Elements of monotheism seem to have existed in the philosophies of at least several of the celebrated ancient Greek philosophers; *e.g.,* Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. A while back, I recall have read (but I can't recall exactly where) that in the writings of the ancients, "God is everywhere implied." Can someone point me to who may have written or uttered this; and also, and if such writings extended beyond ancient Greek philosophy? *Remarks:* I thought perhaps the statement might have come from St. Thomas Aquinas because he was very much influenced by Aristotle---but so far, have found nothing. Also, I thought perhaps I would find the desired remark in St. Basil's "Address to young men on the right use of Greek literature," but it seemed to me to disclose nothing of the sort. Thank you.

One of the motivations behind the *doctrine of divine simplicity* (DDS) is that if God was composed of parts, God would depend upon those parts to exist and hence there would be something more fundamental than the godhead to account for what God is. In order for God to be most absolute, God must be completely simple, lacking any and all composition. Some philosophers have suggested that God himself could be the cause of his own complexity, and hence God's aseity would not be threatened. Classical theistic philosophers in response argue that the idea that God giving rise to his own complexity is incoherent and would require for God to be prior to himself, which is absurd. In response to the classical theistic objection, philosophers have suggested that God could be the *grounds* of his own complexity rather than the cause. Philosopher Matthew Baddorf writes: > [I]t is far from obvious that the only kind of thing that could > satisfactorily explain compresence is an outside sufficient cause. ... > **[The neo-classical theistic] God’s tropes are dependent upon God**. This > suggests another explanation for their compresence: they are > compresent because they are each grounded in God. **This is not a causal > explanation, but it is plausible to think that it is an explanation > nonetheless**. ... This conclusion can also be supported by more general > argument. **It is plausible that tropes are individuated by their > bearers and so cannot exist without them. Or, similarly, it is > plausible to think that tropes cannot exist without their bearers > since they are merely ways their bearers are.** (Baddorf, “Divine Simplicity”, 408–409) Rather than God depending upon his parts, his parts depend on him. > For all x, if x is a proper part of God or x is a property of God, > then x depends on God for its existence. (Fowler, “Simplicity”, 122) Is this position coherent? Further reading on this issue would be appreciated. Thanks!

**Background** Frequently, Creationists and Theistic Evolutionists will appeal to and debate/discuss the idea of *"Creatio Ex Nihilo"* (Latin for "creation from nothing") with some critiquing the concept and claiming that Genesis [does](https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2015/04/06/creatio-ex-nihilo-is-it-found-in-the-bible/) not [assume]( https://earlychurch.org.uk/article_exnihilo_copan.html) *creatio [ex nihilo](http://www.patheos.com/blogs/faithpromotingrumor/2009/05/thats-not-in-the-bible-creation-ex-nihilo-and-israelite-cosmology/)*. These critics often assert that the concept arose out of Greco-Roman philosophy. According to Wikipedia , > Some scholars\[*which?*\] have argued that Plethon viewed Plato as positing *ex nihilo* creation in his *[Timaeus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timaeus_(dialogue))* ... [and] ... The [School of Chartres](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/School_of_Chartres_) understood the creation account in Plato's Timaeus to refer to creatio ex nihilo. And this appeared to be a [topic of interest and discussion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_comes_from_nothing) amongst the philosophers. **Question** What, exactly were the arguments for the philosophical concept of *Creatio Ex Nihilo* made by the classical philosophers and what relationship (if any) does this have to [Plato's Theory of Forms](https://hermeneutics.stackexchange.com/questions/22641/what-is-the-difference-between-the-%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%81%CF%86%E1%BF%87-of-god-and-the-%CE%B5%E1%BC%B6%CE%B4%CE%BF%CF%82-of-god/25185#25185) ? How might these arguments have influenced the modern Christian doctrine of *Creatio Ex Nihilo*, and what relationship do these ancient philsopical arguments have (if any) with it?

Augustine was a staunch advocate of the "doctrine" of divine ideas , which locates Plato's exemplary forms in the mind of God. The theory seems to have been generally adopted by Thomas Aquinas . But did the Magisterium of the Catholic Church ever endorse the theory of divine ideas? Is the Catholic free to reject it, as Ockham effectively did?

I have a friend who is unfamiliar with both philosophy and Christianity. I thought I would to share the Christian truth by starting with the Greek philosophical concept from Plato known as the "allegory of the cave," and then from there, lead them into the concept of prophecies (i.e. that came true of Jesus). I felt that the cave allegory was very useful for opening up discussion because it helps to establish two very key fundamental things: 1) our reality the way it is presented may not be (and is not necessarily) true (e.g. the world teaches we evolved from nothing ultimately, but the truth is that God created us), and therefore 2) there is a serious need for us to seek the truth, not only despite the push-back from the world, but also so that we can share the truth with our friends for their own sakes. So I started with Plato's cave allegory, and I explained it and said we should seek freedom from this world and seek the truth, even if we may be rejected by the world (our friends)... Very basic foundation to start with, I thought, before just jumping into the OT prophecies of Jesus... However, after some discussion, he said > "Freedom? Tell me what was his [the cave man who escaped] freedom? The > world (his friends) won't accept the cave man. When he was in the cave > he knew a little and that little is what gave him happiness!" My friend's argument that followed this was that we should not seek the truth but be content with being ignorant, because that's when we have some happiness, and we aren't rejected by our friends. How can his argument be countered? Or how can the general trajectory I went for be improved? I suppose it is possible to skip the cave allegory. But if my friend is content with believing what he is taught and would rather care about the little happiness he has "in the cave", then how could he even begin to accept that maybe there is something more?

I get the idea that Greek thinking had a mind-body distinction . What I'm driving at is the label and origin of that distinction. I get that Plato had an idea of objective reality - where he described the 'ideal horse ' - that existed in objective reality, and reality had 'instances' of the ideal horse. In 1 Cor 6 - we see the idea of the mind body distinction. For this reason, the argument by the Corinthians is that what they do with their bodies doesn't matter - because they are living in a spiritual reality. Paul's response is that the body does matter because the resurrection is about physical bodies. (Also that you wouldn't take the members of Christ's body and unite them with a prostitute.) My question is: **Is it the idea of Platonism that describes the mind-body distinction in 1 Cor 6?**

Many historians agree that the philosophical systems of Platonism and Stoicism had an important role in the efforts of the early Church to communicate the message of the Gospel to unbelievers, and even in informing some early Christians' interpretations of the writings of Paul and others. According to historians, **did any other philosophical systems have a similar level of influence early in the life of the Church?**

Lewis followed Plato's notion of the Forms. He believed everything on Earth reflected the all-perfect, all-joyous God. Or did he? I asked a Christian recently if he thought CS Lewis thought 'all' (books, films, footballs, Frankenstein, Snow White and the Seven Dwarves...even termites or earthworms....EVERYTHING) things reflected God. He said no. But surely this is incorrect? Lewis (I would have thought) felt evil was negation of good, not existing, created forms...Therefore all 'things' cannot be entirely ungodly (in so much as something exists of them!) and, therefore, nothing existing is 'unqualified' to reflect Him?- particularly pleasurable things for He created pleasures... But am I missing something and is there 'something' Lewis would have felt unreflective?

I asked a question on Plato's the Forms to Justin Welby (using films as an example of what might reflect God- after all, if Plato was correct, everything reflects something perfect and heavenly). I got no response from him, but this was what his secretary wrote: "I’m a bit rusty but recall that Plato considers that there is a perfect ’ heavenly’ model for everything we experience here. A former Archbishop of Canterbury who was a New Testament theologian, Michael Ramsey, suggested something more startling. He said, “God is like Christ and in him there is no un-Christ-like-ness at all”. Does that not stand the platonic ideal on its head? To expand that concept, it means that there is nothing hidden in the nature of the Almighty (whom we cannot see) which is different from the nature of Jesus as revealed or manifested to human beings. There are lots of other hints here and now: our appreciation of beauty, the sense of awe which both attracts and repels (see Rudolph Otto on “The Idea of the Holy”) but nothing compares with God as one of us. The opening words of St John’s Gospel and the Letter to the Hebrews are startling in their vision. The first employs the Greek idea of ‘Word’ reaching fulfilment in Christ, and the second refers to the culmination in Christ of a preliminary series of revelations. Very exciting." Is this the general belief of Christians? Aren't 'all things' met via Jesus (for instance, what pleasure counts as a 'Jesus' thing and what doesn't?)