This question may be related to the [Dr. Alexander Wynne question](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/53914/8157) . The Visuddhimagga says: > This has been said by the Blessed One, “This dependent origination is profound, Ánanda, and profound it appears” (D II 55; S II 92). And the profundity is fourfold as we shall explain below (XVII.304f.); but there is none of that in simple arising. And this dependent origination is explained [by the teachers] as adorned with the fourfold method (XVII.309); but there is no [need of] any such tetrad of methods in simple arising. So dependent origination is not simple arising, since that (i.e., simple arising) admits of no profound treatment > > **It is ungrammatical: this word paticca** (lit. “having > depended”; freely “due to,” “dependent”), [being a gerund of the verb > pati + eti, to go back to], **establishes a meaning** [in a formula of > establishment by verb] **when it is construed as past with the same > subject** [as that of the principal verb], **as in the sentence “Having > depended on** (paticca = ‘due to’) **the eye and visible objects, eye- > consciousness arises** **(uppajjati)**” (S II 72). **But if it is construed > here with the word uppáda (arising),** [which is a noun], **in a formula > of establishment by noun, there is a breach of grammar, because there > is no shared subject** [as there is in above-quoted sentence], **and so it > does not establish any meaning al all. So the dependent origination is > not simple arising because that is ungrammatical.** > > [Page 356](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf) Alternative translation: > Because of a difference in word usage, the word paṭicca (‘depending > on’) ordinarily makes sense when used with the same agent and with > reference to an earlier time. For example: ‘**Dependent on (paticca)** eye and > forms, eye-consciousness **arises (uppajjati)**’ (SN II 43). But here, when it is > combined with the term **uppāda (‘arising’)**, which expresses the sense > of existence, since there is no common agent, the word changes its > usage and adds nothing to the meaning. Thus, even on the basis of word > analysis, paṭiccasamuppāda cannot mean simply ‘mere arising.’ What is Buddhaghosa's salient point in this text about paticca-uppajjati versus paticca-sam-uppáda?

> “‘All conditioned things are impermanent’ — when one sees this with wisdom, one turns away from suffering.” -The Buddha, from [Dhammapada, verse 277](https://www.tipitaka.net/tipitaka/dhp/verseload.php?verse=277) > “Whatever has the nature of arising, all of it has the nature of ceasing.” -The Buddha, from [Kimsuka Sutta](http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn35/sn35.204.wlsh.html) But why does something being conditioned mean that it has to be impermanent? And why does something having arisen mean that it has the "nature" of ceasing? Most scientists believe that this localized spacetime manifold in its current state had an origin 13.8 billion years ago. The current consensus among the scientific community regarding the future of this localized spacetime manifold is that it will simply continue to expand forever if we are to believe the current cosmological data. I wrote that as an example, but likewise, I can give other examples. Its not at all clear to me as to why something having arisen means that it can cease, and its not at all clear to me as to why something being conditioned means that it is impermanent. Of course, one could retort and say that the contents of the universe might change or that in this moment, that particle will be in a different position, but that means largely nothing because there is a difference between the microscopic and macroscopic things we observe from our point of view, which is why we distinguish between something like classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. Even with this, many, e.g. Neoplatonists, would contest this notion and say that the Universal Intellect as they conceptualize it is conditioned and created as well as composite, but never changes and is eternal. All in all, its not at all clear to me what proof is given for the idea that *all* conditioned things are impermanent, and that *whatever* has the nature of arising, *all of it* has the nature of ceasing. Any help on explaining this would be appreciated.

In MN 61 the Buddha teaches his young son the importance of being truthful.  This is an amazing sutta! So wise, and yet so elegant and straightforward, that even a seven-year-old can learn something from it. Are there other suttas in the canon that **explain** the importance of not lying to oneself, or to others?

By "conventional" I think those are the things created by human conventions, that are all imaginary. By "conditioned" I think those are things that came from another thing or things. Do these terms have the same meaning in the Buddha's teaching?

The Wikipedia page for "the 3 marks of existence" differentiates between "conditioned things" and "unconditioned things" like so: > The three marks are: > 1. sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā — "all saṅkhāras > (conditioned things) are impermanent" > 2. sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā — "all > saṅkhāras are unsatisfactory" > 3. sabbe dhammā anattā — "all dharmas > (conditioned or unconditioned things) are not self" The Buddha said "I teach one thing and one thing only. Suffering and the end of suffering." Within that context: 1. What is the difference between a "conditioned thing" and an "unconditioned thing"? 2. How does that difference give meaning to the 3 marks? 3. How does this meaning point towards "the end of suffering"?

Through reading books on Buddhism I get the idea that existence is conditioned. The faculties (mind, consciousness, etc.) through which we try to attain Nirvana are also conditioned. So, how is it possible to attain the Unconditioned through conditioned faculties?

All our feelings depend on conditions... it is said that conditions are impermanent.... is it possible for us to create conditions for us to have good feelings forever ? If not , why ? I am not saying good feelings can exist eternally ... I am saying can we create conditions for good feelings? For example by earning money we can ensure that a perpetual supply of food is available.... we fulfill the conditions of money accumulation and in return I get food. Similarly is it possible to work for something which ensures us good feelings forever or at least till we last ?

What is meant by the impossibility "A Buddha can not help someone not related to him, no relative of him"? Is said to be one of the three things a/the Buddha can not do. How should that be understood? And what is needed to become one that a Buddha could help? Who is a relative, are the relatives, of the Buddha? [Related and given in tiven sphere: [Buddha can not help one not related to him? Buddha kann keinem "Fremden" nicht helfen?](http://sangham.net/index.php/topic,9364.msg19285.html#msg19285) . *(Note that this is not asked for trade, exchange, stacks, entertainment and akusala deeds, but as a share of [merits](http://accesstoinsight.eu/en/dictionary/punnakiriyavatthu) and continue such for release)*

Is the experience of jhana considered dukkha because of its impermanence? If yes, is it still considered dukkha after attaining Nibbana? Is the experience of jhana conditioned? Is it still considered conditioned after attaining Nibbana? Thanks in advance for your time and patience. Kind regards!

I am looking for a specific sutta wherein the conditionality and insubstantiality of the existential process of a sentient being, or consciousness, is made plain by use of the simile of a resonating musical instrument being struck by the player's hand, the sound of which, resonating for awhile, then slowly fades away. Any references, anyone ? Thanks :)

In Buddhist doctrine there is always the problem, that for the sake of understandability, certain concepts are being presented in a solid, substantial way, while actually, one has to keep in the back of one's mind, that by the central tenet of *anattā*/*anātman* these concepts are **actually** not like that. The same applies to *kamma*/*karma*, which can be presented as **something** that a being accumulates and carries with itself in this life and to the next and the ones following. Now, actually, there is nothing substantial that transmigrates from one life to the next, as is clear from the similes that are used to explain rebirth without soul: a candle that lights another, an echo, a mirror image, the imprint in wax of seal. In these cases, though there is some link between the two sides, nothing actually goes from one to the other (the case with the echo should maybe be reconsidered according to the old Indian theories of sound and the echo). So, what is *kamma*/*karma*? How does it stick to the individual? To take this question one step further, if we admit now that *kamma*/*karma* is near-identical with the concept of *saṃskāra*/*saṃkhāra*, and therefore with volitions and *cetanā*, as in this quote from AN 6.63 : > cetanāhaṃ bhikkave kammaṃ vadāmi > > Intention, I tell you, is kamma and that by karmic unwholesome action the consciousness "leans towards" unwholesomeness, then how are these leanings supposed to look, how are they thought to be transported from one conscious moment to the next?

This philosophical treatment of Nagarjuna by Westerhoff talks about how a cause depends on its effect. I think that this point is a stumbling block for me but in my philosophical interpretations of Buddhism *and* of life and death per se. He says: > There are three different ways in which we can make sense of > Nāgārjuna's assertion that the cause depends existentially on the > effect. And then proceeds to argue about them (which I cannot make complete sense of). Is the idea that a conditioned cause must be conditioned by its effect, in the sense of having it as a part?

If I get into a habit of fighting to defend "my self" is it reasonable to say that getting into a fight and getting beat up is karma? How similar is karma to the idiom "you reap what you sow"?