I was refreshing myself with some stuff on Madhyamaka. I don't understand how the difference between Prasangika and Svātantrika can be svabhava. How can svabhava exist without changing anything else about conventional entities or ultimate reality? So what other claims does this entail about conventional entities by Svātantrika? Or does Prasangika show their ultimate reality cannot be empty?

I’m in Drikung Kagyu and have a lama in that lineage and find the Gelug approach to emptiness to be extremely helpful to viewing emptiness. I know all these philosophies in Rime point to the same truth, but I still wonder how its viewed to hold philosophical positions from another lineage but of course keeping the practice your lama outlines for you? I’ve read Tulku Rinpoche book on Rime and in the beginning it says to keep integrity of lineages, but obviously now many lamas receive teachings from multiple lineages. Am I ok in viewing emptiness from a Gelug pov as a Drikung Kagyu if it’s helpful for me?

Udāna 8.1 describes what appears to be a radically transcendent “dimension” — one beyond the elements, the formless attainments, and even beyond movement, time, and dualistic perception. It is characterized entirely by negation, culminating in the phrase: "just this is the end of stress/suffering."- > There is that dimension where there is neither earth, nor water, nor > fire, nor wind; neither dimension of the infinitude of space, nor > dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, nor dimension of > nothingness, nor dimension of neither perception nor non-perception; > neither this world, nor the next world, nor sun, nor moon. And there, > I say, there is neither coming, nor going, nor staying; neither > passing away nor arising: unestablished, unevolving, without support > (mental object). This, just this, is the end of stress. Have any advanced practitioners, past or present, claimed to have directly realized this dimension? If so: - How was the realization described? Was it marked by total cessation, a kind of knowing without content, or something altogether ineffable? - Was there awareness during the experience? Or did it resemble the cessation of perception and feeling (nirodha-samāpatti), with no consciousness during and only retrospective insight after? - How was the transition into and out of this dimension understood? Did it feel like a gradual absorption, a sudden drop, or a shift beyond all experience? - Did practitioners interpret it as a momentary event or as the uncovering of a timeless truth? In other words, is this dimension entered, or is it recognized as always already the case? - What changed after the experience? Were there shifts in perception, identity, or sense of reality that aligned with the description of “no coming, no going” and “no this world or another world”? ---------- I understand that language may fall short in describing such a realization, but I’m curious whether any teachings or testimonies exist that give practical or phenomenological insight into what this “dimension” might entail — and whether realization is framed as a momentary insight or an ongoing mode of liberation.

While reading through the Buddhist suttas, I came across the detailed descriptions of the eight emancipations. These passages were deeply intriguing, but they also gave rise to some questions in my mind which I decided to ask before which let me cite the concerned passages - > “Ānanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight? > > “**Possessed of form, one sees forms.** This is the first > emancipation. > > “**Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally.** > This is the second emancipation. > > “**One is intent only on the beautiful.** This is the third > emancipation. > > “**With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, > with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding > perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one > enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space**. This > is the fourth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** This is > the fifth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of nothingness.** This is the sixth > emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor > non-perception.** This is the seventh emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation > of perception and feeling.** This is the eighth emancipation. > > “**Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward > order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order**, when he > attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he > wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of > effluents he enters and remains in the effluent-free release of > awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and > realized it for himself in the here and now, **he is said to be a monk > released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher > or more sublime than this, there is none.”** ~ DN 15 Questions- 1. Why is “nothingness” (6th) distinguished from “neither perception nor non-perception” (7th), given that both involve retreating from mental activity? Or from the 8th which involves total cessation of perception and feeling? 2. What kind of experience is “neither perception nor non-perception”? Is it a liminal state — and if so, how does one know they have entered it? Can a mind in this state be said to ‘experience’ anything at all? 3. In discussions with scholars from eternalist backgrounds, such as vedanta a common challenge raised is that the Buddhist teachings on the eight emancipations seem to imply the existence of a continuous or eternal subject since someone appears to be progressing through these subtle states of consciousness. If there is no eternal soul or self in Buddhism, then who is it that experiences and moves through these emancipations? How would a Buddhist respond to this objection? 4. What is the significance of being able to enter and exit these states at will, as emphasized in the sutta? 5. Is the progression through these states ultimately teaching that liberation is not something to be gained, but everything to be let go including perception, feeling, identity, and knowing?

What is the "meditation on emptiness" in MN 121 ? What does "emptiness" refer to in this sutta? Also, what does "oneness dependent on the perception of ..." mean in this sutta? > “Indeed, Ānanda, you properly heard, learned, attended, and remembered > that. Now, as before, I usually practice the meditation on emptiness. > > Consider this stilt longhouse of Migāra’s mother. It’s empty of > elephants, cows, horses, and mares; of gold and money; and of > gatherings of men and women. There is only this that is not emptiness, > namely, the oneness dependent on the mendicant Saṅgha. In the same > way, a mendicant—ignoring the perception of the village and the > perception of people—focuses on the oneness dependent on the > perception of wilderness. Their mind becomes eager, confident, > settled, and decided in that perception of wilderness. They > understand: ‘Here there is no stress due to the perception of village > or the perception of people. There is only this modicum of stress, > namely the oneness dependent on the perception of wilderness.’ They > understand: ‘This field of perception is empty of the perception of > the village. It is empty of the perception of people. There is only > this that is not emptiness, namely the oneness dependent on the > perception of wilderness.’ And so they regard it as empty of what is > not there, but as to what remains they understand that it is present. > That’s how emptiness is born in them—genuine, undistorted, and pure. > > ...... > > Whatever ascetics and brahmins enter and remain in the pure, ultimate, > supreme emptiness—whether in the past, future, or present—all of them > enter and remain in this same pure, ultimate, supreme emptiness. So, > Ānanda, you should train like this: ‘We will enter and remain in the > pure, ultimate, supreme emptiness.’ That’s how you should train.”

One word in Pali Canon seems to be especially challenging for translators to convey. This word is "*papañca*" (e.g. MN18 , DN21 , Sn 4.11 , AN4.173 ). Some attempts at translating *papañca* include "exaggeration", "proliferation ", "association ", "conceptualization ", "objectification ", and "reification ". What is *papañca* and what is it's significance in Buddhism? How is it used in Pali Canon and what is it's referent in real life? How is *papañca* (*prapañca* in Sanskrit) explained by Mahayana philosophers such as Nagarjuna, Asanga, and Tsongkhapa?

If I am not mistaken, Tenzen Gyatzo HHDL is translated by Tupten Jinpa in quoting ‘another Amado Master’ as stating “Emptiness does not mean the absence of functionality”. Meaning, that although the phenomenon we experience in our ordinary human existence does not have inherent existence, but evolves in and out of existence, because of many causes and conditions (dependent origination), that does not imply that the reality that we experience is not real in the human sense. This insight is fundamentally important in the liberation from suffering, and in this context, the attainment of the direct experiential knowledge of emptiness is facilitated by syllogistic reasoning. This post was stated as a question because I wanted to earn reputation points in order to respond to another question on the nature of emptiness.

A Mahayana-practising member wrote this comment : > With respect, the Theravada generally has a much more coarse > understanding of emptiness and anatta and is confused as to the object > of negation. In much the way that placing a bag of ice on a gushing > head wound has some efficacy, yet is utterly incapable of actually > curing the wound the Theravada understanding anatta doctrine is very > helpful, but insufficient to provide a genuine antidote to ignorance > and hence suffering ..... The Mahayana tenet systems ... > believe Theravada adherents are not ready to understand, > but will understand the selflessness of phenomena eventually as they > continue to progress on the path. I would like to understand the perspective of Mahayana Buddhists on why Theravada's anatta (and dependent origination) doctrine is "*insufficient to provide a genuine antidote to ignorance and hence suffering*" compared to Mahayana's sunyata (emptiness) doctrine?

Tsongkhapa and the Gelug school in general place great emphasis on the analysis of the emptiness of each thing. However, after this analysis, they also insist on having an "insight" into this object. It is, so to speak, like seeing "floaters" in my eyes and my doctor telling me that it is an ocular problem, not actual flies. I still have the experience of seeing flies, but I know that the object of this perception is an ocular condition. If I undergo surgery, this object is also confirmed subjectively, phenomenologically, and my experience aligns with the object. Something similar happens with the method Tsongkhapa proposes. What I want to know is: what kind of *act* does Tsongkhapa understand this to be? Is it a non-conceptual *perception*? Is it an *intuition*?

The Theory of "Emptiness" is the concept that all phenomenon are empty of inherent existence. Something has the illusion of existence when the right causes and conditions arise. Example: there is no inherently existing chicken soup. You only get chicken soup when you put together a dead chicken, hot water. Veggies etc. in this theory, you illusory sense of self comes from the right causes and conditions, parents, a body, a brain etc. following this logic, upon death, the self should simply cease to exist because that which made you a self has dissolved and since you do not inherently exist you should just vanish, and yet the Buddha is clear we take rebirth. This is illogical and makes no sense. Perhaps this is why the Buddha never taught a theory of emptiness. This idea is nowhere in the entire Pali Canon.

>the Aṣṭā­daśa­sāhasrikā­prajñā­pāramitā: > >Furthermore, Subhūti, you should know that a sentient being is nonexistent because a self is nonexistent. You should know that a living being, a creature, one who lives, an individual, a person, one born of Manu, a child of Manu, one who does, one who feels, one who knows, and one who sees is nonexistent because a sentient being is nonexistent. You should know that the very limit of reality is nonexistent because … one who knows and one who sees is nonexistent. You should know that space is nonexistent because the very limit of reality is nonexistent. You should know that the Great Vehicle is nonexistent because space is nonexistent. You should know that the infinite, the countless, and that which is beyond measure [F.201.b] are nonexistent because the Great Vehicle is nonexistent, and you should know that all dharmas are nonexistent because that which is beyond measure is nonexistent. Therefore, Subhūti, the Great Vehicle has room for infinite, countless beings beyond measure. And why? Subhūti, it is because a self, up to one who knows and one who sees, the very limit of reality, space, the Great Vehicle, the infinite, the countless, that which is beyond measure, up to all dharmas all cannot be apprehended. And why? Subhūti, bodhisattva great beings practicing the perfection of wisdom do not see form; do not see feeling, perception, volitional factors, or consciousness; do not see eyes; do not see ears, nose, tongue, body, or thinking mind; do not see a form, a sound, a smell, a taste, a feeling, or a dharma; do not see ignorance; do not see volitional factors, consciousness, name and form, the six sense fields, contact, feeling, craving, appropriation, existence, birth, or old age and death; do not see greed; do not see hatred or confusion; do not see a self; do not see a being, a living being, one who lives, an individual, a person, one born of Manu, a child of Manu, one who does, one who feels, one who knows, or one who sees; do not see the desire realm; do not see the form realm or formless realm; do not see śrāvakas and the śrāvaka dharmas; do not see pratyekabuddhas and the pratyekabuddha dharmas; do not see bodhisattvas and do not see bodhisattva dharmas; do not see buddhas [F.68.b] and do not see buddha dharmas; do not see awakening, up to do not see all dharmas. And while not seeing all dharmas they do not tremble, feel frightened, or become terrified.” My question is : Are all sentient beings non existent as the sutra claims ?

Can emptiness be understood as a conservation law? In other words, is it true that to posit a true end to any existent is to necessarily presuppose that it truly existed before it ended? Another way of saying it, to posit that with death and the break up of the body that a person truly ended is to presuppose that the person truly existed in the body beforehand? Doesn't viewing the true destruction of a chariot presuppose that the chariot truly existed in the first place? Doesn't viewing the true destruction of the body presuppose that the body truly existed in the first place? Can an illusion ever truly end? Or does illusion necessarily give birth to subsequent moments of new illusion? To my understanding a person is an impermanent ever changing phenomenon. That the person is like an illusion that continues from moment to moment in this life. If that is so, then how is death different? Doesn't supposing a true end for an illusion-like phenomenon necessarily imply that someone has mistaken the illusion for something real? Is this one consequence of the equation emptiness === form?

Believing that 'there is mother and father' is listed as right view affected by the taints.

“And what, bhikkhus, is right view that is affected by the taints, partaking of merit, ripening in the acquisitions? ‘There is what is given and what is offered and what is sacrificed; there is fruit and result of good and bad actions; there is this world and the other world; there is mother and father; there are beings who are reborn spontaneously; there are in the world good and virtuous recluses and brahmins who have realised for themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’ This is right view affected by taints, partaking of merit, ripening in the acquisitions. MN 117

1. To what extent does right view *not affected by the taints* deny that there is a mother and father?
2. What logic or analysis does right view *not affected by the taints* employ to deny this?
3. Are mother and father to be denied altogether?
4. Is there no such thing as mother and father for one who is awakened?

Can emptiness due to dependent origination be logically connected to the "vast emptiness" of Bodhidharma and Huineng?
A possible connection is that "vast emptiness" of space is the ultimate source of everything that happens into it, which is insignificant relative to its vast and empty support (container).
In this way emptiness is something vastly more substantial than the little substantialities we perceive as such using our ordinary mind, including seemingly grandiose ideas like the cyclical ever-recurring universe or the self-referential ability of the mind that results in the ego consciousness.
So is this the main point of dependent origination? That it ultimately leads to vast empty space as the source of everything?

Segments in a straight line have non-zero lengths but all of them have zero area i.e. they are "empty" when viewed as embedded in 2-dimensional plane. Similarly, all 2-dimensional shapes viewed as embedded in 3 dimensions appear as zero-volume entities, although in their own plane of 2 dimensions they do have intrinsic substance (area).
So my first question is: is this a valid analogy for the buddhist concept of "emptiness"? Naturally, the analogy can be continued to infinity: at each step, objects are "substantial" within their own plane but "empty" as regards the higher planes. This urges us to think that in infinite dimensions we have finally arrived at perfect substantiality, as no higher plane can exist to destroy it. But we can move further on, to spaces with uncountably infinite dimensions, where "orders of infinity" can indeed provide new dimensions to our enquiry, to a point where our human thinking begins to be at a loss as to what is going on...
So my second question is: has this extension to infinite dimensions caught the attention of buddhist philosophers?

It is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira:

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word ‘chariot’ is used, So, when the aggregates exist, There is the convention ‘a being.’ SN 5.10

However, in the Yamaka Sutta:

“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.” ... “But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life ...” SN 22.85

Yamaka denies the aggregates taken together as the Tathagata is real and actual. On the other hand, Vajira seems to be affirming that the aggregates taken together is a convention. The words in pali for this phrase of real and actual are *saccato thetato* and for convention the word is *sammuti.* When he performed an analysis - as the Buddha advised Yamaka to do - he tried to find the *saccato thetato* self, but came up empty. Does that mean that Vajira erred in naming 'a being' as a convention? Is this a true contradiction? Why did the Buddha advise Yamaka to try and find a self through analysis? Wasn't this leading Yamaka into a thicket of views? UPDATE: This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question (at least I do now and I'm not totally convinced I didn't have that idea already when I first opened it) so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

It is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira:

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word ‘chariot’ is used, So, when the aggregates exist, There is the convention ‘a being.’ SN 5.10

The pali translated as 'convention' is 'sammuti'. Looking at other places where the word 'sammuti' is used we can find numerous references in the theravada vinaya. Each of these translates the word 'sammuti' from pali to english as 'agreement' and not 'convention.' Is that all the conventional existence of 'a being' is - an agreement? Is 'a fist' an agreement? Is 'a lap' an agreement? Is 'the President of the United States' an agreement? Is 'rebirth' an agreement? It would seem some agreements are skillful and some are not. That is why the Buddha gave the vinaya, right? Do Noble Ones with Right View not understand agreements or somehow give up these agreements or do they just acknowledge that *all of these* are just agreements and not real and actual? It would seem to me that Noble Ones with Right View see that 'mother and father' is just an agreement to the same extent as 'this world' and 'the next world.' Right View does not utterly deny any of these; it simply acknowledges them for what they are and no more: useful agreements. UPDATE: This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

The setup ...

Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena. AN 3.47

Together with ...

Why is that? Transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. For such a long time you have undergone suffering, agony, and disaster, swelling the cemeteries. This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions. SN 15.1

Along with the assumption that "transmigration" or "samsara" is a conditioned phenomena ... Would seem to give rise to a contradiction. On the one hand, the Buddha said quite unambiguously that conditioned phenomena have a beginning, middle and an end, but on the other hand the Buddha said that "transmigration" or "samsara" has no known beginning. Questions:

1. Do you agree this is an apparent contradiction?
2. Do you think this is a real contradiction?
3. If it is apparent but not real, then how would you resolve it?

I would say, "yes, no, and it is complicated" but I'm curious to know how others resolve it. Related but distinct questions. UPDATE: This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

This question concerns the proper understanding of AN 3.47:

“Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena.” AN 3.47

It might have been suggested in other questions that this sutta is referring only to non-composite sankharas. That is, for composite phenomena - like a chariot - that arising, ceasing, and enduring are not evident. Is this correct? Can the arising, enduring and ceasing of a chariot not be known because it is composite or made up of parts? If so, what would be a good example of a non-composite sankhara that this sutta *would* be applicable to? What non-composite conditioned phenomena can rightfully be said to arise, endure and cease? Does anyone have an example?

In *Beacon of Certainty* (tr. Pettit), Mipham Rinpoche addresses key questions about how to practice based on Madhyamaka philosophy. The first question has to do with distinguishing absolute negation from implicative negation. - An affirming negative (or “implicative negation”) “expresses the absence of one predicate while implying some other.” (Pettit 109) In short, this is not a good way to conceive how *appearances* are empty of any true and inherent existence: because the implied *object* has to somehow stand apart and have some kind of inherent existence that is immune from further analysis. - A non-affirming negative (or “absolute negation”) “simply excludes something, without implying anything else.” (Pettit 109) This is a much more fruitful stance because it does not hold some kind of appearance as standing separate from emptiness; and therefore it can serve as a conceptual segue to meditative experience of the coalescence of emptiness and appearance. I think this distinction is a very powerful tool in overcoming the tendency to take appearances as concrete realities that somehow have emptiness within them; and to understand how appearance and emptiness coalesce. Is there a similar distinction within Theravadin buddhism? It seems like this would be a useful distinction when exploring the 3 Dharma seals, particularly that of not-self *(sabbe dhammā anattā*). But I've never encountered such an analysis when reading in the Pali Canon or Theravadin commentaries.