhuviññāṇa, sotaviññāṇa), and lacking any underlying unity apart from causal continuity. In contrast, Yogācāra sources such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and systematic expositions in the Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra systematize a layered model of consciousness introducing the concept of ālayavijñāna as a subliminal, foundational consciousness that serves as the repository of karmic seeds (bīja) and the basis for the arising of the six manifest cognitive consciousnesses. Though described as momentary and dependently arisen, it appears to function as a unifying and enduring āśraya (support) for saṃsāric continuity. The question, which then arises is that Do the Nikāyan materials when interpreted without later Theravāda Abhidhamma categories contain any conceptual space for a structurally analogous substrate, or is Yogācāra’s ālayavijñāna a divergent theoretical innovation? Further Does the mutual conditioning of viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa in DN 15 imply a recursive continuity that could support a proto-ālaya interpretation, or is this reading anachronistic?

In early Buddhist sources, Uddaka Rāmaputta is described as one of the teachers under whom Siddhartha Gautama studied before attaining enlightenment, immediately after his training with Āḷāra Kālāma. The Pāli Canon (e.g MN 26) and parallel Sanskrit sources suggest that Uddaka Rāmaputta taught a form of meditative attainment described as “āruppajhāna”, culminating in a state of “neither perception nor non-perception” (naivasaññānāsaññāyatana). Some Scholars such as Alexander Wynne have hypothesised his affilation with Upanishadic streams of thought by theorizing that Uddaka Rāmaputta’s highest meditative attainment, naivasaññānāsaññāyatana, is identical to the Upanishadic notion of turiya, as described in the Mandukya Upanishad’s “nā prajñam, nāprajñam” (vide. The origin of Buddhist meditation, Wynne 2007) > ****nāntaḥ-prajñam, **na bahiṣ prajñam, nobhayataḥ-prajñam na > prajnañā-ghanam, na prajñam, nāprajñam**; adṛṣtam, avyavahārayam, > agrāhyam, alakṣaṇam, acintyam, avyapadeśyam, ekātma-pratyaya-sāram, > prapañcopaśamam, śāntam, śivam, advaitam, caturtham manyante, sa ātmā, > sa vijñeyaḥ. || 7 ||**** > > That is known as the fourth quarter: **neither inward-turned nor > outward-turned consciousness, nor the two together; not an > indifferentiated mass of consciousness; neither knowing, nor > unknowing**; invisible, ineffable, intangible, devoid of > characteristics, inconceivable, indefinable, its sole essence being > the consciousness of its own Self; the coming to rest of all relative > existence; utterly quiet; peaceful; blissful: without a second: this > is the Ātman, the Self; this is to be realised. (7) (Mandukya Upanishad, Verse 7) While academic scholars like Wynne emphasize these philosophical affinities with Upanishadic thought, it still remains unclear how traditional Buddhist scholarship situates Uddaka. How do Pali texts and classical commentaries classify his meditative system and doctrinal orientation? Was he regarded as belonging to a specific sramanic or Brahmanical school, or is he primarily interpreted as a precursor within the Buddha’s own spiritual biography?

Across Buddhist traditions, liberation (nirvāṇa/nibbāna) is presented as the cessation of suffering through insight into the nature of reality. However, there appears to be substantial disagreement both within the tradition and in modern scholarship over whether this requires substantive ontological commitments. In the early discourses of the Pāli Canon, the Buddha famously refuses to answer speculative metaphysical questions (e.g., the “undeclared questions” in the Cūḷamālukya Sutta), framing the Dhamma as therapeutically oriented toward the cessation of dukkha. This has led some interpreters to read early Buddhism as anti-metaphysical or methodologically quietist. Yet the path itself seems to require insight into doctrines such as dependent origination paṭiccasamuppāda,anattā, and anicca. These appear to function not merely as pragmatic heuristics but as claims about how things actually are. Later traditions intensify this tension:- - The Abhidharma systems of schools such as the Sarvāstivāda develop highly detailed ontologies of dharmas, seemingly grounding liberation in precise metaphysical analysis. - In contrast, Madhyamaka, especially as articulated by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, appears to deconstruct all ontological positions including those that might underwrite soteriology itself while maintaining that such deconstruction is indispensable for liberation. This raises a structural problem: If liberation requires “seeing things as they are” (yathābhūta-ñāṇadassana), does this not presuppose some metaphysical or ontological account of what ultimately exists or how phenomena are structured? Can a “metaphysics-free” Buddhism be coherent, or does the very logic of liberation require at least minimal ontological commitments?

Are there good apologetic resources (books, audios, sites, etc.) that give the buddhist answer to advaita vedanta and/or hinduism in general? To the substantial model of the atman-brahman or purusha/prakriti of Patanjali yoga. I understand that in the West, Whitehead's criticisms were quite close.

I know a lot of the Kyoto school were / have been defined as being as panentheists: but were there any **pantheist** Buddhists? And, has any comparative religion scholar defined it as pantheism?

I just get started three days ago. When meditating, I felt hard to breathe and even the lack of oxygen to the brain. I felt my bell and chess were stiff and this intervene me in getting enough oxygen. My posture is right (I so sure about that). How do I overcome it? Should I keep going or find some changes?

Can we intend and generate karma for something that we believe is impossible? Suppose I am playing a video game and imagine that I am killing actual people on a battlefield, but believe this is not the case. Do I generate the karma of killing? What if someone has hooked it up to an AI on a battlefield or I suspect that they have. Do I generate the karma of killing in either of those cases? This is similar to this question, but I really wanted a authoritative answer, especially of this version. I suspect that it can generate unwholesome attitudes for a while. Is that the same as generating bad karma?

Is this Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN 5.230)sutta true? Is it translated to English from the Pali correctly? >AN 5.230 Numbered Discourses 5.230 >23. Long Wandering Black Snakes (2nd) “Mendicants, there are these five drawbacks of a black snake. What five? It’s irritable, acrimonious, venomous, fork-tongued, and treacherous. These are the five dangers of a black snake. >In the same way there are five drawbacks of a lady. What five? She’s irritable, acrimonious, venomous, fork-tongued, and treacherous. This is a lady’s venom: usually she’s very lustful. This is a lady’s forked tongue: usually she speaks divisively. This is a lady’s treachery: usually she’s an adulteress. These are the five drawbacks of a lady.” https://suttacentral.net/an5.230/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none¬es=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin Ajahn Sujato says it's just wrong, but I wonder if its mistranslated. Are there any other suttas where the Buddha appears to believe things that seem to be born of kilesa. Do any Buddhists believe this sutta? How old is this sutta? I am thinking that that it must be a bad teaching that maybe some monk with too much kilesa slipped in there? >Ajahn Sujato: "And no, I don’t think this was really spoken by the Buddha. Deal with it. What I’m interested in is to subject this text to the same elementary standard that the Buddha himself insisted on, and that we would apply to any other truth claims: does it stack up against the evidence? I assume it doesn’t, but I’d like to see the proof. Does anyone know of any objective, empirically based psychological studies that statistically examine possible gender differences between men and women in these traits?"... https://sujato.wordpress.com/2010/12/05/is-this-sutta-true/ Unless I am just too unenlightened to understand, that sutta doesn't sound like the Buddha I follow. Is it in the context of meditation against sensual desire? Does this damage the reputation of the Buddha? Does the Buddha have to be completely perfect within our unenlightened understanding? That sutta seems impossible though. The Buddha did ordain Bhikkhunis so I was thinking this sutta must be a fraud, right?

In these video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWcgvxlyrkw how come one part of mind(the first part) is again mind?

Is it true that the Buddha will never be a woman? If so, why is this? To be specific, I am particularly asking whether or not the Buddha itself can be female. I am *not* asking whether a woman can become a Buddha in her future life.

One of the 10 wrong views is the view that there are no spontaneously reborn beings. The preceding 2 wrong views in the sequence of 10 are "there is no mother" and "there is no father". 1. Now beings born on earth mostly see beings coming to existence due to a mother and father. Most will never see a "spontaneously reborn being". So how does one form the view that there ARE spontaneously reborn beings when one has never seen such beings? Or is it adequate to simply not reject the possibility of the existence of such beings, but not form the view that there are such beings? 2. Also, if one has the view that there is a mother and father, how does one reconcile these 2 views with the view that there are spontaneously reborn beings, which we are also told are born without a mother and father? Further, say if all the beings we encounter were born spontaneously, how can we form the view that there is a mother and father? Or do the words mother and father mean something other than the biological parents or the first pair of primary carers, e.g. DP verse 294? 3. Why is this view included in the 10 wrong views? The other 9 views does provide a framework for beings to avoid evil and do good. Rejecting this wrong view and accepting its opposing view that there indeed ARE spontaneously reborn beings requires a stretch of the imagination for many. What is the moral purpose? Once again these questions are asked only for academic interest.

In contemporary scholarship on Buddhist philosophy, nonduality is an important theme, but its ontological and epistemological status varies greatly across traditions. For example: Madhyamaka critiques any intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and affirms nonduality as a de-reification of both subject and object. Yogācāra is often interpreted as asserting mind-only (cittamātra), but classical Yogācāra philosophers also defend a two-truths framework to avoid ontological commitments. Zen emphasizes direct nondual experience, yet it operates outside detailed philosophical articulation. Question: How do these various Buddhist approaches such as classical Mahāyāna/Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, Zen, etc conceptualize nonduality such that: It does not collapse into a metaphysical foundation or eternal ground (i.e., avoids eternalism / ground-substantiation), It preserves Buddhist soteriology (dependence, emptiness, two truths), And it remains philosophically coherent within each school’s own ontological and epistemic frameworks? In other words: What are the distinct mechanisms or philosophical moves each tradition uses to articulate nonduality without turning it into a reified ultimate reality? Please support answers with primary sources or credible secondary scholarship where possible.