The right view of the Noble Ones is described here as:

"There is no mother and father, without the self."

Buddha describes wrong view here:

“And what, bhikkhus, is wrong view? ‘There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother, no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have realised for themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’ This is wrong view. MN 117

Is it possible to turn this wrong view into the right view of the Noble Ones by adding "without the self?"

“And what, bhikkhus, is right view of the Noble Ones? ‘There is nothing given without the self, nothing offered without the self, nothing sacrificed without the self; no fruit or result of good and bad actions without the self; no this world without the self, no other world without the self; no mother, no father without the self; no beings who are reborn spontaneously without the self; no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have realised for themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world without the self.’ This is right view of the Noble Ones."

Is this an accurate description of the right view that is noble, taintless, supramundane, a factor of the path?

Believing that 'there is mother and father' is listed as right view affected by the taints.

“And what, bhikkhus, is right view that is affected by the taints, partaking of merit, ripening in the acquisitions? ‘There is what is given and what is offered and what is sacrificed; there is fruit and result of good and bad actions; there is this world and the other world; there is mother and father; there are beings who are reborn spontaneously; there are in the world good and virtuous recluses and brahmins who have realised for themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’ This is right view affected by taints, partaking of merit, ripening in the acquisitions. MN 117

1. To what extent does right view *not affected by the taints* deny that there is a mother and father?
2. What logic or analysis does right view *not affected by the taints* employ to deny this?
3. Are mother and father to be denied altogether?
4. Is there no such thing as mother and father for one who is awakened?

It is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira:

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word ‘chariot’ is used, So, when the aggregates exist, There is the convention ‘a being.’ SN 5.10

The pali translated as 'convention' is 'sammuti'. Looking at other places where the word 'sammuti' is used we can find numerous references in the theravada vinaya. Each of these translates the word 'sammuti' from pali to english as 'agreement' and not 'convention.' Is that all the conventional existence of 'a being' is - an agreement? Is 'a fist' an agreement? Is 'a lap' an agreement? Is 'the President of the United States' an agreement? Is 'rebirth' an agreement? It would seem some agreements are skillful and some are not. That is why the Buddha gave the vinaya, right? Do Noble Ones with Right View not understand agreements or somehow give up these agreements or do they just acknowledge that *all of these* are just agreements and not real and actual? It would seem to me that Noble Ones with Right View see that 'mother and father' is just an agreement to the same extent as 'this world' and 'the next world.' Right View does not utterly deny any of these; it simply acknowledges them for what they are and no more: useful agreements. UPDATE: This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

It is widely understood across all Buddhist traditions that the Buddha often spoke of persons and used words like 'I' and 'person' and 'self' and this is not seen as problematic or contradictory to the doctrine of anatman. Just as it is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira: > “Just as, with an assemblage of parts, > The word ‘chariot’ is used, > So, when the aggregates exist, > There is the convention ‘a being.’ > > SN 5.10 It is also self-evident that the Buddha would associate a proper name with individual beings and use this name conventionally over time to identify specific individuals. This is also not controversial for any Buddhist tradition that I'm aware. However, there were times when "the self" was discussed in such a way that the Buddha would not answer such as the famous case of Vacchagotta. It is widely understood that the Buddha found Vacchagotta's questions or mindset about those questions as problematic. Specifically, he held that Vacchagotta was confused or had some invalid presuppositions about the self that directly violated or contradicted the doctrine of anatman. Vacchagotta held to the notion that the self necessarily was real and actual and the Buddha understood that Vacchagotta was incapable of understanding the truth so he was silent. There are some on this forum who hold that speaking of *the self in this life* - when it is merely for conventional communication - is fine and not in contradiction to anatman, but speaking of *the self in other lives* in the same continuity is strictly forbidden as always contradicting anatman and necessarily presupposing the self to be real and actual. Why insist that all discussions of future or past lives necessarily entails the presupposition of real and actual existence? In short, why is it that real and actual existence is only sometimes the basis for discussions in this life, but always the basis for discussions about past or future lives? Why do some hold so dearly that the Buddha could not be speaking of future lives in the very same conventional manner that the Buddha often used the word "I" to refer to himself in his present life... merely as a means of communicating the truth to worldly beings? Why is it that some believe we can speak faultlessly of persons in this life and identifying them across various points in time in this life, but we are foreclosed of speaking faultlessly of persons in next lives or in past lives? Consider the Yamaka Sutta: > “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, > perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as > the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.” “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do > you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling, > without perception, without volitional formations, without > consciousness?”—“No, friend.” > > “But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and > actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I > understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose > taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of > the body and does not exist after death’?” > > SN 22.85 From this we can draw four conclusions: 1. It is not appropriate to regard the Tathagata as possessing or consisting of the aggregates taken together as real and actual 2. It is not appropriate to regard the Tathagata as not-possessing the aggregates or without them taken together as real and actual 3. The Tathagata is not to be regarded as real and actual 4. This is true both for future lives (the focus of Yamaka's question) as well as the present life If this is so, then it was entirely appropriate to refer to the Tathagata as existing in his present life, but not to do so with the presupposition that the Tathagata was 'real and actual', right? It was faultless to refer to the Tathagata as merely existing conventionally, right? If this is so, then why is it a fault to refer to the Tathagata as merely existing conventionally in a future life? Indeed, Yamaka was rebuked for denying this very thing, right?! With this question I'm interested in the perspective and answers from all the Buddhist traditions. NOTE: Some may see an apparent contradiction between SN 5.10 and SN 22.85 but it is cleared up by understanding the difference between 'convention' and 'real and actual'

This question concerns the proper understanding of AN 3.47:

“Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena.” AN 3.47

It might have been suggested in other questions that this sutta is referring only to non-composite sankharas. That is, for composite phenomena - like a chariot - that arising, ceasing, and enduring are not evident. Is this correct? Can the arising, enduring and ceasing of a chariot not be known because it is composite or made up of parts? If so, what would be a good example of a non-composite sankhara that this sutta *would* be applicable to? What non-composite conditioned phenomena can rightfully be said to arise, endure and cease? Does anyone have an example?

Why are Concepts not Impermanent? I found the below explanation in another forum. Are they Permanent? or not both? > Conventional reality (sammuti sacca/ pannatti) is just a concept and > not real. Non-real dhammas don’t exist and therefore cannot be anicca > or dukkha. > > According to Abhdhamma: > > - dhamma = paramata + pannatti > - paramata = sankhata + asankhata > - sankhata = citta + cetasika + rupa > - asnkhata = nibbana > - dhamma = citta + cetasika + rupa + nibbana + pannatti > > All the dhammas are anatta. Anatta means devoid of > essence/self/ownership/hegemony. > > Only the sankhata (compounded) is anicca-dukkha. Nibbana and Pannatti > are anatta only. > > Nibbana is real but not compounded. Therefore not anicca-dukkha. > Pannatti is non-real. Therefore not anicca-dukkha. > **In Theravada, Concept is an object (unreal object).** It is not the > Concept-formation of our mind. Mind and mental factors that form a > concept do arise and cease, but not the Concept. > The conceptualizing in mind is the impermanent one, but not the > Conceptual-object of Conceptualizing-mind. **Pannatti is an object.** This > fake object is perceived by the impermanent mind. > The colors that the eye sees in a movie are real, but not the concept > of “movie”. What is fake is the Object pointed by the Idea of “movie”. > **What “Conceptualizing” points to, is the Concept.** It is a fake object > that “Conceptualizing” points to. > > **The pointer exists, but “what is pointed” doesn’t exist.** > > So Concepts are not considered as anicca or dukkha. Conventional Reality is not Impermanent! Introduction to the Ultimacy (International Institute of Theravada)

By "conventional" I think those are the things created by human conventions, that are all imaginary. By "conditioned" I think those are things that came from another thing or things. Do these terms have the same meaning in the Buddha's teaching?

Is the conventional self "conventional" in the same way as dharmas are? So if the conventionality of dharmas means that they arise and disappear each moment, or that they don't exist from their own side, or that they leave no trace of themselves, or that they always have parts (etc., etc.) does the same apply to the conventional self? I understand that both lack "substance": but does that mean the same thing here? **I'm interested in anyone having said "no".**