The statement, "Christ *paid the penalty* for our sins" does not appear in the Bible. When in the history of Christian theology did this specific statement first appear? Who said it? Please provide the actual text (and source) from the writings of the Christian theologians or teachers who first said it—or at least, the earliest ones you can document. **If that is clear to you, there is no need to read the rest of this question.** *Please note:* - This question is specifically about the statement that Christ *paid the penalty* for our sins. Equivalent wordings, such as "Christ paid the *price* for our sins" or *"Jesus* paid the penalty for our sins," are on-topic. However, "Christ died for our sins" or "Christ suffered for our sins" or even "Christ was punished for our sins" are off-topic. I am looking for statements specifically about Christ *paying the penalty,* or *paying the price,* for our sins. - "Paying the price" in the context of Ransom Theory is also off-topic. A ransom is not a penalty or punishment for sin. - I am *not* looking for antecedents for this idea, nor am I looking for passages quoted as the biblical basis for this idea. I am looking for the earliest *explicit statements* of the idea itself. - For reference: the Wikipedia article on Penal Substitution . Please do not just quote from or refer to the Wikipedia article, which seems rather murky and disorganized. ***Edit** in response to comments:* My hypothesis is that the Penal Substitution theory of atonement is closely tied to the phrase "paid the penalty." This is a history of doctrine question rather than simply an English phrase question. However, it is common for proponents of Penal Substitution to see this theory of atonement in phrases representing ideas that are not necessarily the same. For example: - *"Christ died for our sins."* If a drunk driver hits you and kills you, you have died for (due to) the sins of the drunk driver, but you have not *paid the penalty* for the sins of the drunk driver. S/he remains guilty of the crime, and subject to punishment. - *"Christ suffered for our sins."* If a drunk driver hits you and injures you, you have suffered for the sins of the drunk driver, but you have not *paid the penalty* for the sins of the drunk driver. S/he remains guilty of the crime, and subject to punishment. - *"Christ was punished for our sins."* If a drunk driver hits you, and you are wrongfully accused and put in jail instead of the drunk driver, you have *still* not paid the penalty for the drunk driver's sins. The drunk driver remains guilty of the crime, and subject to its penalty if and when it is discovered that there was a miscarriage of justice. Or if you were to voluntarily go to jail *with* the drunk driver, taking the same punishment even though you didn't commit the crime, you would still not have *paid the penalty* for the drunk driver's sins. S/he would *still* remain guilty of the crime, and subject to punishment. The point is, every one of these statements can easily and very reasonably be read as meaning something other than Christ paying the penalty for our sins. (And I happen to think that they *do* mean something other than Christ paying the penalty for our sins.) That is why I am insisting on the precise language that most specifically expresses the Penal Substitution theory of atonement: that Christ *paid the penalty* for our sins. Protestant tracts are full of the statement, "Christ paid the penalty for our sins." That phrase is not in the Bible. It must have come from *somewhere.* I want to know where it came from. I suspect this will also provide the origin point of the Penal Substitution theory of atonement in the history of Christian doctrine. If none of that works for you, just repeat over and over again before writing an answer: **Where did the precise phrase "Christ *paid the penalty* for our sins" come from?**

All throughout the Bible, in too many instances to list, there is a meta narrative wherein the sentence of a righteous judgment is avoided by the sacrifice of an innocent: The innocent bearing the sentence of the guilty. Examples of this include the Passover lamb in the Exodus story, and the scapegoat of the great day of atonement. Up until the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world put an end to sacrifice, by becoming the once for all sacrifice, those sacrifices were of lesser beings for greater beings; lambs for people, etc. Jesus turned that around and made it the sacrifice of a greater for the lesser, but it doesn't seem as though the underlying idea of punishment for sin, retribution if you will, being transferred from one being to the other as disappeared On the other hand, I know that there are theologies which reject the notion of penal substitutionary atonement as being unbiblical. What do those theologians do with Passover and the scapegoat, for example??

In referring to opponents of Penal Substitution theory , I'm referring specifically to those who view it as a ***false*** view of the Atonement, not merely that it is incomplete (*eg* those who hold to alternative theories of Atonement may assert their theories are more holistic, but will not necessarily deny that penal substitution is a contributing element within them). Consider: > ... the Lord will not leave the guilty unpunished. - Nahum 1:3b NIV > Acquitting the guilty and condemning the innocent— the Lord detests them both. - <a href="/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.biblegateway.com%2Fpassage%2F%3Fsearch%3Dprov%252017%253A15%26version%3DNIV" class="external-link" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Proverbs 17:15 NIV <i class="fas fa-external-link-alt fa-xs"></i></a> > Have nothing to do with a false charge and do not put an innocent or honest person to death, for I will not acquit the guilty. - Exodus 23:7 NIV If Christ doesn't bear the penalty or punishment for our sins by taking our guilt upon himself, where does the condemnation and punishment go? What is the specific mechanism by which, a sinner can be saved from their sins without making nonsense or lies of the preceding declarations?

I've been looking at [penal substitutionary atonement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penal_substitution) and am finding that although Calvinists and Arminians seem to affirm it, it appears to be Calvinists who affirm it most strongly. Is this accurate?

Can a divine being claim to have made a very heavy sacrifice when he uses his creative power and makes another vessel / being / substitute creature that he gives away or gives up to be tortured on his behalf? **Is it Him who is suffering or the being he created?** When humans sacrifice a cow / sheep / goat, place the knife on its throat and cut it, is it the animal or the owner that feels the pain?

Can someone give a summary of how to read Romans 1-4 in "[Beyond Justification: Liberating Paul's Gospel](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/205122128-beyond-justification) "? From a [podcast](https://wipfandstock.com/blog/2024/03/05/douglas-a-campbell-and-jon-depue-liberating-pauls-gospel-from-justification-theory/) , I got the idea that Paul actually starts with a Socratic argument, rather than plainly stating what he believes and how things work. I'm not sure if I properly understood it though. According to the authors of the book, Romans 1-4 is the basis for "Justification Theory", an Atonement Theory often in the form of Penal Substitution. But 90% of what Paul wrote, "the gospel" as laid out by Paul in the rest of his corpus, doesn't work like that, namely: your faith in Christ is a sign that you are elected and thus saved and equipped to do good works. Perhaps I got that part wrong too, feel free to correct me.

When someone believes on Jesus Christ how does Jesus sinless perfect righteousness is transferred to the believer and the believer's sin transferred to Jesus? Like what is the theory or doctrine that explains this in detail. And how is Jesus who was one man also God but one man imputes his righteousness for more than one sinner? For example if you have debt of $100 and I have $100 and I take your debt and you take my $100??

How does the Catholic Church view Penal Substitutionary Atonement (as formulated within the Reformed tradition)? A comment on [this question](https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/59135/if-god-already-paid-for-my-sins-by-crucifixion-why-should-i-repent-now) , states that PSA 'has been declared doctrinal heresy'. Is that accurate? I am familliar with the development of the theory and that it is not consistent with the Satisfaction Theory of Anslem and Aquinas, but I am not aware of it ever being offically denounced. Was it? If so, when? If not, is it implicitly heretical because it contradicts a particular dogma? Or perhaps it is not heretical, but still wrong?

Among evangelical Protestants, especially, but also in various other quarters of Christianity, it is common to believe that "Jesus died for me" in the sense that Jesus' death made satisfaction for (in Catholicism) or specifically made satisfaction by paying the penalty for (in Protestantism) my *individual* sins. There is a great deal of wording in the Bible supporting the idea that Jesus died for the sins of humans *collectively.* For example, this passage from Isaiah is commonly interpreted by Christians as referring to Jesus' death for us on the Cross: > Surely he has borne our infirmities and carried our diseases; yet we accounted him stricken, struck down by God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, crushed for our iniquities; upon him was the punishment that made us whole, and by his bruises we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have all turned to our own way, and the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all. (Isaiah 53:4–6) The language here is not individual, but collective: "*our* diseases," "*our* transgressions," "has made *us* whole," "*all we* like sheep," "the iniquity *of us all.*" And: > For while we were still weak, at the right time Christ died for the ungodly. Indeed, rarely will anyone die for a righteous person—though perhaps for a good person someone might actually dare to die. But God proves his love for us in that while we still were sinners Christ died for us. (Romans 5:6–8) Here dying for an individual righteous person is mentioned as a parallel example, but the language specifically about *Jesus'* death is still collective: "While *we* were still weak," "died for the ungodly [the Greek is plural]," "while *we* were still sinners Christ died for *us.*" I am specifically *not* asking for the answer, "Jesus died for everyone, and that means he died for you, too." That answer says, essentially, "You are part of the collective, so Jesus' death covers you as well." Rather, I am asking for the biblical basis for the belief that Jesus' death made satisfaction for *individual* sins, not just for the *collective* sins of humanity under which individuals are also covered. To use a legal analogy: that Jesus did not engage in a class action lawsuit, but litigated—and litigates—each individual's sins separately. Pointing out that particular individuals belong to the class of "sinners" does *not* answer this question. In layman's terms, what is the biblical basis for the belief that Jesus suffered and died for *each one of my individual sins,* and not just for the sins of all of humanity, which covers my particular sins also? ---------- *Note 1:* Though the question "What is the Biblical basis for thinking that Jesus died for me specifically? " is closely related to this one, as the OP says in a comment on the accepted answer, that question is more about whether Jesus was consciously thinking of, and dying, for, individuals while he was on the cross. My question is not concerned with Jesus conscious awareness (or lack thereof) of dying for every individual's sins on the cross, but with the biblical basis of the belief that Jesus' death made satisfaction for specific sins committed by specific individuals, and not just general satisfaction for the collective sins of humanity. *Note 2:* I am asking this question from the perspective of those denominations, mainly Catholic and Protestant, that subscribe to one or another form of satisfaction theory , and that may include the belief that this means Christ made satisfaction for individual, not just collective, sins. I am presuming that the question applies primarily to evangelical Protestantism, but the answer should not be significantly different if answered from a Catholic satisfaction model that includes the idea that Jesus died to make satisfaction for individual sins. If even today the Catholic Church does not hold that Jesus made satisfaction for individual sins, but only for collective ones, please provide me with the relevant references to Catholic doctrine on that subject, and I'll edit it out of the question.

Non-Christians raise many objections to the atoning death of Jesus Christ, who is the Lamb of God. One of the most important objections is that God being the Almighty and Sovereign should be able to do whatever that pleases him to do, except illogical ones. It is God's prerogative either to forgive or not forgive anyone. Therefore, if God the Almighty wants to forgive a sinner He should be able to do that without having to make a payment or a substitution on behalf of the sinner. If the God of the Bible cannot forgive sinners this way then how can He be the Almighty God? My above question is mainly to the protestant Christians.

The Wikipedia article on Penal substitution states in its opening paragraph: > Penal substitution (sometimes, esp. in older writings, called forensic theory) is a theory of the atonement within Christian theology, *developed with the Reformed tradition.* It argues that Christ, by his own sacrificial choice, was punished (penalised) in the place of sinners (substitution), thus satisfying the demands of justice so God can justly forgive the sins. It is thus a specific understanding of substitutionary atonement, where the substitutionary nature of Jesus' death is understood in the sense of a substitutionary punishment. (italics added) In the final paragraph of the Overview section, it states further: > While penal substitution shares themes present in many other theories of the atonement, penal substitution *is a distinctively Protestant understanding* of the atonement that differs from both Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox understandings of the atonement. *Many trace its origin to Calvin, but it was more concretely formulated by the Reformed theologian Charles Hodge.* Traditionally a belief in penal substitution is often regarded as a hallmark of the evangelical faith and is included as an article of faith by many (but not all) evangelical organizations today. (italics added) These quotes place the development of penal substitution firmly within the Protestant tradition. However, they, and the article as a whole, are not very conclusive about exactly where and when penal substitution theory originated. Its formulation is attributed to figures as distant from one another in time as John Calvin (1509-1564) and Charles Hodge (1797-1878). Manwe Elder's answer to my earlier related question, "When and where does the statement, "Christ paid the penalty for our sins" first appear? " does a fine job of briefly tracing the history of the idea of Christ paying the penalty for our sins, and showing that it was not present among major theologians before the Protestant Reformation. It also provides some examples of early Protestant theologians who spoke of Christ paying the penalty for our sins. A related question of mine also asks, "Did Martin Luther teach penal substitution? " Given that penal substitution is a distinctly *Protestant* doctrine (this question is *not* about earlier foreshadowings or bases of the theory): **What Protestant theologian or theologians first clearly formulated the doctrine of penal substitution?** Whatever other sources an answer may use, please provide direct quotations from the relevant theologians' own writings to support the answer.

The doctrine of unlimited atonement teaches that Christ died for all mankind, but only paid for the sins of those who believe in Him. If this is the case then either Jesus already knew who would believe and paid only for their sins (which sounds like limited atonement), or he paid for everyone's sins, but those people who do not believe are still viewed as guilty before God and are still punished. Hence, their sin receives a double payment. This though would seem to make God unjust (which I know He's not.) Let me give an example why I say this. Let's say there was a man who got a speeding ticket and stood before the judge. The judge tells the man that the fine is $200.00 or one week in jail. The man says he doesn't have the money, but before the man is escorted to his cell, another man comes forward and pays the $200 instead. The fine is paid. Now what if the judge, having accepted the $200, still sent the man to jail. Wouldn't that make the judge unjust and wouldn't it make the person who paid the $200 feel used? In short it would mean the judge was demanding double payment for the penalty. Because unlimited atonement is an Arminian teaching, I would like answers from Arminians.

The term 'substitutionary atonement' has been used within Trinitarian, Protestant, Reformed Baptist circles for some time, and it is those I wish to examine in this question. But the word 'substitute' does not translate a Greek word found in scripture, nor does the term 'atonement'. The word 'atonement' is found once in the KJV, Romans 5:11, but it is a clear mis-translation of the word καταλλαγην, *katallagen*, in all other places rendered 'reconciliation'. Both words are vague in meaning. Nor does 'substitute' or 'substitution' convey a concept that the apostolic epistles express, the emphasis of the doctrine of Christ being union with Christ (in his sufferings, in his death and in his resurrection) rather than some kind of 'exchange' (another word never found in Greek except μετηλλαξαν, *metellazan*, in Romans 1:26). The word 'atonement' has a weak etymology and an ill-defined concept, its meaning a loose 'at-one' derivation and its application being a very general and overall term for the both the sufferings and death and resurrection of Christ that is never found in the greater precision of the apostolic writings. What exactly is being conveyed by the term ? When was the expression first coined ? What error was being resisted by the introduction of this couplet ? Again, I am looking for a response in regard to Trinitarian, Protestant, Reformed and Baptist usage of the terminology. -------------------------- EDIT upon comment : I believe that 'Christ died for our sins, according to the scriptures'. I believe that 'Christ gave his life a ransom for many'. I believe that 'He bare our sins in his own body on the tree'. I believe that 'he was made sin for us, who knew no sin'. But the scripture never uses the word 'substitute' to express that. I am questioning the terminology, not the doctrine of Christ. Further explanatory EDIT : My concern has always been the *emphasis*. If I have no relationship with Christ, if I am not in union with Him, if I know not his presence before my face when I pray, then *the facts* of his sufferings, death and resurrection are just that - historical facts. The terms 'substitute' and 'exchange' are distant terms. But kinsman-redeemer, for example, (*gaal* in Hebrew) conveys a relationship that exists *before the redemption takes place*, (see the book of Ruth, on this). And one is chosen 'in Christ' (not apart from him) before the foundation of the world. These are my concerns and the reason for my question.

How do opponents of the penal substitution theory of atonement handle Isaiah 53? This seems to describe penal substitution quite well: > 53:4 Surely he took up our pain and bore our suffering, yet we considered him punished by God, stricken by him, and afflicted. > > 5 But he was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; the punishment that brought us peace was on him, and by his wounds we are healed. > > 6 We all, like sheep, have gone astray, each of us has turned to our own way; and the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all. (Isaiah 53:4-6, NIV)

How do Protestants explain penal substitution being consistent and compatible with divine simplicity given the following discussion? For most of Church history, most Christians have believed that in some sense God is simple i.e. not made up of parts. Stephen R. Holmes writes (39) : > Simplicity is a property of the divine essence. A standard piece of logic in the Greek philosophical tradition, accepted without demur by the Fathers, claims that anything composite must have been composed by an agent; therefore, the claim that God is incomposite is to insist that God was not made by any more basic agent. Then if God is incomposite, God is necessarily simple — the two words are not quite synonyms, but they are certainly mutually entailed. There is no complexity in the divine nature; God is not separable into this bit and that bit. This belief that God is simple, seems important for believing that God is uncreated, or uncaused by anything outside himself – which would offer a legitimate challenge to the idea that he is truly ‘God’. Furthermore, Holmes continues (40): > This matter is coupled with the classical concern to avoid putting God into any class. The logic is once again easily described: if God is one example of a class of things — say, one merciful thing among many other merciful things — then the class as a whole is larger than God, and so something is greater than God. **Similarly, the Christian solution to the Euthyphro dilemma is the doctrine of simplicity. The dilemma, in Christian theological terms, runs as follows. Is God good because we define good to mean what God is (which evacuates the term of any transcendental moral content)? Or is God good because God conforms to some external standard of goodness (which asserts the existence of something greater than God)? By identifying God’s goodness with God’s essence — divine simplicity — we are able to claim that God’s own life is the transcendental standard of goodness, avoiding both unacceptable consequences.** This doctrine of divine simplicity usually includes along with it a doctrine of impassibility i.e. God is unable to be ‘created,’ ‘caused,’ or ‘influenced’ by his emotions, because for them to affect him they must be a separate ‘part’. James E. Dolezal writes about passibility meaning 'caused to be' (24) > Every passion is a caused state of being into which one is moved by the activity of some agent. For this reason, all passions are finite, dependent, time bound, and mutable states of being. Moreover, to experience passion one must possess a principle of receptivity (i.e., passive potency) by which new actuality is received. That is, one must be moveable or changeable. Metaphysically speaking, a passion is an accident that inheres in a substance and modifies the being of that substance in some way. In existential terms, every experience of passion causes the patient to be in some new way. Although it seems okay to say that God can be affected by emotions in his human incarnation (see this question ) penal substitution seems to imply that he is ‘required’ by his wrath to punish humanity for sin. In the most basic sense, penal substitution is: > the idea that Christ’s death is in some way a representative one in which he suffers the judgment/wrath of God on behalf of deserving sinners thereby releasing them from guilt and obtaining forgiveness for them But the way it is typically described by protestants emphasizes God’s anger wrath that cannot be appeased without some sort of blood sacrifice. We say something like: “God cannot abide sin” or his “justice demands to eradicate it”. Tom Wright describes this wrath-bound God as being a hold-over from medieval times: > Christians have spoken, in effect, of the angry God upstairs and the suffering Jesus placating him. Spoken? They’ve painted it: many a mediaeval altarpiece, many a devotional artwork, have sketched exactly that. And of course for some late mediaeval theologians this was the point of the Mass: God was angry, but by performing this propitiatory sacrifice once more, the priest could make it all right. And it was at least in part in reaction against this understanding of the Eucharist that the Reformers rightly insisted that what happened on the cross happened once for all. They did not invent, they merely adapted and relocated, the idea of the propitiation of God’s wrath through the death of Jesus. **This seems to be out of line with belief in God’s simplicity, suggesting that Jesus ‘had’ to die to appease God’s justice, but in so saying, describing justice as a power separate from God himself which ‘affects’ him (contra passibility) and ‘causes’ (contra simplicity) him to demand blood.** Even though wrath does seem to be a real biblical motivator for God’s judgement (Rom. 1:18 and various OT events), it also seems in practice to overly distinguish the ‘loving’ sacrifice of Jesus from the ‘wrath’ of God. That is why Orthodox Abbot Tryphon says : > The major problem with this teaching can be seen in the fact that had Christ died for our sins against God the Father, thus causing a division of God, with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity laid waste, with God pitted against God. This heretical doctrine divides God by implying that Christ isn’t fully God. It also suggests that there is a higher force than God, thus making, God Himself ruled by a “higher force”. In other words, God has no choice but to punish. By this notion, justice forces God to respond to our sin with His wrath, with love becoming secondary. My questions are as follows: **(1.A.) Are there versions of penal substitution which do not include recourse to a lack of emotional self-control – i.e. ‘needing’ to punish someone?** **(1.B.) How do *they* make sense of God’s anger/wrath in scripture?** A discussion regarding simplicity and God's attributes can be found here , although it doesn't address the atonement. **(2.A.) Alternatively, how do advocates of penal substitution communicate Christ’s work without seeming to violate divine simplicity/impassibility?** **(2.B.) Or do these concepts themselves need to be modified in light of penal substitution?** A discussion which gives more precision to the *reasons* for believing in simplicity can be found here .

Sinful humans are judged and sentenced to eternal death. But did Jesus experience eternal death? If so, how? If not, how then can it be considered substitutionary for our deaths? How do those who teach penal substitution explain this?

This question is not about whether Catholics think salvation is a process or a one time thing, it is more nuanced than that. I am looking for precise theological interpretations of Christ's redemptive work but not so much its relation to us if that makes sense. For example the dominant view in Protestantism is Penal Substitionary Atonement which teaches for instance that the Father poured his wrath on the Son. I am looking for the official view of the Catholic Church and it would be well appreciated if the answer includes elements like whether or not thi view has always been the official one and if it is elevated to the level of dogma rather than merely an encouraged interpretation of dogma. A brief explanation of the characteristics of the view is also necessary to have one's answer validated.

Related to this other question about whether murder is unforgivable according to the LDS Church. One of the answers to the question says that: > Murder is a very serious sin, and while it can't be forgiven it can be > pardoned. However the link in the word "pardoned" leads to a "page not found" message. This answer, however, does quote the following from D&C study guide in chapter 42: > The second most serious sin is to commit murder—that is, to willfully > shed innocent blood. Concerning this sin, the Lord has said: ‘Thou > shalt not kill; and he that kills shall not have forgiveness in this > world, nor in the world to come.’ (D&C 42:18.) **Thus this is an > unforgivable sin, which means that Jesus Christ cannot pay for (or > ‘atone for’ or ‘forgive’) the penalty demanded by the broken law. This > sin is a pardonable sin, however; that is, the sinner can eventually > make full payment himself, and be received into a state of pardon.** (Emphasis added.) So, murder is described as a sin that Jesus cannot atone for and yet, the individual himself can receive a pardon by making some form of a payment. --- My questions are: **1. What kind of "payment" can a murderer make to cover for murder?** **2. What are the differences, if any, between being thus pardoned and being forgiven by Jesus' atonement?**

The Wikipedia article on Penal Substitution states (under the heading "Differing views "): > Critics, however, argue that the theory of penal substitution is solely a later development, only forming part of orthodox Christian thought during the Protestant Reformation of the 16th-century, being advocated by Martin Luther and Calvin. Under the heading "Anselm, the Reformers, and John Wesley ," it goes into more detail on Luther's position: > Broadly speaking, Martin Luther followed Anselm, thus remaining mainly in the "Latin" model identified by Gustaf Aulén. He held, however, that Christ's atoning work encompassed both his active and passive obedience to the law;: as the perfectly innocent God-man, he fulfilled the law perfectly during his life AND he, in his death on the cross, bore the eternal punishment that all men deserved for their breaking the law. Unlike Anselm, Luther thus combines both satisfaction and punishment. (This is not the entire segment on Luther's views.) However, footnote 10 , on the earlier statement including Luther among those advocating penal substitution, reads: > Gustaf Aulén, a critic of penal substitution theory, disputed in his 1931 book *Christus Victor* that Luther accepted penal substitution. 'Under Aulen's assessment, Martin Luther revitalized the Christus Victor paradigm. According to Aulen, however, beginning with Melanchthon himself, Luther's reappropriation of the classic theme was quickly lost within later Protestant circles as more objective, "Latin," theories were allowed to displace it.' (Paul R. Eddy and James Beilby, 'The Atonement: An Introduction', in P. R. Eddy and J. Beilby [eds], *The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views* [Downers Grove: IVP, 2006], p. 13) Recognizing that there is some dissension on this point, my question is: *Did* Luther teach penal substitution? Whatever other sources an answer may use, please provide direct quotations from Luther's own works to support the answer.

This question is a follow-up to my question, "Did Martin Luther teach penal substitution? " The Wikipedia article on Philip Melanchthon states in its opening paragraphs: > Philip Melanchthon . . . (16 February 1497 – 19 April 1560), . . . was a German Lutheran reformer, collaborator with Martin Luther, the first systematic theologian of the Protestant Reformation, intellectual leader of the Lutheran Reformation, and an influential designer of educational systems. > > He stands next to Luther and Calvin as a reformer, theologian, and molder of Protestantism. Along with Luther, he is the primary founder of Lutheranism, and is often deemed by historians to be its intellectual leader as contrasted with Martin Luther's rather simplistic views. They both denounced what they believed was the exaggerated cult of the saints, asserted justification by faith, . . . . Under the subheading, "As theologian ," the article states: > Melanchthon . . . furthermore reduced Luther's much richer view of redemption to that of legal satisfaction. This suggests that Melanchthon, rather than Luther himself, may have been the origin of the common Protestant view that Luther's theology of justification and redemption revolved around the penal substitution theory of atonement—and of the ascendancy of that doctrine within Lutheranism generally. Indeed, this is the very thing suggested in footnote 10 on Wikipedia's "Penal substitution" article: > Gustaf Aulén, a critic of penal substitution theory, disputed in his 1931 book *Christus Victor* that Luther accepted penal substitution. 'Under Aulen's assessment, Martin Luther revitalized the Christus Victor paradigm. According to Aulen, however, *beginning with Melanchthon himself, Luther's reappropriation of the classic theme was quickly lost within later Protestant circles as more objective, "Latin," theories were allowed to displace it.'* (Paul R. Eddy and James Beilby, 'The Atonement: An Introduction', in P. R. Eddy and J. Beilby [eds], The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views [Downers Grove: IVP, 2006], p. 13) [italics added] However, the Wikipedia article on Melanchthon does not go into any greater detail on his theology of justification, redemption, and atonement. So my question is: **Did Philip Melanchthon teach penal substitution?** Whatever other sources an answer may use, please provide direct quotations from Melanchthon's own works to support your answer. (**Note:** Answers regarding *Luther's* teachings on penal substitution should be posted under the related question linked above. Also related: "Who first clearly formulated the penal substitution theory of atonement? ")